Most of us believe that it would be unjust to act with indifference about the plight of future generations. Zipper arguments in intergenerational justice aim to show that we have duties of justice ...Show moreMost of us believe that it would be unjust to act with indifference about the plight of future generations. Zipper arguments in intergenerational justice aim to show that we have duties of justice regarding future generations, regardless of whether we have duties of justice to future generations. By doing so, such arguments circumvent the foundational challenges that come with theorising duties to remote future generations, which result from the non-existence, non-identity and non-contemporaneity of future generations. I argue that zipper arguments face several significant challenges. The ought-implies-can challenge points out that because prior generations determine what later generations can transfer, they determine how much they ought to transfer. In addition, both intentional and non-intentional non-compliance can break the chain of duties towards future generations on which zipper arguments rely. Some versions are surprisingly resilient especially in real-world circumstances. This paper does not show that zipper arguments inevitably fail, but all ways forward come at significant theoretical costs. Unless the challenges posed here are met (or shown as irrelevant), theorists of justice cannot side-track the foundational challenges that come with doing intergenerational justice. Show less
This chapter asks what role limitarianism can play in theorizing justice between generations. Do intergenerational challenges give us additional reasons to embrace limitarianism? Taking economic... Show moreThis chapter asks what role limitarianism can play in theorizing justice between generations. Do intergenerational challenges give us additional reasons to embrace limitarianism? Taking economic limitarianism as a starting point, I argue that both the democratic argument and the argument from basic needs have considerable intergenerational traction, but the latter raises difficult questions for limitarians. I also argue that economic limitarianism cannot offer a full account of intergenerational justice, due to its focus on individual and monetary holdings. We could design a more comprehensive limitarianism in response to these worries, but only at the cost of the appeal and distinctiveness of limitarianism. The last section somewhat speculatively develops a Rawls-inspired account of intergenerational limitarianism which stays true to the focus on monetary wealth, but with clear environmental implications. Show less
This chapter provides an overview of the kind of questions one has to answer to take position on the question of who owes what to future generations in the context of climate change and discusses... Show moreThis chapter provides an overview of the kind of questions one has to answer to take position on the question of who owes what to future generations in the context of climate change and discusses several possible answers as well as their upsides and downsides. It first asks whether we have duties of justice to future at all, raising several challenges to the idea of including future generations under the scope of justice. Second, it asks how much we owe to future people: equality, sufficiency, or just basic human rights. Even if there are theoretical reasons to embrace a more demanding account, there may be political or feasibility reasons to endorse a less demanding view. The third question is what we owe to future people: what kind of world, with what kind of goods and opportunities, do we owe to future people? Before concluding, the chapter discusses the distribution of duties to future people among contemporaries, the idea that we might have to limit the amount of future people, and possible institutional responses to challenges of intergenerational justice. Show less
We gedragen ons soms alsof we maar zeer beperkte morele verplichtingen hebben jegens mensen buiten onze landsgrenzen. Tegelijkertijd maken we ons zorgen over klimaatverandering en toekomstige...Show moreWe gedragen ons soms alsof we maar zeer beperkte morele verplichtingen hebben jegens mensen buiten onze landsgrenzen. Tegelijkertijd maken we ons zorgen over klimaatverandering en toekomstige generaties, misschien in het bijzonder de toekomstige inwoners van ons eigen land. Maar valt die relatieve onverschilligheid ten aanzien van wat elders gebeurt wel te rijmen met het belang dat we hechten aan het welzijn van toekomstige mensen? Onze banden met mensen die nu elders in de wereld leven, zijn immers substantieler en daarom misschien van groter ethisch gewicht dan onze relatie met niet-bestaande toekomstige personen.Show less
Buijs, D.M.F. van den; Wilgenhof, A.; Knaapen, P.; Zivelonghi, C.; Meijers, T.; Vermeersch, P.; ... ; Brink, F.S. van den 2022
Objectives. To compare two different forms of mechanical circulatory support (MCS) in patients with complex high-risk indicated PCI (CHIP): the Impella CP system and veno-arterial extracorporeal... Show moreObjectives. To compare two different forms of mechanical circulatory support (MCS) in patients with complex high-risk indicated PCI (CHIP): the Impella CP system and veno-arterial extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (VA-ECMO). Background. To prevent hemodynamic instability in CHIP, various MCS systems are available. However, comparable data on different forms of MCS are not at hand. Methods. In this multicenter observational study, we retrospectively evaluated all CHIP procedures with the support of an Impella CP or VA-ECMO, who were declined surgery by the heart team. Major adverse cardiac events (MACE), mortality at discharge, and 30-day mortality were evaluated. Results. A total of 41 patients were included, of which 27 patients were supported with Impella CP and 14 patients with VA-ECMO. Baseline characteristics were well-balanced in both groups. No significant difference in periprocedural hemodynamic instability was observed between both groups (3.7% vs. 14.3%; p=0.22). The composite outcome of MACE showed no significant difference (30.7% vs. 21.4%; p=0.59). Bleeding complications were higher in the Impella CP group, but showed no significant difference (22.2% vs. 7.1%; p=0.22) and occurred more at the non-Impella access site. In-hospital mortality was 7.4% in the Impella CP group versus 14.3% in the VA-ECMO group and showed no significant difference (p=0.48). 30-Day mortality showed no significant difference (7.4% vs. 21.4%; p=0.09). Conclusions. In patients with CHIP, there were no significant differences in hemodynamic instability and overall MACE between VA-ECMO or Impella CP device as mechanical circulatory support. Based on this study, the choice of either VA-ECMO or Impella CP does not alter the outcome. Show less
States combine the routine refusal of citizenship to migrants withpolicies that grant newborns of citizens (or residents) full member-ship of society without questions asked. This paper asks what,... Show moreStates combine the routine refusal of citizenship to migrants withpolicies that grant newborns of citizens (or residents) full member-ship of society without questions asked. This paper asks what, ifanything, can justify this differential treatment of the two types ofnewcomers. It explores arguments for differential treatment basedon the differential environmental impact, different impact on the(political) culture of the society in question and differences betweenthe positions of the newcomers themselves. I conclude that,although some justification for differential treatment exists, thecase for it is weaker than one may expect and the grounds onwhich it can be justified are surprising and problematic. Show less
Hickey, C.; Meijers, T.; Robeyns, I.; Timmer, D. 2021
The complexities of how justice comes to be realized, and bywhich agents, is a relatively neglected element in contem-porary theories of justice. This has left several crucial ques-tions about... Show moreThe complexities of how justice comes to be realized, and bywhich agents, is a relatively neglected element in contem-porary theories of justice. This has left several crucial ques-tions about agency and justice undertheorized, such as whysome particular agents are responsible for realizing justice,how their contribution towards realizing justice should beunderstood, and what role agents such as activists and com-munity leaders play in realizing justice. We aim to contributetowards a better understanding of the landscape of thesekinds of questions. First, we argue that theorists should dis-tinguish between (i) agents who are responsible for realizingjustice, but not committed to it, (ii) agents who are not re-sponsible for realizing justice, but who are committed to it,and (iii) agents who are both responsible for and committedto realizing justice. Second, we discuss how to incorporateagents of justice more robustly into theorizing about justice. Show less
Some luck egalitarians argue that justice is just one value among others and is thus not necessarily what we should strive for in order to make the world better. Yet, by focusing on only one... Show moreSome luck egalitarians argue that justice is just one value among others and is thus not necessarily what we should strive for in order to make the world better. Yet, by focusing on only one dimension of what matters – luck equality – it proves very difficult to draw political implications in cases where several values are in tension. We believe that normative political philosophy must have the ambitionto guide political action. Hence, in this paper we make a negative and a positive point. Negatively, we argue that the inability to offer recommendations on what to strive for potentially weakens Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s account of luck egalitarianism. In order not to be irrelevant for political practice, a more serviceable version of luck egalitarianism that would allow for all-things-considered judgments is needed. Positively, we examine two possible routes toward such a view. One would be to stick to pluralism, but to discuss possible clashes and find a rule of regulation in each case. Another would consist in giving up value pluralism by identifying an over-arching value or principle that would arbitrate between different values. We suggest that Lippert-Rasmussen’s foundation of equality carries the potential for such an overarching principle. Show less
In this introduction, we underline the theoretical connection between responsibility, luck, and equality upon which luck egalitarianism rests, and we consider the social and political relevance of... Show moreIn this introduction, we underline the theoretical connection between responsibility, luck, and equality upon which luck egalitarianism rests, and we consider the social and political relevance of the approach. We then situate Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s version of the view as proposed in his book, Luck Egalitarianism, in the egalitarian landscape. Lastly, we introduce the six papers that make up this symposium: some are critiques from within or outside luck egalitarianism, while others engage with the theory by expanding the scope of luck egalitarianism. Show less
