Nowadays, urban-rural connections are accelerating in sub-Saharan Africa resulting in agricultural transformations, which in turn lead to the transformation of rural livelihoods. This paper... Show moreNowadays, urban-rural connections are accelerating in sub-Saharan Africa resulting in agricultural transformations, which in turn lead to the transformation of rural livelihoods. This paper examines agricultural transformations in the Dodoma Region, Tanzania, and their impact on local rural livelihoods. Triggered by transportation development and rising demand for agricultural produce on the national and international level, the transformation of rural livelihoods on the village level entails: the application of more advanced methods and organisation of agricultural production; the increased use wage-labour; considerably higher agricultural revenues; a distinct rise of livelihoods partly or exclusively based on small-scale industry, petty trade and other businesses; and a distinctively higher level of incomes and consumption. Show less
Summary: Global media discussion and policy responses to the armed conflict in Tigray Region, Ethiopia, that started op 4 November 2020 by the TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front) party-led... Show moreSummary: Global media discussion and policy responses to the armed conflict in Tigray Region, Ethiopia, that started op 4 November 2020 by the TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front) party-led Tigray Regional government, are marked by bias, incompleteness, lack of context understanding, credulity and an anti-federal goverment attitude. The conflict, provoked by an unannounced and treacherous nightly attack by TPLF forces on federal army troups stationed in Tigray to protect the Region, was the result of misplaced power-mongering by the TPLF, and its building up of tension with the federal Ethiopian goverment. The 4 November attack led to a major federal army response. Five days after the attack by TPLF, on 9 November 2021, over 800 Amharic-speaking civilian inhabitants of the town of Mai Kadra in Western Tigray were killed by TPLF-affiliated forces and militias in a gruesome manner – a classic case of ‘ethnic cleansing’. Perpetrators mostly fled to Sudanese refugee camps. These two events - the 4 November attack and the ‘ethnic cleansing’ - were defining dramatic moments in the war. While the conflict unfolded, leading to defeat of the TPLF forces on 28 November 2020 with the taking over of the regional capital Meqele and the flight of the TPLF leadership, many leading Western media and news websites focused on the aftermath and the effects of the fighting in Tigray Region and its population, easily shifting sympathy twards the perceived ‘underdog’ (TPLF). This was followed by hastily written statements by foreign policy makers in EU, USA and UN circles, leading to an emerging policy narrative whereby essential details of the context, the nature of the adversaries, the reasons of the conflict were sidelined. These Atlantic community spokespersons shifted to ‘blaming’ the federal Ethiopian government and ‘demanding’ all kinds of measures from it. Notable was the international community clamouring for ‘unlimited and full access’ for humanitarian aid to ‘prevent famine’, and demand a halt to all hostilities. But meanwhile it did not deliver much aid itself and did as if making it conditional on the federal government following their orders. Part of the international media, several academic associates and researchers who saw acces to their research sites blocked, and diverse TPLF associates in various international organizations continued to fuel the flames of this approach, next to the ‘digital activism’and the production of fake news reports by pro-TPLF persons in Ethiopa and especially in the Tigrayan ‘diaspora’ in the West.All this led to serious misperceptions and unfair bias on the part of the Atlantic countries and the UN vis-à-vis Ethiopia, which endangered integrity, balance, and a proper perspective on causes and consequences, as well as to policies that seemed akin to ‘development aid blackmail’ and sanctimonious lecturing of a fragile, low-income African developing country. In the exercise, the detailed press statements, reports and explanations by Ethiopian parties, including the government and reformist Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, are routinely neglected or doubted. In contrast, the statements and international messages by TPLF remnants and advocates, marked by a high degree of unreliability, exaggeration and very often lacking truth content, are used uncritically. On the basis of a number of telling examples, this paper describes the above process, analyses the emerging Atlantic discourse and some of its mistakes and wrong assumptions. It thereby pleads for a more balanced, critical approach to the incomplete reporting and wilfull misinformation from questionable sources so as to have the media and Atlantic policy makers develop a more responsible approach.Résumé: parti TPLF (Tigray Peoples Liberation Front), sont marquées par des préjugés, des incomplétudes, un manque de compréhension du contexte, la crédulité et une attitude contre le gouvernement fédéral. Le conflit, provoqué par une attaque nocturne inopinée et perfide par les forces tigréennes contre les troupes de l'armée fédérale stationnées au Tigré pour protéger la région, était le résultat d'une politique de la force mal jugée par le TPLF et sa montée des tensions avec le gouvernement fédéral éthiopien. L'attaque du 4 novembre a évoquée à une réponse directe de l'armée fédérale. Cinq jours après l'attaque du TPLF, plus de 800 habitants civils de langue amharique de la ville de Mai Kadra dans le Tigray occidental ont été tués, le 9 novembre 2021, par des forces et des milices affiliées au TPLF d'une manière horrible - un cas classique de «nettoyage ethnique», et les auteurs ont pour la plupart fui vers les camps de réfugiés soudanais. Ces deux événements - l’attaque du 4 novembre et ce «nettoyage ethnique» - étaient des moments dramatiques cruciales de la guerre. Alors que le conflit se déroulait, conduisant à la défaite des forces du TPLF le 28 novembre 2020 avec la prise de contrôle de la capitale régionale Meqele et la fuite des dirigeants du TPL, de nombreux médias et sites Internet occidentaux de premier plan se sont concentrés sur les conséquences et les effets des combats dans la région du Tigray et sa population, la sympathie se déplaçant facilement vers le «perdant» perçu (TPLF). Cela a été suivi par des déclarations écrites à la hâte par des décideurs politiques étrangers aux cercles de l'UE, des États-Unis et de l'ONU, menant à un récit politique émergent dans lequel les détails essentiels du contexte, de la nature des adversaires et des raisons du conflit ont été mis de côté. Ces portes-parole de la communauté atlantique sont passés à toujours «blâmer» le gouvernement fédéral éthiopien et à «exiger» toutes sortes de mesures de sa part. Il convient de noter que la communauté internationale toujours réclamait un «accès illimité et complet pour l’aide humanitaire» pour «prévenir la famine» et exigeait «‘l’arrêt de toutes les hostilités, mais entre-temps, elle n'a pas fourni beaucoup d'aide et semble la conditionner à ce que le gouvernement fédéral suive ses ordres. Une partie de la presse mondiale, plusieurs universitaires qui ont vu l'accès à leurs sites de recherche bloqué, et divers associés du TPLF dans diverses organisations internationales ont continué à alimenter les flammes de cette approche, à côté de «l'activisme digitale» et de la production de «fake news» et rapports douteux de personnes pro-TPLF en Ethiopie et en particulier dans la «diaspora» tigréenne en Occident. Tout cela a conduit à de graves perceptions erronées et à des préjugés injustes de la part des pays atlantiques et de l'ONU vis-à-vis de l'Éthiopie qui ont mis en danger l'intégrité, l'équilibre et une bonne perspective des causes et des conséquences, ainsi qu’a des politiques qui semblent s'apparenter à une approche sur base de «development aid blackmail» et des discours moralisateurs envers un pays africain pauvre et en développement fragile. Dans l'exercice, les déclarations de presse détaillées et les explications de la part de l’Éthiopie, y compris le gouvernement et le Premier Ministre réformiste Abiy Ahmed, sont régulièrement négligés ou mis en doute. En revanche, les déclarations et les messages internationaux des défenseurs du TPLF, marqués par un degré élevé de manque de fiabilité, d'exagération et souvent dépourvus de contenu véridique, sont utilisés sans critique. Sur la base d'un certain nombre d'exemples révélateurs, cet article décrit le processus ci-dessus et analyse le discours atlantique émergent et certaines de ses erreurs et hypothèses erronées. Il plaide ainsi pour une approche plus équilibrée et critique du reportage incomplet et de la désinformation afin que les médias et la politique atlantique développent une politique plus responsable. Show less
This paper offers a political analysis of the development of the TPLF-induced armed conflict in northern Ethiopia and considers the international responses in media and international policy circles... Show moreThis paper offers a political analysis of the development of the TPLF-induced armed conflict in northern Ethiopia and considers the international responses in media and international policy circles. The extension of the conflict by the TPLF after the unilateral ceasefire proclaimed by the federal government on 28 June 2021 (followed by its retreat from Tigray) did not lead to an easing of the fighting. On the contrary, the TPLF used scorched-earth tactics, perpetrated substantial abuse of civilians (mass killings, burning down villages, destroying and looting hospitals, health centres and other economic infrastructure), and created food scarcity, hundreds of thousands of IDPs and hugely aggravated humanitarian problems in the Amhara and Afar regions. In spite of this unilateral TPLF extension of the armed conflict, the responses of international policy circles, notably from the Western ‘donor countries’ and the UN, have been negative towards the federal government and mild on the TPLF.This paper explores aspects of this paradoxical and problematic approach and argues that it will not lead to a political or other solution of the conflict, especially not in view of the undiminished belligerent strategy of the TPLF. The Ethiopian federal government and its leader PM Abiy Ahmed, having been confirmed in power after a relatively successful and credible parliamentary election on 21 June 2021, are pressurized by much of the global media and Western policy makers for the problems in Tigray – including the ‘famine’ declared by TPLF - and urged to negotiate. The TPLF, incorrectly identified with the people of Tigray as a whole, is not held to account. But an overbearing Western approach based on the threat of sanctions (by the US government) and on what often seem ‘neo-imperialist’ demands, as evident from serious interference in the conflict - even by a number of UN individuals (expelled from the country on 30 September 2021) - will not contribute to political negotiations or dialogue, restoration of peace, or rehabilitation of the war-torn regions, neither to stability in Ethiopia. Not only improved media reporting, based on solid local (Ethiopian) information and checking sources, but also a fundamental reset of certain UN and Western donor country policies on Ethiopia, are needed.RésuméCette étude propose une analyse politique du développement du conflit armé induit par les TPLF dans le nord de l'Éthiopie et examine les réponses internationales dans les médias et les cercles politiques internationaux. L'extension du conflit par le TPLF après le cessez-le-feu unilatéral proclamé par le gouvernement fédéral le 28 juin 2021 (suivi de son retrait du Tigré) n'a pas conduit à un apaisement des combats ; au contraire. Les tactiques de la terre brûlée, les abus sérieux contre les civils (meurtres en masse, incendies de villages, pillage et destruction des hôpitaux et autres infrastructures économiques), la pénurie alimentaire, des centaines de milliers de déplacés internes et des problèmes humanitaires extrêmement aggravés dans les régions d'Amhara et d'Afar en ont été le résultat. Malgré cette extension unilatérale du conflit par le TPLF, les réponses des cercles politiques internationaux, notamment des pays « bailleurs-de-fonds » occidentaux et de l'ONU, ont été négatives envers le gouvernement fédéral mais modérées envers le TPLF. Show less
This document presents the preliminary findings from the quantitative data generation and analysis conducted as part of the project “Financial decision-making, gender and social norms in Zambia”.... Show moreThis document presents the preliminary findings from the quantitative data generation and analysis conducted as part of the project “Financial decision-making, gender and social norms in Zambia”. Using a series of specially designed behavioural experiments, we generated an extensive set of insights into the normative environment within which spouses in Eastern Province, Zambia, make decisions about individual money holding and saving. Here are some of those insights. Spouses in Eastern Province, Zambia, are willing to compromise household-level earnings in order to maintain individual control over money. Wives, but not husbands, are more likely to compromise household-level earnings in order to maintain individual control over money, when they can keep that money and their actions hidden from their spouses. Individually-held behavioural prescriptions, i.e., the “shoulds” and “oughts” that individuals have in mind and reference as guides for their own behaviour and as benchmarks against which to evaluate others’ behaviour, inform decision-making about maintaining individual control over money at a cost to the household. Further, when individuals know that their spouses will find out about their descisions regarding maintaining individual control over money (or not) at a cost to the household, the individuals take their spouses’ opinions about what they should do into account, i.e., they compromise. There is strong but not unequivocal evidence pointing to the existence of a social norm, i.e., a “should” or “ought” that is collectively held and enforced by members of a community, forbidding saving in secret from one’s spouse, with the secrecy not the saving being the problem. Assuming it exists, this social norm forbidding saving in secret from one’s spouse applies to both husbands and wives, and this is acknowledged by both husbands and wives. However, the extent to which violations of this norm are tolerated depends on who is doing the violating and who the evaluating. In patrilineal communities (as compared to matrilineal communities), both husbands and wives are especially intolerant of secret saving by husbands and in both patrilineal and matrilineal communities, wives are less tolerant than husbands of secret saving by husbands and more tolerant than husbands of secret saving by wives. This relative tolerance of secret saving by wives notwithstanding, just under one in three wives and one in six husbands think that a man is justified in beating his wife if he discovers that she is saving in an e-wallet or has joined a savings group without his knowledge and, as grounds for wife beating, saving in secret is on a par with neglecting the children, visiting friends or family in secret and refusing to have sex. For further insights, see the main text of the report. Show less
[Abstract in English]. This article investigates the possibility of long-term causation in the political history of the Central African Republic. It does so by looking at the biography of... Show more[Abstract in English]. This article investigates the possibility of long-term causation in the political history of the Central African Republic. It does so by looking at the biography of Barthélémy Boganda (1910-1959). It argues that the upheavals of European colonisation at the beginning of the twentieth century – as experienced by Boganda as a child – exercised an enduring influence on his persona and remained relevant for his life and work throughout the later part of the colonial era. Second, the article investigates the persistent relevance of cultural repertoires as ingrained in the religious cosmologies in the region in pre-colonial times for the nature of Boganda’s political leadership. It argues that his charisma was articulated through the behavioural repertoires of the trickster archetype, as described in the pedagogical warnings of pre-colonial regional cosmologies. This betrays the continued relevance of pre-colonial notions of political legitimacy as marked by folly, which is an essential element in the trickster figure. While warning against essentialist interpretations of Central African culture, the article concludes that research into political anthropology could reveal how styles of political deportment among Central African leaders (from politicians to warlords) are possibly fed by older (unhelpfully called ‘pre-colonial’) notions of cunning and brutality, which undergird deeper representations of violence and power.[Abstract in French]. Cet article examine la possibilité de causalités de longue durée dans l’histoire politique de la République centrafricaine. Il s’y attèle à travers une étude biographique de Barthélémy Boganda (1910-1959). Il soutient que les bouleversements induits par la colonisation européenne au début du XXe siècle – tels que vécus par Boganda enfant – ont exercé une influence durable sur sa personnalité et ont continué à avoir un impact sur sa vie et son travail tout au long des dernières années de l’époque coloniale. L’article examine également le fait que les répertoires culturels enracinés dans les cosmologies religieuses de la région depuis l’époque précoloniale sont restés pertinents pour la nature du leadership politique de Boganda. Il soutient que son charisme s’exprimait à travers des répertoires de comportement liés à l’archétype du décepteur ou fripon, tels que décrits dans les admonitions pédagogiques des cosmologies régionales précoloniales. De ce fait, on constate que les notions précoloniales de légitimité politique marquées par la folie, qui sont un élément central de la figure du décepteur, sont restées d’actualité. Tout en mettant en garde contre toute interprétation essentialiste des cultures centrafricaines, l’article conclut que les recherches sur l’anthropologie politique peuvent mettre au jour la manières dont les modes de conduite politique observables chez les leaders centrafricains (des politiciens aux chefs de guerre) pourraient être nourris par des notions anciennes (qualifiées de façon peu idoine de « précoloniales ») de ruse et de brutalité, qui sous-tendent des représentations plus profondes de violence et de pouvoir. Show less
Kamau, P.; Kinyanjui, B.; Akinyoade, A.; Mukoko, C. 2018
This paper documents and assesses productive employment policies in Kenya. The main objective being to reflect on the current state of affairs, identify constraints and gaps among these policies.... Show moreThis paper documents and assesses productive employment policies in Kenya. The main objective being to reflect on the current state of affairs, identify constraints and gaps among these policies. The paper is mainly based on desk-top research which reviews available literature and policy papers on employment in Kenya since independence in 1963 in order to determine how these policies have impacted on productive employment in Kenya.The paper argues that the primary challenge in the labor market in Kenya is not unemployment per se but rather lack of productive employment and decent work among the poor population given that most of the population works in the informal sector. This population working in the informal sector tends to be vulnerable and has low productivity and low earnings, which effectively undermine the efforts for inclusive and sustainable growth. We use the framework related to productive employment to document and analyze different policies. While employment creation has been central in all government policies, the focus has largely been on increasing the number as opposed to the quality of employment creation. It is for this reason the informal economy has remained the main contributor of employment opportunities. Apparently jobs in the informal sector tend to be largely casual, temporary, low wage, and without effective job security.The Agriculture and Manufacturing sectors have potential for creating employment but again the nature of jobs in these two sectors remain largely casual which compromises on productive employment. To promote productive employment, these sectors require increased funding and establishment of stakeholders’ consultative forums. There is also the need to attract FDI most of which come with better terms of employment compared to indigenous investments. Show less
Kazimierczuk, A.H.; Kamau, P.; Kinuthia, B.K.; Mukoko, C. 2018
The flower sector in Kenya accounted for over 65 per cent of new jobs created in the agricultural sector between 2010 and 2015 and remains a major employer in the country. The floriculture value... Show moreThe flower sector in Kenya accounted for over 65 per cent of new jobs created in the agricultural sector between 2010 and 2015 and remains a major employer in the country. The floriculture value chain involves a variety of players involved in activities, such as plant development and growing, providing necessary inputs, transport and handling – each of them generating a part of the direct or indirect employment. The quality of this employment is, however, less clear.In 1978, the flowers’ export volume was 3,000 tons. Since then, the sector has grown by an average of 16 per cent per year in terms of volume and 25 per cent in terms of value of production. Foreign investors and partners played a critical role in launching and expanding the floriculture industry in Kenya. Dutch companies started flower export businesses, and Dutch and Israeli advisors have been important sources of technical support. Initially, large and medium flower farms were mostly owned by foreigners, Kenyans of foreign descent or members of the Kenyan (political) elite. Kenyan smallholders were also involved in flower growing at that stage. In 2016, approximately 190 flower farms and 5,000 smallholder farmers were involved in the flower production. Today, flower growing is done predominantly by Kenyan-owned farms, while Dutch companies dominate the breeding and propagation activities. Growers provide the highest employment opportunities in the entire chain, predominantly for women, due to the labour intensive character of their operations. Breeders, propagators and other companies in the chain hire less people directly but create important indirect employment in the sector.The support of the Kenyan government in promoting the floriculture sector was mixed through the years and was not the decisive factor in the sector development. The success of the industry is, to an extent, a result of the capacity of the private sector to develop independently from the state and the capacity to quickly adapt to changing circumstances. Following the rapid development of the sector in the mid-1990s, flower companies have been criticized for poor labour standards and a number of other abusive practices. In response to this criticism, the companies have adapted a range of international and national social and environmental standards that should lead to improved labour conditions.This working paper’s primary objective is to assess to the extent to which the flower sector and the jobs created have been sustainable, inclusive and productive; and whether there are any differences between practices and quality of employment created by the international players, particularly Dutch companies in comparison to the non-Dutch counterparts. The secondary objective is to assess and understand what are the main challenges for the companies in the flower sector to create and maintain (productive) employment, as well as other pitfalls in their day-to-day operations. For this purpose, a mixed methods approach to data collection was implemented, including a sector-wide standardized questionnaire, case studies and a number of key informant interviews. This report concludes with a set of policy recommendations targeting the Kenyan government and the international community. Show less
Conflicts are multi causal and remain an inevitable part of human existence, and Africa like other parts of the world has had to grapple with the phenomenon. The Northern Region of Ghana has over... Show moreConflicts are multi causal and remain an inevitable part of human existence, and Africa like other parts of the world has had to grapple with the phenomenon. The Northern Region of Ghana has over the years been a hotbed of conflicts as several communities have gained notoriety for frequent violent disturbances. Though the “North” is not the only place of simmering tensions and conflicts since colonial times, the violent nature and intractability of some conflicts which often make the headlines for obviously “bad” reasons leaves much to be desired This paper examines Northern Ghana’s intractable conflicts many of which have partisan and political undertones, and have served as fodder to exacerbate; chieftaincy succession conflicts, land and boundary disputes, and others that may arise from competing group interests. More importantly, some of these disputes may directly be as a result of struggle for political power or domination. Whilst relying on textual or content analysis of conflicts in Ghana and Africa the author also makes use of, interviews, personal observation and experiences gained from the area under discussion. Resource persons and researchers, some from these conflict areas offered great insight for this write-up. Show less
This paper discusses general political and economic issues in Nawuriland during and after German colonialism. The paper argues that the legacies of German colonialism are still largely seen and... Show moreThis paper discusses general political and economic issues in Nawuriland during and after German colonialism. The paper argues that the legacies of German colonialism are still largely seen and felt in Nawuriland especially in plantation projects, land and chieftaincy. Show less