Credit lines between central banks can be a powerful instrument to restore international financial stability during a crisis. Yet, so far, few political scientists have ventured to study central... Show moreCredit lines between central banks can be a powerful instrument to restore international financial stability during a crisis. Yet, so far, few political scientists have ventured to study central bank cooperation in the context of European macroeconomic governance and the implications for the international role of the euro. This paper closes this gap in our knowledge by looking at the European Central Bank’s (ECB) cooperation with non-Euro Area central banks during the Global Financial Crisis 2008/09 and the COVID-19-crisis 2020. Based on recently declassified policy documents and eight insider interviews I find that the ECB’s handling of the international role of the euro has changed over time. In 2008, the ECB had decided the credit terms largely based on perceived sovereign credit risk. In 2020, the ECB granted better lending conditions to countries that were institutionally closer to the Euro Area. Based on this I argue that the ECB has redefined its interests during international crises from limiting financial risks to promoting the institutional objectives of the Euro Area. This indicates not just that the ECB has in 2020 acted more proactively as international lender of last resort, but also that it has done so largely in line with political considerations. Show less
Credit lines between central banks can be a powerful instrument to restore international financial stability during a crisis. Yet, so far, few political scientists have ventured to study central... Show moreCredit lines between central banks can be a powerful instrument to restore international financial stability during a crisis. Yet, so far, few political scientists have ventured to study central bank cooperation in the context of European macroeconomic governance and the implications for the international role of the euro. This paper closes this gap in our knowledge by looking at the European Central Bank’s (ECB) cooperation with non-Euro Area central banks during the Global Financial Crisis 2008/09 and the COVID-19-crisis 2020. Based on recently declassified policy documents and eight insider interviews I find that the ECB’s handling of the international role of the euro has changed over time. In 2008, the ECB had decided the credit terms largely based on perceived sovereign credit risk. In 2020, the ECB granted better lending conditions to countries that were institutionally closer to the Euro Area. Based on this I argue that the ECB has redefined its interests during international crises from limiting financial risks to promoting the institutional objectives of the Euro Area. This indicates not just that the ECB has in 2020 acted more proactively as international lender of last resort, but also that it has done so largely in line with political considerations. Show less
