There has been much recent debate over whether the European Union is or should be a ‘militant democratic’ actor in order to respond to democratic backsliding in EU member states. This article... Show moreThere has been much recent debate over whether the European Union is or should be a ‘militant democratic’ actor in order to respond to democratic backsliding in EU member states. This article argues that the EU is a militant democracy in a specific and limited sense, but that this may be normatively undesirable from a democratic perspective. I first develop a definition of militant democracy that focuses on the militant democratic paradox. I argue that the strongest justifications for militant democracy require that two conditions are met: an ‘existential threat condition’ and a ‘necessity condition’. Next, I analyse four ways in which the European Union has been said to be empowered to act in a militant democratic fashion to combat democratic backsliding in EU member states. I show how some, though not all, of these warrant the label ‘militant democracy’. Moving from the descriptive to the normative analysis, I then consider whether the necessity condition can ever be met since there is always the possibility of non-militant responses through forms of EU disintegration. If we accept this argument, EU actors should prioritize robust non-militant measures where possible while pro-democratic member states should disassociate from frankly autocratic member states where non-militant measures fail. Show less
Hongarije is geen democratische staat meer. Het land nu toestaan voorzitter van EU-raad te zijn bedreigt de fundamentele waarden van de EU, betogen Tom Theuns, universitair docent politieke theorie... Show moreHongarije is geen democratische staat meer. Het land nu toestaan voorzitter van EU-raad te zijn bedreigt de fundamentele waarden van de EU, betogen Tom Theuns, universitair docent politieke theorie en Europese politiek aan het Instituut voor Politieke Wetenschap in Leiden, en Samira Rafaela, Europarlementariër voor D66. Show less
The boundary problem holds that, whatever the theory of democratic legitimacy, the initial act of constituting the demos can never be considered met by it. Many contemporary attempts to solve the... Show moreThe boundary problem holds that, whatever the theory of democratic legitimacy, the initial act of constituting the demos can never be considered met by it. Many contemporary attempts to solve the boundary problem can be understood as falling into two categories: functional demos views and global demos views. This article argues against both views. Functional demos views exacerbate the legitimacy puzzle posed by the boundary problem, while a global democracy cannot be held democratically accountable by its citizens. In the place of global demos and functional demos views, we ought to examine the democratic legitimacy of polities in light of the standards of pluralist democracy. Pluralist democracy is a non-ideal conception of democracy that recognizes democratic procedures to be historically grounded, non-ideal, and problem-oriented. Show less
Rippon, S.; Zala, M.; Theuns, T.J.H.; Maagt; S. de; Brink, B. van den 2020
This paper critically engages the legal and political framework for responding to democracy and rule of law backsliding in the EU. I develop a new and original critique of Article 7 TEU based on it... Show moreThis paper critically engages the legal and political framework for responding to democracy and rule of law backsliding in the EU. I develop a new and original critique of Article 7 TEU based on it being democratically illegitimate and normatively incoherent qua itself in conflict with EU fundamental values. Other more incremental and scaleable responses are desirable, and the paper moves on to assess the legitimacy of economic sanctions such as tying access to EU funds to performance on democratic and rule of law indicators or imposing fines on backsliding states. I hold such sanctions to be a priori legitimate, and argue that in some cases economic sanctions are even normatively required, given that EU material support of backsliding member states can amount to material complicity in their backsliding. However, an economic conditionality mechanism would need to be designed to minimize unjust and counterproductive effects. One way to pursue this could be to complement sanctions against the backsliding government with investment for prodemocratic actors in that state. Show less
