Response: commentary: distrust, false cues, and below-chance deception detection accuracy: commentary on Stel et al. (2020) and further reflections on (un)conscious lie detection from the perspective of truth-default theory

Abstract

People often mistake other people’s deceits for truths (i.e., the truth bias; McCornack and Parks,

1986). The Adaptive-Lie-Detector theory suggests that people make informed judgments using

reliable cues. A possible explanation for the truth bias is that when cues are absent, people make

an “educated guess” based on most communication being honest (Street, 2015). Stel et al. (2020) investigated whether inducing contextual distrust could be the antidote for this bias. Based on previous evidence that (1) distrust may induce conscious thought (e.g., Mayo, 2015) and (2) conscious processes can hinder the ability to detect deception (e.g., Reinhard et al., 2013), we expected and found that participants are less accurate in judging deceits and truths when contextual distrust (vs. trust) is induced, which was partly due to participants relying more on false beliefs about deception. In his commentary on Stel et al. (2020), Levine (2021) agreed that (1) distrust hampers correct deception judgments and that (2) distrust involves conscious processing. He was, however, skeptical that deception cues could explain why distrust hampered truth detection. The main arguments were that Stel et al. found (1) below chance-accuracy in the distrust condition, (2) which was explained by more reliance on false deception cues. Levine states that the deception cues used in Stel et al. are generally non-diagnostic rather than antidiagnostic. He argued the findings are not in line with previous findings and his theoretical perspective. Here, we react to these comments and argue that our findings do not contradict, but expand previous findings.