The crime of aggression and public international law

Abstract

Under customary law as well as the amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted in the Review Conference in Kampala in 2010, an act of aggression by a State is a part of the definition of the crime of aggression. This definition clearly encompasses two separate wrongful conducts by different actors. It is less clear how international responsibility arises for both the aggressor state and the individual, and why responsibility for the latter can be predicated only upon the former. This dissertation analyses the way in which aggression is attributed to the aggressor State and the individual, and how State and individual responsibility is delineated from each other, with a particular focus on the legal interest of the aggressed State.

First, the argument considers the way in which international law prohibits and criminalizes aggression, elaborating international obligations of States and individuals in that regard (Part I). It then analyses the interconnection between obligations of States to refrain from an act of aggression and obligations of individuals to refrain from conduct relating to the crime of aggression (Part II). Finally, the enforcement against the crime of aggression in the ICC and domestic courts is explored (Part III).