The social organization of human cooperation and intergroup conflict under inequality

Abstract

With collective action being fragile and at times destructive, a foundational question is when and how groups can create stability and predictability in collective action. Key to this is how groups (re)organize themselves for collective action. Much of the existing experimental research on the social organization of cooperation and intergroup conflict has assumed that individuals or groups are equal — possessing equal resources, abilities to cooperate, and occupying similar positions in intergroup conflicts. However, in real-world societies, inequality is pervasive. Individuals vary in their ability to contribute to public goods, with some being able to generate more welfare than others through cooperation, and intergroup conflicts are often asymmetric, with one group forced to defend against attacks from another. How inequality influences the bottom-up and top-down social organization of cooperation and intergroup conflict, and how groups can socially organize themselves to achieve important societal goals, such as promoting overall welfare, reducing inequality, and minimizing intergroup conflict, are questions I addressed in this dissertation.