Developing countries are growing apart on environmental issues. International environ- mental negotiations are no longer characterized merely by the North–South conflict. Rising powers have come to... Show moreDeveloping countries are growing apart on environmental issues. International environ- mental negotiations are no longer characterized merely by the North–South conflict. Rising powers have come to divide the Global South and redefine the Common-But- Differentiated Responsibilities principle. This article explains the divergence of China and India at the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, one of the first global envi- ronmental agreements to differentiate obligations between developing countries. China and India, the world’s two largest hydrofluorocarbon producers, ended decades of collaboration and split the rest of the developing world behind them. I argue that devel- opmental strategy and political institutions shape the preferences and influences of industrial, governmental, and social stakeholders, thereby explaining their negotiation behavior and outcome. This article explains why China moved faster and further than India on negotiations for hydrofluorocarbon regulation. It has important implications for the two rising powers’ implementation of the Kigali Amendment and for their posi- tion formulations on other environmental issues. Show less
If fiscal decentralization promotes growth, why do some regions decentralize more than others? This article identifies the growing divergence of fiscal centralization among Chinese cities and... Show moreIf fiscal decentralization promotes growth, why do some regions decentralize more than others? This article identifies the growing divergence of fiscal centralization among Chinese cities and explains it in a public finance framework. It argues that fiscal decentralization and its economy-liberalizing effect entail significant short-term fiscal risk. The more a locality relies on uncompetitive business ownership for fiscal revenue, the less likely fiscal decentralization is to occur. This article compiles a dataset of 20 provincial capitals between 1999 and 2016 to test for the connection between a city’s tax base and its fiscal centralization level. It then pairs two “most similar” cities to trace how fiscal security concerns drove their fiscal and economic policies apart. This article adds a micro-level perspective to the literature on fiscal federalism. By pointing out the fiscal constraints confronting local governments, it offers a new angle to understand the different growth paths of Chinese cities. Show less
