From effects-based operations to effects-based force : on causality, complex adaptive system, and the biology of war

Abstract

The author addresses a recent force employment concept called effects-based operations, which first appeared during the 1991 war against Iraq. The attributes of effects-based operations can be grouped around three common, but interrelated elements such as effects focus, advanced technology, and systems thinking. However, the characteristics upon which the common elements are built, such as causality/deduction for effects focus, intangibles/control for advanced technology, and categorisation/analysis for systems thinking bear dangerous simplifications regarding the nature of war. These characterictics are in sharp contrast with war__s frictional nature as outlined by Clausewitz, who stated that effects in war cannot be traced back to single causes, as several concurrent causes are normally at work. Novelty must always be expected in war as friction dims expectations in terms of causality and the ability to achieve desired effects. The author suggests an organic approach to address the challenge posed by war. According to him the emphasis must shift towards learning and adaptation, instead of planning for desired effects. Friction indicates that often it is more important in war how we do things than what things we do, which has a clear practical limitation for the concept of effects-based operations.