Pluralism within Parameters : towards a mature evaluative historiography of science

Abstract

Historiography of science is in its current self-image a

non-evaluative discipline. Its main goal is to understand past processes

of knowledge formation on their own terms. In the last few decades this

approach has greatly improved our understanding of the phenomenon of science. Yet, something strange in going on. Reading present-day historiography of science it is as if no one ever made a mistake. We may wonder why there has been development in science at all, if no mistake has ever stood in need of correction. I argue that it is possible to add an evaluative dimension to historiography of science without relinquishing the many insights won in the past few decades. Such an evaluative stance requires a radical comparative approach towards assessments of past science. I argue that this comparativism is not incompatible to relationalism but complementary to it. Next to this I argue that, if we take the wish to reduce uncertainty as the primary force of change in science, a proper conceptualization of the notion of error, which is now surprisingly lacking, becomes possible. The results of my thesis endow historians of science with a set of analytical possibilities, which, if used, will significantly strengthen the historiographical output of the field.