On 26 July 2012, Mario Draghi declared in front of a group of about 200 London business people that he would do ‘whatever it takes to save the euro’.1 These seven words have been analysed to have... Show moreOn 26 July 2012, Mario Draghi declared in front of a group of about 200 London business people that he would do ‘whatever it takes to save the euro’.1 These seven words have been analysed to have made all the difference.2 By doing so, the European Central Bank (ECB) effectively ended a long period of uncertainty and indecisiveness. The markets needed a strong signal so that they knew that the young European currency would be supported politically and economically. After summer 2012, the euro area did not experience the same level of crisis, although the sovereign debt crisis was truly resolved only in 2015 and there were still challenging times until then. Show less
This chapter offers an inquiry into how EMU has been conceptualized in the European Union by analysing the path taken over the past five decades. The definition of what is on the agenda, and... Show moreThis chapter offers an inquiry into how EMU has been conceptualized in the European Union by analysing the path taken over the past five decades. The definition of what is on the agenda, and considered part of the scope of EMU, has had a major impact on what EMU actually covers. In the early years, the focus was on exchange rates, policy coordination, and central banking. In the second part, macroeconomic policy coordination with limits on budgetary deficits and public debt took centre stage. The third period added the importance of banking regulation. The most recent period is branching out into the early steps of fiscal federalism. These topics had been considered when conceptualizing early plans, but had not been developed, as there was insufficient consensus for actionable points, leading to asymmetries. Revisions to EMU followed the various crises, for example the financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis, and most recently the COVID-19 crisis. Theories of European economic and political integration impacted the creation of EMU at the time of its design, but the pragmatic understanding of what was feasible was at least as important for determining what became part of the institutional design of EMU. Show less
This chapter charts the position of the European Union (EU) in the global political economy (GPE), identifies key dimensions of change and development, and evaluates the EU’s impact on the... Show moreThis chapter charts the position of the European Union (EU) in the global political economy (GPE), identifies key dimensions of change and development, and evaluates the EU’s impact on the operation of the contemporary GPE. It does so by outlining key ideas in international political economy (IPE), by relating these to the growth of the EU, and by assessing the EU’s role in the GPE in three areas: European integration itself, the EU’s engagement in the GPE, and the EU’s claims to be a major economic power. The final part of the chapter brings these together an examination of global economic governance—in particular, the EU’s role in the financial, multilateral state system with its principles of global governance, and pays some attention to recent crises (such as the Covid-19 pandemic) and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Show less
As the guardian of the euro, the European Central Bank (ECB) manages what has long been considered the prime example of differentiated integration (Verhelst 2013; Schimmelfennig 2014). Originally... Show moreAs the guardian of the euro, the European Central Bank (ECB) manages what has long been considered the prime example of differentiated integration (Verhelst 2013; Schimmelfennig 2014). Originally known by other names, such as ‘variable geometry’ or ‘two-speed Europe’, differentiation arose when the Maastricht Treaty established Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with two member states (Denmark and the United Kingdom) receiving formal opt-outs (Thygesen 1999). Importantly, their autonomous decisions not to join the single cur-rency did not reflect a lack of capacity to meet requirements for joining. Rather this choice reflected deep-seated concerns among political elites and electorates about losing sovereignty in an area of core state powers. The 1992 and 2000 referendums in Denmark and the 2003 refer-endum in Sweden offer the clearest examples of this dynamic (Leuffen et al. 2013: 149).The ECB has overseen both a significant widening and deepening of integration in its domain during the two decades since its birth. While it was confronted with the threat of disintegration in the context of the euro area crisis, it has played its part in successfully averting the scenario of one (or more) member states leaving the euro area (Spiegel 2014; Schoeller 2018). At the height of the Greek sovereign debt crisis, there was widespread concern that the departure of one member of the euro area could lead to a domino effect – thereby calling into question the long-term viability of the single currency itself (Chibber 2011; Kutter 2014). From a neofunctionalist per-spective, one may argue that a supranational institution, such as the ECB, would seek to advance European integration as a supranational solution to transnational problems. The euro crisis offered a window of opportunity for pursuing this goal as the neofunctionalist logic suggests (Haas 1958; Schimmelfennig 2012; Hodson 2013; Niemann and Ioannou 2015). Show less
À l’été 2020, dans une démarche sans précédent, l’UE a proposé à ses États membres de les aider à faire face aux retombées de la pandémie de Covid-19. Pour ce faire, elle a puisé dans... Show moreÀ l’été 2020, dans une démarche sans précédent, l’UE a proposé à ses États membres de les aider à faire face aux retombées de la pandémie de Covid-19. Pour ce faire, elle a puisé dans le budget à long terme de l’UE (2021-2027) et créé un nouveau système de soutien temporaire appelé « NextGenerationEU » (NGEU). Officiellement mis en place en février 2021, la « facilité de reprise et de résilience » (FRR), qui est au cœur de NGEU, offre un soutien financier aux États membres, notamment par une combinaison de subventions et de prêts (Parlement européen et Conseil de l’UE 2021). Pour financer ces dépenses, l’UE a émis des emprunts, dont l’ampleur et la portée sont inédites et rompent avec des tabous de longue date (Alcidi et Corti, ce volume). Malgré tout cela, tous les analystes ne s’accordent pas pour dire qu’il s’agit là d’un changement radical (par exemple, Howarth et Quaglia, 2021). La Commission européenne a insisté pour que ces fonds soient assortis de conditions, à savoir être consacrés à la transition numérique, à la transition énergétique et à la stimulation d’une croissance sociale et inclusive bénéficiant à la prochaine génération. Les États membres doivent soumettre des plans nationaux de reprise et de résilience (PRR) détaillés pour accéder aux fonds. Show less
This chapter introduces economic and monetary union (EMU). It describes the key components of EMU and what happens when countries join. EMU was the result of decades of collaboration and learning,... Show moreThis chapter introduces economic and monetary union (EMU). It describes the key components of EMU and what happens when countries join. EMU was the result of decades of collaboration and learning, which have been subdivided here into three periods: 1969–91, from the agreement to creation to its inclusion in the Treaty on European Union (TEU); 1992–2002, from having the plans for EMU to the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates; and 2002 onwards, when EMU had been established, and euro banknotes and coins were circulating in member states. Next, the chapter reviews various theoretical explanations, both economic and political, accounting for why EMU was created and looks at some criticisms of EMU. Finally, the chapter discusses how EMU has fared under the global financial crisis, the sovereign debt crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic. These crises brought to the fore various imperfections in the design of EMU and provided opportunities for further development. This section discusses what changes have been made since 2009 to address those flaws and at what may be yet to come. Show less
This chapter studies the origins of this agreement and examines how the EU-Canada relationship in this regard changed over time. It explores why an SPA was possible in 2016, but not before. To do... Show moreThis chapter studies the origins of this agreement and examines how the EU-Canada relationship in this regard changed over time. It explores why an SPA was possible in 2016, but not before. To do so, I focus in particular on endogenous and exogenous factors (Hill 1993, 1998; Tsuruoka 2006). In this chapter, I divide up EU-Canada collaboration into four time periods: period one (from 1959 to 1976); period two (1977–1996); period three (1997–2008); period four (2009–2020).This chapter examines the following question: Why could this more institutionalised collaboration be signed in 2016, but not before? It seeks to address this question by assessing the path of the creation of the strategic partnership agreement. In particular, it asks, why has the deepening of the EU-Canada strategic partnership been a challenge to set up during the three decades after 1976 agreement, only to get an agreement four decades later, in 2016? To assess this process, the chapter seeks to understand the role of governance structures of both partners as well as the strategic opportunity that came out of the agreement. The chapter concludes that the Canada-EU relationships have been coloured by a number of endogenous and exogenous factors, especially the development of domestic structures and political pressures but also the broader re-structuring of the global and transatlantic arenas. These factors help us to account not only for the content of the partnership, but also for the stages of negotiation that took place before it could finally be concluded, and they reflect both the ‘internal’ and the ‘external’ logics explored elsewhere in the book. Show less
European integration theories help us understand the actors and mechanisms that drive European integration. Traditionally, European integration scholars used grand theories of integration to... Show moreEuropean integration theories help us understand the actors and mechanisms that drive European integration. Traditionally, European integration scholars used grand theories of integration to explain why integration progresses or stands still. Born out of assumptions that are prevalent in realist international relations theories, intergovernmentalism was first developed as a theory in opposition to neofunctionalism. In a nutshell, intergovernmentalism argues that states (i.e., national governments or state leaders), based on national interests, determine the outcome of integration. Intergovernmentalism was seen as a plausible explanatory perspective during the 1970s and 1980s, when the integration process seemed to have stalled. Despite the fact that it could not explain many of the gradual incremental changes or informal politics, intergovernmentalism—as did various other approaches—gained renewed popularity in the 1990s, following the launch of liberal intergovernmentalism. During that decade, the study of European integration was burgeoning, triggered in part by the aim to complete the single market and the signing of the Maastricht Treaty that launched the European Union (EU). Intergovernmentalism also often received considerable pushback from researchers who were unconvinced by its core predictions. Attempts to relaunch intergovernmentalism were made in the 2010s, in response to the observation that EU member states played a prominent role in dealing with the various crises that the EU was confronted with at that time, such as the financial crisis and the migration crisis. Although intergovernmentalism is unable —and is not suited —to explain all aspects of European integration, scholars revert to intergovernmentalism as a theoretical approach in particular when examining the role of member states in European politics. Outside the EU, in the international arena (such as the United Nations), intergovernmentalism is also observed when studying various forums in which member states come together to bargain over particular collective outcomes in an intergovernmental setting. Show less
The European Central Bank (ECB) has been in existence for almost 20 years and more if one considers its immediate predecessor the European Monetary Institute (1994–1997). During these two decades... Show moreThe European Central Bank (ECB) has been in existence for almost 20 years and more if one considers its immediate predecessor the European Monetary Institute (1994–1997). During these two decades the ECB has become an established institution. It secures price stability and further increased its reputation as a lender of last resort during the financial crisis and its aftermath. In the 2010s, in response to the global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis, the ECB has also taken on the role of supervisor of the financial system and monitors developments in the Euro Area financial sector.Political science literature on the ECB can be subdivided into different strands. One strand looks at the ECB as just another central bank and hence examines its role as a central bank with the usual instruments. Another strand of literature examines the role of the ECB as an institution that is insufficiently embedded into democratic checks and balances. This perennial criticism of the ECB was born when the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) was created to be independent from political influence. A third strand of the literature is newer and examines the unorthodox steps that the ECB (and other central banks) took, and have taken, to offset the financial crisis and the ensuing economic crisis. An analysis of European integration and the political economy of the Euro Area can contribute to a better understanding of why the ECB has taken a proactive role. The political science research of the ECB is discussed here as well as the various dimensions of research conducted on the ECB. Show less
The European Union’s contextualization of ‘social policy’ is contained within the realm of employment and social affairs. As such, social policymaking is fundamentally intertwined with the... Show moreThe European Union’s contextualization of ‘social policy’ is contained within the realm of employment and social affairs. As such, social policymaking is fundamentally intertwined with the employment opportunities and prospects for people living and working in the Member States (Cram 1993, 1997; Hantrais 2007; Daly 2019). This understanding of social policy – which emphatically links social rights to education, training and labour market opportunities – is partly the result of the mixed competences of the EU in this area, with Member States responsible for most archetypal social welfare policies such as providing social assistance, unemployment benefits, pensions, health care and education. The EU, by contrast, is mostly involved in those dimensions of social policy that have an impact on the functioning of the single market, namely in the realm of employment (Gold 1993; Rhodes 2010). These dimensions include health and safety at work, coordination of social security systems, and the rights of mobile workers within a mobile labour market, all of which were driven first by the push for market integration and later by the need to build a common foundation to support the free movement of workers in an expanding single market (Falkner 1998; Anderson 2015). Show less
L’Union européenne (UE) inscrit contextuellement la «politique sociale» dans le domaine de l’emploi et des affaires sociales. L’élaboration des politiques sociales est dès lors fondamentalement... Show moreL’Union européenne (UE) inscrit contextuellement la «politique sociale» dans le domaine de l’emploi et des affaires sociales. L’élaboration des politiques sociales est dès lors fondamentalement liée aux opportunités et perspectives d’emploi des personnes vivant et travaillant dans les États membres (Cram 1993, 1997; Hantrais 2007; Daly 2019). Cette conception de la politique sociale — qui lie fortement les droits sociaux à l’éducation, à la formation et aux opportunités sur le marché du travail — découle en partie du caractère mixte des compétences de l’UE dans ce domaine, les États membres étant responsables de la plupart des politiques de protection sociale archétypiques telles que l’assistance sociale, les allocations de chômage, les pensions, les soins de santé et l’éducation. L’UE, en revanche, est principalement impliquée dans les dimensions de la politique sociale qui ont une incidence sur le fonctionnement du marché unique, notamment dans le domaine de l’emploi (Gold 1993; Rhodes 2010). Ces dimensions incluent la santé et la sécurité au travail, la coordination des systèmes de sécurité sociale et les droits des travailleurs mobiles sur un marché de l’emploi mobile, toutes motivées d’abord par la volonté d’intégrer le marché, puis par la nécessité de créer des fondements communs pour soutenir la libre circulation des travailleurs dans un marché unique en expansion (Falkner 1998; Anderson 2015). Show less
