Politicians need expertise to make public policies, and civil servants are principal and proximate providers of knowledge. Yet, what constitutes relevant knowledge and skills for bureaucrats is... Show morePoliticians need expertise to make public policies, and civil servants are principal and proximate providers of knowledge. Yet, what constitutes relevant knowledge and skills for bureaucrats is regularly contested—both by politicians and bureaucrats—and subject to change. How can we explain the processes of contestation and change in the expertise of policy bureaucracies? The article presents a theoretical framework for analyzing the politics of bureaucratic expertise. It proposes the concept of “expertise bargains” to capture the understanding between politicians and bureaucrats about the knowledge and skills of civil servants. Based on a transactional view of authority in bureaucratic politics, it argues that the terms of this expertise bargain are mutually defined by politicians and bureaucrats through a dynamic bargaining process. The analytical utility of the framework is demonstrated through a comparative-historical analysis of contestation and change in bureaucratic expertise in the field of economic policy. Show less
The expert competences of the public bureaucracy are often seen as crucial for the quality and legitimacy of public policies. Yet, the role of expertise in the state varies greatly across countries... Show moreThe expert competences of the public bureaucracy are often seen as crucial for the quality and legitimacy of public policies. Yet, the role of expertise in the state varies greatly across countries. How can we explain the position of expert competences in the bureaucracy? The paper examines this question through a historical-institutional analysis of the Italian ministerial bureaucracy. Extending the ‘public service bargains’ framework, it argues that the role of expertise in the state is the result of a bargaining process between civil servants and the politicians that they serve. The paper shows how the peculiar position of expertise in the Italian state – the paucity of technical expertise in the permanent administration, the role of ministerial cabinets as politicized providers of expertise, and the dominance of legal training among civil servants – was the result of a chain of political and bureaucratic strategies and responses. Show less
