For decades, public health experts and journalists worldwide warned about a viral pandemic capable of causing illness and loss of life. Previous outbreaks of SARS, Ebola, and MERS highlighted this... Show moreFor decades, public health experts and journalists worldwide warned about a viral pandemic capable of causing illness and loss of life. Previous outbreaks of SARS, Ebola, and MERS highlighted this threat, which occupied top positions in risk assessments globally. Yet even with knowledge and precedent, the COVID-19 pandemic caught the world off guard. It revealed a world inadequately prepared and plunged societies into a state of disruption, with over 7 million deaths reported to the World Health Organization by April 2024. How did this tragedy foretold take the world by such surprise? In The COVID-19 Intelligence Failure: Why Warning Was Not Enough, Erik J. Dahl explores this question from the vantage point of the United States.In his book, Dahl, who is highly regarded for his expertise on intelligence failures, analyzes past and present intelligence efforts to underline the shortcomings and successes of the U.S. intelligence community's anticipation of the pandemic, comparing the anticipation and response to COVID-19 with historical failed warnings, such as those preceding 9/11 and Pearl Harbor. Show less
ParlEE Plenary Speeches V4 contains the full-text speeches from eight legislative chambers for Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Poland covering 2009-2019, extending... Show moreParlEE Plenary Speeches V4 contains the full-text speeches from eight legislative chambers for Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Poland covering 2009-2019, extending the breadth of countries included in the ParlEE Plenary Speech dataset to a total of 28 parliaments. Like ParlEE Plenary Speeches V1, V2, and V3 this data set provides the plenary speeches split to the sentence-level annotated with date, speaker, party, EU vs. Domestic politics classification, and relevant policy area (using the Comparative Agendas Project coding scheme). (2024-02-12) Show less
On 26 July 2012, Mario Draghi declared in front of a group of about 200 London business people that he would do ‘whatever it takes to save the euro’.1 These seven words have been analysed to have... Show moreOn 26 July 2012, Mario Draghi declared in front of a group of about 200 London business people that he would do ‘whatever it takes to save the euro’.1 These seven words have been analysed to have made all the difference.2 By doing so, the European Central Bank (ECB) effectively ended a long period of uncertainty and indecisiveness. The markets needed a strong signal so that they knew that the young European currency would be supported politically and economically. After summer 2012, the euro area did not experience the same level of crisis, although the sovereign debt crisis was truly resolved only in 2015 and there were still challenging times until then. Show less
This chapter offers an inquiry into how EMU has been conceptualized in the European Union by analysing the path taken over the past five decades. The definition of what is on the agenda, and... Show moreThis chapter offers an inquiry into how EMU has been conceptualized in the European Union by analysing the path taken over the past five decades. The definition of what is on the agenda, and considered part of the scope of EMU, has had a major impact on what EMU actually covers. In the early years, the focus was on exchange rates, policy coordination, and central banking. In the second part, macroeconomic policy coordination with limits on budgetary deficits and public debt took centre stage. The third period added the importance of banking regulation. The most recent period is branching out into the early steps of fiscal federalism. These topics had been considered when conceptualizing early plans, but had not been developed, as there was insufficient consensus for actionable points, leading to asymmetries. Revisions to EMU followed the various crises, for example the financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis, and most recently the COVID-19 crisis. Theories of European economic and political integration impacted the creation of EMU at the time of its design, but the pragmatic understanding of what was feasible was at least as important for determining what became part of the institutional design of EMU. Show less
Krause, J.; Masullo Jimenez, J.; Paddon, E.; Welsh, J. 2023
Hongarije is geen democratische staat meer. Het land nu toestaan voorzitter van EU-raad te zijn bedreigt de fundamentele waarden van de EU, betogen Tom Theuns, universitair docent politieke theorie... Show moreHongarije is geen democratische staat meer. Het land nu toestaan voorzitter van EU-raad te zijn bedreigt de fundamentele waarden van de EU, betogen Tom Theuns, universitair docent politieke theorie en Europese politiek aan het Instituut voor Politieke Wetenschap in Leiden, en Samira Rafaela, Europarlementariër voor D66. Show less
Dr. Femke Bakker shares her life experiences drawing from her various careers and personal life to demonstrate the power of self-gentleness as an antidote to perfectionism. She explains the power... Show moreDr. Femke Bakker shares her life experiences drawing from her various careers and personal life to demonstrate the power of self-gentleness as an antidote to perfectionism. She explains the power of meditation and self-gentleness as a way to radically accept oneself to consistently deserve one's own gentleness. Show less
