The War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713) caused financial difficulties for all the warring parties. The bubbles that these eventually caused in France and Great Britain and which burst in 1720... Show moreThe War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713) caused financial difficulties for all the warring parties. The bubbles that these eventually caused in France and Great Britain and which burst in 1720 are well known. Financial constructions such as those in France and Great Britain proved superfluous for the Dutch Republic. Although the debts pressed heavily on the Provincial finances, it appears not to have led to problems with the capital market, apart from a temporary suspension of payments by the Union in 1715. The case of the province of Friesland casts doubts on this interpretation and the consensus about the absence of problems in public debt management within the Dutch Republic. The central question in this contribution is how the regions managed their growing debts within the context of the federal state. The argument is that the federal structure is essential to understanding the Republic's public debt management. For example, it allowed unequal treatment of creditors within and outside the province. Secondly, it led to credit rationing in Holland for Friesland. Thirdly, it shows that federal credit was essential for a way out of the impasse that had arisen between the Province of Friesland and the capital market in Holland. Finally, it shows that creditors reconciled with this situation, so that a consistently delayed payment could persist until after the end of the old Republic in 1795. De Spaanse Successieoorlog (1701-1713) veroorzaakte financiële moeilijkheden voor alle strijdende partijen. De zeepbellen die dezen uiteindelijk in Frankrijk en Groot-Brittannië veroorzaakten en die in 1720 knapten zijn overbekend. Voor de Republiek bleken financiële constructies zoals in Frankrijk en Groot-Brittannië overbodig. Hoewel de schulden zwaar drukten op de Gewestelijke financiën leek het ook niet leiden tot problemen met de kapitaalmarkt, afgezien van een tijdelijke sluiting van het betaalkantoor van de Unie in 1715. De Friese casus geeft aanleiding om deze interpretatie en de consensus over de absentie van problemen met de staatsschuld in de Republiek te heroverwegen. In deze bijdrage staat de vraag centraal hoe de gewesten, binnen die context van de federale staat, hun groeiende schulden beheerden. Het argument is dat de federale structuur essentieel is om de wijze van schuldbeheer te begrijpen. Zo maakte het ongelijke behandeling van crediteuren binnen en buiten het gewest mogelijk. Ten tweede leidde het tot kredietrantsoenering in Holland voor Friesland. Op de derde plaats laat het zien dat het federale krediet essentieel was voor een uitweg uit de ontstane impasse tussen het gewest Friesland en de kapitaalmarkt in Holland. Tenslotte laat het zien dat crediteuren zich verzoenden met deze situatie, zodat een consistent vertraagde betaling kon blijven bestaan tot na het einde van de oude Republiek. Show less
This article investigates how consumer demand shaped markets for high-quality domestic decoration in the Roman world and highlights how this affected the economic strategies of people involved in... Show moreThis article investigates how consumer demand shaped markets for high-quality domestic decoration in the Roman world and highlights how this affected the economic strategies of people involved in the production and trade of high-quality wall decoration, mosaics, and sculpture. The argument analyzes the consumption of high-quality domestic decoration at Pompeii and models the structure of demand for decorative skills in the Roman world at large. The Pompeian case study focuses on three categories of high-quality decoration: Late Hellenistic opus vermiculatum mosaics, first-century C.E. fourth-style panel pictures, and domestic sculpture. Analyzing the spread of these mosaics, paintings, and statues over a database of Pompeian houses makes it possible to reconstruct a demand profile for each category of decoration and to discuss the nature of its supply economy. It is argued that the market for high-quality decoration at Pompeii provided few incentives for professionals to acquire specialist skills and that this has broader implications: as market conditions in Pompeii and the Bay of Naples region were significantly above average, the strategic possibilities for painters, mosaicists, and sculptors in many parts of the Roman world were even more restricted and, consequently, their motivation to invest in skills and repertoire remained limited. Show less
