Social cognition emerged in the 1970s and 80s as an attempt to answer social-psychological questions by adopting experimental techniques and theoretical concepts from cognitive psychology. Recently... Show moreSocial cognition emerged in the 1970s and 80s as an attempt to answer social-psychological questions by adopting experimental techniques and theoretical concepts from cognitive psychology. Recently, cognitive psychologists began to build complementary bridges between cognitive and social psychology by showing increasing interest in the cognitive implications of social situations. Here, we take a closer look at the remaining obstacles to join cognitive and social perspectives on human behavior. Using conformity as an example, we attempt to demonstrate that the social-cognition approach has been successful in adopting cognitive concepts and experimental methods, but is still lagging behind with respect to (1) mechanistic theorizing, as it often engages in merely describing phenomena in terms of reasons rather than explaining it in terms of causes and (2) reflecting the sociohistorical context of the phenomenon under investigation. As we try to show, developing mechanistic theories for social phenomena, including the effects of individual differences and their sociohistorical dependencies, is not only possible but necessary to eliminate the boundaries between cognitive and social accounts of human behavior. Show less
Everyday thinking and scientific theorizing about human action control are equally driven by the apparently obvious contrast between will and habit or, in their more modern disguise: intentional... Show moreEveryday thinking and scientific theorizing about human action control are equally driven by the apparently obvious contrast between will and habit or, in their more modern disguise: intentional and automatic processes, and model-based and model-free action planning. And yet, no comprehensive category system to systematically tell truly willed from merely habitual actions is available. As I argue, this is because the contrast is ill-conceived, because almost every single action is both willed and habitual, intentional and automatic, and model-based and model-free, simply because will and habit (and their successors) do not refer to alternative modes or pathways of action control but rather to different phases of action planning. I further discuss three basic misconceptions about action control that binary theorizing relies on: the assumption that intentional processes compete with automatic processes (rather than the former setting the stage for the latter), the assumption that action control is targeting processes (rather than representations of action outcomes), and the assumption that people follow only one goal at a time (rather than multiple goals). I conclude that (at least the present style of) binary theorizing fails to account for action control and should thus be replaced by a more integrative view. Show less
In this article, we challenge the usefulness of “attention” as a unitary construct and/or neural system. We point out that the concept has too many meanings to justify a single term, and that ... Show moreIn this article, we challenge the usefulness of “attention” as a unitary construct and/or neural system. We point out that the concept has too many meanings to justify a single term, and that “attention” is used to refer to both the explanandum (the set of phenomena in need of explanation) and the explanans (the set of processes doing the explaining). To illustrate these points, we focus our discussion on visual selective attention. It is argued that selectivity in processing has emerged through evolution as a design feature of a complex multi-channel sensorimotor system, which generates selective phenomena of “attention” as one of many by-products. Instead of the traditional analytic approach to attention, we suggest a synthetic approach that starts with well-understood mechanisms that do not need to be dedicated to attention, and yet account for the selectivity phenomena under investigation. We conclude that what would serve scientific progress best would be to drop the term “attention” as a label for a specific functional or neural system and instead focus on behaviorally relevant selection processes and the many systems that implement them. Show less
Adaptive behavioral control involves a balance between top-down persistence and flexible updating of goals under changing demands. According to the metacontrol state model (MSM), this balance... Show moreAdaptive behavioral control involves a balance between top-down persistence and flexible updating of goals under changing demands. According to the metacontrol state model (MSM), this balance emerges from the interaction between the frontal and the striatal dopaminergic system. The attentional blink (AB) task has been argued to tap into the interaction between persistence and flexibility, as it reflects overpersistence—the too-exclusive allocation of attentional resources to the processing of the first of two consecutive targets. Notably, previous studies are inconclusive about the association between the AB and noninvasive proxies of dopamine including the spontaneous eye blink rate (sEBR), which allegedly assesses striatal dopamine levels. We aimed to substantiate and extend previous attempts to predict individual sizes of the AB in two separate experiments with larger sample sizes (N = 71 & N = 65) by means of noninvasive behavioral and physiological proxies of dopamine (DA), such as sEBR and mood measures, which are likely to reflect striatal dopamine levels, and color discrimination, which has been argued to tap into the frontal dopamine levels. Our findings did not confirm the prediction that AB size covaries with sEBR, mood, or color discrimination. The implications of this inconsistency with previous observations are discussed. Show less
Few articles in psychology and cognitive neuroscience do without the promise to get into the “mechanisms underlying” particular psychological phenomena. And yet the progress in our mechanistic... Show moreFew articles in psychology and cognitive neuroscience do without the promise to get into the “mechanisms underlying” particular psychological phenomena. And yet the progress in our mechanistic understanding of human cognition and behavior must be considered disappointing: Most “explanations” merely classify the phenomenon under investigation as falling into a broader category of (not any better understood) phenomena, specify the context conditions under which the phenomenon is likely to occur, or specify a particular kind of neural activity (such as the activation of a particular brain area) that is correlated with the phenomenon. None of these meets the criteria of a truly mechanistic explanation, which needs to account for phenomena in terms of “a structure performing a function in virtue of its component parts, component operations, and their organization” (Bechtel, 2006). This contribution characterizes the problem and some of its implications and discusses possible solutions. Show less
Anecdotal evidence suggests that cocaine use will help overcome creative ‘blocks’ by enhancing flexible thinking. Given that cocaine is likely to enhance dopamine (DA) levels, which in turn are... Show moreAnecdotal evidence suggests that cocaine use will help overcome creative ‘blocks’ by enhancing flexible thinking. Given that cocaine is likely to enhance dopamine (DA) levels, which in turn are positively associated with divergent thinking (DT); is a possibility that is tested in the present study. Furthermore, the impact of cocaine is tested on convergent thinking (CT), another aspect of creative thinking, which has been reported to be impaired with high DA levels. It was hypothesized that cocaine would enhance DT and impair CT. A placebo-controlled within-subjects study including 24 healthy poly-drug users was set up to test the influence of oral cocaine (300 mg) on creativity. Verbal CT was assessed with the Remote Associates Task (RAT); figural CT was assessed with the Picture Concepts Task (PCT) and the Tower of London (TOL). Verbal DT was assessed with the Alternative Uses Task (AUT); figural DT was assessed with the Pattern/Line Meanings Task (PLMT). Findings showed that, compared to placebo, cocaine impaired figural CT (TOL) and flexible DT of verbal stimuli (AUT), while it enhanced figural DT (PLMT). No significant effects of cocaine were observed regarding the PCT and RAT. It was demonstrated that cocaine-induced effects on creativity in poly-drug users are stimulus-dependent. Cocaine enhanced performance on figural DT but impaired performance on verbal (flexible) DT. Cocaine impaired CT on only one figural task and but not on the other tasks. As creativity is an important aspect in cognitive therapies, it is important to further understand these discrepancies in creativity task performance. Show less
This article provides an update of the Theory of Event Coding (TEC), which claims that perception and action are identical processes operating on the same codes – event files consisting of... Show moreThis article provides an update of the Theory of Event Coding (TEC), which claims that perception and action are identical processes operating on the same codes – event files consisting of integrated networks of sensorimotor feature codes. The original version of the theory emphasized its representational underpinnings, but recent theoretical developments provide the basis for a more integrated view consisting of both the codes that are shared between perception and action in the control processes operating on these codes. Four developments are discussed in more detail: The degree to which the integration and retrieval of event files depends on current goals, how metacontrol states impact the handling of event files, how feature binding relates to event learning, and how the integration of non-social events relates to the integration of social events. Case examples using various versions of the Simon task are used to explain how the new version of TEC explains interactions between perception and action in non-social and social situations. Show less
Accumulating theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that task-irrelevant mood states have specific effects on insightful and analytical problem solving, but few studies have directly related... Show moreAccumulating theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that task-irrelevant mood states have specific effects on insightful and analytical problem solving, but few studies have directly related those states to these two problem-solving strategies. The present research investigated the impact of pre-existing mood and experimentally induced mood states on solving problems that could be solved analytically or by insight. Results revealed that an induced negative moods, as compared to an induced neutral mood, increases the probability of analytic solutions. In contrast, spontaneous positive moods facilitated problem solving performance regardless of the specific solution strategy. Additionally, the process of generating solutions had a marked effect on subsequent memory recall regardless of recall interval. These findings provide support for the cognitive tuning theory. Show less
Virtual-hand-illusion studies often use explicit and implicit measures of body ownership but no agreed-on implicit measure of agency exists. We investigated whether the Intentional Binding (IB)... Show moreVirtual-hand-illusion studies often use explicit and implicit measures of body ownership but no agreed-on implicit measure of agency exists. We investigated whether the Intentional Binding (IB) effect could serve as such a measure. A pilot study confirmed that current consistency increases both perceived agency and IB. In three experiments, current consistency was 50% but the previously experienced consistency was either 100% or 0%. When previous and present consistency experience were separated by a short break, both explicit judgments and IB showed a contrast effect. Eliminating the break reversed the effect in explicit agency but not in IB; and making the transition between previous and present consistency smoother replicated the effect for explicit agency but reversed the pattern for IB. Our findings suggest that explicit agency and IB rely on different sources of information, presumably including cross-sensory correlations, predictions of expected action-effects, and comparisons between present and previous consistency experiences. Show less
The ventral tegmental area (VTA) and substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) are assumed to play a key role in dopamine-related functions such as reward-related behaviour, motivation, addiction and... Show moreThe ventral tegmental area (VTA) and substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) are assumed to play a key role in dopamine-related functions such as reward-related behaviour, motivation, addiction and motor functioning. Although dopamine-producing midbrain structures are bordering, they show significant differences in structure and function that argue for a distinction when studying the functions of the dopaminergic midbrain, especially by means of neuroimaging. First, unlike the SNc, the VTA is not a nucleus, which makes it difficult to delineate the structure due to lack of clear anatomical borders. Second, there is no consensus in the literature about the anatomical nomenclature to describe the VTA. Third, these factors in combination with limitations in magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) complicate VTA visualization. We suggest that developing an MRI-compatible probabilistic atlas of the VTA will help to overcome these issues. Such an atlas can be used to identify the individual VTA and serve as region-of-interest for functional MRI. Show less
Human beings are assumed to own a concept of their self, but it remains a mystery how they represent themselves and others. I shall develop a theoretical framework, inspired by the Theory of Event... Show moreHuman beings are assumed to own a concept of their self, but it remains a mystery how they represent themselves and others. I shall develop a theoretical framework, inspired by the Theory of Event Coding, of how people represent themselves and others, how and under which circumstances these two kinds of representations interact and what consequences this has. In a nutshell, I shall argue that self- and other-representations can overlap to the degree that they share features, that the shared features are particularly relevant or salient, and that the individual is under a particular metacontrol state. Then I shall argue that self-concepts emerge through active exploration of one’s physical and social environment during infancy and childhood, as well as through cultural learning, and that their main purpose is related to social communication but not online action control. Show less
To elucidate the working mechanism behind anthropomorphism, this study investigated whether human participants would anthropomorphize a robot more if they move synchronously versus non... Show moreTo elucidate the working mechanism behind anthropomorphism, this study investigated whether human participants would anthropomorphize a robot more if they move synchronously versus non-synchronously with it, and whether this is affected by which of the two initiates the movements. We tested two competing hypotheses. The feature-overlap hypothesis predicts that moving in synchrony would increase perceived self-other feature overlap, which in turn might spread activation to codes of features related to humans—which should increase anthropomorphization. In contrast, the autonomy hypothesis predicts that unpredictability increases anthropomorphization, and thus that whenever the robot initiates movements, or when the human initiates movements to which the robot moves non-synchronously, there is an increased perception of the robot as a more human-like, intentionally acting creature, which in turn should increase anthropomorphization. We performed a study with synchrony as within-subjects factor, and initiator (robot or human) as between-subjects factor. To study the impact of synchrony on self-other overlap and perception of human likeness, participants completed two tasks that served as implicit measures of state anthropomorphization, and two questionnaires that served as explicit measures of state anthropomorphization toward the robot. The two implicit measures were the joint Simon task and one-shot Dictator Game. Additionally, participants filled in a trait anthropomorphization questionnaire, to enable correction for baseline tendencies to anthropomorphize. The synchrony manipulation did not affect the joint Simon effect, although there was an effect on average reaction time (RT), where in the group in which the robot initiated the movement, RTs were slower when the human and robot moved non-synchronously. The Dictator Game offer and the state anthropomorphization questionnaires were not affected by the synchrony manipulation. There was, however, a positive correlation between current anthropomorphization of the robot and amount of money offered to it. Given that most measures were not systematically affected by our manipulation, it appears that either our design was suboptimal, or that synchronization does not affect the anthropomorphization of a robot. Show less
There is substantial interest in the possibility that cognitive skills can be improved by dedicated behavioral training. Yet despite the large amount of work being conducted in this domain, there... Show moreThere is substantial interest in the possibility that cognitive skills can be improved by dedicated behavioral training. Yet despite the large amount of work being conducted in this domain, there is not an explicit and widely agreed upon consensus around the best methodological practices. This document seeks to fill this gap. We start from the perspective that there are many types of studies that are important in this domain—e.g., feasibility, mechanistic, efficacy, and effectiveness. These studies have fundamentally different goals, and, as such, the best-practice methods to meet those goals will also differ. We thus make suggestions in topics ranging from the design and implementation of control groups, to reporting of results, to dissemination and communication, taking the perspective that the best practices are not necessarily uniform across all study types. We also explicitly recognize and discuss the fact that there are methodological issues around which we currently lack the theoretical and/or empirical foundation to determine best practices (e.g., as pertains to assessing participant expectations). For these, we suggest important routes forward, including greater interdisciplinary collaboration with individuals from domains that face related concerns. Our hope is that these recommendations will greatly increase the rate at which science in this domain advances. Show less
Creativity is a compelling but heterogeneous phenomenon. As opposed to big-C creativity, which is regarded as limited to the rare brilliant mind, little-c creativity is indispensable in adaptive... Show moreCreativity is a compelling but heterogeneous phenomenon. As opposed to big-C creativity, which is regarded as limited to the rare brilliant mind, little-c creativity is indispensable in adaptive everyday behavior, serving to adjust to changing circumstances and challenges. Computational approaches help demystify human creativity by offering insights into the underlying mechanisms and their characteristics. Recently proposed computational models to creative cognition often focus on either divergent or convergent problem-solving, but some start to integrate these processes into broader cognitive frameworks. We briefly review the state-of-the-art in the field and point out theoretical overlap. We extract basic principles that most existing models agree on and desiderata on the way towards a comprehensive model. Show less
