Since as far back antiquity, philosophers have been inquiring into the nature of conflict. One of the most prominent ideas to have dominated this inquiry is that conflict represents an undesirable... Show moreSince as far back antiquity, philosophers have been inquiring into the nature of conflict. One of the most prominent ideas to have dominated this inquiry is that conflict represents an undesirable part of life, one that stands opposed to the ideals of harmony, co-operation and consensus. Nietzsche, however, rejects this position, proffering various arguments for why we ought to positively value conflict. Yet Nietzsche’s stance is by no means unambigious. Commentators sharply disagree regarding the specific form of conflict to which his endorsement refers. His “hard” readers present him as a warmonger, who predominantly advocates unmeasured, destructive types of struggle (e.g. war). Conversely, Nietzsche’s “soft” readers claim that he exclusively promotes a measured, agonal mode of struggle modelled on the non-violent contests (or agons) that pervaded ancient Greek culture. I contend that both of these readings are one-sided and require modification. Indeed, the thesis that this dissertation defends is that Nietzsche promotes both measured and unmeasured struggle in an entirely coherent manner. I further argue that commentators have neglected the most significant form of conflict in Nietzsche’s thought, which is characterised by a combination of measured and unmeasured conflict. This species of struggle is analogous to the biological process of digestion, which simultaneously involves 1) a measured struggle to incorporate that which is deemed serviceable to the organism, and 2) an unmeasured struggle to eliminate material deemed redundant or harmful. This dualistic struggle is what I term organisational conflict on account of the fact that both incorporation and exclusion form part of a single overarching impetus to establish healthy organisation. Show less
Political philosophy is not only a form of theory, but also a practice. If we wish to learn something about politics, therefore, we should focus not only on its propositional content, but also on... Show morePolitical philosophy is not only a form of theory, but also a practice. If we wish to learn something about politics, therefore, we should focus not only on its propositional content, but also on its performative meaning. This dissertation offers a reconstruction of the propositional contents of the writings of Karl Popper, Leo Strauss, and Hannah Arendt while bringing these into discussion with their performative meanings, such as polemical forms of reasoning, analogical and metaphorical uses of language, and hidden assumptions that become manifest as soon as people start acting upon them. First, it is demonstrated that Popper prescribes a conception of politics that is modeled after science, while he performs a polemical conception of politics. Next, it is shown that Strauss is aware of the performative condition of philosophy, whereas his way of framing it in terms of the mutually hostile opposition between phi losophy and politics and his remedy of the art of writing amount to an unrealistic escape from it. Finally, it is argued that Arendt not only shows to be aware of the contingent character of human action, but also develops forms of political thinking that do justice to it. Show less
