Grenzen aan wettelijk ingrijpen in topbeloning

Abstract

I began this book with the observation that top remuneration in the Netherlands causes commotion and social unrest. Among other things, this unrest has led to remuneration legislation, which in the eyes of some is too intrusive and encounters legal objections. Intervention in wages is certainly not new; after World War II, the Dutch government sometimes interfered intensively with wage development. There were various reasons and justifications for this, such as economic stability, control of government spending and proportional income distribution. Partly under the influence of ILO standards on collective bargaining freedom, the role of government, more specifically in the capacity of legislator, in wage setting has diminished. In the 21st century, until now, the emphasis has been on regulating top pay. The public outcry about it obviously plays a role in this, but many other reasons have been advanced to justify this government intervention. These include prudent use of public funds and reducing financial incentives through rewarding undesirable or even risky behavior. Although the context of and reasons for intervening in top pay differ from previous pay measures, the question remains whether the government, the legislature, may do so. In this dissertation, I examined where the main legal limits of legal intervention in top pay lie. To what extent can the Dutch government legally intervene in top pay? I examined two fundamental rights, being the right to property and the right to free collective bargaining, and concurrence with equivalent remuneration standards to determine these limits.