Over the past decades, extremist violence and jihadism/religious movements have become an important factor in the political and economic developments of drylands. This evolution has been attributed... Show moreOver the past decades, extremist violence and jihadism/religious movements have become an important factor in the political and economic developments of drylands. This evolution has been attributed to a variety of underlying dynamics that are typical for drylands, including increasing scarcity of land and water due to climate change; a growing population; the poor performance and authoritarian character of states; increasing displacements and resettlements related to large-scale investments; and progressive marginalization and exclusion of specific social groups. In addition, increasing levels of conflict between population groups have provided a fertile ground for recruitment by armed groups for self-defence and religious purposes, often along ethnic lines, and also to secure access to natural resources. The chapter discusses the backgrounds of these movements and shows how a jihadist movement in the Sahel transformed from a terrorist movement into a rural insurgency. Show less
The new connectivity, through mobile phones, social media, and wireless internet, is an agent in social change in the drylands. In this chapter, we present four case studies: the introduction of... Show moreThe new connectivity, through mobile phones, social media, and wireless internet, is an agent in social change in the drylands. In this chapter, we present four case studies: the introduction of mobile apps in Mongolia and Kenya, the role of mobile telephony in the Sahel, and the introduction of online learning in the Negev Desert. Each of these case studies develops an argument around the role of connectivity in ‘giving a voice’ to the people living in drylands. Indeed, as the studies show, the new technology of communication is a resource for such populations, especially when we focus on the benefits of improved communication and access to information. However, the effective use of such a resource is hampered by the lack of knowledge of dryland dynamics among the developers of the new technology and by the imposed power relations of the State. Also, the technology may follow its own pathway, being appropriated by the population in unexpected ways and creating new power relations that may also lead to conflict. Show less
This essay departs from my search to understand how (new/digital) media interact with society and vice versa, especially in relation to political communication and political change. These ‘effects’... Show moreThis essay departs from my search to understand how (new/digital) media interact with society and vice versa, especially in relation to political communication and political change. These ‘effects’ of changing media technology, however, not only touch the societies that we try to understand but also our own practice of ‘doing’ research. Especially in area studies, the ethnographic method, the relations with the field, with people is at the center of ‘knowing’. Hence changes in these relationships, such as caused by (digital/new) Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), will also influence the ‘data’ gathering, the insights, in short, the knowledge production processes and outcomes. In this essay I compare my own presence as a researcher in the Sahel in the 1990s and now, and I reinterpret this presence in relation to the changing communication ecology in the Sahel. My lens to analyze this is the concept of mediatization and mediation. It offers an interpretation of the changing relations in the field that has expanded with the use of digital media. Hence, I try to understand changes in knowledge ‘construction’ in ethnographic practice in the digital age. Show less
The enormous diversity of responses to the drought conditions in the Sahel in the last thirty years makes it difficult to formulate general conclusions about people's responses to climate change.... Show moreThe enormous diversity of responses to the drought conditions in the Sahel in the last thirty years makes it difficult to formulate general conclusions about people's responses to climate change. It is important to study the pathways of decisionmaking units at the micro-level and even at individual level and to emphasize the socioeconomic differences in changing patterns of responses and the gradual changes in people's 'habitus'. To understand the options available to people it is wise to focus on the technological changes in land use, the changes in the control over resources, migration and mobility, the trends of livelihood diversification and institutional change. The chapter is based on recent and ongoing research in Kaya (Burkina Faso), and Koutiala and Douentza (both in Mali). Summary. [Book abstract] Show less
Het Dogongebied maakt deel uit van de regio Mopti en behoort tot de armste gebieden van Mali. De economie van het gebied is gebaseerd op de graanbouw voor eigen gebruik en op de veeteelt voor... Show moreHet Dogongebied maakt deel uit van de regio Mopti en behoort tot de armste gebieden van Mali. De economie van het gebied is gebaseerd op de graanbouw voor eigen gebruik en op de veeteelt voor vlees en melk. Voor enkele bewoners die op het Plateau van Bandiagara leven, is tuinbouw de enige bron van inkomsten. In de afgelopen decennia heeft de technologische ontwikkeling een versnelde groei van landbouwgronden met zich meegebracht. Hoewel de productie sinds lange tijd schijnt af te nemen onder invloed van de droogte, is de totale productie niet gedaald dankzij de snelle groei van het landbouwareaal. De landbouwstrategieën van de Dogon worden hier besproken per agro-ecologische zone: graanbouw, uienteelt en marginale veeteelt op het Plateau van Bandiagara, en veeteelt, graanbouw, oasen, steun en handel in de vlakten. Noten. [Samenvatting ASC Leiden] Show less
Bruijn, M.E. de; Beek, W.E.A. van; Dijk, J.W.M. van 2003
De Peul en de Dogon leven, ruim voor het tijdperk van grote Peulstaten als het Macinarijk, reeds lang naast elkaar in centraal Mali. De Peul weidden er hun kudden, pleegden er overvallen en... Show moreDe Peul en de Dogon leven, ruim voor het tijdperk van grote Peulstaten als het Macinarijk, reeds lang naast elkaar in centraal Mali. De Peul weidden er hun kudden, pleegden er overvallen en gebruikten het gebied als slavenreservoir. Ook de Dogon organiseerden van tijd tot tijd overvallen. Door de geschiedenis heen hebben de betrekkingen tussen de Dogon en de Peul afwisselende uitingsvormen gekend afhankelijk van de diverse woongebieden in de Seno-Gondo- en Seno-Mangovlakten. Rond de Falaise van Bandiagara blijkt uit diverse rituelen van de Dogon een diepe rancune jegens de Peul. In het spraakgebruik van de Dogon staat de Peul symbool voor het beeld van 'de ander', de bewoner van de wildernis. Maar als mens van de wildernis vertegenwoordigt de Peul ook andere waarden: omdat de wildernis wijs en sterk is, maar ook gevaarlijk en grillig, is de Peul dat ook. De betrekkingen tussen de Houmbebe, een Dogon subgroep van landbouwers in de Hayre, en de Peul, veehouders en halfnomaden, hebben een werkbare vorm gekregen door de opkomst van de 'njaatigi' (gastheer). In elk dorp heeft de Peul een 'njaatigi' op wie hij een beroep kan doen. Door de aanhoudende droogte in het gebied verandert de 'njaatigi'-verhouding echter steeds meer in een afhankelijkheidsrelatie. Noten. [Samenvatting ASC Leiden] Show less
African history of the Sahel and Sudan zone appears to have been marked by political instability. Resistance to Fulbe empires was more common than the main literature suggests. The Fulbe are... Show moreAfrican history of the Sahel and Sudan zone appears to have been marked by political instability. Resistance to Fulbe empires was more common than the main literature suggests. The Fulbe are pastoralists and the empires of nomadic pastoralists are inherently unstable. The Fulbe emirates are often described as having been born out of the revolts of religiously inspired nomadic pastoralists against oppressive sedentary regimes. However, the resistance movements against Fulbe hegemony itself can partly be explained as revolts of the originally nomadic population who felt their cause was not well defended by the elite of these emirates. Opposition to the ideology of Islam inspired revolts of non-Islamic groups. These resistance movements were also fed by the oppressive nature of the new emirates, whose most prominent characteristic was slavery. Resistance is expressed in contemporary ritual and oral traditions, challenging the official historiography of these emirates. Three examples are taken in this chapter to illustrate resistance against Fulbe hegemony: the Timbo Emirate in the Fuuta Jallon, the Diina Emirate in central Mali and the Futanke Emirate which followed Diina in the second half of the 19th century. Notes, ref., sum. [Book abstract] Show less
