Toulmin’s Warrants and Wittgenstein’s Hinges
- Editor(s):
- Boogaart, Ronny; Garssen, Bart; Jansen, Henrike; Van Leeuwen, Maarten; Pilgram, Roosmaryn; Reuneker, Alex
Abstract
Although the most discussed characteristic of hinge propositions is their alleged unchallengeability, Wittgenstein already assumes their non-permanent status. He claims, though, that we distinguish practices in which we challenge certain basic assumptions from practices in which we rely on them, so their (un)challengeability is basically local and practice-related. The particularity of hinge propositions is better captured by their specific logical role for which Toulmin’s suggestions regarding his own concept of warrant proves useful.
argumentative practiceshinge epistemologyhinge propositionsrecognition of reasonsToulminwarrantsWittgenstein

