Using the case of Nigeria's Dangote Group and an exploratory research technique, we critique CSR practices in a developing country context based on a three‐pillar model—traditional CSR, strategic... Show moreUsing the case of Nigeria's Dangote Group and an exploratory research technique, we critique CSR practices in a developing country context based on a three‐pillar model—traditional CSR, strategic CSR and strategic business engagements. Our paper makes a unique contribution by revealing how a company can transform its strategic CSR into strategic business engagements that permit it to circumvent public procurement laws and secure public contracts at non‐competitive terms. We show how, in weak institutional and regulatory contexts, strategic CSR could be turned to a tool for rent extraction and profit maximization. We advocate for regulatory measures that impose ex ante and ex post limits on the extent to which firms can go in integrating CSR into their normal business operations. Based on the outcomes from this important African case study, we illustrate and propose the strategic business engagement model as a new framework for analysing the social benefits of strategic CSR practices in developing countries. Show less
This paper critiques the emergence of Dangote Cement as the dominant player in cement manufacturing in Nigeria. It argues that the changed economic environment General Obasanjo met when he became... Show moreThis paper critiques the emergence of Dangote Cement as the dominant player in cement manufacturing in Nigeria. It argues that the changed economic environment General Obasanjo met when he became president of Nigeria for a second time in 1999 made it difficult for him to continue the nationalisation policies and the expansion of government involvement in several spheres of economic activity that he helped to promote in the 1970s. The realisation that this strategy, which created numerous crony capitalists, was unsustainable resulted in Obasanjo allying with Dangote and promulgating the Backward Integration Programme (BIP) for the local cement industry. This made it possible for Dangote to risk aggressive investment in the capital-intensive cement production business. This strategy achieved public good by rapidly making Nigeria, an oil rent- and import-dependent economy with enormous limestone reserves, self-sufficient in cement production. Show less
This paper critiques the emergence of Dangote Cement as the dominant player in cement manufacturing in Nigeria. It argues that the changed economic environment General Obasanjo met when he became... Show moreThis paper critiques the emergence of Dangote Cement as the dominant player in cement manufacturing in Nigeria. It argues that the changed economic environment General Obasanjo met when he became president of Nigeria for a second time in 1999 made it difficult for him to continue the nationalisation policies and the expansion of government involvement in several spheres of economic activity that he helped to promote in the 1970s. The realisation that this strategy, which created numerous crony capitalists, was unsustainable resulted in Obasanjo allying with Dangote and promulgating the Backward Integration Programme (BIP) for the local cement industry. This made it possible for Dangote to risk aggressive investment in the capital-intensive cement production business. This strategy achieved public good by rapidly making Nigeria, an oil rent- and import-dependent economy with enormous limestone reserves, self-sufficient in cement production. Show less
