Without press freedom a constitutional democracy cannot function properly, to the extent that the degree of press freedom becomes an indicator of the level of democracy in a particular country.... Show moreWithout press freedom a constitutional democracy cannot function properly, to the extent that the degree of press freedom becomes an indicator of the level of democracy in a particular country. This socio-legal study aims to clarify how the concepts of freedom of expression and press freedom have evolved in Indonesian law; how press freedom as one of the main pillars of constitutional democracy has been guaranteed or curbed by the Indonesian legal system; how press freedom has been shaped in practice; and how this can be evaluated from a rule of law perspective. The research found press freedom in Indonesia is still under pressure, despite the demise of Soeharto’s authoritarian New Order regime in 1998. Decentralised model of governance during ‘Reformasi’ has led to new types of attacks on the press. Extra-judicial killings, physical violence, bringing criminal or civil claims against journalists and impunity of those perpetrating such acts have made it difficult for many journalists to conduct their work in a proper manner and without fear. Hence, there is still a pattern of legal and non-legal attacks against the press. The research has found that from colonial times until the present Indonesia has struggled with press freedom. Show less
Het doel van dit onderzoek is om tot inzicht te komen inzake de omvang van de juridische beperking die uitgaat van de botsing tussen de verschillende levensbeschouwingen voor de vrijheid van... Show moreHet doel van dit onderzoek is om tot inzicht te komen inzake de omvang van de juridische beperking die uitgaat van de botsing tussen de verschillende levensbeschouwingen voor de vrijheid van meningsuiting. Show less
Is public procurement of research and development (‘R&D’) services the key to European Union (‘EU’)’s sustainable welfare? Is it being regulated in accordance with economic prescripts for... Show moreIs public procurement of research and development (‘R&D’) services the key to European Union (‘EU’)’s sustainable welfare? Is it being regulated in accordance with economic prescripts for effectiveness? Is the regulatory and policy setting clear and comprehensive in order to stimulate a widespread use of this instrument by EU public authorities? In 2007, the EU released an Interpretative Communication, explaining how to purchase R&D services in compliance with the EU public procurement and State aid rules. The prescribed procedure was named ‘pre-commercial procurement’ (‘PCP’). The motivation advanced for adopting this Communication was the need to clarify the applicable law, in order to encourage public authorities throughout the EU to engage in R&D services procurement. The EU policy makers aimed to help the public sector become a sophisticated customer, capable of steering the development of cutting-edge technologies towards the resolution of public needs. This would yield solutions to serious problems such as climate change, pressure on the health system due to an ageing population, security threats etc. In addition, it would strengthen the competitive advantages of European private innovators on global markets. Eventually this would strengthen EU’s economy and would increase the welfare of its citizens Show less
The era of big data brings with it increasing challenges to privacy. China witnessed a lack of data protection law. It wants to upgrade its legal arrangement on personal data protection.... Show moreThe era of big data brings with it increasing challenges to privacy. China witnessed a lack of data protection law. It wants to upgrade its legal arrangement on personal data protection. Accordingly, Chinese legislators consider cloning European data protection law. The plan raises a number of questions: Can European data protection law improve the quality of data protection in China? If so, how do the historic and cultural contexts matter for data protection laws unfolding in Europe and in China? Chinese policymakers assume that the european data protection law is complete, but it is not. How should China process the EU experiences to achieve a positive impact for how personal data are deployed and protected in the commercial world? In this book, these questions are examined. The book synthesizes dogmatic and empirical discussions and establishes that the subject matter of data protection law exhibits the characteristics of a complex adaptive system. It is aruged that complexity and legal theories provide a toolbox to improve exploration of data protection laws, its functions and its dynamics. The book ventures to open doors to help legal scholarship facing problems now, that threaten to trouble data protection law arrangements for decades to come. Show less
This Thesis aims to show the necessity and benefits of historically self-aware legal theory and practice in preventing and resolving conflicts that have a religious dimension. Contrary to Iberian... Show moreThis Thesis aims to show the necessity and benefits of historically self-aware legal theory and practice in preventing and resolving conflicts that have a religious dimension. Contrary to Iberian and French colonial projects, early modern Dutch and English thinkers developed ways to encounter non-European legal systems without having to take a position on issues like missionary obligation, forcible conversion, or non-Christians’ right to property and sovereignty. This colonial advantage was a corollary of secularising ideas and steps to improve domestic stability in a time of religious conflict, including the deprioritisation of divine laws, refuting chosen nation ideologies, and subverting theology’s claim to epistemic supremacy. The new system reduced the economic and ideological costs of imperialism. Understood as a contingent, cumulative and incomplete process, and partially the unintended consequence of limited designs for stability and peace, secularisation is a useful concept in legal historiography. The examination of Dutch and English secularisation and soft imperialism offers a new perspective on the decline of French and Iberian early modern empires, and eighteenth- and nineteenth-century exceptionalisms. Further, it sheds light on why, when and how public international law became desensitised to the contingency of secularisation as a process, and secularism as a norm Show less
This inquiry seeks to determine to what extent equality and freedom are constituents of a liberal democratic state; part 1 deals with equality, part 2 with freedom. Since the concept of the liberal... Show moreThis inquiry seeks to determine to what extent equality and freedom are constituents of a liberal democratic state; part 1 deals with equality, part 2 with freedom. Since the concept of the liberal democratic state is the subject matter at hand, it seems obvious that freedom is not absent, but that does not answer the question to what extent it should be allowed to citizens, which is what is inquired in detail. As for equality: equal rights, such as the right for every (adult) citizen to vote, are generally accepted to be an integral part of a liberal democratic state, but this raises the question on what foundation such rights are based. Equal rights have widely been defended on the basis of various moral viewpoints. After dealing with some preliminary matters in chapter 1, the tenability of some important and representative theories are examined in chapters 2 to 5. Rawls’s theory focuses on rationality as the pivotal feature to consider beings as equals and to treat them equally, but fails to indicate the import of this feature in that it remains unclear whether rationality is a moral characteristic. The problem with Dworkin’s position, on the other hand, is its abstract nature: Dworkin does not base his account on rationality as a special characteristic, but instead speaks of some beings being ‘intrinsically valuable’. In Kateb’s account, ‘human dignity’ is the focal concept. When it comes to providing the basis for human dignity, this position appears to be difficult to uphold, primarily because it remains unclear precisely which characteristic of human beings is supposed to account for their alleged dignity. In Kant’s alternative, this problem is absent, as reason – in a special sense – is the crucial feature for him. The main problem in this case is that it is difficult to see how dignity should follow from being reasonable or acting on the basis of reason. Starting from a moral outlook is problematic for these reasons and others, so in chapter 6, a position that does not use such a basis is defended. ‘Basic equality’ is the crucial notion here. Simply put, the actual (approximate) equality, which I call factual equality, is the starting point, to be specified by basic equality. Factual equality is observed in many ways, and basic equality is the sort of factual equality between two or more beings that is considered relevant to them (and simultaneously by them, as they are, in a liberal democratic state, also the ones who establish this). Basic equality must in turn be specified. Rationality, I argue, is the most viable characteristic to realize this specification in a liberal democratic state; this has no moral connotation. The upshot of this stance is that a realistic alternative to the theories discussed above is offered, the benefits of which are twofold. On the one hand, vague and problematic terms are shunned, which adds to the position’s consistency and tenability, while it provides, on the other hand, a solid basis for a liberal democratic state to recognize one of its essential features. This means that formal equality, manifested in political equality (exhibited by political liberties, such as the right to vote and the freedom of speech) and legal equality, resulting in equal treatment (e.g. of employees by their employers), can be upheld without the need to resort to moral premises that not only fail to constitute a consistent account but are in addition not universally acknowledged. Part 2 of the inquiry deals with freedom. After some general remarks are made in chapter 7, the import of freedom is indicated in chapter 8. This makes it clear why granting citizens as much freedom as possible is beneficial for both the liberal democratic state as a whole and for citizens themselves. However, as the phrase ‘as much as possible’ indicates, it is important to define the limits (if any) of freedom carefully. Since part 1 of the inquiry emphasizes the importance of (basic) equality, it would seem appealing to connect it with freedom. The merits and difficulties of such a position – Dworkin’s ideas are examined here – are expounded in chapter 9. An alternative for it is offered in chapters 10 and 11, where a demarcation line to limit freedom is defended. Mill’s harm principle provides a useful frame of reference here; the ignore principle, as it is called, seeks to find the optimal outcome in balancing the various interests that are involved. The foregoing prompts the question of whether the liberal democratic state can adopt a neutral stance, and how it should respond to those who deny certain principles of a liberal democratic state, notably those defended in part 1 of this study. In other words: what should the state’s position be towards those who deny that people are equal, e.g. on the basis of racial differences? This is the central issue that is examined in chapters 12 to 15. I argue that it is not the task of a liberal democratic state to decide what people should think, but that, in line with what is maintained in chapters 10 and 11, only equal treatment should be guaranteed, meaning that the outward acts of citizens may legitimately be regulated but nothing else. In this light, Rawls’s and Habermas’s positions are examined critically. Finally, some attention is devoted to the subject matter of militant democracy. The question is pertinent whether the liberal democratic state might be undermined by its own principles. After all, a majority is able to radically change this form of government to one that is ultimately incompatible with those very principles. I try to approach this issue as consistently as the others that present themselves throughout this inquiry. Show less
