Early centralizers: inter-provincial rivalry and elite divisions in the Yucatan Peninsula

Abstract

Why are countries born with greater state capacity in some regions of their territory than others? In the developing world, state institutions often extend only to core areas, while peripheral regions are governed through intermediaries who shape the reach of national bureaucracies. This article argues that inter-provincial rivalry can drive successful state centralization in the periphery. I compare the neighboring provinces of Campeche and Yucatan in post-revolutionary Mexico, where Mexico City’s first major centralizing project (mass primary education) met starkly different responses: in Campeche, local bosses embraced national schools early and consistently, whereas in Yucatan they resisted and obstructed them. I show that Campeche’s early centralization resulted from a deal with the center (support for direct rule in exchange for protection against Yucatan’s long-standing regional dominance) made possible by a critical antecedent (Campeche’s nineteenth-century split from Yucatan) that produced chronic elite divisions. Drawing on primary and secondary sources, I contrast this power-relational explanation with an alternative based on pre-existing subnational infrastructural capacity. Moving beyond national-level accounts of Latin American state formation, the article highlights how national-subnational bargaining within ruling coalitions shapes the spatial trajectories of state-building inside countries.