Peer punishment can help groups to establish collectively beneficial public goods. However, when humans condition punishment on other factors than poor contribution, punishment can become... Show morePeer punishment can help groups to establish collectively beneficial public goods. However, when humans condition punishment on other factors than poor contribution, punishment can become ineffective and group cooperation deteriorates. Here we show that this happens in pluriform groups where members have different socio-demographic characteristics. In our public good provision experiment, participants were confronted with a public good from which all group members benefitted equally, and in-between rounds they could punish each other. Groups were uniform (members shared the same academic background) or pluriform (half the members shared the same academic background, and the other half shared another background). We show that punishment effectively enforced cooperation in uniform groups where punishment was conditioned on poor contribution. In pluriform groups, punishment was conditioned on poor contribution too, but also partially on others’ social-demographic characteristics—dissimilar others were punished more than similar others regardless of their contribution. As a result, punishment lost its effectiveness in deterring free-riding and maintaining public good provision. Follow-up experiments indicated that such discriminatory punishment was used to demarcate and reinforce subgroup boundaries. This work reveals that peer punishment fails to enforce cooperation in groups with a pluriform structure, which is rule rather than exception in contemporary societies. Show less
Humans work together in groups to tackle shared problems and contribute to local club goods that benefit other group members. Whereas benefits from club goods remain group bound, groups are often... Show moreHumans work together in groups to tackle shared problems and contribute to local club goods that benefit other group members. Whereas benefits from club goods remain group bound, groups are often nested in overarching collectives that face shared problems like pandemics or climate change. Such challenges require individuals to cooperate across group boundaries, raising the question how cooperation can transcend beyond confined groups. Here, we show how frequent intergroup interactions allow groups to transition from group-bound to universal cooperation. With frequent intergroup interactions, reciprocity of cooperative acts permeates group boundaries and enables the evolution of universal cooperation. As soon as intergroup interactions take place frequently, people start to selectively reward cooperation aimed at benefitting everyone, irrespective of their group membership. Simulations further show that it becomes more difficult to overcome group-bound cooperation when populations are fragmented into many small groups. Our findings reveal important prerequisites for the evolution of universal cooperation. Show less
Sun, Q.; Molenmaker, W.E.; Zhang, Y.; Liu, Y.; Dijk, E. van 2022
Two experiments were conducted to explore whether and why procedural fairness may promote cooperation. In both experiments, participants first took part in a task in which they were connected to an... Show moreTwo experiments were conducted to explore whether and why procedural fairness may promote cooperation. In both experiments, participants first took part in a task in which they were connected to an allocator who then either selected a fair or an unfair procedure for allocating outcomes between them. After this manipulation of procedural fairness, participants performed a second task in which we studied their cooperation in a chicken game. In Experiment 1, participants were informed that their opponent in the chicken game was the same person who had previously selected the fair (vs. unfair) procedure. In Experiment 2, participants learned that their opponent in the chicken game had not been involved in the selection of the prior procedure. Both studies showed that having experienced a fair (vs. unfair) procedure facilitated subsequent cooperation in the chicken game. Mediation analyses suggest that this positive effect was explained by the finding that the prior experience of procedural fairness induced participants to expect higher levels of cooperation from their opponent, even when this opponent was not involved in the prior experience of procedural fairness. Show less
Molenmaker, W.E.; Lelieveld, G.; Kwaadsteniet, E.W. de; Dijk, E. van 2022
Common resource dilemmas (CRDs) and public good dilemmas (PGDs) are distinct types of social dilemmas, yet they model the same underlying conflict between the collective interest and one's self... Show moreCommon resource dilemmas (CRDs) and public good dilemmas (PGDs) are distinct types of social dilemmas, yet they model the same underlying conflict between the collective interest and one's self-interest. Here, we study and interpret behavioral differences between these two main types of social dilemmas by applying a logic of appropriateness. In two experiments, we argue and demonstrate that CRDs, relative to PGDs, evoke higher levels of cooperation, because taking from collective property (in CRDs) is generally considered less appropriate than not giving from personal property (in PGDs). Importantly, these differential considerations of appropriateness are reflected not only in the willingness to cooperate but also in the willingness to punish and reward others' (non)cooperative behavior. Taken together, the findings reveal that CRDs and PGDs elicit different norms of appropriateness. Show less
Kwaadsteniet, E.W. de; Kiyonari, T.; Molenmaker, W.E.; Dijk, E. van 2019
The present paper investigates how rewards as well as punishments – implemented to enforce the social norm of cooperation – impact the reputations of the leaders administering them. Moreover, we... Show moreThe present paper investigates how rewards as well as punishments – implemented to enforce the social norm of cooperation – impact the reputations of the leaders administering them. Moreover, we investigate whether and how the effects of norm enforcement decisions on leaders' reputations change when – due to behavioral noise – they are unable to perfectly monitor group members' decisions. To address these questions, we present a new psychological perspective that uses insights from the person perception literature to define and measure different sub-dimensions of leaders' reputations (i.e., morality, competence and sociability). In three experimental studies, we show that under no noise both decisions to reward and decisions to punish can have a positive effect on leaders' reputations (as compared to leaders who do not punish or reward; Studies 1, 2, and 3), and that these findings extend to leader preferences (Study 2). Interestingly, all three studies also showed that these effects are moderated by noise. That is, under noise decisions to reward have a more positive influence on leaders' reputations than decisions to punish (Studies 1, 2, and 3). Moreover, we found these effects in two different contexts: a social dilemma game (Studies 1 and 2) and an organizational setting (Study 3). In the general discussion, the implications of these findings are outlined and suggestions for future research are given. Show less
Molenmaker, W.E.; Kwaadsteniet, E.W. de; Dijk, E. van 2018
Numerous studies have demonstrated that sanctions can promote cooperation. However, it is important to know not only that sanctions can work but also under what conditions people are actually... Show moreNumerous studies have demonstrated that sanctions can promote cooperation. However, it is important to know not only that sanctions can work but also under what conditions people are actually willing to sanction cooperation positively (i.e., reward) or noncooperation negatively (i.e., punish). In this article, we demonstrate that people use sanctions less often and sanction more mildly when they decide about sanctioning before (instead of after) the occurrence of others' (non)cooperation (Experiments 1 and 2), regardless of whether they decide directly afterwards or after a time delay (Experiment 2). Moreover, we reveal that beforehand (as compared with afterwards) people have not yet formed clear sanctioning preferences (Experiment 3). These findings corroborate our reasoning that the decision environment beforehand induces nonconsequential reasoning and thereby hampers people's willingness to sanction. We discuss the theoretical, methodological, and practical implications of our work. Show less
Dijk, E. van; Molenmaker, W.E.; Kwaadsteniet, E.W. de 2015