When and how does public opinion affect the delegation choices of legislatorsin the EU? We argue the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers limitthe discretion of the Commission in... Show moreWhen and how does public opinion affect the delegation choices of legislatorsin the EU? We argue the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers limitthe discretion of the Commission in response to EU-wide scepticism andpoliticisation of EU policies. Public opposition to EU policies, theircontestation, and potential scrutiny motivate the EU legislators to minimisethe discrepancies between the adopted and implemented policies. They doso to avoid bearing the costs of disregarding public preferences over thelevel of EU integration. Our analysis of legislation adopted between 2009–2019 relying on a novel dataset on public policy preferences and agencydiscretion supports this expectation. The results offer evidence of previouslyunexplored responsiveness of the EU institutions emerging in the policyimplementation that might entail efficiency losses. Show less
The EP plays a crucial role in defining the power of implementing agencies in the EU. In this article, we move beyond the 'unitary actor' approach to the EP and examine the influence of intra... Show moreThe EP plays a crucial role in defining the power of implementing agencies in the EU. In this article, we move beyond the 'unitary actor' approach to the EP and examine the influence of intra-parliamentary dynamics on the delegation patterns in the Union. We maintain that party polarization as well as the level of policy salience shape delegation patterns in the EU. Reflecting the differences between political elites, increasing party polarization motivates the EP to curtail the prospect of bureaucratic drift when delegating power. Lacking effective control mechanisms over the supranational agency, the EP hinders the extent of delegated power if the Commission oversees the policy. In contrast to the extant literature, we do not find policy salience to be influential for the EP's delegation decisions. We test these conjunctions using data from the Euromanifesto project and the dataset on delegation dynamic in the Union. Show less
