Are competition authorities equipped to combat entrenched digital monopolies? Lessons from the US and EU antitrust cases against Google

Abstract

This article compares the approach to antitrust remedies in digital markets in two jurisdictions, the EU and the US. Our study is based on the cases against Google, with a particular focus on the problems faced by the European Commission in finding suitable remedies in Google Shopping and Google Android. Our analysis of remedies in the US emphasizes their comparative breadth and distinct purpose, restoring lost competition. We compare the design and objectives of EU and US laws and explain how these differences impact the abilities of the European Commission and US courts to formulate proper remedies. We find that the European Commission—despite its intensive investigation into the facts—is held back in its ability to impose suitable remedies as a consequence of the design of EU laws, as well as the procedures followed in competition law cases. The procedures under the US Sherman Act grant significantly more discretion to the Department of Justice and courts to find proper remedies. We conclude that despite challenges in both jurisdictions, EU and US competition authorities can work symbiotically if the US acts as a second-mover, using lessons from European enforcement to develop suitable remedies. The effectiveness of remedies does, however, hinge on political will to impose them. In contrast, we find that on the EU side, it will be necessary to amend the relevant laws and procedures to make remedies more effective, despite the Commission intending to proactively enforce EU competition law.