This article analyses the United Kingdom’s (UK) ‘trade continuity programme’. The promise that, once outside the European Union (EU), the UK would strike new, lucrative trade deals continues to be... Show moreThis article analyses the United Kingdom’s (UK) ‘trade continuity programme’. The promise that, once outside the European Union (EU), the UK would strike new, lucrative trade deals continues to be an important part of the Brexiteers’ narrative. What the UK was compelled to do first, however, was to conclude ‘roll-over’ agreements to replace the trade agreements already made by the EU. This article posits that, contrary to expectations, the UK’s continuity programme should be regarded as a success – for both the UK and the EU. In most cases, the UK managed to replicate to a very large extent the terms originally granted to the EU, despite being a smaller market and despite challenging circumstances. From the EU’s perspective, the UK’s continuity programme can be regarded as a case of successful norm internalization and export. This first chapter of post-Brexit UK trade policy shows that even a country that has left the EU still legally commits itself and its partners to the EU’s norms and values. Hence, the EU should welcome the UK’s imitation as a shared normative basis to expand cooperation with its former member state in a challenging geopolitical environment. Show less
In 2011, the European Union (EU) concluded the first of a ‘new generation’ of free trade agreements that contained a separate chapter with obligations relating to ‘trade and sustainable development... Show moreIn 2011, the European Union (EU) concluded the first of a ‘new generation’ of free trade agreements that contained a separate chapter with obligations relating to ‘trade and sustainable development’ (TSD) issues. This was the Free Trade Agreement with the Republic of Korea. The EU formally initiated its first TSD complaint, under this agreement, in 2018. This labour complaint came after a non-paper of the European Commission promised ‘more assertive’ use of the soft dispute mechanism for TSD obligations, following years of pressure by various stakeholders. This non-paper remained apologetic about hard sanctions but promised a review in 2023. This article aims to study to what extent the EU delivered upon its promise to use the soft dispute mechanism more assertively during its first TSD proceedings. It finds that the EU was not prepared to act assertively in relation to certain issues (collective bargaining and the right to strike) and certain workers (in the public and export sectors) during the proceedings before the ad hoc Panel of Experts, which ended in 2021. It argues, in particular, that the EU missed a major opportunity to use its bargaining leverage vis-à-vis Korean consumer conglomerates. Show less