Ten years ago, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) was created, centralizing European banking supervision. In the SSM, the European Central Bank (ECB) cooperates closely with the National... Show moreTen years ago, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) was created, centralizing European banking supervision. In the SSM, the European Central Bank (ECB) cooperates closely with the National Competent Authorities (NCAs). The unprecedented degree of integration between NCAs and the ECB leads to supervision often being a joint exercise. SSM composite procedures are a specific type of such a joint exercise.Composite procedures culminate in a final ECB or NCA decision, yet are based on input from both. This integrated decision-making forms a paradox with the European system of judicial protection, which to an important extent remains to be organised dualistically. In short, national courts still review only national acts while the EU Courts, in principle, review only EU acts.This paradox raises concerns regarding effective judicial protection. This dissertation aims to investigate whether the EU principle of effective judicial protection is currently safeguarded within the SSM, particularly where it concerns composite procedures. It examines both the action for annulment and the action for damages, addressing the interplay between the EU and Dutch national legal framework. It is concluded that effective judicial protection is not always achieved. The dissertation therefore proposes several recommendations aimed at enhancing effective judicial protection within SSM composite procedures. Show less
In the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), decisions to grant or oppose an acquisition of a qualifying holding in a bank are adopted in a so-called composite procedure. First, the national... Show moreIn the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), decisions to grant or oppose an acquisition of a qualifying holding in a bank are adopted in a so-called composite procedure. First, the national competent authority (NCA) assesses the proposed acquisition based on five criteria enshrined in Art. 23(1) of the Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) and implemented into national law. Then, it forwards a proposal for a decision to the European Central Bank (ECB). The ECB adopts the final decision. One of the criteria requires an assessment of whether, in connection with the proposed acquisition, there are reasonable grounds to suspect (potential) breaches of rules on the prevention of money laundering (AML) or financing of terrorism (CFT). While the NCAs have the competence to assess such (potential) breaches, the SSM Regulation did not confer AML and CFT-related supervisory tasks on the ECB. The ECB must thus to a certain extent rely on the national AML/CFT assessment. The question is how to reconcile the ECB’s lacking AML/CFT competence with its sole responsibility and legal accountability for the final decision on a proposed acquisition. This contribution suggests that the general principle of duty of care can be calibrated to allow the ECB to review the AML/CFT assessments made by the NCA without exceeding the limits of its competence and ensure a judicial review by the EU courts. Show less
