The question of artistic truth: preparations for a critique of non-discursive reason

Abstract

This thesis aims to emancipate the ancient Greek question of artistic truth. First, I will demonstrate that the question of artistic truth is raised rather than answered by Plato. Second, I will show that this question is extended rather than solved by Aristotle’s attempt to answer it. Third, I claim that, partly as a consequence of this Aristotelian heritage, the question is currently absent in contemporary aesthetics, yet needed for contemporary art practices. Through my discussion of Plato and Aristotle, I develop a conceptual framework that can help to employ, develop and compare various theories of artistic truth. In short, this conceptual framework encompasses a transcendental scheme of three truth conceptions (i.e. metaphysical truth, discursive correctness and aesthetic plausibility) of which each corresponds to a distinct metaphysical modality (i.e. necessity, reality and possibility) and a specific form of representation (i.e. preceding, succeeding and simultaneous with the represented). With this differentiated account of truth, I present a systematic metaphysical framework in which truth is not identical with correctness, thinking not with discursive thinking, and the intellectual value of art not with the knowledge it bears. With this, I aim to aid a more critical inquiry into the conditions and possibilities of non-discursive thought in general, and its value of truth in particular.