While it has long been assumed that smaller communities are more prone to particularistic politics, the relationship between state size and clientelism remains strongly undertheorized. Departing... Show moreWhile it has long been assumed that smaller communities are more prone to particularistic politics, the relationship between state size and clientelism remains strongly undertheorized. Departing from the assumption that face-to-face contacts, overlapping role relations, stronger monitoring mechanisms, and the enhanced power of single votes contribute to the emergence of patron–client linkages, this article provides an in-depth case study of clientelism in Malta, the smallest member state of the European Union. The analysis reveals not only that patron–client linkages are a ubiquitous feature of political life in Malta, but also that the smallness of Malta strongly affects the functioning of clientelism by eliminating the need for brokers and enhancing the power of clients versus patrons. In addition, clientelism is found to be related to several other characteristics of Maltese politics, among which the sharp polarization between parties, extremely high turnout rates, profound executive dominance, and the incidence of corruption scandals. Show less
In this article, we examine the foreign policy implications of different types of investment flows. North–South investment is more sensitive to political risks (expropriation, default, civil war)... Show moreIn this article, we examine the foreign policy implications of different types of investment flows. North–South investment is more sensitive to political risks (expropriation, default, civil war) than North–North investment. We argue that North–South investment flows create a constituency within the US financial sector that is likely to support stabilising intervention – military intervention aimed at reducing political risk abroad. Examining political action committee donations from Fortune 500 financial firms with a cross-sectional Tobit model, we find that US financial firms with greater exposure to the Global South are likely to favour congressional candidates with a record of voting for intervention in developing countries. This study contributes to the literature on economic interdependence and peace, proposes an original method for capturing the revealed preferences of political actors, and enhances our understanding of the sectoral underpinnings of foreign policy-making. Show less
This article analyses how populist parties wage opposition in parliament. We conceptualise opposition behaviour in terms of two independent dimensions: scrutiny (monitoring and criticising... Show moreThis article analyses how populist parties wage opposition in parliament. We conceptualise opposition behaviour in terms of two independent dimensions: scrutiny (monitoring and criticising government actions) and policy-making (participating in or directly influencing legislative production). In line with the conceptualisation of populism as an opposition to the ruling elite in name of ‘the people’, our hypothesis is that populist opposition parties are more likely to use scrutiny and less likely to use policy-making tools than non-populist opposition parties. We study the Netherlands between 1998 and 2017 as a typical example of a consensus democracy, where populist parties have a greater opportunity to win representation and use parliamentary tools (compared to majoritarian democracies). Our findings indicate that populist opposition parties are particularly less likely to engage in policy-making behaviour and somewhat more likely to engage in scrutiny behaviour. Show less
District magnitude and list type shape the incentives for politicians to develop a personal vote. If voters also react to these strategies, their knowledge about candidates should be influenced by... Show moreDistrict magnitude and list type shape the incentives for politicians to develop a personal vote. If voters also react to these strategies, their knowledge about candidates should be influenced by these features of the electoral system. This article directly tests the responsiveness of voters by employing individual-level survey data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. As district magnitude increases, more people remember at least one candidate in closed list systems, but there is no such effect in open list systems. These influences are also larger for non-voters than for voters. A measure of political contact is not affected in this way. The differential effect of district magnitude can be explained by a different campaign focus. Show less
Berkhout, J.; Beyers, J.; Braun, C.; Hanegraaff, M.; Lowery, D. 2017
Scholars of mobilisation and policy influence employ two quite different approaches to mapping interest group systems. Those interested in research questions on mobilisation typically rely on a... Show moreScholars of mobilisation and policy influence employ two quite different approaches to mapping interest group systems. Those interested in research questions on mobilisation typically rely on a bottom-up mapping strategy in order to characterise the total size and composition of interest group communities. Researchers with an interest in policy influence usually rely on a top-down strategy in which the mapping of politically active organisations depends on samples of specific policies. But some scholars also use top-down data gathered for other research questions on mobilisation (and vice versa). However, it is currently unclear how valid such large-N data for different types of research questions are. We illustrate our argument by addressing these questions using unique data sets drawn from the INTEREURO project on lobbying in the European Union and the European Union’s Transparency Register. Our findings suggest that top-down and bottom-up mapping strategies lead to profoundly different maps of interest group communities. Show less
