The Snake Oil of Stabilisation? Explaining the Rise and Demise of the Comprehensive Approach

Abstract

Only a decade ago, the idea of a comprehensive approach that combines military, political and socio-economic instruments of power in stabilization operations, counter-insurgency and state-building held great promise. The approach also became intricately linked to the ideal liberal state-building. However, following the withdrawal of large scale military contingents from Afghanistan and Iraq and the meagre results of these massive combined civil-military efforts, enthusiasm in the Western world for what critics have also called ‘armed state-building’ seems to have sunk to an all-time low. Treating the comprehensive approach in a broader historical context, this paper analyses the roots, the rise and early signs of its demise. It will argue that while it is justified to question many of the assumptions underlying the recent idealistic interpretations of the comprehensive approach, run the risk of throwing out the baby with the bathwater if we do not continue to build on past mistakes, thereby shaking of the naivety of the post-9/11 era.