Intelligence is generally collected and used in secret to inform internal audiences. Before and after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, the UK and US governments have deployed intelligence... Show moreIntelligence is generally collected and used in secret to inform internal audiences. Before and after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, the UK and US governments have deployed intelligence extensively to influence external audiences, both publicly and privately, regarding Russian intentions, capabilities and practices, and the consequences of Russian actions. While the scale, manner and initially pre-emptive nature of these disclosures represent a significant evolutionary step in how liberal-democratic governments use their intelligence assets, current practice has built upon historical precedents. This article examines why states choose to use intelligence – including fabricated intelligence – for influencing external audiences; the different methods they deploy for doing so; the gains and costs of publicising intelligence; and how the use of intelligence during the Russia–Ukraine conflict should be understood within broader historical and contemporary trends. The authors conclude that while liberal democracies’ use of intelligence in public is to be welcomed for its greater transparency, careful risk management will be needed if this approach is to continue. Show less
Mazepus, H.; Laustsen, L.; Van Leeuwen, F.; Bartusevičius, H.; Vugt, M. van 2022
Waar vanaf 2012 de aandacht voornamelijk uitging naar westerlingen – waarvan ruim driehonderd uit Nederland – die zich en masse aansloten bij jihadistische groeperingen in Syrië en Irak, was er... Show moreWaar vanaf 2012 de aandacht voornamelijk uitging naar westerlingen – waarvan ruim driehonderd uit Nederland – die zich en masse aansloten bij jihadistische groeperingen in Syrië en Irak, was er veel minder aandacht voor de aantrekkingskracht van een ander conflict in de ring rond Europa: de Russisch-Oekraïense oorlog, die volgde op onder meer de annexatie van de Krim in 2014. In dit artikel bekijken de auteurs wat we weten over de Nederlandse strijders die naar Oekraïne gereisd zijn en wat dit voor gevolgen heeft. Show less
This article introduces a special issue that investigates the interplay between domestic socio-political orders and changing external influences – of the EU, Russia, Turkey and other external... Show moreThis article introduces a special issue that investigates the interplay between domestic socio-political orders and changing external influences – of the EU, Russia, Turkey and other external actors in the region. In this introduction, we lay the conceptual framework and propose theoretical mechanisms linking state capacity and the actions of external actors to the likelihood of transformations from limited to open access orders. Previewing the findings, we note a fundamental asymmetry: while external actors have many levers to undermine the establishment of an open access order, they are more limited in how they can support reforms towards liberal democracy and free-market economy. Show less
This article identifies patronage networks in three Ukrainian regions and develops some ideas on the relation between these networks, economic and political openness, and the provision of public... Show moreThis article identifies patronage networks in three Ukrainian regions and develops some ideas on the relation between these networks, economic and political openness, and the provision of public goods. The research represents a rich empirical study linking business and politics in three regions (Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Ivano-Frankivsk) with different levels of openness and democratic reform. Formal and informal ties between politics and business are identified using primary (interview) and secondary data. By focusing on the local rather than national level in Ukraine, the article provides a comparison between different levels of patronage and type of networks. This study relates the empirical exploration of patronage networks in post-communist setting to a broader theoretical framework of limited access orders. Our findings show that although a multiplicity of networks might be a necessary condition for the opening of access to political and economic resources, it is not a sufficient one. We find that a single dominant network achieves a relatively high level of citizen satisfaction with public service provision, while the presence of multiple networks is not necessarily associated with citizen satisfaction with public goods provision. Show less
Dimitrova, A.; Toshkov, D.; Mazepus, H.; Maniokas, K.; Boroda, M.; Chulitskaya, T.; ... ; Wolczuk, K. 2018
This essay analyses convergence with EU rules in Ukraine in two policy areas—foreign and security policy and state aid regulation. Comparing the two, we find different levels of convergence,... Show moreThis essay analyses convergence with EU rules in Ukraine in two policy areas—foreign and security policy and state aid regulation. Comparing the two, we find different levels of convergence, somewhat higher in foreign policy (but slowing down after 2010) than in state aid law regulation. We explain this by analysing the presence and actions of oligarchs as veto players that have had an extensive influence on policy in the Ukrainian political system in recent years. In policy areas where convergence with EU rules negatively affects the interests of oligarchs and their political allies, we see only limited convergence with EU legislation and policies. Show less
