Bureaucratisch gedrag in een ministerloos tijdperk
Abstract
The truth of some conceptions concerning bureaucratic behaviour is tested in the wartime situation (1940-1945) in the Netherlands, when the bureaucracy was thrown hack on its own responsibility and initiative, since its political superiors had left the country. Three questions are asked: 1) What was the share of the bureaucracy in forcing Dutch citizens to work for the Germans (conscription of labour or ’Arbeitseinsatz*)?; 2) How can we explain this bureaucratic behaviour?; 3) Can we justify this behaviour? Many civil servants were dissatisfied with pre-war liberal unemployment policy. The absence of the political leaders provided them with an opportunity to implement their cherished full employment plans. In doing so, they helped to lay the organizational and administrative basis of the Arbeitseinsatz, which gradually became unacceptable both from a legal and from a moral point of view. Factors accounting for this bureaucratic behaviour are: the human tendency to be concerned with the solution of problems of the past; the lack of experience with similar situations; the bureaucratic characteristics of depolitization, specialization, stress on law and order (’business should be as usual’), fear of the novel, hierarchical thinking and lack of personal involvement in the results of decisions; the social isolation and resulting political isolations of the higher bureaucrats; the absence of any systematic approach to the problems of co-operation with the German occupiers. The supposition is made, that the absence of traditional political leadership and the lack of contact with and acceptance of political forces in Dutch society, resulted in strengthening the German influence on the administrative apparatus. This hypothesis is confirmed by the outcome of decisions which were influenced by local government officials (Mayors), who were in fact accepted as a relevant political force. Now that many facts are known, the role of bureaucracy in the conscription of labour cannot he justified. But should officials have acted differently not knowing at the time many of the relevant facts and outcomes? Two aspects of this question are dealt with: 1) Working together with the Germans seemed to give German administration a quality of legitimacy and weakened the forces of the people (political-psychological effect); 2) During the war legal responsibility for controversial decisions was frequently passed on from one official to another; the present writer thinks that in cases where elementary legal principles are violated, moral responsibility for the mere execution of unacceptable decisions cannot be avoided in this way

