Globalizing economies and long-distance trade rely on individuals from different cultural groups to negotiate agreement on what to give and take. In such settings, individuals often lack insight... Show moreGlobalizing economies and long-distance trade rely on individuals from different cultural groups to negotiate agreement on what to give and take. In such settings, individuals often lack insight into what interaction partners deem fair and appropriate, potentially seeding misunderstandings, frustration, and conflict. Here, we examine how individuals decipher distinct rules of engagement and adapt their behavior to reach agreements with partners from other cultural groups. Modeling individuals as Bayesian learners with inequality aversion reveals that individuals, in repeated ultimatum bargaining with responders sampled from different groups, can be more generous than needed. While this allows them to reach agreements, it also gives rise to biased beliefs about what is required to reach agreement with members from distinct groups. Preregistered behavioral (N = 420) and neuroimaging experiments (N = 49) support model predictions: Seeking equitable agreements can lead to overly generous behavior toward partners from different groups alongside incorrect beliefs about prevailing norms of what is appropriate in groups and cultures other than one’s own. Show less
Farina, A.; Rojek-Giffin, M.; Gross, J.A.J.; Dreu, C.K.W. de 2021
Humans differ in their preferences for personal rewards, fairness and others’ welfare. Such social preferences predict trust, public goods provision and mutual gains bargaining and have been linked... Show moreHumans differ in their preferences for personal rewards, fairness and others’ welfare. Such social preferences predict trust, public goods provision and mutual gains bargaining and have been linked to neural activity in regions involved in reward computation, cognitive control and perspective-taking. Although shaped by culture, social preferences are relatively stable across time, raising the question whether differences in brain anatomy predict social preferences and their key components—concern for personal outcomes and concern for others’ outcomes. Here, we examine this possibility by linking social preferences measured with incentivized economic games to 74 cortical parcels in 194 healthy humans. Neither concerns for personal outcomes nor concerns for the outcomes of others in isolation were related to anatomical differences. However, fitting earlier findings, social preferences positively scaled with cortical thickness in the left olfactory sulcus, a structure in the orbital frontal cortex previously shown to be involved in value-based decision-making. Consistent with work showing that heavier usage corresponds to larger brain volume, findings suggest that pro-social preferences relate to cortical thickness in the left olfactory sulcus because of heavier reliance on the orbital frontal cortex during social decision-making. Show less
This thesis consists of three empirical chapters that investigate elements of human social behavior, adherence to and violations of social norms, and the computational and neurological... Show moreThis thesis consists of three empirical chapters that investigate elements of human social behavior, adherence to and violations of social norms, and the computational and neurological underpinnings thereof. I focus on three behavioral paradigms in particular – the attacker-defender contest, the trust game, and the ultimatum game – which model asymmetrical conflicts, generosity and reciprocity, and norms of fairness, respectively. Ultimately, each chapter acts as a building block contributing a different perspective to the study of human sociality. Using economic games, computational models based on the principle of utility, and model-based neuroimaging, my research contributes to the scientific endeavor working to crack the “elaborate and secret code that is written nowhere, known by none, and understood by all” (Sapir, 1927, p.137) Show less
Dreu, C.K.W. de; Pliskin, R.; Rojek-Giffin, M.; Meder, Z.; Gross, J. 2021
Political conflicts often revolve around changing versus defending a status quo. We propose to capture the dynamics between proponents and opponents of political change in terms of an asymmetric... Show morePolitical conflicts often revolve around changing versus defending a status quo. We propose to capture the dynamics between proponents and opponents of political change in terms of an asymmetric game of attack and defence with its equilibrium in mixed strategies. Formal analyses generate predictions about effort expended on revising and protecting the status quo, the form and function of false signalling and cheap talk, how power differences impact conflict intensity and the likelihood of status quo revision. Laboratory experiments on the neurocognitive and hormonal foundations of attack and defence reveal that out-of-equilibrium investments in attack emerge because of non-selfish preferences, limited capacity to compute costs and benefits and optimistic beliefs about the chances of winning from one's rival. We conclude with implications for the likelihood of political change and inertia, and discuss the role of ideology in political games of attack and defence. This article is part of the theme issue 'The political brain: neurocognitive and computational mechanisms'. Show less
