A comparison is made of the average age and length of membership of members of parliament in 1965 and 1967. Average age has decreased in the Second Chamber (table 1) and increased in the First... Show moreA comparison is made of the average age and length of membership of members of parliament in 1965 and 1967. Average age has decreased in the Second Chamber (table 1) and increased in the First Chamber (table 5). Table 2 and 6 give subdivisions by party and agegroups for the Second resp. the First Chamber. Average length of membership has decreased in the Second Chamber (table 3, subvisions in table 4) and has increased in the First Chamber (table 7, subdivisions in table 8). Show less
The truth of some conceptions concerning bureaucratic behaviour is tested in the wartime situation (1940-1945) in the Netherlands, when the bureaucracy was thrown hack on its own responsibility and... Show moreThe truth of some conceptions concerning bureaucratic behaviour is tested in the wartime situation (1940-1945) in the Netherlands, when the bureaucracy was thrown hack on its own responsibility and initiative, since its political superiors had left the country. Three questions are asked: 1) What was the share of the bureaucracy in forcing Dutch citizens to work for the Germans (conscription of labour or ’Arbeitseinsatz*)?; 2) How can we explain this bureaucratic behaviour?; 3) Can we justify this behaviour? Many civil servants were dissatisfied with pre-war liberal unemployment policy. The absence of the political leaders provided them with an opportunity to implement their cherished full employment plans. In doing so, they helped to lay the organizational and administrative basis of the Arbeitseinsatz, which gradually became unacceptable both from a legal and from a moral point of view. Factors accounting for this bureaucratic behaviour are: the human tendency to be concerned with the solution of problems of the past; the lack of experience with similar situations; the bureaucratic characteristics of depolitization, specialization, stress on law and order (’business should be as usual’), fear of the novel, hierarchical thinking and lack of personal involvement in the results of decisions; the social isolation and resulting political isolations of the higher bureaucrats; the absence of any systematic approach to the problems of co-operation with the German occupiers. The supposition is made, that the absence of traditional political leadership and the lack of contact with and acceptance of political forces in Dutch society, resulted in strengthening the German influence on the administrative apparatus. This hypothesis is confirmed by the outcome of decisions which were influenced by local government officials (Mayors), who were in fact accepted as a relevant political force. Now that many facts are known, the role of bureaucracy in the conscription of labour cannot he justified. But should officials have acted differently not knowing at the time many of the relevant facts and outcomes? Two aspects of this question are dealt with: 1) Working together with the Germans seemed to give German administration a quality of legitimacy and weakened the forces of the people (political-psychological effect); 2) During the war legal responsibility for controversial decisions was frequently passed on from one official to another; the present writer thinks that in cases where elementary legal principles are violated, moral responsibility for the mere execution of unacceptable decisions cannot be avoided in this way Show less
Part I: General Observations is mainly devoted to a discussion of several features of a constitution which very likely have a bearing on the exercise by the courts of their power to strike down... Show morePart I: General Observations is mainly devoted to a discussion of several features of a constitution which very likely have a bearing on the exercise by the courts of their power to strike down acts of the legislature. First it is argued that the absence of a written constitution does not necessarily rule out the possibility of judicial review. But as today almost all countries do have written constitutions and because in England, the most notable exception, judicial review of Acts of Parliament does not exist, the article is subsequently confined to review of legislation in terms of written constitutions. (1-1) Subsequently, the operative quality of constitutional documents, their contents and wording, and their inner consistency are discussed as some of the factors which may ultimately determine the actual operation of judicial review. (1-2) It is then argued that although presumably the rigidity or flexibility of a constitution plays a role in the practice of judicial review, it is extremely hard to identify that role. (1-3) As to another traditional classification of constitutions, that into federal and unitary, the contention that federalism necessarily implies judical review of federal legislation is rejected. There is a brief discussion of the role of the American Supreme Court as an umpire of the federal system. (1-4) Next the ambiguity of the doctrine of separation of powers is demonstrated, and it is emphasized that no easy conclusions follow from it. (1-5) Finally there is a brief comment on the changing function of certain modern legislation in the light of its possible impact on judicial review. (1-6) Part II: Judicial Review in the U.S.A. does not deal with the constitutionality of judicial review, but takes it for granted in the form in which it has developed in America, to wit as judicial supremacy. (II-1) In a discussion of the scope of judicial review, neutrality in constitutional adjudication is considered an object which will never be completely attained, however much it should be pursued. (II-2) As to the democratic character of judicial review it is maintained that the system of checks and balances, which enables Congress and the President to bring a hostile Court into line, together with the statesmanship usually displayed by the members of the Supreme Court, has prevented the latter from operating as an undemocratic force. (IT3) The concluding pages deal with the relatively neglected area of the legal consequences of judicial invalidation. After some introductory remarks (II-4), the question is raised whether judicial invalidation operates as a repeal, and a distinction is then made between two different kinds of rulings of unconstitutionality: as applied or in toto. Only as to the latter kind of ruling can there be any question of its being equal to a repeal. (II-5) This distinction is further elaborated (II-6) and it is shown how it ties in with the so-called standing problem. (II7). Show less
The concept of ’robustness’ of scales in cross-cultural comparison is introduced and used in a comparison of the properties of the well-known scale of ’sense of political efficacy for American and... Show moreThe concept of ’robustness’ of scales in cross-cultural comparison is introduced and used in a comparison of the properties of the well-known scale of ’sense of political efficacy for American and Dutch data. The same scale properties are compared across several cultural subgroupings within the United States. On the basis of a version of Guttman type scale analysis applied by the author, an improved scale possessing some degree of cross-cultural robustness is constructed. A type of «-alp construction, devised by the author, was used for the construction of an extended scale for use in the Netherlands. Finally the paper presents this new Dutch scale of political efficacy, consisting of nine items Show less
From about 1917 to 1967, Dutch politics closely resembled the model of consociational democracy (pacificatie-democratie'), characterized by a fragmented political culture, overarching... Show moreFrom about 1917 to 1967, Dutch politics closely resembled the model of consociational democracy (pacificatie-democratie'), characterized by a fragmented political culture, overarching cooperation among the subcultural elites, and a high degree of political stability. Dutch democracy is now in a period of transition from the consociational pattern to the depoliticized pattern of democracy (kartel-democratie), characterized by a homogeneous political culture and, like the consociational system, cooperation rather than competition among the elites. There are several reasons why this transition is not proceeding smoothly: (1) The homogenization of the political culture is a multidimensional process, in which the different variables (the decline of ideology and religion as politically relevant factors, the decrease of social segregation, and the declining cohesion of the organizations within each subculture) are developing unevenly. As a result, the party system tends toward fragmentation instead of the growth of large catchall parties. (2) A neo-democratic ideology is developing as a reaction against the insufficiently democratic quality of the depoliticized system. Because the ’undemocratic’ cartel of elites is also characteristic of consociational democracy, this neo-democratic opposition appears in an early stage of the political transition in the Netherlands. (3) The elites, accustomed to the relatively easy tasks of political accommodation and to the deference of their followers in consociational democracy, react indecisively to the sudden political unrest. (4) The extreme form of proportional representation in the Netherlands tends to reinforce disproportionately the effects of fragmentation and neo-democratic demands. The recent controversies over the royal house have also added to the political unrest, but this factor is a purely coincidental one. Dutch politics will probably keep moving toward the depoliticized pattern, and will remain relatively unstable because of the neo-democratic opposition inherent in this type of democracy. A deliberate decartellization and re-politicization by the ruling elites, which would mean a return to competitive politics and greater stability, is possible but not very probable. Show less
On the basis of governmental publications a mainly statistical analysis is given of changes in the Foreign Service of the Netherlands. The diplomatic organisation can be divided into the following... Show moreOn the basis of governmental publications a mainly statistical analysis is given of changes in the Foreign Service of the Netherlands. The diplomatic organisation can be divided into the following categories: ’consulary service’, ’foreign service officers, ’bilateral representation’ and multilateral representation’. The growth of the diplomatic organization in the postwar years can be traced back to the growth of representation, mainly multilateral representation (Figures 1, 2 and 3). Comparison with Norwegian data reveals that the same trend appears in the Norwegian diplomatic organization. In the third section an analysis is made of the effects of tensions in the formal hierarchy of the diplomacy. A Dutch diplomat can formally be forwarded with a ’personal title’ belonging to one rank higher in the hierarchy than he actually occupies. Table 4 shows that this practice was more and more applied in postwar years and that it centers around rank level III. There also are some formal possibilities to appoint foreign service officers in another than the officially prescribed way. These ’irregular’ appointments occured mainly during the first ten post-war years (table 5) and include about 1/3 of all appointments in the entire post-war period (table 6). The ’irregulars’ leave the diplomatic service sooner than the ’regulars’ (table 7), the ratio for the whole post-war period being 3 : 1 (table 8). In section 4 comparisons are made between formal and actual progress of the diplomatic career of the ’regulars’ (figure 6). Also the relation between career speed and preparatory training is analyzed (table 13). Show less
