South Africa's policy of destabilisation of neighbouring countries was closely associated with the rise of South Africa as a leading middleman in the international ivory trade. South African-based... Show moreSouth Africa's policy of destabilisation of neighbouring countries was closely associated with the rise of South Africa as a leading middleman in the international ivory trade. South African-based traders, acting in partnership or with protection from officers of the South African Military Intelligence Directorate, imported raw ivory from Angola, Mozambique and points further north and re-exported it to markets in the Far East. This was a source of income both for the South African secret services and for individuals associated with them. The same trade routes were also used for trade in other goods, including rhino horn, drugs, gems, currency and weapons. This was not only as a means of earning money but also a technique of destabilisation in itself. The extent of South Africa's involvement in this trade, although suspected by some conservationists, was difficult to prove and did not form the target of any concerted campaign by the leading conservation groups world-wide. In this respect, the strength of the South Africa lobby in the World-Wide Fund for Nature seems to have played a significant role. Since the ending of South Africa's military presence in Namibia and Angola in 1989, the Military Intelligence officers, Special Forces officers and others who conducted the wars for the defence of white South Africa have been intent on the struggle inside South Africa itself. There is evidence that such counter-insurgency specialists are now using Mozambique in particular as a base for operations inside South Africa. Moreover, they continue to have an interest in the ivory and rhino horn trades. Former officers of specialist counter-insurgency units have also found employment as game wardens in national parks. The bold proposals currently being implemented to create large new game parks along the South African-Mozambican border, using modern management techniques and involving local communities in their management, have important implications for politics and national security. Show less
The chapters in this collection record a workshop held at the School of Oriental and African Studies, in April 1991, on African languages, development and the State. The book is divided into an... Show moreThe chapters in this collection record a workshop held at the School of Oriental and African Studies, in April 1991, on African languages, development and the State. The book is divided into an introductory chapter, by Richard Fardon and Graham Furniss, and three parts. Part 1, West Africa, contains papers by Ayo Bamgbose (multilingualism), C. Magbaily Fyle (policy toward Krio in Sierra Leone), Mamoud Akanni Igu‚ and Raphael Windali N'ou‚ni (the politics of language in B‚nin), Ben Ohi Elugbe (minority language development in Rivers and Bendel States, Nigeria), Gillian F. Hansford (mother tongue literacy among the Chumburung speakers in Ghana). Part 2, Central and Southern Africa, contains papers by J.M.M. Katupha (language use in Mozambique), Jean Benjamin (language and the struggle for racial equality in the development of a non-racial southern African nation), Nhlanhla P. Maake (a new language policy for post-apartheid South Africa), James Fairhead (linguistic pluralism in a Bwisha community, eastern Zaire), Wim van Binsbergen (minority languages in Zambia (Nkoya) and Botswana (Kalanga)). Part 3, East Africa, contains papers by Gnter Schlee (loanwords in Oromo and Rendille), Jan Blommaert (the metaphors of modernization in Tanzanian language policy), David Parkin (Arabic, Swahili and the vernaculars in Kenya). Show less
Etniciteit heeft altijd een centrale rol gespeeld in de Afrikaanse politiek. Politieke leiders hebben in het verleden hun machtsbasis steeds gevonden binnen hun eigen volk. Vanwege de etnische... Show moreEtniciteit heeft altijd een centrale rol gespeeld in de Afrikaanse politiek. Politieke leiders hebben in het verleden hun machtsbasis steeds gevonden binnen hun eigen volk. Vanwege de etnische tegenstellingen zijn velen pessimistisch over het welslagen van de golf van democratisering die op dit moment Afrika overspoelt. Hoe 'etnisch' werd er bijvoorbeeld gestemd in Kenia en Kameroen tijdens de algemene verkiezingen in hun landen in 1992? Dit artikel gaat in op deze vraag. In etnische termen behoort Kameroen tot de meest gefragmenteerde landen van Afrika. In 1992 heeft president Biya gehoor gegeven aan de roep om politieke democratisering, hetgeen resulteerde in twee vrije verkiezingen: parlementsverkiezingen in maart en presidentsverkiezingen in oktober. Uit een analyse van de verkiezingsuitslagen blijkt dat regionale etnisch-religieuze tegenstellingen, alsmede lokale machts- en afhankelijkheidsrelaties, een bepalende rol hebben gespeeld in het stemgedrag van de bevolking. Ook in Kenia is de etnische versnippering groot. De bevolking van 25 miljoen mensen is verdeeld in ongeveer 40 etnische groepen. Geen enkele groep heeft een numeriek overwicht. Ook hier weerspiegelt de uitslag van de verkiezingen voor het presidentschap en voor het parlement van december 1992 de realiteit van de etnische politiek in Kenia. Show less
