Atlantis lost : the American experience with De Gaulle, 1958-1969

Abstract

This dissertation examines the reactions in the United States to French foreign policy during de Gaulle’s presidential tenure (1958-1969). It is concerned with these reactions in the context of the history of American foreign policy and of American approaches to the transatlantic relationship. Based on the American documentary record, it responds to the following questions: How did Americans interpret de Gaulle’s policy of ‘independence’ within the larger framework of their ideas about the transatlantic relationship? How did consecutive administrations actually deal with the challenges posed within this framework by de Gaulle’s ‘independent’ foreign policy from 1958 to 1969? Did de Gaulle’s policy of ‘independence’ modify American policies towards Europe and the Atlantic alliance?

How Americans judged Gaullism largely depended on whether they were liberal or conservative; as the liberal mindset was dominant during 1960s, the Franco-American disagreement must be partially understood as a clash between an American foreign policy steeped in liberal values and a French foreign policy steeped in the conservative tradition. As importantly, de Gaulle’s foreign policy contributed to a paradigm shift in American perceptions of the transatlantic relationship from the notion of an evolving Atlantic ‘community’ toward a more realistic Atlanticism primarily attuned to the national interest.