In recent years, the use of primary data in terrorism research has increased. In order to maximise the benefits of this trend, we want to encourage terrorism scholars to implement open science... Show moreIn recent years, the use of primary data in terrorism research has increased. In order to maximise the benefits of this trend, we want to encourage terrorism scholars to implement open science practices more systematically. This article therefore presents different avenues towards open and reproducible terrorism studies. After introducing the open science movement and advantages of open science, we report an online survey study (N = 75) that shows that terrorism researchers have favourable attitudes towards and are keen to engage in open science activities. Findings, however, also point to key challenges that might prevent the implementation of open science in terrorism studies. Survey respondents were particularly concerned about sharing sensitive data, the risk of malicious practices, publishing in low-impact open access outlets, and indicated that open science seemed mainly targeted at quantitative research. To illustrate how researchers from different backgrounds and with potential resource restrictions can adopt open science practices, we propose practical solutions to address and reflect on these barriers. Show less
This research note argues that the ‘lone wolf’ typology should be fundamentally reconsidered. Based on a three-year empirical research project, two key points are made to support this argument.... Show moreThis research note argues that the ‘lone wolf’ typology should be fundamentally reconsidered. Based on a three-year empirical research project, two key points are made to support this argument. First, the authors found that ties to online and offline radical milieus are critical to lone actors’ adoption and maintenance of both the motive and capability to commits acts of terrorism. Secondly, in terms of pre-attack behaviors, the majority of lone actors are not the stealthy and highly capable terrorists the ‘lone wolf’ moniker alludes to. These findings not only urge a reconsideration of the utility of the lone-wolf concept, they are also particularly relevant for counterterrorism professional, whose conceptions of this threat may have closed off avenues for detection and interdiction that do, in fact, exist. Show less
The threat posed by lone actors ranks high on the list of terrorism-related security concerns. In recent years especially, discussions about these perpetrators have focused primarily on those... Show moreThe threat posed by lone actors ranks high on the list of terrorism-related security concerns. In recent years especially, discussions about these perpetrators have focused primarily on those associated with, or inspired by, Islamic State and other jihadist entities. However, a significant portion of lone actors actually hail from right-wing extremist milieus. This article serves to draw attention to this subcategory of lone-actor terrorists, with a particular focus on their backgrounds and pre-attack behaviours. To that end, two datasets are presented that allow a comparison to be made between right-wing extremist lone actors and other ideologically-motivated lone actors. While several differences are noted, perhaps the most surprising finding is the degree of similarity between right-wing extremist lone actors and those adhering to different ideological currents. The results contribute to a knowledge-base that can inform discussion about whether risk assessment tools and protocols should differentiate between ideological categories of lone actor terrorists. Show less
Schuurman, B.W.; Bakker, E.; Gill, P.; Bouhana, N. 2018
This article provides an in-depth assessment of lone actor terrorists’ attack planning and preparation. A codebook of 198 variables related to different aspects of pre-attack behavior is applied to... Show moreThis article provides an in-depth assessment of lone actor terrorists’ attack planning and preparation. A codebook of 198 variables related to different aspects of pre-attack behavior is applied to a sample of 55 lone actor terrorists. Data were drawn from open-source materials and complemented where possible with primary sources. Most lone actors are not highly lethal or surreptitious attackers. They are generally poor at maintaining operational security, leak their motivations and capabilities in numerous ways, and generally do so months and even years before an attack. Moreover, the “loneness” thought to define this type of terrorism is generally absent; most lone actors uphold social ties that are crucial to their adoption and maintenance of the motivation and capability to commit terrorist violence. The results offer concrete input for those working to detect and prevent this form of terrorism and argue for a re-evaluation of the “lone actor” concept. Show less
