Interest groups cannot advocate on every issue they might consider relevant. They must decide what issues to prioritise and which ones to leave to one side. In this article, we examine how groups... Show moreInterest groups cannot advocate on every issue they might consider relevant. They must decide what issues to prioritise and which ones to leave to one side. In this article, we examine how groups seek to balance different internal and external considerations when prioritizing issues, and which factors might explain variation in the relative strength of these drivers. We integrate data of a survey of national interest groups in Australia with findings from interviews with a cross section of high-profile groups. While the literature often suggests a clash between external political considerations and internal membership demands, we find that groups view these drivers as largely compatible. Our explanatory analysis points to the policy orientation and insider status of the group, its democratic character, and the extent to which it faces competition for membership contributions, as important factors shaping the relative strength of distinct drivers of internal agenda setting. Show less
Governments are increasingly facilitating the roll-out of so-called “smart metres,” a technology for measuring energy consumption and able to transmit and receive data using a form of electronic... Show moreGovernments are increasingly facilitating the roll-out of so-called “smart metres,” a technology for measuring energy consumption and able to transmit and receive data using a form of electronic communication. However, implementation has been slow or even stalled. To identify some of the causes for this, the policy coordination perspective serves as a lens to unravel the different elements involved in smart meter implementation. The research adds the demand and supply dimension to account for market dynamics and public engagement challenges in the process. A case study of the UK finds that government efforts are challenged by the timely and coherent coordination of diverse stakeholders and regulatory measures. Show less
Bondarouk, E.; Liefferink, D.; Mastenbroek, E. 2019
As far as local governments are responsible for the practical implementation of many European Union (EU) policies, they co-determine member states’ EU compliance records and the fate of EU... Show moreAs far as local governments are responsible for the practical implementation of many European Union (EU) policies, they co-determine member states’ EU compliance records and the fate of EU legislation. Yet, they do so in remarkably different ways, as exemplified by the variegated implementation of the Ambient Air Quality Directive 2008/50/EC by Dutch municipalities. Taking guidance from the literature on EU compliance, in this article we explain the differences in local implementation performance based on the political and managerial approaches. Understanding which of the two approaches drives different local responses to EU policy bears consequences for the appropriate remedy for non implementation. Four municipalities were purposefully selected along with the two-by-two implementation performance scoring matrix in the realm of air quality. A comparative within-case analysis specifies how political explanations outweigh managerial explanations in accounting for variation in implementation performance and distils ‘policy saliency’ as the driving causal mechanism. Show less
Does party government moderate the responsiveness of public policy to public opinion? Analysing a new dataset, we examine whether the ability of governments to respond to the public on 306 specific... Show moreDoes party government moderate the responsiveness of public policy to public opinion? Analysing a new dataset, we examine whether the ability of governments to respond to the public on 306 specific policy issues in Denmark, Germany and the UK is affected by the extent of coalition conflict and by the fit of the considered policy changes with the government preferences. We find a systematic but relatively weak positive impact of public support on the likelihood and speed of policy change. Contrary to expectations, a higher number of coalition partners are not associated with fewer policy changes nor with weaker responsiveness to public opinion. We also find no evidence that responsiveness to public opinion is necessarily weaker for policy changes that go against the preferences of the government. Rather, it appears that public and government support for policy change are substitute resources. Show less
