The debate on free will is dominated by the discussion between compatibilists and incompatibilists. The central intuition of the incompatibilist is that the future must be open; on the other hand,... Show moreThe debate on free will is dominated by the discussion between compatibilists and incompatibilists. The central intuition of the incompatibilist is that the future must be open; on the other hand, for the compatibilist it makes no difference to free will whether or not the laws of nature are deterministic. This paper argues that we can hold the incompatiblist and compatibilist intuitions together with the doctrine of free will, on the condition that we deny the seemingly evident claim that determinism implies a closed future. In order to deny this claim, I develop a new version of presentism that I call causal presentism. The causal presentist holds that only the present exists, and that statements about the past and the future are statements about what the present causally implies. Within this framework, the open future and determinism are compatible so long as we are willing to accept that our present choices determine not just the future, but also the past. I discuss several counterarguments that can be brought against this idea, showing that they lack force. In doing so, I demonstrate that causal presentism is worthy of further development. Show less
States combine the routine refusal of citizenship to migrants withpolicies that grant newborns of citizens (or residents) full member-ship of society without questions asked. This paper asks what,... Show moreStates combine the routine refusal of citizenship to migrants withpolicies that grant newborns of citizens (or residents) full member-ship of society without questions asked. This paper asks what, ifanything, can justify this differential treatment of the two types ofnewcomers. It explores arguments for differential treatment basedon the differential environmental impact, different impact on the(political) culture of the society in question and differences betweenthe positions of the newcomers themselves. I conclude that,although some justification for differential treatment exists, thecase for it is weaker than one may expect and the grounds onwhich it can be justified are surprising and problematic. Show less
This research aims to address the relationship between cinema and political thought in Latin America, in order to question a limited understanding of cinema politics, which has dominated the field... Show moreThis research aims to address the relationship between cinema and political thought in Latin America, in order to question a limited understanding of cinema politics, which has dominated the field of study since the middle of the last century, and to propose a different one that we will call politics of anonymity in Latin American cinema. With the production of this concept, we will seek to take charge of this "extensive and amorphous matter" of Latin American cinema, to demonstrate the existence of a radical cinema politics right there where it has been denied, both by conventional film studies and by the political theories of Latin American militant filmmakers. Show less
This paper examines the differences between moralist, realist, and pragmatist approaches to political legitimacy by articulating their largely implicit views of judgment. Three claims are advanced... Show moreThis paper examines the differences between moralist, realist, and pragmatist approaches to political legitimacy by articulating their largely implicit views of judgment. Three claims are advanced. First, the salient opposition among approaches to legitimacy is not between “moralism” and “realism.” Recent realist proposals for rethinking legitimacy share with moralist views a distinctive form, called “normativism”: a quest for knowledge of principles that solve the question of legitimacy. This assumes that judging legitimacy is a matter of applying such principles to a case at hand. Second, neither Rawls nor Habermas is a normativist about political legitimacy. The principles of legitimacy they proffer claim to express rather than adjudicate the legitimacy of a liberal-democratic regime, and thus cannot solve the question of legitimacy at a fundamental level. But perhaps we should question the normativist aspiration to theoretically resolving the problem to begin with. My third claim is that a “pragmatist” approach enables us to rethink political legitimacy more deeply by shifting focus from the articulation of principles to the activity of judging. Implicit in Rawls and Habermas’s theories I then find clues towards an alternative account of judgment, in which the question of legitimacy calls not for theoretical resolution but for ongoing practical engagement. Show less
This dissertation deals with Hegel’s theory of the sublime (das Erhabene). I focus specifically on die heilige Poesie (sacred poetry), a form of art that he identifies with the Judaic Psalms and... Show moreThis dissertation deals with Hegel’s theory of the sublime (das Erhabene). I focus specifically on die heilige Poesie (sacred poetry), a form of art that he identifies with the Judaic Psalms and which I claim to be the core of Hegel’s approach to sublimity. I claim that Hegel’s apparent lack of interest in the sublime must be clarified and interpreted in the light of his comments on the heilige Poesie. But to fully elucidate this, it is necessary to move beyond the domain of Hegel’s aesthetics: we should turn to his early practical dispute, before 1800, with Kantian morality in order to reconstruct and fully elucidate Hegel’s attitude toward sublimity. Show less
This paper examines the development of Nietzsche’s thought on pessimism in the light of his own reflections. Drawing on GT, the late prefaces he wrote around 1886 (GT, MA, M, FW), the fifth book of... Show moreThis paper examines the development of Nietzsche’s thought on pessimism in the light of his own reflections. Drawing on GT, the late prefaces he wrote around 1886 (GT, MA, M, FW), the fifth book of FW, and unpublished notes, it reconstructs the several meanings that Nietzsche attributes to ‘pessimism’. It focuses on the complex relation between ‘romantic’ and ‘Dionysian’ pessimism. It is shown that these two forms of pessimism are rooted in Nietzsche’s ambivalent metaphysical pessimism in GT, which is influenced by Schopenhauer and the tragic Greeks. This approach is distinguished from the later Nietzsche who attempts to redefine his struggle with pessimism in order to ‘forget’ the metaphysical background, and to understand pessimism as a symptom of historical and psychological conditions. Nietzsche consequently understands his own thought as a continuation of Schopenhauer’s critique of the Christian worldview, which leads to the problem of nihilism. Nietzsche attempts to show how it is possible to overcome romantic pessimism and European morality, if he also suffers the consequences of nihilism. In order to tackle this problem, Nietzsche formulates a dynamic of self-overcoming which needs both strength and weakness, health and sickness. Show less
This essay contributes to developing a new approach to political legitimacy by asking what is involved in judging the legitimacy of a regime from a practical point of view. It is focused on one... Show moreThis essay contributes to developing a new approach to political legitimacy by asking what is involved in judging the legitimacy of a regime from a practical point of view. It is focused on one aspect of this question: the role of identity in such judgment. I examine three ways of understanding the significance of identity for political legitimacy: the foundational, associative, and agonistic picture. Neither view, I claim, persuasively captures the dilemmas of judgment in the face of disagreement and uncertainty about who “I” am and who “we” are. I then propose a composite, pragmatic picture. This view casts the question of political legitimacy as an existential predicament: it is fundamentally a question about who you are—both as a person and as a member of collectives. The pragmatic picture integrates rational, prudential, and ethical qualities of good judgment that were heretofore associated with mutually exclusive ways of theorizing legitimacy. It also implies that the question of legitimacy cannot be resolved philosophically. Show less
