Following the Syrian regime’s violent crackdown on protesters during the 2011 Syrian uprising, leading powers in the Arab world spearheaded a coordinated effort to isolate the Asad regime. But,... Show moreFollowing the Syrian regime’s violent crackdown on protesters during the 2011 Syrian uprising, leading powers in the Arab world spearheaded a coordinated effort to isolate the Asad regime. But, since 2018, we have been witnessing a drastic reversal of this policy, with Arab countries reopening their embassies in Damascus. As the conditions that gave rise to ostracising the Syrian regime have only worsened, we should have expected further intensification of the status of Syria as a pariah state, not its rehabilitation. Nevertheless, this remains a protracted ambivalent process: it involves diplomatic normalisation without political and economic reintegration. What explains this ambivalence? To answer this question, I deploy securitization theory and put forth the concept of ‘mirroring’ securitization. I argue that both the securitization and desecuritization of the Syrian regime by leading Arab states mirror the way of thinking about security of their Western allies, especially the US, and targets Western – not Arab – audiences. Arab states’ speech acts concerning Syria have served to either legitimise from the bottom Western security policies or verbalise what Western countries cannot (yet) afford to verbalise. Overall, this article bridges securitization theory and the study of international hierarchies, and reflects on the agential limits and potentials of securitizing actors in the Global South. Show less
The alliance between Iran, Syria and Hezbollah is central to Middle East security –yet we know surprisingly little about what makes it possible. Existing accounts concentrate on material or... Show moreThe alliance between Iran, Syria and Hezbollah is central to Middle East security –yet we know surprisingly little about what makes it possible. Existing accounts concentrate on material or ideational incentives to explain this alliance, without however offering a systematic explanation for its rise and endurance. Most strikingly, these accounts fail to acknowledge how different these actors are from one another, and how unlikely it is for them to form an alliance –let alone a stable one. This article traces the genealogy of this curious form of cooperation in order to shed light on the sources of converge that are strong enough to overcome their manifold divergences. It finds that shared memory of humiliation and betrayal at the hands of the US and the West more generally is the main reason for the rise and endurance of this alliance. It is an alliance that defends an absolutist conception of self-determination in order to resist US hegemony in the region, even it violates the individual self-determination of the people under their authority. Overall, the article shows that neither materialist nor ideational approaches get to the bottom of why states cooperate amongst themselves and with nonstate actors to form counter-hegemonic alliances, such as the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis—a form of counter-hegemonic non-hegemonic cooperation. Show less
Why do rebels enter formal politics whilst at the same time seeking to preserve their informal military force? Scholars tend to see armed political parties as either a transient phenomenon when... Show moreWhy do rebels enter formal politics whilst at the same time seeking to preserve their informal military force? Scholars tend to see armed political parties as either a transient phenomenon when states transition from war to peace or, conversely, as a failure of the peace process. Whilst some view armed political parties as signalling a move towards democratisation, others consider them as examples of the failure of the post-war democratisation. Based on rebels’ political participation in the Middle East, this chapter puts forward an alternative explanation. It argues that rebel groups enter formal politics when the threat to their informal role increases. They enter politics to secure their autonomy from it. Show less
The main aim of this chapter is to conceptualise the conflict between states and non-state armed groups in the Middle East. It begins by tracing the colonial origin of the distinction between state... Show moreThe main aim of this chapter is to conceptualise the conflict between states and non-state armed groups in the Middle East. It begins by tracing the colonial origin of the distinction between state and non-state violence, the emergence of counterinsurgency and its reincarnation in liberal interventions. It then considers the politics of demarcation of legitimate and illegitimate violence and its centrality in the scramble among local and international state and non-state actors to control the Middle East. The chapter analyses the effects of both physical violence and ideological confrontation in the origins and consequences of political violence in the Middle East. It finally illustrates these dynamics by analysing the concerted international and Lebanese campaign to destroy Hezbollah and the resilience of Hezbollah to withstand such enormous pressure and become stronger as a result. Show less
