The opportunities & limits of compellence strategies : the quest for a framework for analysis

Abstract

This thesis concerns coercive strategies, in particular ‘compellence’, the counterpart of the better-known notion ‘deterrence’, both holding a special position in the contemporary International Relations theory. Compellence is defined as, “the use of threatened force — and at times the actual use of limited force to back up the threat — to induce an adversary to reverse an intolerable action he has taken earlier.” The dissertation provides a framework for the analysis of compellence processes. By means of this framework, it investigates the circumstances affecting the (successful) application of compellence. The framework can be useful to explain – ex post – the development of a particular compellence case. Furthermore, it can provide a basis for future research to expound – ex ante, given particular circumstances – the probable outcome of a compellence case. The analysis made shows that ‘motivation’ is the most important ‘critical success factor’ in a compellence process. Application of the framework also demonstrates that ‘targets’ have, in general, an advantage over ‘compellers’. Moreover, it shows that compellence strategies that imply the gradual increase of pressure on an opponent tend to be failure prone. Finally, a remarkable conclusion is that there is insufficient proof to support Robert Pape’s often quoted assertion that, in general, ‘compellence by denial’ is preferable to ‘compellence by punishment’.