The return of strongmen politics, exemplified by Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, has raised questions about societal influence on authoritarian regimes' foreign policies. Despite authoritarian rule... Show moreThe return of strongmen politics, exemplified by Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, has raised questions about societal influence on authoritarian regimes' foreign policies. Despite authoritarian rule tightening, vibrant debates on foreign policy persist in China. Scholars have pinpointed actors capable of influencing China's foreign policy and identified channels for exerting this influence. However, conditions under which Chinese societal actors impact foreign policy remain unclear. This dissertation investigates the influence of experts from Chinese foreign policy think tanks and International Relations scholars. Analyzing 100 official foreign policy statements, 500 think tank reports, and around 2000 academic articles using frame analysis and quantitative content analysis, I found no perfect transmission between official and societal constructs of China's national interest. This necessitates considering the impact of domestic structures. I argue that societal actors' proximity to the state and the state's openness to societal input facilitate or constrain their influence on the official construction of the national interest. My examination of political institutions and state-society relations changes under Xi Jinping reveals shifts in the state's receptivity to societal input, differing for think tanks and scholars. Additionally, I introduce a new measure of think tanks' and scholars' proximity to the state, providing fresh insights for reevaluating societal actors' impact on authoritarian regime foreign policies. Show less
Under conditions of guerrilla conflict, mass indiscriminate violence has been shown to effectively starve a guerrilla of its support. Consequently, counter-guerrilla mass violence is concentrated... Show moreUnder conditions of guerrilla conflict, mass indiscriminate violence has been shown to effectively starve a guerrilla of its support. Consequently, counter-guerrilla mass violence is concentrated within territories where a guerrilla is dominant. However, in roughly 40% of mass violence episodes (e.g., Rwanda and Cambodia), the violence was aimed at populations within areas of secure territorial control. These episodes have therefore been explained by attributing high-risk ideological preferences to leaders or as unique cases only. I argue that leaders under conditions of heightened elite rivalry, adopt mass indiscriminate violence against outgroup civilians to consolidate power. The violence serves two main goals. First, it helps build coalitions with constituencies that gain from violence. Second, it targets rival factions indirectly by undermining the formal monopoly of violence and forcing local security officials to facilitate or oppose the violence. The violence thereby provides rival supporters with an exit option, provides the regime with information on rival supporters’ private loyalties, and undermines rivals’ abilities to mount an effective resistance. These rivals can ultimately be purged from the regime. Based on newly collected original data on elite purges and on the type of mass indiscriminate violence for the years 1950-2004, I show that this type of mass violence, which I call ‘genocidal consolidation,’ is intimately connected to authoritarian consolidation. Show less
