This paper engages in a critical discussion with Christa Davis Acamporaconcerning Nietzsche’s concept of the agon. It takes issue with the “meaning-making”model of the agon developed in her book Co...Show moreThis paper engages in a critical discussion with Christa Davis Acamporaconcerning Nietzsche’s concept of the agon. It takes issue with the “meaning-making”model of the agon developed in her book Contesting Nietzsche, the typology fordistinguishing productive agonal confl ict from destructive confl ict, and its applicationto the Apollinian-Dionysian relation in GT and to Nietzsche’s critique of Socrates.Acampora’s model, it is argued, modernises and soft ens Nietzsche’s agon by takingout the moment of negation, disempowerment, or critical opposition that belongstogether with reciprocal affi rmation or stimulation in agonal interaction.Keywords: Agon, Wettkampf, Vernichtungskampf, Homer, Socrates, Apollinian / Dionysian,dialectic.Zusammenfassung: Der Beitrag tritt in eine kritische Diskussion mit Christa DavisAcampora uber Nietzsches Begriff des Agon ein. Er befasst sich mit dem ,sinngebenden‘Modell des Agon, das sie in ihrem Buch Contesting Nietzsche entwickelt, ihrertypologischen Unterscheidung des produktiven agonalen vom destruktiven Konfliktund deren Anwendung auf die Relation des Apollinischen und Dionysischen in GTund auf Nietzsches Sokrates-Kritik. Acamporas Model, so die These, passt NietzschesAgon dem heutigen Geschmack an, zeichnet ihn weich, indem sie das Moment derNegation, Entmachtung, kritischen Gegenstellung herausnimmt, das ebenso wiegegenseitige Bejahung oder Reizung zur agonalen Interaktion gehort.Schlagwörter: Agon, Wettkampf, Vernichtungskampf, Homer, Sokrates, apollinisch /dionysisch, Dialektik. Show less
This paper will examine the concept of „agonal culture‟ set out in Nietzsche's early essay Homer‟s Contest. The orientation is, in the first instance, hermeneutic: to what extent does agonal... Show moreThis paper will examine the concept of „agonal culture‟ set out in Nietzsche's early essay Homer‟s Contest. The orientation is, in the first instance, hermeneutic: to what extent does agonal culture offer a fruitful model for Nietzsche's own writing? At its most ambitious, my claim is that the Greek agon, with its peculiar dynamic form, operates as a principle that organises and regulates Nietzsche's critical discourse. As a law of production governing Nietzsche's text, the agon allows us to make sense of Nietzsche's polemical style - of certain puzzling, yet recurrent features of his textual confrontations that tend to get ignored or written off as inessential. More importantly, however, it addresses certain key problems intrinsic to transvaluation itself; problems that threaten the coherence of Nietzsche's philosophical project. Keywords: Nietzsche, Agonal Culture, Polemical Style, Transvalutation, Imaginary Communities Questo articolo esamina il concetto di „cultura agonale‟ presente nel saggio giovanile di Nietzsche Agone omerico. L‟orientamento del lavoro è, in prima istanza, ermeneutico; ci chiediamo se e in che misura la cultura agonale offra alla scrittura nietzscheana un modello fecondo. La mia tesi mira a mostrare come l‟agon greco, con la sua peculiare forma dinamica, operi come principio organizzatore e regolatore del discorso critico nietzscheano. Infatti, se intendiamo l‟agon come legge di produzione che governa il testo nietzscheano, questo ci permette di dare un senso allo stile polemico di Nietzsche, un senso di certo sconcertante, ma che caratterizza in maniera ricorrente i suoi „scontri/confronti‟ testuali. Tuttavia un obiettivo ancora più importante di questo articolo è quello di affrontare alcune questioni fondamentali, interne alla transvalutazione stessa, questioni che potrebbero minacciare la coerenza stessa del progetto filosofico di Nietzsche. Parole chiave: Nietzsche, cultura agonale, stile polemico, trasvalutazione, comunità di finzione Show less
Este artículo examina la filosofía de la vida de Nietzsche. Para ello se enmarca 1) dentro de la ontología Nietzscheana del conflicto y la lucha en tanto que dimensión irreducible de la existencia... Show moreEste artículo examina la filosofía de la vida de Nietzsche. Para ello se enmarca 1) dentro de la ontología Nietzscheana del conflicto y la lucha en tanto que dimensión irreducible de la existencia humana a todos los niveles y 2) dentro del intento por parte de las ‘teorías agonísticas’ de incorporar este supuesto a la teoría democrática. Para comenzar, en oposición a la metafísica tradicional (i.e. a la ontología de la sustancia), la filosofía nietzscheana de la vida se presenta como una ontología dinámica y relacional del conflicto entre poderes que no están sujetos a ninguna sustancia. Partiendo de este concepto de vida surge la pregunta: ¿cuáles son las implicaciones políticas del compromiso nietzscheano con la afirmación y con el realce o intensificación (Steigerung) de la vida? En contraposición a la interpretación común, según la cual Nietzsche abogaría por la dominación y la violencia, este texto sostiene que, según Nietzsche, la vida es intensificada al máximo cuando la lucha (o tensión) y la pluralidad son maximizadas; y que esa lucha y pluralidad son maximizadas sólo en el caso de que haya un equilibrio aproximado entre fuerzas más o menos iguales, y no bajo condiciones de dominación. Aplicando esta línea de pensamiento a la cuestión de la naturaleza y al estatus de la ley resulta que la filosofía de la vida de Nietzsche aboca en una afirmación de pluralidad de órdenes legales en tensión constructiva, lo que nos invita a plantear la pregunta acerca de las condiciones institucionales que harían esto posible. Palabras claves: conflicto - agón - ontología de la sustancia - equilibrio -ley. ABSTRACT: This paper examines Nietzsche’s philosophy of life against the background claim that conflict and struggle constitute an irreducible dimension of human existence at all levels and the attempt on the part of ‘agonistic theorists’ to incorporate this claim into democratic theory. To begin with, Nietzsche’s philosophy of life is set out against traditional metaphysics (substance ontology) as a dynamic, relational ontology of conflict among powers without substance. Given this concept of life, what, then, are the political implications of Nietzsche commitment to life-affirmation and life-enhancement? Against the standard view that Nietzsche advocates domination and violence, it is argued that life is maximally enhanced when struggle(or tension) and plurality are maximised, and that struggle and plurality are maximised under conditions of an approximate equilibrium among more or less equal forces, and not under conditions of domination. This line of thought is applied to the question of the nature and status of law with the result that Nietzsche’s philosophy of life issues in an affirmation of a plurality of legal orders in constructive tension with one another, raising the question of the institutional conditions that would make this possible Show less
This essay, based on the author’s work for the entry Gesetz in the Nietzsche-Wörterbuch, examines four key moments in the development of Nietzsche’s concept of necessity. The main thesis is that... Show moreThis essay, based on the author’s work for the entry Gesetz in the Nietzsche-Wörterbuch, examines four key moments in the development of Nietzsche’s concept of necessity. The main thesis is that Nietzsche’s concept of necessity needs to be understood in terms of his (largely critical) engagement with the scientific (mechanistic) concept of laws of nature (Naturgesetze). According to one established meaning, ‘necessity’ (1) expresses the so-sein-müssen (must-be-thus) or invariability of the processes described by laws of nature. This meaning is affirmed by the young Nietzsche. The middle Nietzsche, by contrast, criticises laws of nature for projecting moral categories onto nature (as if things or forces ‘followed’ laws out of obedience). In this context, ‘necessity’ (2) is sometimes detached from laws of nature and affirmed by Nietzsche, as that which remains after ‘subtracting’ laws and other anthropomorphisms from nature: a non-anthropomorphic, extra-moral Müssen that expresses the regularity (Berechenbarkeit) of processes of nature, but is logically independent of laws of nature. At other times ‘necessity’ (3) is used by Nietzsche for the false, moral constraint (Zwang), the so-sein-sollen (ought-to-be-thus) expressed by mechanistic laws of nature. ‘Necessity’ in this sense not only moralises nature, but also fails to explain the regularity of natural processes. Nietzsche’s criticisms of mechanistic laws of nature confront him with the task of rethinking ‘necessity’ in non-anthropomorphic, extra-moral terms in a way that offers an alternative, non-legalistic explanation of the regularity of natural processes. This task is engaged with the concepts of will to power and fate. Thinking away ‘necessity’ as false, moral constraint (meaning 3) leaves a minimal concept ‘necessity’ (4) as: so-sein (being-thus), so-und-nicht-anders-sein (being-thus-and-not-otherwise), so-beschaffen-sein: that something is as it is, as strong or as weak, as a function of relations of power and the degrees of power-over and resistance. This concept of necessity is proposed by Nietzsche as an alternative (non-legalistic, non-mechanistic, non-causal) explanation of the regularity of natural processes. But ‘necessity’, as being-thus (so-sein), also precludes the ‘could-have-been-otherwise’ (hätte-anders-sein-können) and thereby serves to exclude the moral concept of necessity (3) expressed by mechanistic laws of nature (ought-to-be-thus: so-sein-sollen). Nietzsche’s efforts to rethink ‘necessity’ beyond mechanistic causality are pursued with the concept of fate, especially in the domains of human morality and art. Show less
Este artigo examina e compara Kant e Nietzsche enquanto pensadores do conflito. Argumenta-se no § 1 que, para ambos os filósofos, o conflito desempenha um papel essencial e construtivo em vários... Show moreEste artigo examina e compara Kant e Nietzsche enquanto pensadores do conflito. Argumenta-se no § 1 que, para ambos os filósofos, o conflito desempenha um papel essencial e construtivo em vários domínios de seu pensamento, e que ambos nos oferecem um rico conjunto de insights sobre as qualidades produtivas do conflito. Contudo, Kant não é capaz de formular um conceito genuinamente afirmativo do conflito que faça jus aos prodigiosos poderes produtivos por ele descritos. Em vez disso, ele promove uma guerra de extermínio (Vernichtungskrieg) filosófica contra toda guerra, destinada a negála em favor de uma reivindicação absoluta pela paz (‘paz perpétua’). Como nos mostra a análise de “Zum ewigen Frieden” no § 2, a possibilidade de ação construtiva requer a eliminação da guerra em favor da paz perpétua por meio do Estado de Direito, e o conflito é, na melhor das hipóteses, produtor de sua própria negação. A parte final do artigo se volta para Nietzsche em busca de um modelo conceitual que permita uma compreensão genuinamente afirmativa do conflito e seus potenciais produtivos. A filosofia da vida de Nietzsche é uma ontologia do conflito que culmina em um ideal de maximização da tensão baseado em um equilíbrio de poderes mais ou menos equânimes. Argumentase que a noção nietzschiana de afirmação da vida nos compromete com uma posição que se situa entre a guerra kantiana e o direito cosmopolita, focando a nossa atenção nas relações antagônicas que se estabelecem tanto no interior quanto entre uma pluralidade de ordenamentos jurídicos. Show less
