This paper addresses the constitutional entrenchment of foreign policy preferences, or “world views”, from the vantage point of International Relations theory. Empirically, norms that sketch out... Show moreThis paper addresses the constitutional entrenchment of foreign policy preferences, or “world views”, from the vantage point of International Relations theory. Empirically, norms that sketch out certain visions of global governance have become a popular feature of constitutional design. The paper expounds both their potential, as well as pitfalls to avoid, with a particular focus on Constructivist scholarship. In terms of their merits, they can serve as evidence of a “normative basis” for foreign policy and as parameters for legitimacy. Furthermore, they represent both evidence of, and fuel for, processes of socialization in foreign policy. However, Constructivists tempted to draw on such constitutional worldviews should heed three main caveats. Firstly, while the constitution is supreme in the legal realm, it is only one of many possible expressions of normative preferences from a political science perspective. Secondly, they should avoid confusion between domestic constitutional standards and universal ones. Thirdly, they should be aware of the problematic of the “dead hand of the past”, i.e., while constitutional entrenchment may lend norms particular gravitas, it also makes them prone to become out-dated. By staying clear of these pitfalls, Constructivist theorists can embrace contemporary constitutions in their quest to elucidate which principles and ideas shape the international order and its maturing legal framework. Show less
