Scholars of mobilisation and policy influence employ two quite different approaches to mapping interest group systems. Those interested in research questions on mobilisation typically rely on a... Show moreScholars of mobilisation and policy influence employ two quite different approaches to mapping interest group systems. Those interested in research questions on mobilisation typically rely on a bottom-up mapping strategy in order to characterise the total size and composition of interest group communities. Researchers with an interest in policy influence usually rely on a top-down strategy in which the mapping of politically active organisations depends on samples of specific policies. But some scholars also use top-down data gathered for other research questions on mobilisation (and vice versa). However, it is currently unclear how valid such large-N data for different types of research questions are. We illustrate our argument by addressing these questions using unique data sets drawn from the INTEREURO project on lobbying in the European Union and the European Union’s Transparency Register. Our findings suggest that top-down and bottom-up mapping strategies lead to profoundly different maps of interest group communities. Show less
The European Union interest group population is often characterised as being biased towards business and detached from its constituency base. Many scholars attribute this to institutional factors... Show moreThe European Union interest group population is often characterised as being biased towards business and detached from its constituency base. Many scholars attribute this to institutional factors unique to the EU. Yet, assessing whether or not the EU is indeed unique in this regard requires a comparative research design. We compare the EU interest group population with those in four member states: France, Great Britain, Germany and the Netherlands. We differentiate system, policy domain and organisational factors and examine their effects on interest group diversity. Our results show that the EU interest system is not more biased towards the representation of business interests than the other systems. Moreover, EU interest organisations are not more detached from their constituents than those in the studied countries. Everywhere, business interest associations seem to be better capable of representing their members’ interests than civil society groups. These findings suggest that the EU is less of a sui generis system than commonly assumed and imply the need for more fine-grained analyses of interest group diversity. Show less
The number of interest organizations (density) varies across policy domains, political issues and economic sectors. This shapes the nature and outcomes of interest representation. In this... Show moreThe number of interest organizations (density) varies across policy domains, political issues and economic sectors. This shapes the nature and outcomes of interest representation. In this contribution, we explain the density of interest organizations per economic sector in the European Union on the basis of political and economic institutional factors. Focusing on business interest representation, we show that economic institutions structure the ‘supply' of interest organizations by affecting the number of potential constituents, the resources available for lobbying and the geographical level of collective action of businesses. In contrast, we do not find consistent evidence that political institutions produce ‘demand' for interest organizations by making laws, developing public policy or spending money. This is in contrast to the extensive evidence that such factors affect lobbying practices. The European Union interest system is (partially) shaped by economic factors, relatively independent from public policy or institutions. Show less
Waarom komen bepaalde onderwerpen op de beleidsagenda en andere niet? En waarom leidt deze aandacht in sommige gevallen tot beleidsverandering en in andere gevallen niet?Een traditioneel antwoord... Show moreWaarom komen bepaalde onderwerpen op de beleidsagenda en andere niet? En waarom leidt deze aandacht in sommige gevallen tot beleidsverandering en in andere gevallen niet?Een traditioneel antwoord op deze vragen zou zich richten op de verkiezingsprogramma's van politieke partijen en de afspraken die partijen vervolgens in coalitieakkoorden overeenkomen. Immers, in een vertegenwoordigende democratie zijn het de verkiezingen en de beloftes van partijen die de beleidsprioriteit binnen het openbaar bestuur bepalen. Eventuele afwijkingen hierop zou men vooral vinden in de traagheid van institutionele en organisatorische aanpassingen, waardoor beleidsverandering met kleine stapjes - incrementeel - verloopt. Show less
