On 31 January 2020 the United Kingdom (UK) left the European Union (EU). In the European Parliament (EP), Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) cried together and folded flags. It marked the... Show moreOn 31 January 2020 the United Kingdom (UK) left the European Union (EU). In the European Parliament (EP), Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) cried together and folded flags. It marked the end of an era. At the end of that year, after much agony, the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) was signed on 24 December 2020 and the ratification was completed in April 2021. The TCA allows both entities tariff-free, quota-free access to markets for goods. Services are not part of the TCA. Part of the agreement are also fishing rights as well as cooperation in the area of security (e.g., in the area of information sharing security related to matters of internal security), but no mention of security and defence collaboration. There are still many unresolved issues. Some of these issues involve fishing matters (Reuters, 2021). But collaboration in security and defence matters is also crucial as demonstrated by the need to deal with the war in Ukraine that erupted following the Russian invasion on 24 February. Show less
This chapter charts the position of the European Union (EU) in the global political economy (GPE), identifies key dimensions of change and development, and evaluates the EU’s impact on the... Show moreThis chapter charts the position of the European Union (EU) in the global political economy (GPE), identifies key dimensions of change and development, and evaluates the EU’s impact on the operation of the contemporary GPE. It does so by outlining key ideas in international political economy (IPE), by relating these to the growth of the EU, and by assessing the EU’s role in the GPE in three areas: European integration itself, the EU’s engagement in the GPE, and the EU’s claims to be a major economic power. The final part of the chapter brings these together an examination of global economic governance—in particular, the EU’s role in the financial, multilateral state system with its principles of global governance, and pays some attention to recent crises (such as the Covid-19 pandemic) and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Show less
Diverse assessments of the EU's role in global governance suggest a great need for dependable and justifiable benchmarks. This chapter argues that constitutional foreign policy objectives are an... Show moreDiverse assessments of the EU's role in global governance suggest a great need for dependable and justifiable benchmarks. This chapter argues that constitutional foreign policy objectives are an important source for such benchmarks — for conceptual, empirical, and normative reasons. Conceptually speaking, global governance is an inherently rule-oriented as well as goal-oriented concept. Empirically, such substantive global governance goals can be found today in many constitutions, including those of the rising powers of the emerging multipolar world. EU primary law post-Lisbon is part of this trend, but also goes further. Next to an extensive collection of substantive objectives, it also puts a distinctive emphasis on law as an essential ingredient of its foreign policy and consequently of its vision for global governance. From a normative point of view, the peculiar features pertaining to constitutional law as a source for global governance guidance, as opposed to policy documents or other law, appear at first sight as problematic. In particular for the EU, facing the challenge of ‘relative decline’ in a multi-polar world, entrenching such an ambitious agenda in its highest laws may appear as audacious wishful thinking. On closer inspection, however, these particular features reveal the true value of the constitutional codification of a global governance agenda. Show less
