This chapter addresses the current developments in the taxation of the digital economy including the current unilateral, multilateral, and EU proposals including objectives, challenges, and... Show moreThis chapter addresses the current developments in the taxation of the digital economy including the current unilateral, multilateral, and EU proposals including objectives, challenges, and problems arising when implementing these proposals. The chapter also provides some elements of analysis regarding the evolution from e-commerce to the digital economy, as well as addresses the concerns regarding the requirement of local presence that may constitute a barrier to trade and investment. The diversity of the proposals reveals that there is no clarity on the best way to deal with highly digitalised business, with the multilateral approaches facing similar scrutiny, especially by developing countries. Therefore, as in trade and investment, multilateral approaches will need to do more to gain legitimacy vis-à-vis developing countries. The chapter concludes with some recommendations regarding the steps that can be taken to address this topic by governments, as well as policymakers at the national, EU, and international levels. Show less
On 31 January 2020 the United Kingdom (UK) left the European Union (EU). In the European Parliament (EP), Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) cried together and folded flags. It marked the... Show moreOn 31 January 2020 the United Kingdom (UK) left the European Union (EU). In the European Parliament (EP), Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) cried together and folded flags. It marked the end of an era. At the end of that year, after much agony, the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) was signed on 24 December 2020 and the ratification was completed in April 2021. The TCA allows both entities tariff-free, quota-free access to markets for goods. Services are not part of the TCA. Part of the agreement are also fishing rights as well as cooperation in the area of security (e.g., in the area of information sharing security related to matters of internal security), but no mention of security and defence collaboration. There are still many unresolved issues. Some of these issues involve fishing matters (Reuters, 2021). But collaboration in security and defence matters is also crucial as demonstrated by the need to deal with the war in Ukraine that erupted following the Russian invasion on 24 February. Show less
This contribution addresses the current developments in the taxation of the digital economy including the current unilateral, multilateral, and EU proposals including objectives, challenges, and... Show moreThis contribution addresses the current developments in the taxation of the digital economy including the current unilateral, multilateral, and EU proposals including objectives, challenges, and problems arising when implementing these proposals. This contribution also provides some elements of analysis regarding the evolution from e-commerce to the digital economy, as well as addresses the concerns regarding the requirement of local presence that may constitute a barrier to trade and investment. The diversity of the proposals reveals that there is no clarity on the best way to deal with highly digitalised business, with the multilateral approaches facing similar scrutiny especially by developing countries. Therefore, as in trade and investment, multilateral approaches will need to do more to gain legitimacy vis-à-vis developing countries. This contribution concludes with some recommendations regarding the steps that can be taken to address this topic by governments, as well as policymakers at the national, EU, and international levels. Show less
Egypt’s position in the caliphate has generally been considered either as loosely tributary, with its governors running the province more or less as a personal possession, granting the caliph a... Show moreEgypt’s position in the caliphate has generally been considered either as loosely tributary, with its governors running the province more or less as a personal possession, granting the caliph a share of the province’s riches, as it pleased them, or as the outer rim of a radial system extending from the caliph’s capital and through which caliphal power was exercised by means of administrative control and military force. In this model – which looks from the center outwards – Egypt is located at the decision-making periphery of the Muslim empire, the recipient of directives and consumer of developments initiated at the imperial capital (first located in Medina, then Damascus, and finally Baghdad), where the sneezes that precipitated all of the caliphate’s colds occurred.This chapter takes a different view. By examining Egypt’s relationship to the imperial center between the Arab conquest and the establishment of the Fatimid caliphate in Cairo in 969 CE, and the complex, ambiguous, and shifting processes of interdependency, caliphal ambition, and local self-assertion as they appear in the sources, I will argue that at all times Egypt’s centrality to the caliphate was a two-way relationship, in which Egypt occupied a key place in caliphal strategic thinking, and in which Egyptians saw themselves as intrinsic to the Muslim imperial project. Show less
Chapter 3 examines the decisions that inform the BRI’s institution building.It explores the tension between strategic and effficiency-oriented concerns, tracing these tensions across three issue... Show moreChapter 3 examines the decisions that inform the BRI’s institution building.It explores the tension between strategic and effficiency-oriented concerns, tracing these tensions across three issue areas: tax, trade, and development finance. The chapter shows that, in dealing with challenges, the Chinese government lacks an integral governance framework that systemically coordinates all relevant institutions. Instead, it takes varied institutional approaches to overseeing BRI projects, ranging from bilateral trade agreements to multilateral fijinancial institutions. This raises the question of what is driving China’s development of agreements and institutions for the BRI. The chapter argues that China’s development of BRI tax initiatives is mostly motivated by efficiency drivers, its trade agreements with key BRI partners by strategic drivers, and its efforts to establish multilateral financial institutions by both drivers. Show less
