Argumentation by Analogy as a Comparison of Argumentative Relationships

Abstract

The thesis of this paper is that what characterises argumentation by analogy is that it is based on a comparison of argumentative relationships. I distinguish two types: intra-argumentative relationships and interargumentative relationships. By the former I mean the relationship between what is presented as a reason and that which that reason allegedly support. This is usually marked by expressions such as ‘so,’ ‘therefore,’ ‘because,’ ‘consequently,’ etc. By interargumentative relationships I mean the relationship between two or more reasons. This is usually marked both by coordinative locutions such as ‘in addition,’ ‘on the other hand,’ ‘what’s more,’ ‘moreover,’ etc., and by adversatives expressions such as ‘but,’ ‘though,’ ‘yet,’ ‘having said that,’ and so on. On the basis of this, two varieties of argumentation by analogy are distinguished: argumentation by parity of reasons and argumentation by parity of weighings.