Hope has intrigued and attracted humans for centuries, with views on this emotion ranging from extremely positive to extremely negative. To deepen and nuance our understanding of hope – a seemingly... Show moreHope has intrigued and attracted humans for centuries, with views on this emotion ranging from extremely positive to extremely negative. To deepen and nuance our understanding of hope – a seemingly positive emotion – we apply to it a valence/function framework of emotion in group-based contexts. This framework facilitates the examination and categorisation of emotions as positive or negative along two orthogonal dimensions: the pleasantness of the emotional experience and their social outcomes. According to this framework, emotions can “move” on both dimensions (i.e. be experienced as pleasant or unpleasant and lead to functional versus dysfunctional outcomes), based on various factors. Applying this framework to group-based hope may seem surprising, as the emotion is often considered universally good. Yet a more nuanced approach reveals situations in which group-based hope can be a “do bad” emotion, and, at times, can even “feel bad.” We discuss the implications of these understandings for research on hope and its applications across different group contexts. Show less
Hasan-Aslih, S.; Pliskin, R.; Shuman, E.; Zomeren, M. van; Saguy, T.; Halperin, E. 2024
The current research examines joint collective action between advantaged and disadvantaged groups, from the perspective of the latter. We hypothesize that joint action poses a dilemma which lies in... Show moreThe current research examines joint collective action between advantaged and disadvantaged groups, from the perspective of the latter. We hypothesize that joint action poses a dilemma which lies in the tension between perceived instrumentality of joint action (i.e., ability to promote the disadvantaged’s goals) and perceived normalization (i.e., its tendency to blur power relations). We test this idea across three studies in the United States and Israel/Palestine. In Study 1 (n = 361) we manipulated perceptions of joint action from the perspective of a hypothetical character, and in Study 2 (n = 378) we presented participants with an article highlighting the risk and benefit of joint activism. Results showed that perceived instrumentality increases, whereas perceived normalization decreases joint action tendencies. In Study 3 (n = 240), we described a joint action event that taps into some of the themes that induce concerns about normalization. We found that normalization perceptions feed into perceptions of instrumentality, and this occurred mainly among high identifiers, for whom the dilemma is most salient. The implications of these findings for understanding the complexity of joint collective action from the perspective of the disadvantaged are discussed. Show less
The functioning of groups and societies requires that individuals cooperate on public goods such as healthcare and state defense. More often than not, individuals face multiple public goods and... Show moreThe functioning of groups and societies requires that individuals cooperate on public goods such as healthcare and state defense. More often than not, individuals face multiple public goods and must choose on which to cooperate, if at all. Such decisions can be difficult when public goods are attractive on one dimension (e.g., being “efficient” in providing comparatively high returns) and unattractive on another (e.g., creating inequality by providing some group members greater returns than others). We examined how people manage such decision conflicts in five preregistered experiments (N = 900) that confronted participants with two public goods that varied in efficiency and (in)equality of returns. People cooperated more on the comparatively efficient public good and on the equal-return (vs. unequal-return) public good (Experiment 1), yet when the unequal-returns public good was also the most efficient, individuals cooperated comparatively more on this unequal-but-efficient public good when they themselves benefitted the most from inequality (Experiments 2–4). Low beneficiaries largely ignored public goods efficiency and preferentially cooperated on the equal- rather than unequal-returns public good. Expectations (Experiments 2–4), preferences for revising the multiple-public-goods provision problems’ choice architecture (Experiments 3–4), and descriptive norms held by uninvolved arbitrators (Experiment 5) echoed these cooperation patterns, but uninvolved arbitrators deemed it socially appropriate to cooperate more on the equal than the unequal public good regardless of beneficiary position. We discuss implications for theory and policy on cooperation Show less
Individuals often face dilemmas in which non-cooperation serves their self-interest and cooperation favors society at large. Cooperation is often considered the moral choice because it creates... Show moreIndividuals often face dilemmas in which non-cooperation serves their self-interest and cooperation favors society at large. Cooperation is often considered the moral choice because it creates equality and fairness among citizens. Accordingly, individuals whose political ideology attaches greater value to equality than to agency and self-reliance should not only cooperate on more rather than less efficient public goods, but also more on public goods from which individuals benefit equally rather than unequally. We examine this possibility by comparing ideologically left-leaning and right-leaning individuals’ cooperation on multiple public goods that varied in efficiency and (in)equality in returns. We find that left-leaning individuals cooperate more than right-leaning ones, but only on public goods that benefit everyone equally, and not more on public goods that generate inequalities. Left-leaning individuals also trust and expect others to cooperate more on equal- versus unequal-returns public goods, while self-identified right-leaning individuals do not differentiate between these. Interestingly, ideology does not predict which public good is deemed more morally appropriate to cooperate on. Results combined specify when and why self-identified leftists can(not) be expected to cooperate more than rightists and reveal how moral decision-making depends on structural elements of the public good provision problems that citizens face. Show less
Morgenroth, T.; Toorn, J. van der; Pliskin, R.; McMahon, C.E. 2023
In modern Western cultures, gender is largely viewed as binary, and individuals who challenge the gender/sex binary face discrimination and marginalization. Across three preregistered studies (N = ... Show moreIn modern Western cultures, gender is largely viewed as binary, and individuals who challenge the gender/sex binary face discrimination and marginalization. Across three preregistered studies (N = 1,096), we examine gender discrimination against gender-nonconforming people. Studies 1 and 2 show that behavioral and appearance-based gender nonconformity leads to the misgendering of cisgender and transgender women and men. This was true for the gendered perception of these targets and the binary assignment to gender/sex-based spaces and policies (e.g., access to bathrooms or gender/sex-based leadership training). Surprisingly, whether the target was transgender or cisgender did not affect these results. Study 3 replicated findings for transgender targets and showed that adherence to gender stereotypes is seen as a necessity for transgender individuals who want their gender identity recognized by others (e.g., on official documents or through pronoun use). Show less
Dreu, C.K.W. de; Pliskin, R.; Rojek-Giffin, M.; Meder, Z.; Gross, J. 2021
Political conflicts often revolve around changing versus defending a status quo. We propose to capture the dynamics between proponents and opponents of political change in terms of an asymmetric... Show morePolitical conflicts often revolve around changing versus defending a status quo. We propose to capture the dynamics between proponents and opponents of political change in terms of an asymmetric game of attack and defence with its equilibrium in mixed strategies. Formal analyses generate predictions about effort expended on revising and protecting the status quo, the form and function of false signalling and cheap talk, how power differences impact conflict intensity and the likelihood of status quo revision. Laboratory experiments on the neurocognitive and hormonal foundations of attack and defence reveal that out-of-equilibrium investments in attack emerge because of non-selfish preferences, limited capacity to compute costs and benefits and optimistic beliefs about the chances of winning from one's rival. We conclude with implications for the likelihood of political change and inertia, and discuss the role of ideology in political games of attack and defence. This article is part of the theme issue 'The political brain: neurocognitive and computational mechanisms'. Show less
Hasan-Aslih, S.; Shuman, E.; Goldenberg, A.; Pliskin, R.; Zomeren, M., van; Halperin, E. 2020
Within contexts of oppression and struggle for social change, in which hope is constantly challenged, do disadvantaged group members still want to feel hope? If so, does this desire translate into... Show moreWithin contexts of oppression and struggle for social change, in which hope is constantly challenged, do disadvantaged group members still want to feel hope? If so, does this desire translate into actual hope? And does motivation for hope relate to disadvantaged individuals’ collective action tendencies? We suggest that, especially when faced with setbacks in the struggle for social change, disadvantaged group members want to feel hope, but actualizing this motivation depends on their group efficacy beliefs. We address these questions in a two-wave sample of 429 Palestinians living under militarized occupation in the West Bank. Our results indicate that when faced with setbacks, Palestinians want to feel hope for social change, but only those who perceive high group efficacy are able to fulfill their desire. We discuss these findings’ implications for understanding motivated emotional processes and hope in contexts of oppression. Show less
Hasan‐Aslih, S.; Shuman, E.; Pliskin, R.; Zomeren, M.; Saguy, T.; Halperin, E. 2020
While we have a rich understanding of the motivations of disadvantaged group members to act collectively with their group, especially the important role played by identification, we know less about... Show moreWhile we have a rich understanding of the motivations of disadvantaged group members to act collectively with their group, especially the important role played by identification, we know less about the disadvantaged's motivations to engage in joint action with the advantaged. This research examines the role of identification in predicting joint and ingroup collective action in intergroup conflicts. Since joint action inherently diffuses the perception of “us versus them”, we propose that identification predicts ingroup action, but not joint action. We also examine conflict intensity as a moderator, and examine how changing identification is linked to change in support for joint action. We test these hypotheses in a three-wave longitudinal study in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Results support our hypotheses, demonstrating that identification positively predicts ingroup action but not necessarily joint action, and that when conflict intensifies, changes in identification are negatively related to joint action with outgroup members. Show less
Toorn, J. van der; Pliskin, R.; Morgenroth, T. 2020
Heteronormative ideology refers to the belief that there are two separate and opposing genders with associated natural roles that match their assigned sex, and that heterosexuality is a given. It... Show moreHeteronormative ideology refers to the belief that there are two separate and opposing genders with associated natural roles that match their assigned sex, and that heterosexuality is a given. It is pervasive and persistent, carrying negative consequences. Because it is embedded in societal institutions and propagated through socialization and other widely held ideologies, it is prevalent among both cis-hetero and LGBTQI+ individuals. In the current article, we discuss the unrelenting and insidious nature of heteronormative ideology, review some of the social-psychological mechanisms that contribute to its maintenance, and provide directions for future research that could inform efforts to combat it. We argue that threat reactions to non-heteronormative behavior reinforce heteronormative beliefs and that interventions are needed to address both prejudice and its underlying mechanisms. Show less
Political psychologists studying ideology have been increasingly examining its relationship with emotion. Much of this work has focused on potential ideological differences in the intensity of... Show morePolitical psychologists studying ideology have been increasingly examining its relationship with emotion. Much of this work has focused on potential ideological differences in the intensity of emotional experiences, leading to conflicting findings. Some work has supported the perspective according to which fundamental psychological differences exist between ideological leftists and rightists, while other work has challenged this view, demonstrating ideological symmetry in emotion. The present review highlights recent advances that can shed further light on this debate, adopting a multi-dimensional, context-sensitive approach to the study of ideological differences in emotional processes. Accordingly, we propose that instead of asking whether or not ideological differences in emotion exist, researchers should ask when, in what ways, and under what circumstances they exist. Show less
Although humans display inequality aversion, many people appear to be untroubled by widespread economic disparities. We suggest that such indifference is partly attributable to a belief in the... Show moreAlthough humans display inequality aversion, many people appear to be untroubled by widespread economic disparities. We suggest that such indifference is partly attributable to a belief in the fairness of the capitalist system. Here we report six studies showing that economic ideology predicts self-reported and physiological responses to inequality. In Studies 1 and 2, participants who regard the economic system as justified, compared with those who do not, report feeling less negative emotion after watching videos depicting homelessness. In Studies 3–5, economic system justifiers exhibit low levels of negative affect, as indexed by activation of the corrugator supercilii muscle, and autonomic arousal, as indexed by skin conductance, while viewing people experiencing homelessness. In Study 6, which employs experience-sampling methodology, everyday exposure to rich and poor people elicits less negative emotion among system justifiers. These results provide the strongest evidence to date that system-justifying beliefs diminish aversion to inequality in economic contexts. Show less
Zipris, I.; Pliskin, R.; Canetti, D.; Halperin, E. 2019
How do wars shape emotions and attitudes in intractable conflicts? In two studies conducted in the aftermath of the 2014 Gaza War in the Middle East, we tested a new theoretical model wherein the... Show moreHow do wars shape emotions and attitudes in intractable conflicts? In two studies conducted in the aftermath of the 2014 Gaza War in the Middle East, we tested a new theoretical model wherein the ability to regulate emotions is central in determining the influence of war exposure on emotions (i.e., group-based humiliation) and support for militancy, through posttraumatic stress symptoms (PSS). Results supported our model: (a) higher exposure to the war predicted group-based humiliation in both studies and in Study 2 also greater support for militancy; in both studies, (b) higher exposure predicted more PSS only among participants high in emotion dysregulation, and, for them, (c) higher exposure predicted greater group-based humiliation, through increased levels of PSS. Results from Study 2 suggest that (d) group-based humiliation will ultimately lead to greater support for militancy. The findings’ contribution to the different literatures and their integration is discussed. Show less
Alkoby, A.; Pliskin, R.; Halperin, E.; Levit-Binnun, N. 2019
In down‐regulating intergroup fear, an intense emotion common to intractable intergroup conflicts, people may employ various fear‐reducing appraisals. Adopting a motivated reasoning perspective, we... Show moreIn down‐regulating intergroup fear, an intense emotion common to intractable intergroup conflicts, people may employ various fear‐reducing appraisals. Adopting a motivated reasoning perspective, we posited that the contents of individuals’ ideological beliefs influence the contents they employ to down‐regulate fear, with rightists preferring ingroup‐empowering content and leftists preferring outgroup‐weakening content. In Study 1, rightists (vs. leftists) reported greater use of ingroup‐empowering reappraisal to down‐regulate fear, but no differences emerged in the use of outgroup‐weakening reappraisal. Study 2 manipulated the contents’ perceived instrumentality in reducing fear, to examine this as an alternative mechanism. Perceived instrumentality influenced participants’ behavioral content preferences ahead of a fear induction, but the manipulation did not mitigate the right‐left differences in ingroup‐empowering reappraisal use once participants were confronted with the stimulus, replicating Study 1. Study 3 extended these findings, identifying ideological differences in two additional fear‐reappraisal themes and in the attitudinal outcomes of fear regulation. Show less
Hasan-Aslih, S.; Pliskin, R.; Van Zomeren, M.; Halperin, E.; Saguy, T. 2018
Biologists and social scientists have long tried to understand why some societies have more fluid and open interpersonal relationships and how those differences influence culture. This study... Show moreBiologists and social scientists have long tried to understand why some societies have more fluid and open interpersonal relationships and how those differences influence culture. This study measures relational mobility, a socioecological variable quantifying voluntary (high relational mobility) vs. fixed (low relational mobility) interpersonal relationships. We measure relational mobility in 39 societies and test whether it predicts social behavior. People in societies with higher relational mobility report more proactive interpersonal behaviors (e.g., self-disclosure and social support) and psychological tendencies that help them build and retain relationships (e.g., general trust, intimacy, self-esteem). Finally, we explore ecological factors that could explain relational mobility differences across societies. Relational mobility was lower in societies that practiced settled, interdependent subsistence styles, such as rice farming, and in societies that had stronger ecological and historical threats. Show less
Pliskin, R.; Halperin, E.; Bar-Tal, D.; Sheppes, G. 2018
Do rightists and leftists experience information about suffering and harm with differing emotional intensities, depending on the identity of target depicted? Do they consequently choose differently... Show moreDo rightists and leftists experience information about suffering and harm with differing emotional intensities, depending on the identity of target depicted? Do they consequently choose differently how to regulate or cope with these emotions? Research has identified ideological differences in emotional processes, but it has yet to identify what types of content lead to ideological differences in emotional intensity or whether these content-dependent differences relate to differing preferences for engaging versus disengaging emotion-regulation strategies. We posited that right–left differences in experienced emotional intensity would be context-dependent, emerging mostly in response to depictions of harm to the outgroup, in accordance with the centrality of intergroup attitudes to ideological self-placement in conflict. Study 1 (N = 83) supported this hypothesis, with leftists (vs. rightists) experiencing outgroup harm (but not ingroup harm or conflict-irrelevant harm) with greater emotional intensity. Study 2 (N = 101), which replicated this finding, additionally examined whether behavioral differences in regulatory choice consequently emerge mostly regarding outgroup harm. We tested 2 competing hypotheses as to the nature of these differences: (a) the intensity hypothesis, positing that leftists (more than rightists) would regulate their intensified reactions to outgroup harm through disengagement–distraction (vs. engagement–reappraisal) due to a documented greater preference for disengaging coping strategies as intensity increases, and (b) the motivation hypothesis, positing that leftists (more than rightists) would prefer engagement–reappraisal (vs. disengagement–distraction), consistent with leftists’ documented greater preference for intergroup empathy. Results exclusively supported the intensity hypothesis, and the significance of both studies is discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved) Show less
