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The functioning of Dutch party youth wings: a comparison of the 1980s and 2010s

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THE FUNCTIONING OF DUTCH **PARTY YOUTH WINGS**

a comparison of the 1980s and 2010s

CHARLOTTE DE ROON

THE FUNCTIONING OF DUTCH PARTY YOUTH WINGS

A comparison of the 1980s and 2010s

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List of Abbreviations

AJC	Arbeiders Jeugd Centrale
ANJV	Algemeen Nederlands Jeugd Verbond
ARJA	Anti-Revolutionaire Jongeren Actie
ARJOS	Anti-Revolutionaire Jongerenstudieclubs
ARP	Anti-Revolutionaire Partij
BJL	Bond van Jonge Liberalen
BVL	Bond van Vrije Liberalen
CBS	Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek
CDA	Christen-Democratisch Appèl
CDJA	Christen-Democratisch Jongeren Appèl
CHJG	Christelijk Historische Jongerengroepen
CHJO	Christelijk-Historische Jongeren Organisatie
CHU	Christelijk-Historische Unie
CPN	Communistische Partij van Nederland
CU	ChristenUnie
D66	Democraten 66
DNPP	Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen
DS'70	Democratisch-Socialisten 1970
FJG	Federatie van Jongerengroepen in de PvdA
FVD	Forum voor Democratie
GL	GroenLinks
GPJC	Landelijk Verband van Gereformeerde Politieke Jeugdstudieclubs
GPV	Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond
IISG	Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis
JD	Jonge Democraten
JF	Jonge Fortuynisten
JFVD	Jongerengroep Forum Voor Democratie
JOVD	Jongeren Organisatie Vrijheid en Democratie
JS	Jonge Socialisten in de PvdA
KVP	Katholieke Volkspartij
KVPJG	Katholieke Volkspartij Jongerengroepen
LPF	Lijst Pim Fortuyn
LVSGS	Landelijk Verband van Staatkundig Gereformeerde Studieverenigingen
LSP	Liberale Staatspartij
NA	Nationaal Archief
NJS	Nationale Jeugdstorm
NSB	Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging
OPP	Jongerengroep OPPOSITIE
PpF	Perspectief, ChristenUnie-jongeren
PPR	Politieke Partij Radikalen
PPRjo	PPR-Jongeren
PSJG	Pacifistisch Socialistische Jongerengroepen

PSP	Pacifistisch-Socialistische Partij
PSP-jg	PSP-Jongerengroepen
PvdA	Partij van de Arbeid
PvdD	Partij voor de Dieren
PvdV	Partij van de Vrijheid
PVV	Partij voor de Vrijheid
ROOD	ROOD, jong in de SP
RPF	Reformatische Politieke Federatie
RPJO	Reformatische Politieke Jongeren Organisatie
SB	Socialistenbond
SDAP	Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij
SDB	Sociaal-Democratische Bond
SDJB	Sociaal-Democratische Jongeliedenbond
SDP	Sociaal-Democratische Partij
SGP	Staatskundig-Gereformeerde Partij
SGPJ	SGP-jongeren
SJB	Socialistische Jongelieden Bond
SP	Socialistische Partij
VDB	Vrijzinnig-Democratische Bond
VDJO	Vrijzinnig-Democratische Jongerenorganisatie
VVD	Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie
Wfpp	Wet financiering politieke partijen

1. Introduction

1.1 A widespread but understudied phenomenon

In the run-up to the 2017 elections for the House of Representatives in the Netherlands (in Dutch: *Tweede Kamer*), the chairpersons of ten youth wings of political parties prepared and signed a climate manifesto.¹ Regardless of their political colour, they agreed upon five measures that would make the Netherlands a worldwide front-runner in sustainability. The party youth wings² insisted that these measures should be included in the government coalition agreement to be closed after the elections. The much-discussed manifesto was written after a call from author and former politician Jan Terlouw, who emphasized that young people should unite on themes and issues that concern them the most.

For those who saw these young people advocating a political cause on TV and in newspapers, this was perhaps a notable event. Politics is often seen as an ‘old men’s game’. Indeed, young people vote for and join political parties less frequently than older voters (e.g. Fieldhouse et al., 2007; Norris, 2003). There are also concerns that young people are decreasingly connected to the traditional political process in general, and to political parties in particular (e.g. Scarrow & Gezgor, 2010; Smets, 2012; Whiteley, 2007). Yet, the ten politically engaged young chairs in the media show us that there is still a group of young people that is involved in party politics. In particular, they are involved through the youth organizations of their respective political parties. The present study deals with these party youth wings. What political functions do party youth wings fulfil in our representative democracy? Has this changed over time?

Youth wings of political parties exist in democracies all around the world, uniting millions of young people. This is already apparent from the manifold international umbrella organizations in which party youth wings unite.³ Research shows that the large majority of Western European parties indeed have a youth wing, and that more parties have a youth wing now than ever before (Allern & Verge, 2017). Alongside political parties, party youth wings can thus be considered a ubiquitous part of a democratic society. It is therefore surprising that this widespread phenomenon has received scant attention in the literature, despite the alleged importance of political youth participation and the proximity of youth wings to political parties, the latter of which are generally characterized as central to our representative democracies. The few existing empirical studies on party youth wings predominantly focus on one specific aspect of their organization (e.g. Bruter & Harrison, 2009a; Hooghe et al., 2004;

¹ See, for instance: NOS Nieuws. (2017, 22 February). Jonge politici tekenen manifest voor duurzaamheid. Via <https://nos.nl/artikel/2159551-jonge-politici-tekenen-manifest-voor-duurzaamheid>.

² In some countries, party youth wings are called ‘political youth organizations’. Other commonly used terms are ‘youth sections’, ‘youth branches’, ‘political youth wings’ or ‘youth factions’. For clarity reasons, I chose to use the term ‘party youth wing’ throughout this thesis.

³ As can be derived from their websites, the International Federation of Liberal Youth has around 70 member organizations, about 150 socialist youth wings are represented by the International Union of Socialist Youth, the umbrella organization Global Young Greens unites over 70 youth wings worldwide and the International Young Democrat Union reports on representing around 125 centre-right party youth wings.

Lamb, 2002; Rainsford, 2017). Although each of these studies provides useful insights, the overarching question of what role party youth wings play in our contemporary democracies has until now been largely ignored. The present study aims to address this question by exploring the relatively unknown world of party youth wings.

Before turning to the main goal of this study in more detail, an understanding is required of what a party youth wing is. It is defined here as *a long-term, visible, voluntarily organized group of young persons that forms a sub-organization of a political party and pursues common purposes concerning collective goods and candidate selections for which certain methods are agreed upon in order to influence decision-making processes*. There are four key features included in this definition that help us distinguish party youth wings from other associations. First and foremost, party youth wings have a *partisan* character, as they are either formally or informally connected to a political party. Both the party and the youth wing propagate that their organizations are linked. Secondly, party youth wings emphasize *political* objectives and their aim at political action, without seeking public office or competing in elections. Following Warren (2001, p. 111), political organizations concern groups that are oriented toward or embedded within the medium of state power. Because of their efforts to assert influence on behalf of a certain constituency or political idea (Beyers et al., 2008), political organizations can be characterized as future-oriented, thus distinguishing them from hobby clubs (Gordon & Babchuk, 1959). A third key feature is that party youth wings comprise *organized and voluntary* political behaviour. A youth wing can be labelled as an association, i.e. “a formally organized named group, most of whose members – whether persons or organizations – are not financially recompensed for their participation” (Knoke, 1986, p. 2). Although the level of organizational formalization may vary across party youth wings, it concerns a group of persons that has agreed upon a common purpose and certain methods of actions which extend beyond a single act (Cole, 1920). The fourth key feature of party youth wings is that associational involvement is open to *people of a young age*. The youth wing itself determines what is defined as young, although the age range generally lies between 14 and 30 years old.⁴

1.2 Studying party youth wing functioning

In our current understanding of political dynamics, young people are on average less likely than adults to be involved in conventional politics.⁵ This lack of participation poses a risk to a political system that aims to represent all parts of society. Ample research is therefore conducted on the levels, forms and determinants of young people’s engagement in politics. In

⁴ The term ‘youth’ or ‘young’ is socially constructed and its definition is therefore not clear-cut. Scholars and societal actors use different definitions, varying from specific age categories to ‘being young’ as a transition phase. Appendix 5.2 provides an overview of the membership criteria and conditions of Dutch party youth wings in the late 1980s and 2010s, which includes the adopted age range for membership.

⁵ Scholars use various terms to distinguish between conventional and unconventional political participation. Some prefer to use terms as electoral-based, institutionalized or traditional participation to indicate the participation that takes place within formal politics. In this thesis, I chose to follow textbooks and other contemporary literature by using the term conventional.

this thesis, I focus on the youth wings of political parties, which have traditionally been created to bridge the gap between political parties and young citizens. Despite the limited amount of empirical research on party youth wings, plenty of statements can be found about their role and functioning. Scholars, news outlets, political actors and public institutions make – often unsubstantiated – remarks about the role of youth wings in political life. On the one hand, this is often done in a positive way. For instance, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte highlights the importance of youth wings as “(...) places where young people can express their social interest. Political youth organizations bring substance and fun together, that's a good combination” (Van Eijdsden, 2015).⁶ The United Nations good practice guide *Enhancing Youth Political Participation throughout the Electoral Cycle* is also illustrative. It promotes the development of strong political party youth wings because of their ability to connect young people to politics “by providing a powerbase for young members, retaining and grooming them, and reaching out to young voters” (United Nations Development Programme, 2013, p. 6). In addition, several national governments have recognized the importance of youth wings, as is apparent from public funding opportunities for these youth organizations (Van Klingeren et al., 2015). Such subsidy schemes are often based on the assumption that youth wings promote the political participation of young people.

On the other hand, there are some who question the relevance of party youth wings. For instance, it is written in an opinion piece in a nationwide British newspaper that “young people are (...) annexed to youth wings, where their policy interests are often compartmentalised or banished to the periphery” (Mycock, 2014). Similarly, in an article from 2007 from the Dutch quality newspaper NRC Handelsblad, the size and relevance of party youth wings are claimed to be waning (Willems, 2007). Researcher Chris Aalberts is even quoted in this article as arguing that youth wings are “small, pathetic clubs in which nobody is interested”.⁷ Although this implies that party youth wings have become less relevant over time, which may indeed be expected amidst scholarly concerns on both political party and youth participation decline, statements like these are unsupported by scientific evidence.

I would argue that it is high time that we move from assumptions and ideas on what party youth wings do or not, to a proper understanding of what they actually do. In order to do so, the current study has adopted the functioning of party youth wings as its central theme. A functional analysis is especially appropriate for investigating party youth wings because they have been repeatedly considered as instrumental, or as a means to a certain end: to enhance the political participation of the young in society (United Nations Development Programme, 2013), to ensure a representative link with young people (Poguntke, 2002), to socialize the young into future political engagement (Rainsford, 2017), and so forth. Alternatively, we may choose to study their organizational design, ideological profile, finances or relationship with the mother party. But such structural aspects in the end can only be understood in the context of the (political) functions that are performed by party youth wings. Particularly in the case of

⁶ In Dutch: “Het is erg belangrijk dat er plekken zijn waar jonge mensen hun maatschappelijke interesse kwijt kunnen. Politieke jongerenorganisaties brengen inhoud en gezelligheid samen, dat is een goede combinatie”.

⁷ In Dutch: “(...) het zijn kleine, zielige clubjes waar niemand in is geïnteresseerd”.

an understudied political phenomenon, a systematic empirical analysis of functions is a logical starting point in gaining insight in the position and meaning of that phenomenon in the political system at large.

In this thesis, I develop a functional framework of party youth wings consisting of three key functions: the mobilization function, the representation function and the socialization function. Firstly, party youth wings may promote the participation of young people in the political system, and hence their function as ‘mobilizing vehicles’. Not only can such exclusive youth-specific organizations be an attractive entry point to politics for young people, we also know that being asked is one of the crucial factors that determine an individual’s political participation (Verba et al., 1995). Secondly, party youth wings may make an effort to represent the interests of young individuals, i.e. act as ‘representation channels’ between the young generation on the one hand and the political system on the other. Situated closely to the mother party, a party youth wing can be typified as an “internal interest group” (Poguntke, 1998, p. 144). Such groups have the potential to exert influence on policy development and the selection of political leaders. Thirdly, party youth wings can be perceived as potential ‘socializing agents’: contexts in which young adults develop the political knowledge and skills and engage in discussions and social networks needed for future political engagement. Generally, voluntary associations are found to play a significant role in the process of political socialization of young people (McFarland & Thomas, 2006; Quintelier, 2008). They would advance the skills, attitudes and capacities needed for political engagement (Flanagan, 2009; Verba et al., 1995). The political character of party youth wings makes them ideally suited for this.

The aim of this study is to empirically assess the degree in which party youth wings perform these key functions. Based on the findings, a picture can be painted of the role that party youth wings play in a democratic society. To what extent this role may subsequently be valued for its contribution to democracy is another question and depends on normative standpoint more so than on description. There is no single conception of the ideal democratic society (Cunningham, 2002; Held, 2006). As a result, the functional performance and relevance of political organizations, such as parties and their youth wings, can be valued differently depending on the adhered perspective of democracy. Several publications show that different perspectives on democracy lead to different emphasis on what tasks and features of political parties are deemed important for the well-functioning of the democratic process. For instance, from the perspective of participatory democracy, the promotion of mass participation is a key function of parties (Allern & Pedersen, 2007). For pluralist democrats, parties act as brokers between civil society and the state by being “facilitators of compromise and guarantors against unreasonable exploitation of one group by another” (Katz & Mair, 1995, p. 14). In the same way, varying degrees of importance can be attributed to the various functions of party youth wings. I will address this in the concluding chapter of this thesis.

1.3 Has the functioning of Dutch party youth wings changed over time?

While party youth wings are largely ignored in the literature, the functioning of their mother parties has been a major issue of concern for multiple decades. Consistent empirical evidence suggests that party membership, party activism, partisan attachments and electoral turnout are decreasing in advanced democracies (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000a; Van Biezen et al., 2012; Whiteley, 2011). This leads to concerns about the connection between parties and society at large (e.g. Mair, 2013). In fact, a ‘crisis of political parties’ is now a commonly held notion (e.g. Montero et al., 2002). At the same time, however, parties have persevered. They continue to play a central role in the governing process in European democracies. Multiple scholars have stressed that political parties transform over time and adapt to circumstances (e.g. Harmel & Janda, 1994; Katz & Mair, 1995; Kölln, 2014a). The role and character of political parties in Western democracies have been argued to change as result of economic, social and political developments, including the rise of mass communication, higher educational levels, and loosened social and religious ties, to name a few (e.g. Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000c).

A study of the functioning of party youth wings cannot ignore this dynamic context. It is likely that the described trends and developments have affected the functioning of party youth wings. Youth wings are becoming more common, but at the same time have to face the challenges of party-related political change and youth disenchantment with party politics. The question then is not only whether party youth wings are able to uphold a link between young people and party politics at this moment in time, but also whether their ability to do so has changed compared to several decades ago. Some argue that, amidst all changes, “there remain important areas of linkage between political parties and citizens” (Dalton et al., 2011, p. 4). It is not clear whether this applies to party youth wings. The only way to assess this is by understanding how party youth wings once functioned versus how they do so today. This study therefore employs a longitudinal design by comparing party youth wing functioning in two time periods within a single country.

In particular, party youth wing functioning will be studied in the Netherlands in the mid-late 1980s and compared to the mid-late 2010s. The Netherlands is very suitable for the longitudinal analysis to be reported in this study. The country is characterized by institutional stability. Party youth wings have a long tradition in this country; their existence goes back to the founding of the first nationwide political party. The Netherlands has had a state subsidy for party youth wings since 1976, which ensures the availability of public records on party youth wings. During the 1980s, we see the number of party youth wings stabilizing, making this a suitable time period for study. Moreover, major political change took place in the Netherlands shortly after the 1980s. This is therefore an appropriate period to include in a study on the functioning of party youth wings in a context of party-related political change. I will specify the rationale behind this selection in more detail in Chapter 3.

In sum, this study attempts to answer the following main research question: *To what extent has the ability of Dutch party youth wings to mobilize, represent and socialize young people into the political system changed between the late 1980s and the late 2010s?* It will do

so by combining qualitative and quantitative data, collected through archival research, interviews and surveys.

1.4 The relevance of this study

Democracy without organization is inconceivable (...) direct democracy falls down in the face of increasing numbers. The individual plain man, swallowed up in a sea of highly differentiated human beings, finds it necessary to organize with others of a like mind so that by concerted action they may bend the state to their will (Odegard, 1966, Preface).

Why should we care about the functioning of party youth wings and the way this functioning may have changed over time? Simply put: youth wings are closely tied to political parties, which in their turn are closely linked to the political process in the vast majority of representative democracies today. However, we still know little of these organizations and their young members. This section describes the various reasons why this study is relevant from a scientific and societal perspective.

Scientific relevance

This study contributes to the literature on the political participation of young people. The dominant focus is often on the young individual, who is either presented as disengaged from conventional politics (e.g. Fieldhouse et al., 2007; Scarrow & Gezgor, 2010; Spanning, 2008b; Wattenberg, 2007), or as engaged in new, more informal and short-term forms of political participation (e.g. Dalton, 2014; Norris, 2003; Sloam, 2013). In contrast, this study sheds light on an understudied type of political participation, namely party youth wing membership, and by doing so focuses on those young people who *are* active in the sphere of conventional politics. Moreover, this study expands our understanding of those organizational structures in which young people unite politically and which partly determine how young people relate to (party) politics. Although social contexts are more and more taken into account in the political participation literature, they are often included as a determinant of a young individual's political behaviour (e.g. Campbell, 2013; McFarland & Thomas, 2006; Quintelier, 2008). Less is known about how young people, when united in a political youth association, jointly participate in the political process, and what opportunities such associations may provide for political involvement and education.

Secondly and related to this, this study contributes to our understanding of the relationship between political parties and young people. Political parties are widely recognized as a main linkage mechanism between society and the political system, which comes in many forms and evolves over time. In this regard, there is still a lot to learn about the link between political parties and young people. Surely, there are studies that focus on a specific aspect of this link, such as young voter turnout and young party membership (Bruter & Harrison, 2009a; Scarrow & Gezgor, 2010; Smets, 2012; Whiteley, 2007). Nevertheless, the outreach strategies and institutional structures of political parties that either deter or encourage young people's engagement have received little attention. Hooghe & Stolle (2003,

pp. 44-45) rightly notice that, “(...) instead of asking whether young people are still interested in party politics, we might as well turn the question around: are parties still interested in young people?”. One key strategy of parties to connect to young people has traditionally been to offer them a more or less independent youth section. Particularly within the context of alleged party decline (Kölln, 2014a), it is important to reflect on this specific strategy as it might contribute to political parties’ fulfilment of their essential representative functions. The approach taken here offers a systematic evaluation of the functioning of such youth sections in two time periods, allowing us to dig deeper into the evolving relationship between political parties and the young.

Thirdly, this study provides relevant insights for the fields of intra-party politics and party organizations. It is widely acknowledged that political parties consist of different subgroups or factions that compete with each other in their attempts to achieve certain objectives (Boucek, 2009; Ceron, 2019). As such, intra-party groups influence the direction of the party and can fuel intra-party conflicts. Although often ignored in this body of literature, party youth wings may pre-eminently act as an intra-party group that directs its articulation efforts towards the internal decisional bodies. They can be considered as highly organized factions that are “not fully integrated into the political party nor fully independent” (Rainsford, 2017, p. 4). This makes party youth wings a unique case to study.

Lastly, this study is not only innovative because it explores a relatively underexposed phenomenon, but also because of its research approach. It is – to my best knowledge – one of the few studies that empirically assess the functioning of a political organization by means of a systematic analysis of a functional framework. The literature is replete with lists of functions of political parties and similar political organizations which, more often than not, lack a systematic operationalization and empirical assessment. The framework and the accompanying operationalization that I present in this study may therefore be useful for other studies of similar political organizations.

Societal relevance

From a societal perspective, it is important to learn how the connection between young people and party politics can be improved. At the heart of any democratic system is the involvement of citizens: “Democracy is unthinkable without the ability of citizens to participate freely in the government process” (Verba et al., 1995, p. 1). Through participatory acts, citizens are able to influence the decisions that affect their everyday lives, and decision-makers are provided with the information needed to make such decisions. Within this dynamic, political parties act as the primary representative agents that link citizens to government policy (Dalton et al., 2011; Poguntke, 2002). Young people are found to participate less in formal (party) political processes than their older counterparts (Spanning, 2008b). Their political engagement has therefore received a lot of scholarly attention. Two underlying concerns seem to be the key drivers hereof: concerns about the current and the future quality of our democracies.

Today, it is widely accepted that an engaged citizenry is a core component of a healthy

democracy. A low engagement of young people in conventional politics may put the quality of democratic governance under pressure, as it challenges the representativeness and responsiveness of the political system. For instance, considering the low participation of young people in elections, one might ask: “If politicians know that young people are far less likely to vote than the elderly, why should they care about young people?” (Wattenberg, 2007, p. 140). This becomes even more pressing when it is taken into account that legislatures “worldwide include more of the affluent than the less well-off, more men than women, more middle-aged than young, and more white-collar professionals than blue-collar workers” (Norris, 1997, p. 6). Only 1.7% of parliamentarians in the world are in their twenties and 11.9% are in their thirties (Power, 2012). The underrepresentation of the young in formal politics may result in a lower response to their social needs as well a larger gap between young people and conventional politics. Moreover, societies and political organizations may be less able to benefit from the potential of young people. They are often portrayed as important “change-makers” or as a “positive force for transformative social change” (United Nations Development Programme, 2013, p. 28). In the specific case of political parties, young people may help them improve and rejuvenate their image (Bruter & Harrison, 2009a, p. 224).

In addition, it is often (implicitly) assumed that a declining engagement of young people in conventional politics puts the future functioning of our democracies at risk. While there are widespread concerns about the declining levels of citizen engagement in conventional politics (Mair, 2005), these concerns are most pertinent in the case of young people as the decline in their partisan engagement seems to be most striking (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000a, p. 31). There is indication that voter turnout has fallen most sharply among young people in some countries (Fieldhouse et al., 2007; Phelps, 2004; Smets, 2012) and that the membership base of political parties in established democracies has been increasingly ageing (Scarrow & Gezgor, 2010). This is particularly problematic when one considers 1) young people to be the ones most susceptible to new conditions (Franklin et al., 2004, p. 216) and 2) the prolonged period between childhood and adulthood as a politically definitive period (Flanagan, 2009). Political attitudes and behaviours seem to take shape at a relatively young age (Hooghe & Stolle, 2002); “joiners in youth become joiners in adulthood” (Flanagan, 2009, p. 297). Following this line of argument, the political behaviour and attitudes of young people today offer us a glimpse into the future of our political parties and systems (but see Hooghe, 2004). In short, in the words of Bruter and Harrison (2009b, p. 1260), “young people are the future of old-style politics, and without their participation, some fear that our current model of governance might reach a point of no return”.

It is against this background that the current study on party youth wings is conducted. As mentioned before, youth wings traditionally aim at accommodating young people in conventional politics. The reported growing disconnect between young people and party politics leads to the question whether party youth wings have become less effective in doing so. A weakening of party youth wings would be yet another indication of a decreasing engagement of young people and presence of parties in society. Yet we also know that a small proportion of young people still becomes involved in politics by joining a political party (Bruter

& Harrison, 2009a; Weber, 2017b). Considering that politicians often start their career in the youth wing of the party (Hooghe et al., 2004), it is likely that within these organizational contexts we find tomorrow's political leaders. For these reasons, we need a better understanding of the functioning of party youth wings within our democracies.

1.5 Plan of the thesis

This study will set out the functioning of Dutch party youth wings in the mid-late 1980s and 2010s in eight chapters. After this introductory chapter, the second chapter will elaborate on the three key functions that party youth wings are expected to fulfil within a democracy. In order to do so, it will place the current research in the context of the prevailing scholarly views on political parties, party sub-organizations and political youth participation. The second chapter culminates in a tripartite functional framework that lays the basis for the study at hand: the mobilization, representation and socialization function. Based on that framework and the societal and party-related trends, I form expectations on changes in the functioning of party youth wings over time. The third chapter, the methodological chapter, defines the accompanying empirical features that point to a party youth wing's compliance with such functions. It will also elaborate on the single-country design, case selection, the methodological issues and the data sources. Chapter 4 introduces the Dutch context by presenting a concise history of party youth wings based on secondary sources and by elaborating on their legal context.

The three chapters that follow present the empirical results of the study. Each discusses and compares the performance of Dutch party youth wings within one of the three key assessment functions in the mid-late 1980s and 2010s. Chapter 5 focuses on the *mobilization* function by examining the extent to which party youth wings fulfil three sub-functions of mobilization in both time periods: 1) the recruitment of members, 2) the facilitation of internal participation and 3) the encouragement of members to participate in politics in other forms beyond youth wing membership. In Chapter 6, I discuss the *representation* function by examining to what extent Dutch party youth wings aggregated and articulated political interests and enhanced descriptive representation in the second half of both the 1980s and the 2010s. Chapter 7 presents a detailed exploration of the third key function of party youth wings: the *socialization* function. Although it is not possible to measure direct socializing effects, the chapter provides insight into the ways in which Dutch party youth wings provide political education and training and facilitate social interaction in their attempt to integrate young people into the political system. The concluding chapter, Chapter 8, will combine these results into an overall conclusion on the changing contribution that party youth wings make to the democratic society of the Netherlands. Moreover, it will outline the limitations, contributions and applications of the findings, and explore avenues for further research.

2. A Functional Framework of Party Youth Wings

Political parties form one of the essential elements of modern representative democracies today. It is therefore no wonder that their functions have received considerable attention in the political science literature. This is not the case for their youth wings. Although ideas will exist about what functions party youth wings fulfil, or should fulfil, these have barely been systematically elaborated or studied. The aim of the present chapter is twofold. Firstly, it seeks to identify the functions that party youth wings may fulfil within a party democracy by consulting the literature on party functions, party organizations, and political youth participation. Based on an exploration of party functions and the – related – rationale for party sub-organizations in general and for the young in specific, I compose a tripartite functional framework of party youth wings. This framework comprises three key functions: the mobilization, representation and socialization function, each of which breaks down into a number of sub-functions. Secondly, this chapter will go into detail on the societal and party-related changes that might have affected the performance of party youth wings on these functions over time. Based on that outline, I hypothesize that party youth wings are negatively affected by the same societal trends that have affected their mother parties and by the resulting party-related changes, and are thus losing functional performance and relevance, particularly when it comes to the mobilization and representation functions.

2.1 Why party sub-organizations?

The quest for party youth wing functions logically starts with the mother party. After all, each youth wing is rooted in the party organization. Party youth wings can be classified as party sub-organization, which are either set up top-down by the party itself or originate bottom-up and become formally acknowledged by the party. If we can unravel how party sub-organizations contribute to a party's activities, we are one step closer to identifying the functions of party youth wings. This section will therefore first present an overview of the functions of political parties, which are then linked to the literature on party sub-organizations.

The functions of political parties

Before the question ‘why party sub-organizations?’ can be answered, we must first understand what a party does. Although the literature is full of definitions, a political party has been commonly defined as “any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (...), candidates for public office” (Sartori, 1976, p. 56). Such a minimal definition is often adopted in order to distinguish parties from other organizations. Of course, parties do more than presenting candidates for elections. The literature offers manifold overviews of functions that are attributed to political parties (e.g. Dalton et al., 2011; Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000c; Gunther & Diamond, 2001; King, 1969; Sartori, 2005; Webb et al., 2002). Generally, two distinct sets of functions have been

associated with political parties in modern democracies: 1) they act as representatives as they articulate, aggregate and translate interests into policy alternatives and 2) they govern by organizing and giving coherence to institutions of government (Katz & Mair, 1995; Mair, 2009). This is also reflected in the phrase of Dalton and Wattenberg (2000c, p. 10), who regard parties as “important vehicles for translating mass preferences into policy choices, and for ensuring the efficient functioning of the democratic process”. To go into the party functions in more detail, the overview of Dalton and Wattenberg (2000c, p. 5) is used. They distinguish party functions on three different party levels: the level of the electorate, the organizational level and the government level.

At the level of the electorate or the mass population, political parties are a collection of supporters, members, activists and voters. The set of functions parties perform at this level focus on the role of these actors in the political process. Political parties make sure that the complex information on policy issues is simplified and manageable for voters (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000c). In this sense, they structure policy choices and alternatives; i.e. they structure the vote (Gunther & Diamond, 2001; King, 1969). Related to this is the education of the public by political parties on (policy) issues and the specific party position on these issues. Parties also offer voters a political anchor by generating loyalty and by serving as symbols of identification (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000c). They motivate people to participate in politics via electoral mobilization (Gunther & Diamond, 2001) or by facilitating participation beyond the vote, as people can become active party members. Moreover, party actions are not limited to actual behaviour, as they can also influence attitudes, feelings and perceptions towards parties and party systems. In this respect, scholars often refer to a broader integration and political socialization function of parties. For instance, King (1969, p. 124) describes this as “the processes whereby individuals acquire psychological and social attachments to political parties and, through them, to the wider political order”.

At the organizational level, parties act as extra-parliamentary organizations. This level involves functions that structure various organizational processes. One of the most basic and often mentioned functions of a political party is the selection and nomination of candidates for political offices (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000c; Gunther & Diamond, 2001; Katz, 2001; King, 1969). It is the most basic function not only because it separates parties from other political organizations, but also because it ultimately influences electoral outcomes, governmental decisions and the public face of the party (Katz, 2001). The party organization also provides a setting to train prospective democratic leaders in democratic norms, party principles and the functioning of the democratic process (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000c). They often become socialized through their activity in a party. Moreover, the political interests of supporters can be articulated and aggregated within the context of the party organization. Political parties not only represent these interests in political campaigns and direct the actions of politicians accordingly, they also bring these interests together into a comprehensive programme like a manifesto, and, if applicable, into a governing programme (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000c).

At the government level, parties are the organizations of public officials. Functions in this category focus on “managing and structuring the affairs of government” (Dalton &

Wattenberg, 2000c, p. 8). Parties are the primary actors in the process of forming a government after elections. They organize the legislative process, ensure cooperation among individual legislators, monitor them, enforce party discipline and often select legislative leadership offices (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000c). At this level, parties aim to convert their political interests into public policy. Parties outside of government organize the opposition and hold the executive accountable. At last, parties foster stability and provide continuity in democratic governance (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000c).

The list of party functions is rather long and not very tangible. To what extent and in what way functions are actually fulfilled is likely to differ across parties, across party systems and across time. The organizational capacity of parties is just but one important factor herein (Scarrow et al., 2017). Arguably, party sub-organizations predominantly play a role in the functional performance of parties on the electoral and organizational level. The party functions on the government level are less relevant as party sub-organizations have no role in the affairs of government. This becomes clear from a short review of the scarce literature on party sub-organizations.


Party sub-organizations in the literature

Party sub-organizations can be defined as units with direct organizational overlap with the main party (Allern & Verge, 2017; Katz & Mair, 1992a; Kopecký, 1995). Examples are organizational units for youth, women, occupational groups and ethnic minorities. They may therefore, first of all, be situated in the internal party domain. From the perspective of intra-party politics, a political party is not a homogeneous entity. It consists of various intra-party groups, such as tendencies, sections or branches. As Ceron (2019, p. 1) describes, intra-party groups are often based on a joint political goal: “Members who retain shared preferences and common interests can join together; they will create intra-party subgroups to boost their influence on internal decision-making”. Such groups come in various sizes and shapes. Party sub-organizations can be argued to differ from other intra-party groups because of their organized structure and acknowledgement by the party. In their review article, Belloni and Beller (1976, pp. 544-545) identify three structural features on which intra-party groups, which they define as factions, can differ: the formalization, completeness and durability of their structure. Matters such as a name, formal procedures, and resources point to a more formal structure. Completeness of structure concerns organizational aspects such as leadership and membership identification and internal communication. The durability of the structure means that a group is either short-lived or enduring. If we consider these features as dimensions, party sub-organizations score high on all three of them. Related to this is that sub-organizations are formally acknowledged as such by the elites of the host party (Allern & Verge, 2017). This may be evidenced by statutory recognition, allocated party resources or overlapping memberships. Such a formal status sets them apart from most other intra-party groups.

This perspective of intra-party politics can be supplemented with a perspective of party linkage, understood as “any means by which political leaders act in accordance with the wants,

needs, and demands of the public in making public policy” (Luttbeg, 1981, p. 3). In their work on parties’ organizational capacity, Scarrow and Webb (2017) identify group linkage as a representative strategy used by parties in varying degrees to connect with specific social interests that are deemed important. Similarly, Poguntke (2002, 2006) situates party sub-organizations in the edifice of organizational ties created by parties in order to build strategic links with society. He explains that parties may establish direct societal links, for instance via mass media channels, and indirect societal links through their membership organization and so-called ‘collateral organizations’. The latter “reach out to specific societal interests, which may not be directly accessible for political parties which need to serve, by definition, a wider and more contradictory range of interests” (Poguntke, 2006, p. 396). This enables party elites to obtain a clear image of the demands and grievances of a relevant portion of their electorate. Figure 2.1 provides a simplified schematic overview of the nature of the link between parties and society. We can distinguish various types of collateral organizations. Collateral organizations can be 1) independent from, 2) corporately linked to, 3) affiliated with or 4) ancillary to the political party (Poguntke, 2006). While the independent and corporate collateral organizations are often almost fully independent of a given party, such as trade unions and churches, affiliated or ancillary organizations are variants of party sub-

Figure 2.1 Simplified illustration of political party-society linkage



Note. Adapted from Poguntke (2002). Party sub-organizations such as youth wings typically fall under the category ‘affiliated’ or ‘ancillary’ collateral organization.

organizations. These are traditionally created by parties as organizational forums for the needs and interests of specific socio-economic groups, such as youth, women, seniors, and religious or ethnic minorities (Poguntke, 1998). The difference between affiliated and ancillary organizations lies in the organization of membership. The former's organization is fully integrated into the party organization, while in the case of the latter there is only partial overlap of membership (Poguntke, 2002). A simplified but comparable categorization is made by Allern and Verge (2017), who distinguish between external interest groups (non-party organizations) and party sub-organizations (party organizational units). The exchanges between a political party and a relevant organization can be either informal or formal (Allern & Verge, 2017; Poguntke, 2002).

The main difference between the perspective of intra-party politics and the perspective of party linkage is that the first predominantly perceives party sub-organizations as bottom-up initiatives of like-minded party members, whereas the latter emphasizes party sub-organizations as a deliberate strategy of political party elites. This latter approach turns out to be dominant in other scholarly work that refers only briefly or indirectly to party sub-organizations. For instance, Sartori (2005) marks subsidiary and collateral organizations as a technique for parties to increase their occupied space or their power coverage at the grassroots level. Another example can be found in the literature on the old mass party, which identifies extensive connections with non-party organizations and party sub-organizations as an original characteristic of the old mass party (Koole, 1992; Krouwel, 2006). Organizations such as youth wings and women's groups were deliberately created in all kinds of fields in order to make sure that social, economic and cultural activities of citizens were consistent with the ideology (Krouwel, 2006).

Regardless of whether the party deliberately instigates sub-organizations or not, this short review of the literature on party sub-organizations underlines their importance for the functional performance of political parties at the level of the electorate and at the organizational level. Party sub-organizations allow parties to connect with specific social groups in society. In that sense, we can understand party sub-organizations as a sort of extension of the main party. This not only may increase a party's appeal to these groups, but also enables the party to identify societal interests in between elections.

Party sub-organizations for young people

Political parties can set up sub-organizations for all kinds of social groups, but they most often opt for youth wings (Allern & Verge, 2017). This indicates that they view young people as a relevant and distinct part of society. What is it about young people and (party) politics that underpins having a sub-organization for this social group? The specificity of young people's life stage and political engagement seems to create incentives to uphold a youth wing. More specifically, it can be derived from the literature that, compared to other age cohorts, young people generally are in a politically definitive life stage, prefer alternative forms of political engagement to conventional politics and are underrepresented in the political systems of established democracies.

The pertinence of a party sub-organization for young people may first lie in the opportunities for political socialization and education. This is especially important in the case of young people, as the prolonged period between childhood and adulthood is considered a politically definitive period in which an individual's political ideology takes shape (Flanagan, 2009). As described in Chapter 1, political attitudes and behaviours seem to take shape at a relatively young age (Hooghe & Stolle, 2002); "joiners in youth become joiners in adulthood" (Flanagan, 2009, p. 297). Considering that young people are tomorrow's political actors and leaders, society traditionally attempts to educate youth for citizen participation during this period (Niemi & Hepburn, 1995). The general assumption is that new generations need to be supported in their understanding of democratic citizenship and in becoming politically engaged so that the democratic future of our societies is secured. Organizations such as youth wings can contribute to this socialization process. This offers opportunities for political parties to socialize and retain new supporters at an early stage.

The creation and maintenance of a sub-organization specifically for young people may also arise from the necessity to enlarge the appeal of political parties to this particular social group, as this is found to be lowest compared to other age groups. Studies show that young people are more often disengaged from conventional politics than their older counterparts are. They vote less than older people (Blais et al., 2004; Fieldhouse et al., 2007; Quintelier, 2007), and political parties find it especially hard to connect with younger cohorts in society (Hooghe et al., 2004). Empirical analysis shows that young people are less politically interested, less likely to discuss politics and follow politics in the media, and less likely than adults to join traditional political organizations (Spannring, 2008b). It is even argued that political engagement is declining because of generational replacement, as would be apparent from ageing party memberships (Scarrow & Gezgor, 2010) and a disproportional decline in turnout of young people over the last couple of decades (Blais et al., 2004; Phelps, 2004). Dalton and Wattenberg (2000a, p. 31) conclude that "the decrease of partisanship in advanced industrial democracies has been disproportionately concentrated among the young". At the same time, a growing strand of scholars argues that young people do seem to be interested in politics but express their interest in non-traditional and non-institutionalized ways (e.g. Dalton, 2014; Norris, 2002; Sloam, 2013). Some therefore attribute the low involvement of young people in conventional politics to the political institutions and elites themselves. Studies do suggest that the formal political process sidelines and marginalizes young people and their interests (Furlong, 2013; Henn & Weinstein, 2006; Sloam, 2014). Spannring (2008a, p. 83) holds that political organizations fall short in their relationship with young people: "Apart from their obvious difficulty to communicate with young people, to integrate youth-specific perspectives in their programmes and to give young people a meaningful role, it is the lack of openness of structures and processes that deter adolescents". A youth wing may be one way to give young people a meaningful place within the party.

The relatively low involvement of young people in conventional politics requires extra efforts of political representatives and parties to hear the voice of young people. The United Nations (2013, p. 3) explains:

Young people between the ages of 15 and 25 constitute a fifth of the world's population. While they are often involved in informal, politically relevant processes, such as activism or civic engagement, they are not formally represented in national political institutions such as parliaments and many of them do not participate in elections. This can impact on the quality of democratic governance.

Such representative deficiencies are particularly relevant in the context of population aging, as the growing political influence of the elderly can have major implications for democratic processes, outcomes and deliberation (Goerres & Vanhuysse, 2012). Moreover, some contend that young people hold different political views compared to other age cohorts. Wattenberg (2007, p. 142), for instance, argues that "an individual's place in the life cycle plays an important role in determining the kind of personal experiences that seem relevant at any given point in time, which in turn affects one's political priorities and values". He shows that American young people are more liberal than older people and that the young turn more conservative when they progress from young adulthood to middle age. As described above, a sub-organization specifically for the young may positively affect the response of political elites to the social needs of young people.

2.2 The functions of party youth wings

The specificity of young people's politics justifies and necessitates an extra effort of political parties to accommodate young people. The previous section has shown that party youth wings can be perceived as such (see also Russell, 2005; Weber, 2017a). Parties can use them as an area of linkage between them and young people. Arguably, the relevance of party youth wings depends on the degree in which the functions they fulfil address the specific nature of young people's politics. In other words, they should educate the young politically, offer them an accessible entry point to (party) politics, and contribute to their political representation. Using the sparse literature on party youth wings, I develop this in the current section into three key functions of youth wings: mobilization, representation and socialization. While the mobilization function is concerned with promoting the participation of young people in politics, the representation functions includes representing young people's interests, and the socialization function involves socializing the young into future political engagement. In what follows, I discuss the three functions in detail and dissect them into eight sub-functions.

Key function: Mobilization

It has become clear that, while there is consensus that citizen participation during and in between elections is of crucial importance for the functioning of a democratic system, young people participate less in traditional forms of political activity. Young people seem to be turned off or even excluded by certain barriers within conventional (party) political structures. In this context, party youth wings have been proposed as mobilizing vehicles for young people. For instance, a United Nations report emphasizes that the support for the development of strong party youth wings is a means to enhance political participation of the young in society

(United Nations Development Programme, 2013).⁸ Moreover, some governments make public funding available for party youth wings because of the potential of these organizations to act as participatory vehicles (see Chapter 3). The first key function of party youth wings is thus the *mobilization function*. Mobilization means here that party youth wings succeed in encouraging young people to participate in politics. There are numerous definitions of political participation, and it goes too far to elaborate on these here. Suffice it to say that a broad understanding of the concept is adopted here, which encompasses “citizens’ activities affecting politics” (Van Deth, 2014, p. 3), or activities that directly or indirectly influence political decision-making processes (Quintelier, 2012; Verba et al., 1995). This can either concern traditional, institutionalized forms of participation, such as voting and party membership, or non-institutionalized forms of participation, such as protests and lifestyle politics (Marien et al., 2010).

What role can associations such as party youth wings play in the political participation of citizens? Verba and Nie (1972, p. 175) identify three roles of voluntary organizations: 1) organizations themselves participate for their members in the political process, 2) a member may use its organizational affiliation to participate in the political process, i.e. participates through the organization, and 3) associations may have an influence on the participatory activities of their members so that citizens may participate directly because of their affiliation with the association. I interpret the first of these roles as representation, which is a separate function category and will therefore be discussed in the next paragraph. The other two roles are somewhat extended here and transformed into three sub-functions of the mobilization function: attract a representative membership, facilitate internal participation and mobilize young people to take part in the political process beyond youth wing membership. Party youth wings can draw young individuals into political life by fulfilling these three sub-functions.

Firstly, party youth wings may mobilize a diverse group of young people via their own membership organization. This sub-function is labelled ‘*attract a representative membership*’. Mere youth wing membership counts as a form of political participation, as “enrolling and maintaining membership status represents a greater amount of political engagement than most citizens are willing to undertake” (Scarrow, 2007, p. 645). It is well-established that being asked is one of the most important factors that determine an individual’s political participation (Verba et al., 1995). Youth wings may even attract new young members that otherwise would not have joined the main party. Poguntke (2002, p. 49) gives an example: “A party’s youth organization (...) may attract radical militants who would reject some of the mother party’s political positions as being too moderate”. The membership strength of party youth wings thus determines their performance of on this sub-function. This goes beyond just attracting as many members as possible; the representativeness of the membership is also important. Namely, if youth wings form the main link between young people and political

⁸ This report, *Enhancing Youth Political Participation throughout the Electoral Cycle*, outlines several proposals of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for the political inclusion of young people. It includes ideas about the role of party youth wings. The UNDP is the central network co-ordinating the work of the United Nations in over 160 developing countries.

parties, their membership should to some extent mirror the youth population. The composition of the youth wing's membership base may have implications not only for the (credibility of the) decision-making within the youth wing but also that of the mother party. This corresponds to the common argument that the representativeness of the party membership has consequences for candidate selection, party policy and democratic legitimacy (Heidar & Wauters, 2019; Widfeldt, 1995).

Secondly, party youth wings are able to *facilitate internal participation* of their members. Generally, as Binderkrantz (2009, pp. 657-658) writes, "if groups are to provide people with a channel for political participation, a precondition must be that members have the chance to get involved in the political processes and activities of the groups". Through member involvement, young people may learn about democracy, deliberate on politics and form public opinions and political identifies. The performance of party youth wings on the mobilization function thus not only depends on their membership strength, but also on the voluntary activity of members within their organizations. Similar to party members, party youth wing members may not only contribute financially but also participate in electoral and year-round activities, including social gatherings and decision-making processes (Scarrow, 2007). Such activities vary in time and effort. Paying a subscription or reading a newsletter are low-cost activities compared to high-intensity activities such as running campaigns or standing for office (Whiteley & Seyd, 2002). Internal participation will likely depend on what a young party member wants to get out of their membership, such as asserting moral beliefs, interacting with like-minded people or building a career (Bruter & Harrison, 2009b).

Thirdly, party youth wings have the potential to *mobilize young people* to participate in the political process *beyond youth wing membership*. It is well known that active membership in voluntary organizations is related to individuals' overall participation levels (e.g. Parry et al., 1992a; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Stolle & Rochon, 1998; Verba & Nie, 1972). This can partly be explained by socializing mechanisms by which members develop skills and attitudes useful for participation (Verba et al., 1995) and are exposed to politics (Verba & Nie, 1972). But organizations can also intentionally send cues for participation to both members and non-members (e.g. Leighley, 1996). Party youth wings may thus encourage their members to participate in politics outside the organization. They may for example reach out to young people to join demonstrations or sign petitions. Another preeminent example is that party youth wings may campaign during elections for the party in general or for specific young candidates in particular (Pickard, 2015). Because of their high appeal to young people, youth wings can "extend outreach to young voters and make parties more credible to them" (United Nations Development Programme, 2013, p. 30). In other words, they can mobilize electoral support for the mother party.

In conclusion, a major task attributed to political parties is also very much true for party youth wings: "One of their major purposes (...) is the creation of politically active citizens out of politically passive ones" (Verba & Nie, 1972, p. 209).

Key function: Representation

Political representation largely takes place through and by political parties in most Western democracies (Dalton, 1985; Dalton et al., 2011). This primarily means that parties have an important responsibility in translating popular will into public policies by aggregating and articulating the interests of all kinds of societal segments. As mentioned before, young people risk being underrepresented in this process due to low participation rates and a low presence in formal political institutions. It is currently a challenge for political parties to take the views and concerns of young people into account. In general, political associations are argued to have the potential to improve the quality of representation (for overviews, see Fung, 2003; Warren, 2001). Party youth wings in particular can be a means for parties to ensure a representative link with young people and respond to their needs and interests (Poguntke, 2002). Similarly, it is argued in the aforementioned United Nations report that party youth wings serve as powerbases for their members (United Nations Development Programme, 2013). As they are situated closely to the political arena and elites, and are able to influence parties from within, party youth wings have the potential to facilitate a representative connection between young people and the political system. The second key function of party youth wings is thus the *representation function*.

Before going into depth on what this key function of party youth wings entails, we first need to define the concept of representation. The classic work of Hannah Pitkin (1967, pp. 8-9) defines representation as “making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact”. She goes on by distinguishing four main types of representation: *formalistic*, where representatives are authorized to act on behalf of others and held accountable via freely contested elections, *symbolic*, where a representative has certain meaning for those being represented, *descriptive*, where representatives resemble those being represented in descriptive and politically relevant characteristics, and *substantive*, where representatives seek to advocate the best interests of the represented. These types are often argued to be interrelated. For instance, descriptive representation seems to matter for substantive representation, in a sense that representatives with certain personal characteristics are considered to be best equipped to represent the needs and interests of people with similar characteristics (e.g. Mansbridge, 1999).

While the first type of representation is not applicable to party youth wings, the latter three may be. This becomes clear when political representation is understood as a process or a sequence of actions. Political parties turn citizen’s demands into political issues and bundle them into political programmes, which are put forward in elections and expressed and pursued by elected party representatives in parliament and government, which in turn results in certain policies implemented by government administrations (e.g. Dalton et al., 2011). This process is not directly applicable to party youth wings, as they do not strive for political office nor do they participate in elections. However, they may aggregate the political interests of young people and exert influence on party representatives in parliament and government accordingly. This makes party youth wings similar to interest groups, although youth wings often have more formal and informal opportunities for articulating interests within the

mother party. Poguntke (1998, p. 144) therefore typifies party sub-organizations as “internal interest groups”. From that position, the efforts of party youth wings may include not only actions to promote the substantive representation of the young, but also the descriptive and symbolic representation as they may advance young people’s odds for nomination. Following from this, three sub-functions can be distinguished that party youth wings should fulfil in order to represent the interests of young individuals: aggregating interests, articulating interests and supporting young political candidates.

Firstly, party youth wings are required to *aggregate the interests* of young people in order to perform well on the representation function. In the context of the party literature, aggregation of interests refers to a “process by which parties bundle together the demands of a variety of social groups” (Webb et al., 2002, p. 12). Party youth wings may do so for the segment of young people, which in itself can be a highly heterogeneous group. As a result of the participation process of its members, a party youth wing can aggregate young people’s political interests by adopting a distinctive political programme. Having a political programme underscores the political independence of party youth wings with regard to the mother party. For this linkage mechanism to work, it is not only important that youth wing positions are determined, but also that these concur with the opinions of their members. It is generally contended that a high degree of congruence in policy objectives between representatives and the represented is a guarantee for good representation (e.g. Giger & Lefkofridi, 2014; Mansbridge, 2009).

Accordingly, party youth wings may articulate these political demands and exert political pressure so that their members’ views are taken into account in decision-making processes. The second sub-function is thus that party youth wings can *articulate the interests* of their members. Articulation refers to “publicly expressing and pursuing the political demands of particular social groups” (Webb et al., 2002, p. 12). Party youth wings can do so within or outside their mother party. Younger party members often constitute a smaller share of the party membership, which makes it harder for them to organize their interests and exert influence within the party. Party youth wings offer a solution to this. Inside the party, they can influence party policy and leadership selection (United Nations Development Programme, 2013). They can promote youth issues and offer new and innovative input according to their members’ views and preferences. Youth wings may have formal access to the mother party, for instance via representation and voting rights within the party. Their representatives may even be part of the national executive committee of a party (Katz & Mair, 1993). Moreover, due to their proximity to political parties, party youth wings can pose questions and obtain information easily, allowing them to critically assess the mother party and the behaviour of its officials. While the political line of youth wings is close to that of the mother parties, they can have a different view on certain matters, challenge outdated views or try to keep the party focused on its political promises. Just like party members in general, the members of party sub-organizations might value ideological purity more than electoral victory (Katz & Mair, 1993). Party youth wings may maintain the pure political principles and ideas better than their mother parties because the latter have to accept compromises in parliament or government.

By being critical and by deviating from party positions, the youth wings might go against the party mainstream and thereby challenge the mother party. Outside the mother party, party youth wings may undertake certain forms of political action in order to press the public concerns of young people, such as (playful) protests, demonstrations and media performances in which they express their opinions.

Thirdly, party youth wings may *enhance the descriptive representation* of young people. They have the potential to advance the nomination of young candidates (United Nations Development Programme, 2013) by offering a recruitment pool to the mother party, by influencing party candidate selection and by providing a support base for a young candidate. In this way, party youth wings can help to address the underrepresentation of the young in local councils and parliament. As Pitkin (1967) has argued, descriptive representation may also lead to better substantive and symbolic representation. Kissau et al. (2010, p. 4) point out that different age profiles in elected office leads to a “substantive difference in opinions and behaviour of parliamentarians as politicians’ individual age or belonging to a specific generation may affect policy preferences and decisions regarding policies”. Descriptive representation can also lead to symbolic representation when the presence of a political minority sends cues that their group is welcome in the political process. In the literature on gender politics, for example, it is emphasized that the presence of female politicians shows that “politics is not simply a man’s game” (Burns et al., 2001, p. 347). Applied to young people, the presence of young politicians shows that “politics is not simply an old man’s game”.

In conclusion, party youth wings can contribute to the substantive, symbolic and descriptive representation of young people. This category of functions has described the capacity of party youth wings to form a representative channel between young people and the political system. By doing so, they are a vital means of communication between a party and a considerate part of the electorate.

Key function: Socialization

Each new generation of citizens in a democratic society needs to be supported in the process of becoming full-grown democratic actors. This falls under the heading of political socialization, which can be described as a learning process through which individuals learn the political attitudes and behaviours from generation to generation (Quintelier, 2012). As described in the previous section, adolescence and pre-adulthood make up a politically definitive period in this regard. Next to the influence of socializing agents such as family (e.g. Jennings et al., 2009) and school (e.g. Andolina et al., 2003), multiple studies have emphasized the significant role of voluntary associations in the process of political socialization of young people (McFarland & Thomas, 2006; Quintelier, 2008). In general, it is demonstrated repeatedly that a connection exists between associational involvement and (future) political engagement (e.g. Putnam, 2000; Van Deth, 1997; Verba et al., 1995). This connection is stronger when the voluntary association has a political character, exposes its members to political activity or adheres to democratic principles (Fung, 2003; Pollock, 1982; Sobieraj &

White, 2004; Verba & Nie, 1972). Studies of young people show similar results. Voluntary organizations that are politically salient or have an aim to aid society are found to be powerful political socialization agents leading to long-term political engagement of young people (McFarland & Thomas, 2006; Quintelier, 2008).

The explanations given for these associational effects on participation often focus on socialization mechanisms. For instance, voluntary associations are deemed to advance the skills and capacities needed for political engagement (Verba et al., 1995). A long time ago, De Tocqueville (1805-1859) famously brought forward his idea of voluntary associations as 'schools of democracy' or contexts that offer a real-life practice to civic life. In the case of young people, it has similarly been argued that young people's involvement in associations leads to the development of citizenship skills and attitudes needed for an involvement in politics:

In the context of their membership in local groups, institutions and organizations, youth practice citizenship. In such contexts they learn what it means to be a member of a group, to exercise rights, to have a say in the group's affairs, and learn to be accountable to fellow members and to the mission of the organizations (Flanagan, 2009, p. 293).

McFarland and Thomas (2006, p. 404) also state that activities of politically salient youth associations lead to the acquirement of "skills that have direct application to adult civic activities". In addition, they bring forward another explanation for the effect of these voluntary associations on future political engagement, namely that associational members are exposed to relevant social networks. In sum, the literature suggests that voluntary associations with a political character within which young people can engage in various activities lead to the development of both the human capital and social capital needed for future political engagement.

Party youth wings clearly are characterized by their voluntary membership organization and political character, as they are closely situated to the realm of their mother parties. It is therefore not surprising that political socialization is often identified as a function of party youth wings, such as Mycock and Tonge (2012, p. 144) do in their article on the party politics of youth in the UK:

Most UK political parties do have youth wings that are distinct from the 'rump' of the party which act as recruiters for the party but also educate and train young people in key party functions such as campaigning, fund-raising, political communication and party organization. They also allow party elites at national, regional and local levels to identify and nurture future elected representatives, policy researchers or party organizers and administration.

Similarly, Rainsford (2017, p. 2) states that "political parties' youth factions are not just an opportunity for politically interested young people to engage in formal politics, but they also socialize their members into future political engagement". Dalton and Wattenberg (2000c, p. 7) even go further by arguing that "many of the parties' internal structures, such as youth groups (...), are designed to identify and nurture future candidates". Some empirical assessments hereof already exist. For instance, in a Belgian study, Hooghe and Stolle (2002)

show that more than 40% of those who were members of any political youth organization, are now members of a political movement or party of any kind. Cross and Young (2008, p. 277) found that the involvement in a party youth wing is one of the strongest positive indicators of the level of party activism, therefore concluding that “party youth wings are important institutions for socializing young partisans into party life and developing elites who will remain active in party affairs throughout their adult lives”. Focusing on the role of party youth wings as recruitment channels for political office, Hooghe et al. (2004) found that of the Flemish city councillors that were surveyed, 41% indicated that they had started their political career in the youth wing of their political party. Those who had been a member of a party youth wing started earlier with their careers and received their first mandate sooner than those who were not involved in a party youth wing.

There are thus sufficient theoretical arguments and empirical evidence to state that the third key function of party youth wings is the *socialization function*. Based on the above, party youth wings should fulfil the following two sub-functions in order to socialize young people into the political system: provide political education and facilitate social interaction. Firstly, party youth wings can be expected to *provide political education and training* to young people. According to the United Nations Development Programme (2013), party youth wings serve as political educator for their members as they organize various skill-building workshops, mentoring programmes and policy development activities. Moreover, young members can experience decision-making processes and develop political skills and viewpoints (United Nations Development Programme, 2013). Through the organization of various activities, youth wings may thus enhance the political socialization of young people.

Secondly, party youth wings should *facilitate social interaction* for their members. They can offer a context in which young people can take part in social activities, create social networks, interact with like-minded people and make new friends (Bruter & Harrison, 2009b). Via social exchange within the party youth wing or via encounters within the party at large, young people can build a valuable network. Hooghe et al. (2004) suggest that these ‘network mechanisms’ within youth wings play a key role in the impact of youth participation on adult activism, suggesting that involvement in organizations such as party youth wings at a young age leads to the easy establishment of networks that will remain accessible throughout one’s life and can help facilitate the start of a political career. The importance of politicized social networks for future participation has been established in the literature (e.g. McClurg, 2003). Moreover, the creation of a valuable network is relevant for the “development of pro-social attitudes and norms of reciprocity” (Van Deth et al., 2016, p. 179). In other words, via this sub-function, party youth wings can contribute to the development of social capital, which has been defined as the “connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” (Putnam, 2000, p. 19).

In conclusion, party youth wings can act as vehicles for the political socialization of young people. Youth wing members may therefore have competitive advantage over non-members. Among them we might find tomorrow’s political leaders.

A functional framework

Table 2.1 summarizes the above, breaks down the key functions into the sub-functions described and identifies some practical examples for illustration purposes. This functional framework will form the basis for an assessment of how well party youth wings perform the identified key functions. Shaping this study in terms of the presented sub-functions allows for the possibility that party youth wings' functional performance is different, and may develop differently, for various areas of party youth wing life. Whenever party youth wings perform these functions, they succeed in connecting young people to politics, thus confirming their role as youth-friendly avenues into political parties and the broader political system. In other words, the functional performance of party youth wings determines their contribution to the democratic political system.

Table 2.1 Functional framework of party youth wings

<i>Key function</i>	<i>Sub-functions</i>	<i>Example</i>
Mobilization	Attract a representative membership	Large and diverse membership base
	Facilitate internal participation	Member participation in assemblies
	Mobilize beyond membership	Campaign activities during elections
Representation	Aggregate political interests	Adopt a political programme
	Articulate political interests	Lobbying activities on party congress
	Enhance descriptive representation	Seats of members in political office
Socialization	Provide political education and training	Provide workshops and trainings
	Facilitate social interaction	Social events

Several remarks have to be made on the classification of the functions within the framework. Firstly, the list is not necessarily exhaustive and the key and sub-functions are not mutually exclusive. Several examples illustrate this. The membership strength of a party youth wing may be related to their representative effectiveness, as larger memberships may increase their leverage and legitimacy. The articulation of political interests may also include political 'street work' of members, and can thus also be identified as a form of mobilization. Social interaction is inherent to many if not all youth wing activities, thus showing an overlap between socialization and the other key functions. However, the classification of the sub-functions is based on the assessment to what key function they *primarily* contribute. For instance, while member assemblies can contribute to the political socialization of young people, it is in the first place a means to promote the participation of young people in politics. The functional framework is therefore considered to suffice for an empirical assessment of the democratic contributions of party youth wings.

Secondly, as this chapter so far has shown, I designed this functional framework from a perspective that is broader than that of the affiliated political party. Although the functional performance of party youth wings is closely tied to the functioning of political parties, a sole party perspective would lead to an emphasis on the functions of party youth wings that exclusively serve the functional performance of political parties as described in Section 2.1.

For instance, youth wings are then supposed to function as recruitment channels to the party (Hooghe & Stolle, 2003), as a means for spreading party ideology (EACEA, 2013), as a general symbol of popular legitimacy and support for the party (Scarrow, 2000), or as the site of the first meaningful set of experiences of young people as party members (Berry, 2008). Although these kinds of functions are intertwined with the functional framework in Table 2.1, which largely corresponds to the set of representative functions of political parties, the framework is not phrased in a way that signifies the youth wing functions predominantly serving the mother party. Party youth wings generally have a certain degree of organizational autonomy. As a result, one can also wonder whether youth wings may counteract the functional performance of the mother party, for instance by limiting the strategic movement of party elites or by mobilizing youth wing members against the party (Poguntke, 2002). While party youth wings can strengthen the party by aligning their preferences, they can also openly reject the party's position and possibly even benefit from differentiating themselves from the mother party. Such intra-party disagreements are of interest to the media (Strömbäck & Van Aelst, 2013), thus leading to possible reputation damage and, in the worst case, to electoral instability. Although this might hinder the party, it does not necessarily change the democratic contribution of youth wings, namely that young people are facilitated in their participation in the political process. Instead of looking at the added value for political parties only, it is the broader assessment of the functioning of party youth wings that is the goal of the current study.

2.3 Western party youth wing functioning in a context of change

Modern political science literature is replete with evidence that the political systems and institutions of established democracies have been subject to major change over the last couple of decades. In this context, two centrally debated concerns are changing patterns of political (youth) participation and political party change. Party youth wings are situated on the intersection of both. It is therefore likely that developments in both the citizenry and political parties have an influence on their functional performance. This paragraph outlines several dominant party-related trends and their alleged effects on party youth wings. Drawing on previous findings, I hypothesize that party youth wings are negatively affected by the same societal trends that affected their mother parties and by changes in the party organizations, and are thus losing functional performance and relevance, particularly when it concerns their mobilization and representation function.

Changing patterns of political participation

Due to social, economic and political modernization and events, the way citizens participate in the politics of Western societies changes over time (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2001; Dalton, 2016; Giddens, 1991; Inglehart, 1977). The common conclusion of studies on political involvement is that citizens have shifted from conventional forms of political participation to the use of an alternative repertoire of political action, such as social movements, protests and consumer activities (e.g. Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Norris, 2002). As described in Section 2.1 and

2.2, this is particularly found to be true for young people. This development has been tied to various societal trends related to modernization, of which two feature most prominently in the literature on political participation: individualization and value change.

A key theme that is discussed with relation to changing patterns of political participation is individualization. It entails the process in which traditional religious and social ties become weaker and less constraining, while the need for individual autonomy and personal choice increases (e.g. Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2001). This process particularly took place in Western societies during the second half of the 20th century, when traditional class and religious identities started to erode. In the political realm this manifested itself, among other things, in a decreasing group-based politics and an increasing unwillingness among younger generations to participate in formal and organized politics (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2001). This has had consequences for party-centred networks that traditionally contributed to the stabilization and identification of the electorate. Mair (2005, pp. 18-19) explains:

Over at least the past thirty years (...) these broader networks have tended to break up. In part, this is because of a weakening of the sister organizations themselves, with churches, trade unions and other traditional forms of association losing both members and the sense of engagement. With the increasingly individualisation of society, traditional collective identities and organizational affiliations count for less, including those that once formed part of party-centred networks.

In other words, citizens nowadays seem to rely less heavily on group-defined interests. This has led to a weakening of partisan ties and an increasing importance of individualistic political concerns, or “particularized demands” (Mair & Van Biezen, 2001, p. 14). The range of salient issues has broadened from class-based cleavages to issues such as the environment and international relations, thus increasing political complexity.

Related to this is the transformation of values and norms, which is considered another important aspect of the modernization process. Well-known for his work on this topic, Inglehart (1977, 2008) shows that older generations are more supportive of materialist values that focus on economic and physical security, while younger generations adopt post-materialist and self-expression values. These value changes imply less emphasis on traditions and authority, and more emphasis on individual freedom, equality and participation in decision-making. Inglehart (2008, p. 145) relates these value changes to socio-economic growth, stating that “a key factor is the extent to which a given generation grows up under conditions that permit it to take survival for granted”. The finding that citizenship norms are changing is in line with this trend. In short, these value changes are less and less defined in terms of duties and obligations, and more and more in terms of social engagement (Dalton, 2008, 2016). This would have changed the way young people in particular prefer to be engaged in politics.

Others have put forward alternative sources of change for the transforming patterns of political participation. Dalton and Wattenberg (2000c, p. 11), for instance, also mention the increasing education levels, which would improve the political skills of the citizenry and those in turn would boost political self-sufficiency and elite-challenging attitudes. Mazzoleni and

Schulz (1999) add mediatization to the list, as the ever-expanding supply of political information enables citizens to develop their political orientation individually and independently from traditional structures. They argue that, due to the heavy reliance of the public on the media, public opinion and elections “have become more volatile, more sensitive to current issues, to images of political leaders, and to the changing *zeitgeist*” (p. 254). Again others cast doubts on the role of intergenerational value change and attribute changing patterns of political participation to the impact of historically defining events on the political socialization of subsequent generations (Grasso, 2014).

Regardless of how and what trends or events exactly play a role, there is consensus that the way citizens relate to politics in general and political parties in particular has changed profoundly. There is a great deal of empirical evidence that party politics, which was traditionally focused on collective group interests, institutionalized structures and class-based cleavages, has lost some of its appeal to citizens. The membership figures of political parties have been declining across the Western world (Mair & Van Biezen, 2001; Van Biezen et al., 2012; Whiteley, 2011). Van Biezen et al. (2012) show that the average ratio of party membership to the electorate has declined from almost ten percent in 1980 to five percent in the late 2000s across old and new European democracies. Others report on a growing partisan dealignment (e.g. Dalton, 2000), an increasing electoral volatility (e.g. Dalton et al., 2000), and lower electoral turnout (e.g. Wattenberg, 2000), although differences exist between countries and parties (for a review, see Kölln, 2014a). Collateral organizations do not offer a way out. New political parties are characterized by weak ties with external organizations, and while older parties show some stable links with traditional collateral organizations such as trade unions and churches, these organizations are also suffering from crumbling memberships (Poguntke, 2002; Van Biezen & Poguntke, 2014). Van Biezen et al. (2012, p. 43) conclude that as “the world of collateral organizations may no longer be capable of offering a refuge to parties, (...) it offers little potential for the parties to make up for their own declining memberships”. In the context of this study, it is important to emphasize again the unique status of young people amidst of all these developments. It is generally believed that young people participate less in conventional forms of politics (Delli Carpini, 2000; Fieldhouse et al., 2007; Quintelier, 2007; Spanring, 2008b), and that they in particular are refraining from partisan participation (e.g. Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000a; Norris, 2003; Scarrow & Gezgor, 2010; Sloam, 2013).

Changing political parties

These developments have put parties under pressure. Some scholars speak of party decline, which can be defined as “citizens’ increasing critical attitude and behaviour towards individual parties” (Kölln, 2014a, p. 56). In other words, it concerns the popular withdrawal and disengagement from conventional politics (Mair, 2005). There are concerns that this waning presence of political parties within wider society has serious consequences for the functioning of representative democracies. At the same time, it is debated whether the ability of parties to represent diverse groups in society has become as weak as suggested. Heidar and Wauters

(2019), for instance, conclude that a decline in party membership does not necessarily translate into lower representativeness of party members. In a similar vein, Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012) show that parties still perform reasonably well on various key criteria of representation, although the increasingly diverse electorate has led to more representational strain for parties. All in all, political parties seem to be driven to find ways to deal with the challenges presented to them. It might therefore be better to speak of party transformation instead of party decline. Political parties have been characterized as adaptive and evolving organizations (e.g. Kölln, 2014a; Mair et al., 2004). In this regard, some general tendencies of party organizational development can be identified.

Because of the declining memberships and group-based interests, parties are argued to have gradually shifted away from the traditional mass party model, a model that is characterized by an attempt of parties to “solidify their political support by enlisting supporters from a particular class into a party-linked social and cultural network” (Scarrow, 2000, p. 100). Political parties instead became keener on broadening their scope – and thereby their electoral appeal – in the dealigned society. These so-called catch-all or electoral-professional parties may have members, but these are recruited on the basis of policy agreement instead of on social identity; i.e. parties make little effort to “encapsulate them” (Katz & Mair, 1995, p. 13). Moreover, because of the rise of mass communication techniques, parties rely less heavily on their members to get the political message across as they can target voters directly. At the same time, broadcasts and digital media pose an extra challenge to parties. Parties have less control over these media than over traditional information channels, such as the traditional party press (Koole, 1996). Together with the increasingly uncertain environment, this has led to a professionalization of the party organization. Parties became more centralized campaigning organizations that rely more heavily on paid professionals and strong national party offices, and spend more money on election campaigns (Farrell & Webb, 2000; Mair et al., 2004).

There is also consensus that, while political parties may have a lowering presence in civil society, they are increasingly entangled with the state (Katz & Mair, 1995; Van Biezen, 2004b). Due to a lower income from member contributions and rising campaign costs, parties turned to the state for resources in order to ensure their existence and cope with the competition. Over time, they have become more and more reliant on public funding and are increasingly affected by state involvement, leading Van Biezen (2004b, p. 702) to conclude that parties are now best characterized as “public utilities”.

Based on these developments, it can even be argued that parties have actually strengthened their organizations, but just not as mass parties, like Dalton and Wattenberg (2000b, p. 269) do:

(...) in some ways the typical political party has become stronger as a political institution by marshalling more resources in the national party office, by hiring more professionalized and technically skilled staff, and by maintaining the national party office as the locus for political control.

Although this implies that parties are still very much capable of performing their procedural functions, it has been suggested that the aforementioned changes in the party organizations might make them even less able to perform their functions at the level of the electorate. Some scholars show, for instance, that the growing reliance of parties on state subventions takes away an incentive to establish a substantive connection with civil society via party membership (Van Biezen, 2004b; Whiteley, 2011). Moreover, the increasing use of technology and professionals by parties might lower their need of active memberships. Van Biezen et al. (2012, p. 40) therefore argue that “parties seem relatively unconcerned about their memberships and are instead much more focused on reaching out to the wider public through professional campaigning and marketing techniques”, although there are exceptions.⁹

At the same time, there are also scholars that point to attempts of political parties to strengthen their position in society and improve their relationship to supporters. Parties carry out various institutional reforms with the aim to boost their appeal, although the question is whether the desired effects are achieved (e.g. Lawson & Poguntke, 2004; Scarrow, 1999). The exact reforms differ per party, but institutional reforms can generally be identified in both the configurations of the party membership organization and party sub-organizations.

Firstly, parties seem to have redefined their membership organizations by adopting a “more individualistic model of party activity” (Scarrow, 2015, p. 206, see also Lawson & Poguntke, 2004 and Gauja, 2013). Initiatives such as new and looser affiliation options, lowered procedural costs and the expansion of intra-party democracy aim at increasing the attractiveness of the membership (Scarrow, 2015). Such changes might be regarded as an attempt by parties to respond to the evolving preferences of politically active citizens (Gauja, 2013a). However, other scholars warn that these trends have been accompanied by more control by the central party leadership. For instance, all-member ballots are regulated and conditioned by party leaders and enable these leaders to marginalize other influential intra-party groups and activists (Hopkin, 2001). Similarly, Mair et al. (2004, pp. 265-266) argue that parties are more and more leadership-driven, whereby “listening to voters becomes more important than listening to members”. The actual influence of the membership organization within the party may thus be questionable.

Secondly, political parties seem to rely less on their traditional links with external collateral organizations, but may be encouraged to compensate the decreasing effectiveness of these relationships by setting up party sub-organizations (Poguntke, 1998). Based on his analysis of the party organizations database of Katz and Mair (1992b), Poguntke (1998) concludes that the linkage of parties with internal collateral organizations outweighs the connection to external collateral organizations. While the substantive linkage with external collateral organizations has been declining, internal collateral organizations have become more relevant to parties between 1960 and 1990. More specifically, he shows that youth and women’s organizations dominate the organizational environment of political parties

⁹ The authors mention the German parties as an example. These parties would be committed to building a large membership organization as the amount of the state subsidy parties receive in Germany depends on the number of paying members they have.

(Poguntke, 2000). A more recent study of Allern and Verge (2017) confirms that party sub-organizations are still more widely used as a linkage mechanism by parties than affiliation with non-party organizations. The authors used the Political Party Database (PPDB) to show that almost 80% of the 122 included Western European parties possessed a youth wing in 2012, while 41% of the parties had a women's organization. Not only older parties had a youth wing; even new parties worked with youth wings. In conclusion, party youth wings are nowadays the most prominent type of collateral organization of political parties.

Impact on party youth wing functioning

It is likely that the trends and party changes described above have affected the functioning of party youth wings within the advanced industrial societies of the Western world. This section outlines several expectations of how youth wing functioning might have changed over time.

First and foremost, we might expect that the attractiveness of party youth wings is under threat. In the context of individualization, it has been argued that "one of the consequences of this trend is the widespread unwillingness among young people to participate in formal youth organizations with regular membership and routine activities" (Kovacheva, 2003, p. 25). When young people are increasingly deterred by conventional politics and when party youth wings are considered part of this sphere of traditional politics, the functioning of party youth wings becomes challenged. In some countries, concerns are indeed expressed on a declining membership base of youth wings, such as in Belgium (Hooghe et al., 2004, p. 199), Germany (Jungblut & Weber, 2017, pp. 123-124; Offe & Fuchs, 2002, p. 216) and Sweden (Rothstein, 2002, p. 294). More specifically, as political disengagement is particularly found among the young (Whiteley, 2007), party youth wings might even suffer from membership declines to a greater extent than political parties. Accordingly, Mair and Van Biezen (1999) conclude on the basis of the Katz and Mair (1992b) party organization dataset that half of the party youth wings in long-established democracies are losing members more rapidly than their mother party, although they also emphasize that the data should not be considered fully reliable. The findings imply that party youth wings, just like their mother parties, are suffering from a decline in membership. *They may therefore be expected to perform their mobilization function less well than they once did.*

Considering the changes on the party level, expectations are more ambiguous. On the one hand, the described lower incentives for parties to attract party members may lead one to question: "Are parties still interested in young people?" (Hooghe & Stolle, 2003, p. 45). More importantly, the professionalized party arguably does not want a critical youth wing. In times when parties are increasingly dependent on the media in order to reach their strategic goals (e.g. Strömbäck & Van Aelst, 2013), they will try to avoid negative media coverage and express internal cohesion and unity. Strömbäck and Van Aelst (2013, p. 350) explain that the media are often interested in intra-party disagreements: "Following news media logic, the media are rather interested in stories about internal conflicts, in particular if they involve factions with identifiable leaders or if they suggest lacking support for the party leadership". Party youth wings in particular may occasionally deviate from the party mainstream as they

push for certain (youth-related) issues. As that may create tensions and highlight internal differences, party elites may want to make sure that the media pay little attention to their internal organizations (Strömbäck & Van Aelst, 2013). Political parties might therefore seek to limit the substantive role of youth wings within the party. Kimberlee (2002, p. 89) identifies such a trend in the UK: “Given that the major political parties have banned or curtailed the influence of their own youth sections, it is unsurprising that very few young people are involved in political parties today”. In extreme cases, the party leadership can even decide to terminate the relationship with the youth wing.¹⁰ It may be difficult for party youth wings to deal with the pressure to conform. More and more, they have to manoeuvre between the interests of their members and the interests of the party leadership. Because of these reasons, *it may be expected that the representation function of party youth wings is increasingly put under pressure.*

We have also seen that political parties are increasingly creating and adopting youth wings as sub-organizations. They are apparently interested in young people, but the aforementioned considerations give rise to the question of whether this is the case because they want to identify and respond to their political interests, or because young people are important for the maintenance of their organizations. Poguntke (2002), for instance, asserts that sub-organizations are originally part of the linkage strategy of parties in order to connect and be responsive to society, while Hooghe et al. (2004) and Gruber (2009) emphasize the role of party youth wings in nurturing future political candidates for public office. In other words, do parties employ relationships with youth wings for their representative or procedural functions? The party-related trends give reason to believe the emphasis has shifted to the latter. Due to the challenges surrounding their representative functions and a closer relationship with the state, parties seem to lay more emphasis on their procedural functions (Mair, 2003). While this contributes to the expectation that the representative status of party youth wings within the mother party has been weakening, *it may be expected that the socialization function of party youth wings has gained importance.* Party youth wings may be increasingly perceived as relevant instruments for nurturing future candidates and nominees, particularly at a time when the party’s own member reservoir of political candidates is in decline and the societal pressure to ensure diversity in descriptive representation is high.

Overall, party youth wings are expected to find it increasingly difficult to promote the political participation of young people and to represent their members’ interests. Young people are less and less interested in conventional politics, and political parties are less and less interested in the representative input of intra-party groups, although they are probably increasingly interested in the socialized recruitment pool that party youth wings have to offer. It should be noted that this might not equally apply to all party youth wings. For political parties, for example, it has been found that the mainstream and traditional parties in particular are suffering from a decline in electoral support (Lisi, 2018). Similarly, relatively new

¹⁰ This happened for instance in Austria when the Green party withdrew the formal acknowledgement of the Young Greens as their party youth wing in 2017 following a dispute over publicly voiced criticism. This led to a stop on the public funding of the youth wing.

parties and parties from the green party family seem to counter the general trend of membership decline (Kölln, 2014b). The same may account for the youth wings of these parties. Although such inter-youth wing differences are not the main focus of this study, they will be part of the exploration in order to enrich our understanding of the functioning of party youth wings.

2.4 Concluding notes

This chapter has described the functions of political parties, the context and role of party sub-organizations, the rationale behind party sub-organizations for young people and a functional framework of party youth wings. It ended with a discussion of the changes in the political landscape in which party youth wings are situated, offering a theoretical framework for the evaluation of the functioning of party youth wings over time. The aim of the chapter was to gain a comprehensive understanding of the functions of party youth wings in a democratic society and explore how these might have changed over time due to various party-related political changes. Party youth wings might fulfil three key functions: mobilization, representation and socialization. In times when the distance of young people to political parties is growing and party memberships are ageing, their outreach to the young electorate can be argued to be of increasing importance to parties. The tripartite functional framework presented here forms the basis of an empirical exploration of the functioning of party youth wings in a democratic society. If youth wings are able to successfully fulfil the functions ascribed to them, a meaningful connection is established between young people and political parties and the broader political system. They then have the potential to contribute to democracy, although this evaluation also depends on what normative considerations on democracy are supported. It has been contended in this chapter that party youth wings are less and less able to promote the political participation of young people and represent their members' interests, due to a declining interest of young people in conventional politics and a changing organization and lower interest from the side of the mother party. At the same time, their socialization function is still or even more relevant, as the procedural role of parties has become more prominent. The current study therefore adopts a comparative perspective over time in the analysis of the functional performance of party youth wings. By doing so, it not only tells us something about the current functioning of political parties and the political participation of young people, but also about the future of our party democracies.

3. Research Design

The present study aims to examine the performance of national party youth wings on the functional framework in the Netherlands by measuring the sub-functions listed in Table 2.1 in two time periods: the mid-late 1980s and the mid-late 2010s. Each of the sub-functions and periods requires a different research strategy. This chapter elaborates on the research design and measurement of the functional framework. It begins by laying out the rationale behind the selection of a single country and two time periods, after which methods for data collection are presented. It then goes on to describe how the eight sub-functions will be operationalized and measured.

3.1 A single-country design

This study will focus on party youth wings in the Netherlands. There are three reasons for studying a single country. The first concerns data availability and complexity. Studying multiple functions of multiple party youth wings over time is challenging, particularly because not much is yet known about the topic. The variety of data required for this in-depth exploration is best guaranteed in a single country design. Secondly, the goal of the current study is to provide a unique in-depth assessment of the functioning of party youth wings and to explore differences and similarities across these organizations over time. A single-country design suits this goal, as institutional details can reasonably be held constant. Adding another level of analysis adds unnecessary complexity to the assessment, while it is not the explicit aim to study the influence of system-level factors. Thirdly, as the phenomenon of party youth wings is understudied in political science, focusing on one case in-depth helps to guide theory. Surely, this depends on the type of case that is selected. In this study, as the remainder of this section will show, a relatively typical case of a country with an increasing societal disconnection of political parties is selected (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). Nevertheless, it remains the case that a single-country design has consequences for the generalizability of the results, as is emphasized by Landman (2003, p. 32): “Inferences made from single-country studies are necessarily less secure than those made from the comparison of several or many countries. Nevertheless, such studies are useful for examining a whole range of comparative issues”.

A country must thus be selected that is at least characterized by institutional stability and a traditional existence of multiple party youth wings. Furthermore, the selection must be guided by a certain degree of availability and accessibility of data on party youth wings on the national level. The latter is not self-evident. It stands to reason that party youth wings may be reluctant to share details about their membership base, activities and internal organization. They may not even maintain a central administration, let alone archives, particularly when we take into account that youth wings are voluntary organizations that generally have a high turnover rate of (board) members and few to no staff members. Such substantive and pragmatic considerations underlie the selection of the Netherlands. In what follows, I elaborate on this in more detail and provide insight into the (dis)similarity with other cases.

Western countries are predominantly characterized by their long-term representative democratic systems in which political parties play a key role and in which youth wings may thus exist for a longer period of time. They often have a multi-party system, as a result of which multiple party youth wings exist. Table 3.1 provides an overview of the Western countries that were consolidated as multi-party democracies after WWII. These states share relatively many similarities in terms of social, economic and democratic development and can thus be considered ‘most similar’ in terms of basic conditions for political associational membership (Morales, 2009). The large majority is characterized by declining party memberships and increasing electoral volatility (fourth and fifth column). As described in Chapter 2, it is this context of party-related trends and their alleged effects on party youth wing functioning that is of interest to this study. The listed countries do differ in the number of parliamentary parties with a youth wing, as revealed in the second column. This varies from five to twelve. In many cases, the total number of party youth wings equals the number of political parties in parliament. If not, only a small number of parties generally does not have a youth wing. For France and Italy, this is different due to the large extent of party fragmentation and electoral system complexity.

Table 3.1 Relevant characteristics of European multi-party democracies (since 1945)

<i>Country</i>	<i>No. of PYW of parliamentary parties^a</i>	<i>Legal provisions on public PYW funding^b</i>	<i>Decrease in total PM since 1980^c</i>	<i>Increasing electoral volatility^d</i>
Austria	5	X	X	X
Belgium	12	*	X	X
Denmark	12		X	
Finland	8		X	X
France	12		X	X
Germany	7	X	X	X
Iceland	6		n/a	X
Ireland	6		X	X
Italy	6		X	X
Luxembourg	7		X	
Netherlands	11	X	X	X
Norway	9		X	X
Sweden	8		X	X
Switzerland	9		X	X

Note. This table lists Western democracies with a multi-party system (after WWII). PYW = party youth wing, PM = party membership. ^a Based on an inventory of parliamentary, political party, and youth wing websites; ^b Van Biezen (2017), Van Klingeren et al. (2015). *Only in Wallonia. ^c Van Biezen et al. (2012, p. 34). ^d Dassonneville and Hooghe (2017, p. 930), Chiamonte and Emanuele (2015, p. 380).

As the third column of Table 3.1 shows, the listed countries also differ on whether public funds are made available for the youth wings of political parties. Van Klingeren et al. (2015) identify seven EU countries that have adopted provisions for the public financing of

youth wings, of which three are included in Table 3.1: Austria, Germany and the Netherlands.¹¹ The conditions and criteria for the allocation of the state subsidy to party youth wings differ per country.¹² Van Biezen (2017) also mentions the French part of Belgium. Flanders abolished the public subsidy for party youth wings in 2016. In addition, countries often provide financial support to all sorts of national youth organizations due to their youth policies, from which party youth wings may benefit (European Commission, 2019). This is at least the case in Finland and Denmark.¹³ Because 1) it is unknown to which of the listed countries this exactly applies, 2) it is not clear whether this concerns structural or incidental subsidies, and 3) party youth wings are not explicitly mentioned in legal provisions, I excluded this form of public funding from Table 3.1.

State subsidies are important for two reasons. Firstly, they likely affect the functioning of party youth wings. The rationale behind subsidies for youth wings can be construed as an attempt of states to strengthen and secure their activities in order for young people to be involved in party politics. Although having a youth wing or not can be a fundamental choice, the availability of a subsidy encourages parties to lean towards the first option (Dragstra, 2008). It helps youth wings to establish their own operational basis (semi-)independently of the mother party, although stability in incomes is not necessarily guaranteed.¹⁴ Secondly, state subsidies foster data availability. As described, party youth wings generally have little incentive to maintain a solid central administration and document their activities. The conditions and obligations that accompany public subventions offer an important incentive to do so.

These two reasons contributed significantly to the selection of the Netherlands for the current study. In order to receive a subsidy, Dutch political parties and their youth wings need to employ a well-functioning system of administration and report on their membership figures, activities and financial situation, which in turn has to be approved on trustworthiness and legality by an accountant (Political parties funding Act, *Wet financiering politieke partijen*,

¹¹ The other four countries are Cyprus, Lithuania, Slovenia and Spain.

¹² Each country has adopted different conditions and criteria for the allocation of the state subsidy to party youth wings. In Austria, party youth wing members need to be predominantly aged below 30, and the youth wing's main goal must be the representation of youths and the furtherance of their interests. The number of parliamentary seats of the mother party and the number of youth wing members together determine the height of the subsidy. In Germany, party youth wings need to be formally acknowledged by the federal mother party, they need to have over 4,000 members on the federal level, and they need to perform youth work according to regulations, adopt democratic working methods, be independent in management and use of resources, and meet professional requirements. The federal and state associations for political youth organizations (e.g. *Ring Politischer Jugend*) allocate the state funds according to varying statutory criteria. In the Netherlands, party youth wings need to be formally acknowledged by the mother party and need to have at least one hundred members of 14-27 years old paying an annual fee of at least €5. The number of parliamentary seats of the mother party and the number of youth wing members together determine the height of the subsidy.

¹³ This information can be found in the Finnish government document 'Political Youth Organizations: Strengthening the Voice of Youth in Politics', and on the website of the Danish Youth Council, <https://en.duf.dk/>.

¹⁴ Regulatory frameworks might be subject to change, leading to differences in subsidy amounts, conditions and allocation criteria. Moreover, subsidies may fluctuate due to varying election results and membership figures. In the worst case, the mother party can withdraw their formal acknowledgement of the youth wing, while this might be part of the funding conditions.

Wfpp). Added to this, the Netherlands turned out to be a suitable case for a comparison of party youth wings over time. It is not characterized by major institutional changes in recent decades (unlike Germany, for example, where East and West reunified in 1990) and the youth wing subsidy has been available in the Netherlands since 1976 (Dragstra, 2008). This yields a sufficient time window for a study that aims to compare the functioning of party youth wings over time (see next section). Moreover, its low electoral threshold and easy registration for new parties (Andeweg et al., 2020) have paved the way for the existence of a relatively high number of party youth wings. Eleven political parties in the House of Representatives had their own party youth wing in 2020, of which several have been around for quite some time. Even if certain youth wings have limited interest in contributing to this study, sufficient data would still be available to secure the comparison across organizations and over time. The absence of a language barrier is an extra advantage in this regard, since I myself am a native Dutch speaker. The next chapter will provide a short history of Dutch party youth wings since the establishment of the first youth wing in 1888 and will describe the state subsidy for party youth wings in more detail.

3.2 Selecting Dutch party youth wings in two time periods

In order to capture potential changes in party youth wing functioning over time, the present study moves beyond a single point in time. As this chapter will show, a relatively wide variety of resources and methods is required to assess the performance of multiple youth wings on the functional framework. The aim is to do this in a systematic and in-depth manner, making it impracticable and virtually impossible to study party youth wing functioning over a long time span. I therefore chose to select an earlier period to compare with recent years in order to capture the impact of described trends in Chapter 2, while at the same time ensuring a certain degree of comparability and data availability. This section discusses the considerations underlying this selection and presents an overview of the party youth wings that are included in this study as a result.

A period before the political turning point in the 1990s

The Dutch political system has changed considerably over the past decades. Although there is no unequivocal answer to the question where one political period ends and another begins, the beginning of the 1990s is one of those moments that are marked as a turning point. Since then, the political system has been increasingly characterized by fragmentation and instability (Louwse et al., 2019b). Three traditionally major political parties and their ideologies still dominated politics in the 1980s: the Christian democratic CDA, the liberal VVD and the socialist PvdA. While these three parties together obtained about 85% of the voter support in 1986, this proportion declined to 61% in 1994 and to 37% in 2021 (Louwse et al., 2019a). Voerman and Van Schuur (2011) conclude that, since the second half of the 1980s, the membership base of at least the larger potential government parties has been shrinking almost continuously. After a long period of denominational dominance in governments since 1917, the first government without religious parties was formed in 1994. The electoral volatility rose

to unprecedented levels that year, and has not returned to previous levels since. The Netherlands is now treated as an exceptional case in terms of high degrees of electoral unpredictability and volatility (Mair, 2008). Otjes (2018, p. 171) summarizes the political changes and consequences succinctly:

Since 1989, the Dutch party system appears to have changed almost unrecognizably: increasing polarization in a system characterized by consensual politics; the introduction of minority government instead of closely coordinated majority government; the entry of eight new parties, while the traditional parties eroded; the emergence of new lines of conflict in a system that for decades was divided over redistribution and moral issues.

A study that aims to identify to what extent party youth wing functioning in the Netherlands has been affected by various political developments thus logically includes a period before this turning point.

Surely, significant changes also occurred in the decades before the 1990s. During the 1960s, the typical and rather isolated religious or socioeconomic subcultures ('pillars') started disintegrating¹⁵ due to processes such as modernization, secularization and individualization, whereby the bonds between individuals and the predefined groups deteriorated (e.g. Andeweg et al., 2020). Political beliefs and choices became less and less defined by tradition, religion or class, and more and more by individual preferences and values (Dekker & Ester, 1996; Koole, 1995). Dutch political parties could not count on the same loyal voters and mobilizing partner associations the way they could before. Moreover, the heydays of the party membership organization were over: the M/E ratio¹⁶ amounted to around 11% in the 1950s, but declined to around 4.5% in the 70s and early 80s (Voerman & Van Schuur, 2011).¹⁷ Although one may thus consider the early 1960s as historical benchmark for the present research, the aforementioned social developments seem to have only really affected the political landscape from 1990 onwards (Louwerse et al., 2019a). As described in the beginning of this paragraph, the dominance of the Christian democracy, social democracy, and liberal ideology – and the accompanying three parties CDA, PvdA and VVD – continued to exist until then. That can be an important reason to select a period just before the political changes of the 1990s. Several methodological and practical considerations were decisive for the selection of the mid-late 1980s as a suitable time frame for this study. These will be discussed next.

Ensuring comparability and data availability

In order to be able to draw valid conclusions on the alleged impact of the described political trends on party youth wing functioning, the influence of irrelevant factors must not only be minimized, but data from the two periods must also be available, accessible and comparable. It is important to make sure that the comparison over time is not obscured by other system-

¹⁵ A process called *ontzuiling* in Dutch.

¹⁶ Total party membership expressed as a percentage of the electorate.

¹⁷ The Netherlands, in comparison to other European countries, has always had relatively low shares of party membership with regard to the total electorate (Andeweg, Irwin & Louwerse, 2020; Van Biezen et al., 2012).

level factors at play. Several institutional structures, which may be assumed to affect Dutch party youth wing functioning, stabilized in the 1970s and 1980s. The minimum voting age and the minimum age for members of parliament further reduced to 18 years in 1972 and 1983 respectively. Both events have probably enlarged the importance of youth wings for the affiliated mother parties, as it forces parties to take young people more seriously. More importantly, as described in Section 3.1 and discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, the state subsidy for party youth wings came into being in 1976 and became more structural as of 1982. Dutch party youth wings still receive state funding today. Not only does this have an encouraging effect on political parties to install or acknowledge a party youth wing, it might also foster organizational development and steer the functional performance of party youth wings in a certain direction (see Chapter 4). In order to disregard the effect of these changes, we should compare two time periods after 1983.

Naturally, a certain level of data availability should also be ensured. Available data on party youth wings increased significantly since the introduction of the state subsidy and its accompanying requirements and conditions. This becomes clear, for example, from the lists of archival records of many party youth wings. Moreover, a survey was conducted in 1989 among the members of the party youth wings in the Netherlands, the report of which I found in the archives of *ProDemos*, offering a unique opportunity for comparison (see Section 3.3). Since the unavailability of data often limits retrospective analyses, such sources are not a luxury. This again indicates that the second half of the 1980s is most suitable for this study.

A last consideration in favour of the late 1980s is that the period to be selected must be characterized by a certain degree of stability in the number of party youth wings. Some significant changes took place in the composition of Dutch party youth wings in terms of new and merging organizations in the beginning of the 1980s. Two party youth wings came to the scene that still exist today: the CDJA in 1981 and the JD in 1984. Three major Christian democratic Dutch parties had suffered from a declining popularity to such an extent that they decided to merge into the CDA in 1980. The affiliated youth wings followed their example a year later and merged into the CDJA. The establishment of the youth wing of the social liberal D66 took a while: the Young Democrats (JD) was not founded until 1984. The developments in the landscape of youth wings of parties with parliamentary representation in the Netherlands are described in more detail in Chapter 4. Suffice it to say here that it remained fairly stable until 1991.

The above considerations led to the selection of the second half of the 1980s. These years represent a period in which the pillarization has ended, but the political system is still characterized by a certain degree of stability. Moreover, these years are not only characterized by a relatively stable party youth wing landscape and a sufficient level of data availability, but also come after certain contextual conditions for party youth wings stabilized. The inclusion of the mid-late 1980s in this study, a period that is on the eve of major political changes, makes it eminently possible to study the impact of political trends on the functioning of party youth wings in the Netherlands.

Table 3.2 Dutch party youth wings in the two periods under study

<i>Party youth wing</i>	<i>Abb.</i>	<i>Since</i>	<i>1985-1990</i>	<i>2014-2020</i>	<i>Mother party</i>	<i>Since</i>	<i>Ideology</i>	<i>Seats (1986)**</i>	<i>Seats (2017)**</i>
SGP-jongeren*	SGPJ	1934	x	x	Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP)	1918	Conservative Christian	3	3
Jongeren Organisatie Vrijheid en Democratie	JOVD	1949	x	x	Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD)	1948	Conservative Liberal	27	33
Jonge Socialisten in de PvdA	JS	1959	x	x	Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA)	1946	Social Democratic	52	9
Gereformeerd Politiek Jongeren Contact	GPJC	1964	x	Merged into PpF	Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond (GPV)	1948	Conservative Christian	1	-
Pacifistisch Socialistische Jongerengroepen***	PSJG	1976	x	Merged into DWARS	Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij (PSP)	1957	Socialist	1	-
Politieke Partij Radicalen Jongerengroepen	PPRjo	1980	x	Merged into DWARS	Politieke Partij Radikalen (PPR)	1968	Progressive Christian	2	-
Christen-Democratisch Jongeren Appèl	CDJA	1981	x	x	Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA)	1980	Christian Democratic	54	19
Reformatorische Politieke Jongerenorganisatie****	RPJO	1984	x	Merged into PpF	Reformatorische Politieke Federatie (RPF)	1975	Conservative Christian	1	-
Jonge Democraten	JD	1984	x	x	Democraten '66 (D66)	1966	Progressive Liberal	9	19
DWARS, GroenLinkse Jongeren	DWARS	1991	Merger of PPRjo and PSJG	x	GroenLinks (GL)	1990	Green Left	-	14
Perspectief, ChristenUnie-jongeren	PpF	2000	Merger of GPJC and RPJO	x	ChristenUnie (CU)	2000	Christian Social	-	5
ROOD, Jong in de SP	ROOD	2003	-	x	Socialistische Partij (SP)	1972	Socialist	-	14
PINK!	-	2006	-	x	Partij voor de Dieren (PvdD)	2002	Deep Green	-	5

Note. For more details and sources, see Chapter 4. *Named *Landelijk verband van Staatkundig Gereformeerde Studieverenigingen* (LVSGS) before 2000. **In the House of Representatives (150 seats), via <https://www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl/>. ***Named *PSP-jongerengroepen* (PSP-jg) before 1986. Eventually also related to another party, the PSO, due to a split in the mother party in 1986. ****Changed its name to *RPF-jongeren* (RPFJ) in 1992.

Included party youth wings from the late 1980s and 2010s

Table 3.2 lists the national party youth wings in 1985-1990 and 2014-2020 that are included in this study. The party youth wings were selected on the criterion that they are formally affiliated to a mother party with representation in the House of Representatives of the Netherlands (in Dutch: *Tweede Kamer*). Parliamentary seats of the mother party have been a condition for public funding ever since the introduction of state subsidies for party youth wings. Moreover, the stable existence of youth wings of political parties without parliamentary representation is scarce (see Chapter 4).

Table 3.2 shows that nine party youth wings were studied in each of the two periods. Three youth wings of parliamentary parties are missing in this overview. In the second half of the 1980s, the small Communist Party (CPN) had a youth wing but disappeared from the House of Representatives in 1986. I therefore excluded this youth wing from this study. In the late 2010s, two new party youth wings came to the scene: the youth wing *OPPOSITIE* of the newly established populist-left pro-immigrant party *DENK* in 2015, and the youth wing *Jongeren Forum voor Democratie* (JFVD) of the recently established national-conservative party *Forum voor Democratie* (FvD) in 2017. Unfortunately, both refused to participate in this study for unknown reasons. However, whenever relevant information or data was publicly available, this was included in the current study. For instance, *OPPOSITIE* and JFVD are included in the brief history of party youth wings in Chapter 4 and the membership figures in Chapter 5. Data about one of the youth wings from Table 3.2 is in some cases also (partly) missing for a single indicator or one of the employed data sources. An example of the latter is the refusal of the JOVD and ROOD to participate in the member survey in 2020. The following sections will indicate for each data source and indicator which data is available for each time period.

3.3 Data sources and collection

In this study, I employed three data sources for the purpose of the in-depth analysis of party youth wing functioning in two time periods: (archival) documents, membership surveys, and semi-structured interviews with (former) board members. This multi-methodological approach has several advantages. It ensures that certain sources of information can be crosschecked. For instance, information provided by interviewees can be confronted with available data from archives and documents, or survey data can be mixed with interview data. Moreover, shortcomings of each of the methods can be compensated with data obtained through one of the other methods. For instance, in case of missing pieces of information in the archives, interview data might fill the gaps. A combination of methods might also enable for a combination of several perspectives on the functioning of the youth wings. While the indicators attempt to establish actual behaviour, policies, rules and/or operations, this information can be supplemented with the views of members and youth wing elites on these matters.

It is different for each of the eight sub-functions of the functional framework to what extent a qualitative assessment of relevant documents (such as statutes and annual reports),

a quantitative analysis of survey data, or information from the interviews is required. Before describing in detail how each sub-function is operationalized and measured, this section elaborates on the methods used to collect the data.

Written (archival) documents

This study is for a large part based on data derived from formal documents of party youth wing, such as annual reports, financial statements, regulations, political manifestos and member magazines. In addition, the measurement of some of the sub-functions asked for the analysis of other documents as well, such as formal mother party documents and newspaper articles. In some cases, data from secondary sources, such as anniversary booklets and previous studies, were employed. The next three sections describe in detail what textual data was analysed for the concerning sub-functions and in what way. Before doing so, this paragraph shortly describes the methods used to find and select the relevant documents.

While much of the mentioned documents are publicly available via online sources¹⁸ or via direct contact with board members in the late 2010s, this is different for the years 1985 to 1990. These years were the early days of personal computers without network connection. One thus has to rely on the paper archives of party youth wings. There are multiple publicly accessible archives in the Netherlands in which political parties and their youth wings periodically deposit their archival documents. In the second half of 2019 and in early 2020, I visited eight of these archives in order to consult and copy hundreds of party youth wing documents. The access often depended on the permission of the mother party, the youth wings or the archivist, which I obtained in all cases. However, access to certain specific records was sometimes denied due to the presence of special personal data. In some cases, archival documents were digitally accessible, such as large parts of the archive of the JOVD.¹⁹ A list of the consulted archives and inventory numbers is adopted in Appendix 3.1.

The archives of the youth wings have been preserved relatively well, although the quality and detail vary from collection to collection. For instance, there is no list of records for locating materials in the collection available for the archive of the RPJO.²⁰ Several other archives are not complete. There are many reasons why certain documents might be missing, such as management crises, informal organizational structures, or carelessness of those who were involved in the organization at the time. An example is the archive of the JS, which is limited in scope for the period of 1985-1990. This might be explained by the internal conflicts that took place within the youth wing during those years (Van der Heide et al., 1998). Another example is the relatively unorganized and incomplete archive of the PSJG, which fits the image

¹⁸ This varied from party and youth wing websites to websites of government agencies and online newspaper databases. Because of a request under the Dutch Public Access to Government Information Act (WOB, in Dutch: *Wet openbaarheid van bestuur*), the financial data and audit reports of political parties and their affiliated associations are available since 2012 via <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten>.

¹⁹ Available via <https://jovd-digitaal.dnpp.nl/>.

²⁰ With the help of the archivist, I randomly selected 30 of the 63 available archive boxes of the RPJO and searched for relevant party youth wing documents. This yielded enough relevant documents from the period of 1985 to 1990 so that I no longer had to explore the other 33 archive boxes.

of this youth wing as being anarchistic and informally organized. This again underlines the importance of a combination of data sources.

Since the number of available documents is generally large, it was important to use certain selection criteria for what materials to request and study in order to make the task at hand feasible, manageable and effective. Firstly, as described before, the focus in the present study is on the functioning of party youth wings on the national level, and thus also on archival documents of the central organization. I excluded materials of local branches as much as possible. Secondly, personal correspondence and hand-written notes were excluded as well. The emphasis is on the functioning of the organization as a whole, not of the individuals in it. Moreover, textual sources of that kind may be biased or concern a snapshot of a series of ongoing events. For this reason, a third selection criterion was a certain degree of formality. Final annual reports, policy proposals, internal newsletters and magazines were preferred over informal memos, minutes or draft versions as it may be assumed that the more official youth wing documents meet a higher level of precision.²¹ In addition, an important consideration underlying all three selection criteria was that the materials from both periods had to be comparable. While formal documents such as annual reports, magazines and policy plans were often available for the late 2010s, minutes or informal documents were not.

The documentary sources are considered indispensable to the purpose of examining certain aspects of party youth wing functioning. The possibility can however not be excluded that the textual documents do not provide a full or accurate account of the state of affairs. As described, archives were not always complete, and the documents itself did not always provide all the details I hoped to find. Moreover, the documents used are not necessarily an accurate reflection of reality. Katz and Mair (1992a, p. 7) already reminded us that “power relations exist outside the officially documented procedures” of political parties. Besides, the purpose with which party youth wing documents were written may lead to an emphasis on certain events more than others. A board report that serves as justification for a subsidy or a members' congress could portray a too positive picture of reality. Such challenges are inherent to the use of document analysis in research (Bowen, 2009). This is why I used a wide array of primary documents in combination with other sources of information as much as possible. Most importantly, the large majority of documents used in the analysis of the present study are central to the party youth wing's administrative organization. They thus provide a meaningful indication of the party youth wing's own conception of their functioning.

Party youth wing membership surveys

The methodology for some of the indicators of the sub-functions described below consists of surveys conducted amongst the members of party youth wings. Such surveys are scarce. To

²¹ Most of these formal documents were and are to some extent accessible outside the party youth wing. The parent party often receives its youth wings' annual reports, magazines and statutes. Moreover, youth wings often provided formal documents about the ins and outs of the organization to the responsible Ministry in the 1980s. In the present time period, party youth wings often have the status of Public Benefit Organization (PBO, in Dutch: *ANBI*), which obliges them to publish formal documents such as policy plans and annual accounts on their websites.

my knowledge, two youth wing surveys have been conducted in the Netherlands in the past: one in 1989 (Bakhuis et al., 1989) and one in 1995 (Bos et al., 1995).²² The 1989 survey was used to measure some of the indicators of youth wing sub-functions in the earlier period of 1985-1990 as much as possible. For the assessment of the functioning of party youth wings in the late 2010s, I conducted a web-based party youth wing membership survey in the beginning of 2020. This paragraph describes both survey methods. Table 3.3 summarizes their characteristics.

Table 3.3 Characteristics of party youth wing membership surveys in 1989 and 2020

<i>Year</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Participating youth wings</i>	<i>Sample</i>	<i>No. of items</i>
1989*	Postal survey	CDJA, JD, JOVD, JS, PPRjo, PSJG	Stratified sample of 300 persons per youth wing (250 members and 50 board members)	+/- 54 questions and 35 statements
2020	Web survey	CDJA, DWARS, JD, JS, PINK!, PpF, SGPJ	No sampling used; secretaries distributed the link via e-mail or newsletter	29 questions and 18 statements

Note. *This survey was conducted by Bakhuis et al. (1989).

The 1989 survey was conducted among six party youth wings by sending out paper questionnaires to a stratified sample of 300 persons per youth wing. Each youth wing sample consisted of 250 regular members and 50 board members. The reasons given for this approach are that 1) the ratio of five ordinary members to one board member appeared to represent reality and 2) because of their position, board members have a broader view of what is happening within the organization. From the 1,800 people that received a questionnaire, 531 (29.5%) returned a completed survey. Respondents were asked to answer 54 questions and to rate 35 statements. Among other things, the survey asked about media behaviour, membership activities, communication and recruitment policies, demographic characteristics, and social and political themes (Bakhuis et al., 1989). It must be noted that, while the report of the membership survey from 1989 is available, the accompanying data file unfortunately is not. I was able to derive a large part of the respondents' (aggregated) answers from the description of the results in the report. This does mean that there are almost no possibilities for statistical analysis and presentation of disaggregated data.

I conducted the membership survey of 2020 among the members of seven party youth wings. The survey included 29 questions, which were grouped into three main sections: questions about the membership, questions about the party youth wing and politics, and questions about demographics (Appendix 3.2). In addition, two blocks of nine statements each were included. Because the goal of the current research is to compare the late 2010s with the late 1980s, I chose to align the content of the survey as much as possible with the one conducted in 1989. It must be noted, however, that the quality of the survey in 1989 is not

²² Both studies were commissioned by the non-governmental organization *Instituut voor Publiek en Politiek* (the predecessor of the national institute for democracy *ProDemos*). The aim was to get an understanding of the functioning of party youth wings so that both the youth wings and the institute were able to improve their efforts in promoting the political awareness and participation of young people in the Netherlands.

ideal. Some of its questions were suggestive, unclear, or outdated, and the answer options did not always match the corresponding question. Only those items that were considered crucial for measuring the indicators were copied identically or were slightly adjusted and modernized before adopting them into the 2020 survey. Due to the omission of old questions and the addition of new questions,²³ the order of the contemporary questions is not the same as in the 1989 survey. The possibility should therefore be considered that the question order effects differ per survey, although questions were grouped by topic in order to unfold in the most logical order possible. Moreover, whenever possible, I randomized the order of the answer options of a question in order to prevent primacy and recency effects.

The 2020 survey was administered via web-based survey software Qualtrics.²⁴ Online surveys offer significant advantages in terms of access, time and costs (for a review, see Wright, 2005). They ease the completion, make data collection and management consistent, and facilitate the data analysis process. Overall, young people have sufficient levels of computer literacy and using the internet for surveying is expected to improve their response rate (Beebe et al., 1997). I pretested the survey on a sample of 10 (mostly ex-)party youth wing members of CDJA, DWARS, JD and JOVD, and made minor modifications in order to improve comprehension and readability. Party youth wing secretaries were then asked to distribute a link to their members via e-mail. Unfortunately, four party youth wings declined participation or did not respond to the requests: JFVD, JOVD, OPPOSITIE and ROOD. The CDJA and JD did participate by sending the survey link via a direct e-mail to their total membership base. SGPJ sent the survey link via a direct e-mail to all members above 14 years old.²⁵ The CDJA also sent a follow-up e-mail to the non-respondents three weeks after the initial invitation. DWARS, JS, PINK! and PpF distributed the survey link multiple times via their online newsletters.²⁶ In order to prevent individuals from taking the survey more than once, I used the 'prevent ballot box stuffing' option in Qualtrics. At the start of the survey, participants were offered an informed consent form, informing them about the study, the researcher, time estimates, and voluntary participation. The length of time to complete the survey was approximately ten to fifteen minutes. Upon completion of a survey, data was stored instantaneously in the Qualtrics database. Data was downloaded from Qualtrics into the data-analysis software IBM SPSS version 25.

Table 3.4 presents an overview of the total and disaggregated response figures for both surveys. The 1989 survey yielded a total absolute response of 531 and a return rate of 29.5%

²³ In most cases whenever new items were added to the survey, I followed the example of the Leiden Party Member Survey 2008 (in Dutch: *partijledenonderzoek*) of Leiden University. For information on the survey methodology, see Den Ridder (2014).

²⁴ Licensed via Leiden University.

²⁵ The SGPJ also has a large group of young members aged 11 to 14 that do not pay a membership fee and are called 'aspirant-members'. These members were excluded from the survey.

²⁶ The reasons they gave for being reluctant to send direct mails were that 1) it could cause information overload and frustration among the members and 2) it was impossible because of the General Data Protection Regulation.

Table 3.4 Survey response rates in 1989 and 2020

Party youth wing	1989		2020		
	<i>n</i>	%*	<i>n</i>	%**	% completed
CDJA	91	30	252	13	71
PPRjo	100	33			
PSJG	69	23			
DWARS			77	2	82
JD	110	37	288	6	72
JOVD	101	34	-	-	-
JS	60	20	133	8	71
PpF	-	-	45	3	62
PINK!	-	-	29	1	83
SGPJ	-	-	397	14***	66
<i>Total</i>	<i>531</i>	<i>29.5</i>	<i>1221</i>	<i>6.4</i>	<i>70.2</i>

Note. *Return rate based on the total sample size. **Response rate based on the total membership size in January 2020 (Appendix 5.1a). ***Based on a reported sample size of 2,896, which concerns the total number of paying SGPJ members (see footnote 25).

of the total sample. Based on the membership figures of the participating party youth wings in 1989,²⁷ 5.1% of the members took part in the survey. The absolute response to the 2020 survey was 1,221, which means that 6.4% of the members participated. The report from 1989 does not mention dropout numbers. Because completed surveys had to be returned by post, I assume that there are no considerable dropout figures. In 2020, 857 respondents completed the questionnaire (70.2%). Dropout could not be attributed to certain questions deemed incomprehensible or annoying by the respondents. Except for a slightly higher dropout at the beginning of the questionnaire, dropout increased gradually towards the end of the questionnaire. Because response patterns of dropouts do not differ from those given by respondents who completed the survey, the answers of dropout respondents were included in the analysis. There are differences in response and completion rates across party youth wings. In 1989, fewer members of the JS and the PSJG responded to the survey, but this is not addressed in the report. In 2020, lower response rates can be found among those party youth wings that distributed the survey link via the newsletter. It turned out that not all youth wing members receive the digital newsletter,²⁸ and those that do receive it not always open it.²⁹

The maximum margin of error (MoE), based on an estimate of 50%, is ± 4.3 percentage points at a 95% confidence level for the 1989 survey. For the 2020 survey, the MoE varies due to variations in the actual sample size per question. For the main part of the survey the actual total sample size is around 1,000, which means that the maximum MoE (at a 95% confidence level) is ± 3.1 percentage points. For a smaller part of the survey, the actual total sample size is just above 850, which means that the maximum MoE is ± 3.4 percentage points at a 95% confidence level. The maximum MoE ranged from ± 6.2 percentage points (JD with a general

²⁷ These can be found in Table 5.2 and Appendix 5.1.
²⁸ The JS reported that 88.6% of their members received the newsletter, for DWARS this was 92.3%. PINK! reported no difference between the total number of members and the members that received the newsletter. Numbers for PpF are unknown.
²⁹ Both the JS and DWARS reported an average open rate of roughly 30%.

N of around 250) to ± 19.6 percentage points (PINK! with a general *N* of around 25) for individual party youth wings. This confirms that we need to interpret the results of party youth wings with a small sample size with caution.

The differences in response rate makes that attention needs to be devoted to the question of representativeness, or the extent to which the members that participated in the survey are representative for the total membership base of youth wings. In other words, how do the survey respondents compare to the member population? Unfortunately, this question cannot be answered in detail for the survey that was conducted in 1989 because of missing background information on the total membership base of the party youth wings. This means that nonresponse cannot be ruled out as an alternative explanation for possible differences between the two time periods. What we do know about the 1989 study is that the members of three party youth wings are missing in the sample: those of the GPJC, LVSGS/SGPJ and RPJO. In 2020, as described before, four youth wings of parliamentary parties did not participate: the JFVD, JOVD, OPPOSITIE and ROOD. Moreover, the response rates of PINK! and PpF are too low to draw reliable conclusions about their specific populations (Table 3.4). This means that when general statements about the total membership base of Dutch party youth wings in 1989 and 2020 are made, we must take into account these caveats. Results will therefore also be presented in a disaggregated manner as much as possible in order to see whether the composition has an effect on the found patterns.

For the 2020 survey, it was possible to conduct a nonresponse analysis based on information that the boards of the party youth wings provided about the size and composition of their membership base. Most register gender, age and place of residence of their members and were willing to share this information, albeit only aggregated to variable to avoid privacy violations. The results of the nonresponse analysis are adopted in Appendix 3.3. It was found that the share of each party youth wing in the sample deviates from their share of members in the population. I therefore calculated weights based on the party youth wing's relative share of the aggregate number of party youth wing members in the Netherlands and applied these whenever aggregated analyses were conducted. Unweighted results will be presented in (foot)notes whenever possible. For the member characteristics gender, age and geography, I detected only few differences between the sample and population distributions, except for some smaller differences for some youth wings (see Appendix 3.3). As this gave no cause for concern, weighting factors for these characteristics were omitted. It was not possible to compare respondents to the population on other demographical characteristics, such as education level or socio-economic status.

In addition to the youth wing size and demographic characteristics, it is important to consider whether active members participated in the survey more often than less active members. It stands to reason that surveys conducted among the members of political organizations are prone to overrepresenting active members. Individuals who are more involved in youth wing-related activities may find the subject of the survey more interesting, which is known to increase the response to survey invitations (e.g. Faas & Schoen, 2006). Moreover, in the present study some of the party youth wings distributed the survey link via

their newsletters, which are most likely read by members that are more involved. The alleged overrepresentation of active members in the current sample can be evaluated by using information from the explorative interviews with the party youth wing chairs in 2014 (see next paragraph). I asked the chairs of the youth wings to estimate the number of internally active members for their youth wing. The majority estimated that less than 10 per cent of their membership base could be labelled as an active member.³⁰ Although the definition of 'active' was not clearly delineated, they seemed to refer to those members who undertake high-intensity participatory activities, such as volunteering or frequent attendance. In the 2020 survey, the share of members fulfilling a position or taking part in activities on a regular basis was significantly larger.³¹ This indicates that active members are to some extent overrepresented in the sample, which may lead to upward biased results on internal and external activism. This presumably also applies to the 1989 survey results. It should not be a problem for other more substantive aspects of the membership that are investigated, because previous party member surveys have shown that the substantial difference between active and less active members is negligible (Den Ridder, 2014, p. 33).

Explorative semi-structured elite interviews

In order to explore elites' perceptions of the functioning of Dutch party youth wings, explorative semi-structured interviews were held with the chairpersons of the party youth wings under study. I chose to interview the chairpersons, as they in particular have an overview of all tasks, activities, processes and policies of their organization. Moreover, they are generally responsible for external contacts, including the contact with their mother party and the media. The elite interviews were not only used to discover new information about the functioning of party youth wings, but also to provide context and colour for the other sources of data used in this study.

I conducted the interviews in two stages of the present study. The first round of interviews was conducted in an early stage in 2014 with all nine chairs of the party youth wings at the time. In 2020, interviews were held with the former chairs of the party youth wings in the late 1980s. Although it was sometimes challenging to locate the interviewees and get in touch, interviews were eventually conducted with eight former youth wing chairs. Attempts to contact the former chair of the PPRjo have failed. This means that 17 interviews were conducted in total. The interviewees were generally recruited via an e-mail or phone call, which included a short explanation of the study and a request to plan a meeting. The duration of the interviews varied between 45 and 90 minutes. While the first round of interviews took place in person, I had to conduct the second round of interviews online via Microsoft Teams or over the phone due to the COVID-19 crisis. All interviews were audio-recorded and

³⁰ Only the chair of ROOD estimated in the interview that one sixth of the membership base is active within youth wing activities.

³¹ A quarter of the survey respondents indicated spending more than 2 hours per week to the party youth wing. Moreover, around 30% of the respondents indicated fulfilling a position within the youth wing at the time of participating in the survey. When asked about participation frequency in the past year, 35.5% answered 'often' or 'very often' to at least four of the thirteen youth wing activities listed.

transcribed.

The aim of the interview was to gather broad information about the functioning of the party youth wing concerned. The interview protocol (Appendix 3.4) intended to explore specific themes and give room to the interviewee to explain events, patterns, and forms of behaviour (Bryman, 2012). One point of attention was the retrospective character of the interviews with the former chairpersons. As they were asked about their experiences of over 30 years ago, a certain recall bias cannot be ruled out. The information yielded by these interviews was therefore tested against the available archival documents as much as possible. In order to put interviewees at ease and make sure they would not make up answers, I emphasized at the beginning of the interview that it is normal to not be able to answer all the questions because of the time that had passed. Moreover, the interviews with the former chairs started with open questions about the moment they became a member and the way the youth wing was organized in the mid-late 1980s in order to refresh their memory. It happened a number of times that certain memories resurfaced during an interview.

The rest of the interview protocol was more or less the same for all interviews. At the start, I asked two broad open questions to the interviewees about their view on the role and functions of their party youth wing. Next, interviewees were asked to rate seven concise statements on possible functions with responses in a 7-point Likert scale format, ranging from 1 = *not at all true* to 7 = *completely true*. The party youth wing..

- .. serves as a power base for its members.
- .. has an influence on decision-making processes within the mother party.
- .. has an influence on decision-making processes within the Netherlands.
- .. has an influence on the public opinion.
- .. offers opportunities for political education.
- .. is committed to convincing young people of the ideas of the mother party.
- .. plays an important role in political recruitment and selection.
- .. ensures that the members could build a valuable social network (only presented to chairs of the late 1980s).

After interviewees rated a statement, they were asked to motivate their choice of answer. Using these statements not only helped to structure the interview and to cause the desired change in interaction, but also motivated the interviewees to think about the functioning of their party youth wing from several angles. Moreover, they allowed for open and in-depth follow-up questions. After these statements, if there was enough time, the interviewees were asked to describe the relationship of the party youth wing with the mother party in more detail, to describe the youth wings' unique political ideas and viewpoints and to describe how the party youth wing relates to young people in general. The latter category included questions on membership recruitment and mobilization. The transcribed interviews were analysed by distinguishing examples from core answers. The results of the interviews will be used throughout this thesis to illustrate and sometimes interpret the reported findings on the performance of youth wings on the sub-functions.

3.4 Measurement of the mobilization function

According to the mobilization function, party youth wings should promote the political participation of young people. In order to do so, they must attract a representative membership, facilitate internal participation and encourage young people to participate in politics in other forms than youth wing membership. Table 3.5 identifies the indicators for each of these three sub-functions. These will be discussed in the following paragraphs. The results are presented and discussed in Chapter 5.

Table 3.5 Indicators and data sources for the mobilization function

<i>Key function</i>	<i>Sub-function</i>	<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Data source</i>
Mobilization	Attract a representative membership	-Number of members -Socio-demographics of members	-Primary youth wing sources supplemented with secondary sources -Party youth wing membership survey in 1989 and 2020; membership administration 2020
	Facilitate internal participation	-Levels of intra-youth wing activism	-Party youth wing membership survey in 1989 and 2020
	Mobilize beyond membership	-Political participation of members	-Party youth wing membership survey in 2020

Attract a representative membership

The first sub-function of the mobilization function concerns the recruitment of a representative membership. It consists of two indicators: the number of members and the socio-demographics of members. Firstly, an important indicator of success is the size of the membership, which was operationalized in the number of direct individual party youth wing members. Similarly to the definition on party membership of Heidar (2006, p. 301), party youth wing membership is defined here as “an organizational affiliation by an individual to a [party youth wing], assigning obligations and privileges to that individual”. In the practice of this research, someone is considered a youth wing member when they are registered as such by the concerning youth wing. It generally means that someone pays an annual membership fee in order for the obligations and privileges associated with the membership to apply. I aspired to obtain youth wing membership data from primary sources. For the greater part of the two time periods, membership figures could be obtained from the annual programmes or reports of the youth wings or the mother parties. Occasionally, I obtained membership data from other primary sources, such as member magazines or meeting minutes. Whenever primary sources were missing, secondary sources were used to supplement the data. Examples are the article of Welp (1999) or newspaper databases.³² For the late 2010s, party youth wings were occasionally contacted and asked to report their membership figures. When no other option was available, the membership data of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations was consulted. The Ministry uses this data in order to calculate the public

³² To give an example, columnist and political scientist Bart Tromp writes about the membership figures of several prominent Dutch party youth wings in the national newspaper *Het Parool* on 19 September 1987. In the same column, he warns that the self-reported membership figures of party youth wings are “by no means accurate”.

subsidy for party youth wings, as arranged in the Political parties funding Act (Wfpp, in Dutch: *Wet financiering politieke partijen*, see Chapter 4). The Act demands that parties appoint an accountant to report on the faithfulness and legality of the provided membership information (Wfpp, art. 25.2). An overview of the membership figures of Dutch party youth wings between 1960 and 2016 and the accompanying data sources are presented in Appendix 5.1.

A number of comments must be made about these data. We know from the party literature that gathering membership data brings along certain challenges (Mair & Van Biezen, 2001). Membership numbers reported by the party might include exaggerations, pure estimates or categories of supporters other than formal members, making the data potentially unreliable. We can also apply these concerns to party youth wing data. Not all youth wings in the Netherlands appeared very conscientious regarding data archiving. The introduction of the state subsidy for party youth wings did boost the member registration of youth wing members, as membership figures were part of the configuration of the subsidy. Moreover, I was sometimes able to crosscheck the number of members with other data sources. The membership figures may still not always fully reflect reality. Subsidized membership data from the Ministry might be more reliable and complete. However, a major disadvantage of these data is that the membership definition of the Act (Wfpp) differs in most cases from the definition that is adopted by parties and party youth wings themselves. Most party youth wings accept members that are younger or older than the required age of 14 to 27 (see Appendix 5.2). As a result, the membership data of the Ministry will in most cases severely underestimate the real membership figures. Moreover, subsidized membership data are not available for the 1980s. I therefore chose to report self-reported membership figures as much as possible.

The second indicator concerns the representativeness of the party youth wing membership. When some groups of young people are more prominently present within the youth wing, their voices may be louder than that of the groups that are underrepresented. In studies on the membership composition of political parties, for example, it is found that in many countries men still outnumber women within political parties and that party members are generally older and have a higher social status than non-members (Scarrow & Gezgor, 2010; Widfeldt, 1995). This indicator was measured by comparing the social composition of the party youth wing membership to that of the youth population in both periods. For the mid-late 1980s, I obtained data on various socio-demographic variables from the membership survey report. It reports on the share of male and female respondents, the mean age of the sample, the share of respondents below 21 years old versus those aged 21 and above, the share of respondents living in the central-western conurbation (in Dutch: *Randstad*) of the Netherlands, the distribution of the sample over rural and urban areas, the distribution of the sample over main occupation and the education level of the respondents (Bakhuis et al., 1989, pp. 13-18). For the late 2020s, I relied on data on the age, registered gender and province of the entire population of party youth wing members, provided by the party boards of the respective youth wings in the beginning of 2020. The membership survey 2020 also contained several socio-demographic items in order to ensure comparability to the 1989 survey results.

It asked respondents for their postal code, highest completed education level and main occupation. In addition, it included an item on country of birth of the respondents and their parents, in order to be able to identify a migration background.³³ Comparisons to the total youth population were made for both time periods by using the public databases of the Statistics Netherlands bureau (in Dutch: CBS).

Facilitating internal participation

The second sub-function of the mobilization function focuses on the internal participation of members. While merely joining a party youth wing in itself counts as a form of participation, party youth wing performance on the mobilization function is also determined by the level of members that actually participate in activities of the organization. Examples of such activities are attending party youth wing meetings, fulfilling executive positions, and organizing events. The youth wing activist can thus be recognized by their devotion of time and effort to the party youth wing.

Party membership is an “under-studied mode of political participation” (Van Haute, 2011, p. 7). However, the party literature does offer some examples of studies on internal party activism that are useful for the present research. Generally, three standard measures of party activism are used: the number of party meetings attended, the amount of time spent on party activity and the extent to which a member considers themselves as active (e.g. Cross & Young, 2008; Gallagher & Marsh, 2004; Van Haute & Gauja, 2015). In addition, some scholars differentiate between the types of activities in order to get an understanding of the different ways in which members participate (Cross & Young, 2008; Den Ridder, 2014). This also enables for the identification of forms of participation that take a lot of time and effort of members (high-intensity participation, see Whiteley & Seyd, 2002).

The party youth wing membership survey conducted in 1989 contained items about party youth wing activism. Respondents were asked to indicate the number of hours spent on the party youth wing per week. In case a respondent answered that they did not spend any hours on the party youth wing, the survey asked for the reasons behind this inactivity. Respondents were also asked whether they fulfil an executive or other organizational position within the youth wing. I replicated these items in the party youth wing membership survey in 2020 in order to ensure comparability over time. In addition, the 2020 survey presented a list of youth wing activities to respondents, such as a meeting or political action, and asked them to indicate how often they had participated in each of these activities in the last year (1 = rarely or never, 2 = occasionally, 3 = often, 4 = very often).

Mobilizing beyond membership

The third sub-function of the mobilization function focuses on the mobilization beyond membership. Youth wings ought to increase their members’ readiness for participation in

³³ The country of birth is generally considered a reliable indicator of immigration, although it does not exclude those individuals that are born abroad because of a temporary stay abroad, for instance in case of a foreign assignment of a parent.

politics. As described in Chapter 2, previous research has already shown that mobilization and associational involvement are crucial factors in determining levels of political participation (e.g. Leighley, 1996; Pollock, 1982; Stolle & Rochon, 1998; Verba & Nie, 1972; Verba et al., 1995). Party youth wings perform well on this sub-function whenever they stimulate young people to undertake forms of political participation other than youth wing membership and internal activism. Ideally, this is measured by analysing the political participatory behaviour of youth wing members and young people in general, while considering the effects of the multi-dimensional participation cues sent by party youth wings. It asks for large-scale surveys or even experimental settings (e.g. Vissers et al., 2011), both within youth wings and among young people in general, ideally comparing a democratic context with and without party youth wings.

Such designs are not feasible within the scope of the current study. I therefore chose to focus on members' voting behaviour and their participation in other political activities. Voting behaviour is included because "elections lie at the heart of the relationship between parties and democracy" (Farrell & Webb, 2000, p. 102). The survey question operationalizes whether the respondent would intend to cast a vote if elections for the House of Representatives would take place at that point in time. I chose to measure the intention to vote instead of the turnout in the last election because of the young age of the respondents. Because the last election took place three years prior to the administration of the survey, asking for actual voting behaviour would exclude a large part of the sample due to the ineligibility to vote. The results were compared to the findings of the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study (DPES) on the electoral participation of young people in general. The party youth wing membership survey of 2020 also included a general question on political participation, asking respondents in what ways they have participated in the past five years in order to raise something political, or influence politicians or the government. This question was replicated from several national studies on political participation in the Netherlands (SCP (cv'02-'10/'11); SKON (nko'02-'12)), making it possible to compare the political participation of youth wing members to (young) citizens in general.

Two restrictions limit the ability to draw strong conclusions about the (changing) functioning of party youth wings on this sub-function. Firstly, the described questions were not part of the 1989 youth wing survey,³⁴ making a comparison over time impossible. Secondly, whenever it is found that party youth wing members are more active politically than young people in general, this finding cannot simply be attributed to mobilizing mechanisms of the party youth wing. Youth wing members might already have a certain propensity toward political activity. This issue cannot be solved with the current research design. The 2020 survey did include a statement about the perception of members of the mobilization mechanisms of their youth wing in order to explore this indirectly.

³⁴ The 1989 survey asked respondents whether they would vote for the mother party in a future election. This is a fundamentally different question than the intention to vote on Election Day.

3.5 Measurement of the representation function

Chapter 2 described that the representation function comprises the role that party youth wings play in representing young people’s interests within the political system. While the previous function focused on the role of party youth wings in promoting individual political participatory acts of young people, the representation function prescribes that party youth wings act as intermediaries between the preferences of their members and the political elites. Party youth wings with more representative power gather their members’ interests in a distinctive and democratically established political programme, articulate these policy preferences within and beyond the mother party, and have a diverse membership base from which they ‘deliver’ young political candidates (see Table 3.6). The results are presented and discussed in Chapter 6.

Table 3.6 Indicators and data sources for the representation function

<i>Key function</i>	<i>Sub-function</i>	<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Data source</i>
Representation	Aggregate political interests	-Adoption of a political programme	-Various primary youth wing sources
		-Participation opportunities in programme development	-Various primary youth wing sources
		-Salience- and position-based ideological congruence	-Party youth wing membership survey in 1989 and 2020
	Articulate political interests	-Insider access: use of various party channels	-Intra-party regulations and various primary youth wing sources
		-Outsider access: media appearance	-Delpher and Nexis Uni newspaper databases
	Enhance descriptive representation	-Youth wing members’ share of parliamentary seats	-Biographical database of the Parliamentary Documentation Centre
-Strategies for influencing candidate selection		-Various primary youth wing sources and elite interviews	

Aggregating political interests

The first sub-function of the representation function concerns the aggregation of political interests by party youth wings. Youth wings perform well on this sub-function whenever they bundle together the political interests of young people in a small number of general political alternatives. In this regard, political programmes or manifestos can be perceived as the ultimate outcome of the aggregation process, as is the case for their mother parties, which “bring together a wide variety of interest groups and forge a common programme that these interests can support” (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000c, p. 8). The political programme or manifesto thus consists of the policy positions and preferences of the party youth wing. As a first step, therefore, I assessed per youth wing in the mid-late 1980s and 2010s whether they had political programmes by consulting party youth wing archives, websites, regulations and elite interviews.

However, it cannot just be assumed that the political programmes of party youth wings reflect the interests and issue priorities of the members. This is important, as the political programme largely determines the political agenda of the organization. It needs to reflect the political interests of the members in order to function properly as a chain in the representation

process. Just as party members are supposed to act as ‘sensors’ in society (Poguntke, 2002, p. 50), youth wing members can transmit the political preferences of young people into the party youth wing and the mother party. Youth wing members therefore need to be able to influence the political programme of their youth wing. Moreover, the latter needs to reflect the interests and concerns of the members. Two other indicators were thus added to the measurement of the functioning of party youth wings on this sub-function: the opportunities of members to be involved in the creation of the political programme and the extent to which the youth wing’s ideological priorities are congruent with those of the membership base. The participation opportunities were assessed by an analysis of primary youth wing sources such as annual reports and internal regulations, supplemented with the elite interviews.

The ‘congruence indicator’ focuses on the extent to which the ideological priorities of the youth wing actually match the stances of its members. In party research, congruence is often understood as the proximity between parties and their voters or the electorate at large. Naturally this cannot be applied to party youth wings as they do not have a voter constituency. Moreover, the aim here is to evaluate the youth wing’s ability to channel their members preferences into the political process, for which youth wing–member congruence is considered a prerequisite. This indicator consisted of two parts: salience- and position-based ideological congruence. Because of a lack of data for the late 1980s, I was only able to measure the functioning of party youth wings on this indicator in the late 2010s. Salience-based ideological congruence focuses on the correspondence between the importance attached to policy areas by the party youth wing and the average youth wing member. It can be argued that congruence is especially important on those issues that are highly valued by the members of the youth wing (Giger & Lefkofridi, 2014). Party youth wings’ issue saliency was measured by classifying all policy statements in their political programmes into one of fourteen general policy areas and calculating the share of each of these policy areas of the total programme. The latter ensured a correction for the length of the political programme. The coding procedures are presented in more detail in the Appendix 3.5. Party youth wing members’ issue saliency was measured by asking respondents of the 2020 member survey to choose which of the listed policy areas they deem important for Dutch politics in the next five years (with a maximum of three answers). The list of policy areas was almost identical to the list of policy areas used in the coding of the political programmes.³⁵ The final step was to calculate the programme-member congruence. For each policy area, the absolute difference between the share of attention received in the political programme and the share of attention received by survey respondents was calculated. I then calculated a total programme-member congruence for each party youth wing, equal to the total average difference.³⁶ A larger difference between

³⁵ The coding scheme for the political programmes included one extra category: ‘No theme, unclear, or intertwined’. Both the survey and the coding scheme for the political programmes included a category ‘other’. I excluded this category from the analysis. See Appendix 3.5 and footnote 146.

³⁶ The formula for calculating the total congruence between the issue salience of the youth wing and the respondents is: $C = (\sum |Si1 - Si2|) / n$, where C – congruence between political programme and survey responses, Si1 – salience of issue category i in the political programme of the youth wing, Si2 – salience of issue category i for the survey respondents from the youth wing, and n the number of issue categories.

the two measures, and thus a higher total programme-member congruence score, points to a larger incongruence on salient issues. It must be noted, however, that it cannot be ruled out that differences are partly caused by the use of two different sources. The amount of text dedicated to a policy area in the political programme is taken as a proxy for issue salience: it is assumed that party youth wings dedicate more space in their political programmes to those issues they care strongly about. While this is plausible, it might also be that in some cases political issues receive more textual attention because of certain strategies or the complexity of the topic. In addition to this measure, I also measured the perception of members of the extent of salience-based ideological congruence. Respondents of the 2020 member survey were asked to indicate whether the devoted attention to issues by their party youth wing meets their own interests (answer options: *very good, good, sufficient, poor, very poor, don't know / no answer*).

The position-based ideological congruence concerns the similarity or proximity in ideological positions of members and the party youth wing on political issues. This part of the 'congruence indicator' was operationalized in several survey items asking respondents to score their own position, that of the party youth wing and that of the mother party on various political dimensions.³⁷ One dimension was the traditional 10-point left-right scale, in which 1 and 10 represent the most leftist and rightist positions, respectively. Because previous studies warn that the exclusive use of the left-right scale may yield a too one-dimensional or positive image of congruence (e.g. Costello et al., 2012; Lesschaeve, 2017), more specific issue dimensions were included as well. These concerned 7-point policy position scales on the issues euthanasia, income disparities, minority integration and European unification. The results will indicate the respondents' perceived (and thus consciously chosen) distance between their own political views, those of the youth wing and those of the mother party (see also Den Ridder, 2014; Van Haute & Carty, 2011).

Articulating political interests

The second sub-function of the representation function consists of the articulation of political interests by party youth wings. As described in Chapter 2, party youth wings perform well on this sub-function whenever they publicly express and pursue the aggregated political demands of young people, with the aim to obtain political influence and make political decision-makers responsive to their aims. Ideally, the functioning of party youth wings on this sub-function is assessed by measuring their actual influence on the political agenda or political decisions.³⁸ However, measuring the exact political influence of a group is found to be

³⁷ Survey question left-right dimension: "Political views are often said to be left or right. When you think of your own views, those of [party youth wing] and those of [mother party], where would you place them on the scale below?" Survey question issue dimensions: "Here are some political controversies. You are asked to indicate your own opinion, that of [party youth wing] and that of [mother party]". The survey listed the policy position scales consecutively. The question formulation is identical to that in the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study (Van der Meer, Van der Kolk, & Rekker, 2017) and the Leiden Party Member Survey (Den Ridder, 2014).

³⁸ One option explored here is the extent to which party youth wings successfully hand in motions and amendments during the national congress (or general assembly) of the mother party. However, attempts to

notoriously difficult (Dür & De Bièvre, 2007). One way of going about this is by focusing on group access to the political arena, assuming that this is as a crucial step towards gaining influence (Binderkrantz et al., 2017). More specifically, group access can be defined as “instances where a group has entered a political arena (parliament, administration, or media) passing a threshold controlled by relevant gatekeepers (politicians, civil servants, or journalists)” (Binderkrantz et al., 2017, p. 307).

Drawing on the literature on the political influence strategies adopted by interest groups (e.g. Binderkrantz, 2005; Grant, 2000, 2004), I contend that party youth wings can adopt both insider and outsider strategies in their pursuit of access to the political arena. Insider strategies of party youth wings are defined here as the series of direct tactics used by party youth wings to influence political decision-making processes from within the mother party. Because party youth wings are affiliated to political parties, they can be argued to enjoy a certain privileged access to the political decision-making process. Examples of insider tactics are advising the party’s executive board, handing in motions at the party congress, giving speeches at party meetings and contacting the party’s members of parliament. Outsider strategies are defined as the series of indirect tactics used by party youth wings to influence political decision-making processes outside of the mother party by exerting pressure via public visibility. Examples of the latter are media appearances, petitions and demonstrations. Both types of strategies can be adopted interchangeably, although it has been argued that interest groups often have a certain preferred strategy (Binderkrantz, 2005). As a result, the sub-function is measured by two indicators: insider access and outsider access.

Insider access was operationalized by the prevalence of formal and informal internal access of party youth wings to various decision-making bodies within the mother party in annual reports and elite interviews. As a first step, by means of a qualitative content analysis, I reviewed the annual reports of party youth wings of 1985 and 2016 for content on contact with the mother party. These years were chosen as they precede an election year. This ensured both comparability and completeness, as internal articulation efforts may particularly take place in the period when the party manifesto is created. Texts were isolated when it was established that the contact with the mother party revolved around political issues.³⁹ On the basis of these isolated contents, I identified four categories of party channels: the parliamentary group, executive board, party congress and other party channels, such as committees and the party council. The isolated contents were then coded for correspondence to these four categories. The second step was to supplement the categorization matrix with findings from the interviews. Groups leaders are more often surveyed on the adoption of certain strategies of influence and the importance attributed to these strategies for realizing the group’s political ambitions (e.g. Binderkrantz, 2005). In some cases, this provided additional information. Thirdly, in order to assess whether the concerning access of the party

collect congress reports for both periods often failed. More importantly, whenever such documents were obtained, it turned out that in many cases only the individual submitters of the proposals were listed. It was thus often not traceable whether the party youth wing submitted a specific motion or amendment or not.

³⁹ Party youth wings sometimes reported to be in contact with the mother party on organizational issues such as finances or the organization of trainings. I excluded these instances.

youth wing was formally arranged or took place in an informal way, intra-party regulations were consulted to identify regulations on the access of the youth wing to the decision-making processes of the mother party. Provisions that mention the corresponding party youth wing were coded as either arranging representative access or not. The coding procedures and sources are adopted in Appendix 3.6.

Outsider access was operationalized by the number and type of media appearances of party youth wings in mainstream newspapers. While the use of social media by youth wings would have been an interesting alternative to study in this context, such new means of communication did not exist yet in the 1980s. Besides, media attention can still be perceived as the ultimate expression of outsider strategies for seeking influence. Party youth wings might release press statements and write opinion articles. Even when they do not directly target the media, but set up demonstrations and playful actions, their aim is often to receive media attention so that their cause becomes visible. But, “it is one thing to seek media attention; to make it to the news is another” (Binderkrantz, 2012, p. 117). Five of the most important Dutch daily newspapers were selected in order to measure the media appearances of Dutch party youth wings: *De Telegraaf*, *De Volkskrant*, *Het Parool*, *NRC Handelsblad*, and *Trouw*. These newspapers were selected for several reasons. Firstly, all five existed in the periods of 1985-1990 and 2014-2020, enabling for a comparison over time. Secondly, the selection ensured that the newspapers covered various political ideologies, as most of them were aligned to certain political parties during the pillarization, which might influence the amount of attention paid to specific political parties. For instance, *De Volkskrant* and *Het Parool* are generally considered more left-leaning, while *NRC Handelsblad* is considered more right-leaning. *Trouw* has a Christian identity, while *De Telegraaf* is generally perceived as a conservative popular newspaper that represents the tabloid press. Through the digital archive NexisUni, which contains a database with printed newspaper articles from the 75 most-read national and regional newspapers in the Netherlands, I collected all news reports within the period of 2014 till 2019 that contain at least one reference to a party youth wing. The digital archive Delpher was used for the collection of news reports from the mid-late 1980s. The news articles were coded on general characteristics, such as section and heading, and on type of appearance. The details of the search process and codebook can be found in Appendix 3.7.

Enhance descriptive representation

While the previous two sub-functions focus on the representation of ideas, the third sub-function focuses on the representation of presence. It prescribes that party youth wings enhance the descriptive representation of young people in electoral institutions. The first indicator adopted to evaluate the performance of party youth wings on this sub-function is the share of young people with youth wing engagement that are actually elected to national parliament. As described in the previous chapter, to get candidates that share the group identity in a decision-making position can be an effective strategy for groups to achieve representation. The measurement of the descriptive representation of a social category therefore generally focuses on an assessment of the number of members of that category

elected to public office. This was measured with the use of the biographical database of the Parliamentary Documentation Centre (PDC) of Leiden University, which has recorded biographies of the Dutch members of parliament (MPs) since 1796, making it possible to identify Dutch young MPs with youth wing involvement for over a longer period of time.

The first step was to identify all young MPs that were ever elected to the House of Representatives. In order to do so, I adopted the maximum age of thirty at the moment of swearing-in for the analysis. This maximum age has been chosen for two reasons. Firstly, a commonly used definition of being young is that an individual is between fifteen and thirty years old (e.g. United Nations Development Programme, 2014). Secondly, many Dutch party youth wings have adopted a maximum age limit of thirty for membership (Appendix 5.2). Adopting an upper age range of thirty thus enables the establishment of a direct link between involvement in a party youth wing and becoming an MP. The second step was to make sure that the PDC data were both correct and complete. By means of a systematic online search on each of the entries, with a specific focus on acknowledged news sources and party and youth wing websites, I verified and complemented the information on involvement in a party youth wing.⁴⁰ One former MP was approached via email to confirm his involvement in the youth wing during the period he was elected to public office. This resulted in a list of 62 cases over a period of 1967-2020 (see Appendix 6.2).⁴¹

The second indicator adopted to evaluate the performance of party youth wings on this sub-function looks at the strategies adopted by party youth wings to exert influence on the selection and election of candidates. Following the general process of political recruitment (e.g. Norris, 2006), party youth wings may intentionally try to influence the supply of available young aspirants, the demand for young aspirants and the outcome of elections. The supply of eligible young aspirants may be influenced by party youth wings as they provide training, social networks and other relevant experiences to their members. This is considered part of the socialization function of party youth wings (next section and Chapter 7). Party youth wings may also lobby for young candidates within the mother party in order to influence the demand of party elites and other party organs for young candidates. Lastly, youth wings may campaign for young candidates with the aim of influencing electoral outcomes. This indicator is supplementary to the first indicator and served to get a better understanding of the deliberate attempts of party youth wings to promote the descriptive representation of young people within their mother party. It was measured through a qualitative exploration of primary youth wing documents as well as the elite interviews.

⁴⁰ To give an example, the database of the PDC did not consider former MP Lea Bouwmeester as a member of the party youth wing of her party, but several sources, such as Wikipedia, Parlement.com and the high-quality newspaper NRC, indicate that she was a member of the JS. The PDC dataset was provided by e-mail in September 2016. For the years 2016-2020, I consulted the *Open Data Portaal* of the House of Representatives.

⁴¹ The required minimum age for MPs was lowered from 30 to 25 in 1963 and from 25 to 18 in 1983. The first MP elected at an age below thirty years old entered parliament in 1967.

3.6 Measurement of the socialization function

The third key function, the socialization function, holds that party youth wings act as socializing agents for the future political attitudes and engagement of young people. As described in Chapter 2, studies have indicated that involvement of young people in political associations, and in party youth wings in particular, enhances future political engagement. Studying such socializing outcomes asks for specific (longitudinal) research designs. For instance, if we want to understand the effect of party youth wing membership on future voting behaviour or political careers, we need to know not only whether voters or politicians have a background in the youth wing, but also whether that background has actually contributed to their current engagement or whether other factors were at play. It is not possible to measure the extent to which socializing effects occur in the present study due to data availability and research design. However, we can focus on the socializing process itself within youth wings by exploring some underlying mechanisms. The political socialization of members depends largely on the extent to which party youth wings actually provide political education and training, and facilitate social interaction. These two sub-functions will be explored in order to assess the performance of party youth wings on the socialization function. The two sub-functions and the accompanying indicators are summarized in Table 3.7. The results are presented and discussed in Chapter 7.

Table 3.7 Indicators and data sources for the socialization function

<i>Key function</i>	<i>Sub-function</i>	<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Data source</i>
Socialization	Provide political education and training	-Focus of education and training	-Various primary youth wing sources and elite interviews
		-Organizational structures of education and training	
		-Perception of members	-Party youth wing membership survey in 1989 and 2020
	Facilitate social interaction	-Political discussions	-Various primary youth wing sources and elite interviews
		-Network-building mechanisms	
		-Perception of members	-Party youth wing membership survey in 1989 and 2020

There are hardly any studies dealing with the (changing) structure and nature of the socializing activities within political associations. For instance, the party literature does not pay much attention to the concept of political socialization, although some describe the year-round activities that parties offer in between the elections through which members have the opportunity to participate in politics and through which their political identities are reinforced (Scarrow, 2007). To my knowledge, these opportunities have not been studied systematically, while it can be argued that party membership offers manifold opportunities for the political socialization of both younger and older citizens. Therefore, more so than in examining the previous two key functions, the research approach adopted for this third key function was largely inductive.⁴² It consisted of an extensive and qualitative exploration of organizational

⁴² The indicators presented in Table 3.7 took shape during the explorative process.

sources such as annual reports, policy plans and member magazines, supplemented with interview results and survey results.

Providing political education

The first sub-function comprises the activities of party youth wings to educate and train their members in politics. Different modes of youth wing involvement may lead to an increase in knowledge or skills. It has been argued in the literature that the mere membership of or active participation in organizations such as party youth wings may already have an educational effect (e.g. Flanagan, 2009). In other words, party youth wings may contribute to the development of political orientations and behaviours of young people in both an implicit and an explicit way. They themselves recognize that implicit and unplanned political learning takes place within their organization, for example because of participation in boards, committees, working groups and members' meetings.⁴³ However, not only is the implicit political learning practice difficult to assess in a qualitative study like this, the aim here is also to reveal in what way various party youth wings intentionally give substance to the sub-function at hand. Particularly in the case of state-subsidized youth wings of political parties, one may ask whether they are intentionally working on the political education and training of their members. The focus of the current analysis was therefore on the explicit political education and training efforts by party youth wings. This means that those activities that serve a purely political, social or organizational purpose were excluded.

I examined various primary youth wing documents to identify and compare the efforts undertaken by party youth wings in both time periods to provide political education and training for their members. This mainly concerned annual reports, policy plans, programmes of activity, member magazines, magazines for the active cadre and youth wing websites. These sources often included a separate section on education, schooling and/or training. From the multitude of sources, it emerged that two indicators are of relevance to assess the functioning of party youth wings on this sub-function: the focus of the education and training activities and the organization behind these activities. While the first focuses on the kind of activities undertaken by party youth wings, such as seminars, workshops and study conferences, the second comprises the division of tasks, the accountability for the education and training activities and the collaboration with the mother party. I collected the data from the documents and grouped it under one of these two sub-functions. Although the document analysis was used as the main method, the data was supplemented with the results of the aforementioned semi-structured elite interviews and membership surveys. Party youth wing chairs were asked to rate the statement that the party youth wing "offers opportunities for

⁴³ This is emphasized in both the interviews with the youth wing chairs and several documents. For example, the JD noted in 1988: "Education and training takes shape by being a complete JD organization on the one hand and by organizing specific training and training activities on the other. This first form of education and training is largely situated in the political decision-making process. A number of activities are not specifically organized with the aim of education and training, but are highly educational for the person concerned. The second form of education and training takes shape in a number of activities, specifically organized with the aim of educating those involved" (*JD, ORGI, herfst 1988, 4*, p. 12).

the political education of its members” and explain their answer. Based on the collected data, I was able to design a classification of party youth wings as educational agents, enabling a comparison of political education and training efforts across youth wings and over time.

In addition to the qualitative analysis described, the surveys provided information on the perception of members on the alleged educational effects of party youth wing membership. This is therefore included as the third indicator of the sub-function at hand. The survey asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement to several statements on knowledge and skills. The included statements about political knowledge were “Without [PYW] membership I would never have known so much about politics” (1989 and 2020 survey) and “[PYW] ensures that members know more about politics” (only in 2020). Statements about political skills included: “By being a member of [PYW] I have become much more articulate” (1989 and 2020 survey) and “[PYW] insufficiently ensures that members develop their political skills” (only in 2020). Respondents could choose their answer from a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = *totally not applicable* to 5 = *totally applicable*.

Facilitating social interaction

The second sub-function of the socialization function consists of the efforts of party youth wings to facilitate social interaction among members. As described in Chapter 2, social interaction within party youth wings is particularly relevant for political socialization as members may partake in political discussions and enter relevant networks. Again, it is not possible to study the lasting socializing effects of social interaction within party youth wings, but mechanisms for political discussion and network building within youth wings in both periods can be explored. These mechanisms are relatively hard to grasp. Political organizations normally do not report on such topics in formal documents, nor are such mechanisms formalized to an extent that they are easily recognizable. Moreover, it cannot be assumed that the experiences of youth wing chairs are the same as that of a normal member due to the centrality and character of their position. The available data does not allow me to say as much as I might like about precisely what opportunities for political discussions and network-building are present and seized within party youth wings. However, the combination of interviews, membership surveys and other organizational sources enable a first exploration of the functioning of party youth wings on this sub-function.

A first step in exploring the prevalence of political discussion within party youth wings was the analysis of the survey item “How do you make your voice heard within [PYW]?”. This item was included in the 1989 and 2020 surveys, making it possible to compare the results between these two years. Making one’s voice heard is central to political discussions. Although this measure is broader than political discussions alone, the answer options included various forms of political discussion.⁴⁴ Respondents of the 2020 member survey also indicated how often they participated in an informal political discussion and online discussion of their

⁴⁴ Respondents could choose multiple answers from the following option: By participating in discussions at the local level; By voting at the general assembly of members; By participating in conferences; Via informal conversations; Online / social media (added to the 2020 survey).

party youth wing. The results were used to supplement the results of the previous item. Lastly, the interview and text data were analysed for information on the structure and prevalence of political discussions within the youth wings.

Network-building mechanisms were also explored by using interview, survey and text data. Some chairs touched upon the subject in the interviews without being directly asked about it. The interviews with the former chairs of the party youth wings in 1985-1990 included an item on whether their youth wing ensured that members could build a valuable social network. As described, chairs may be biased because of their contact-rich position. I therefore supplemented the findings from the interviews with three survey items: the importance of 'chance to make new friends / acquaintances' in the decision to become a youth wing member (asked in 1989 and 2020), the responses to the statement "By being a member of PYW young people expand their social network" (asked in 2020), and the frequency with which social activities are attended (asked in 2020, see Section 3.4). This provides us with information on the motivations, participation and perceptions of members concerning networking opportunities. Lastly, party youth wing documents from both periods were scanned for the mention of social activities. This yielded information on the prevalence and character of social gatherings, which are considered crucial for network-building.

3.7 Concluding notes

This chapter presented the research design of the current study. Besides the rationale for the single-country design, indicators were identified for each of the eight sub-functions of the framework in Chapter 2. As described, to measure these indicators, data was collected from a multitude of sources, such as annual reports, intra-organizational regulations, political manifestos, organizational websites, newspapers, archives, youth wing membership surveys, interviews and youth wing contacts. Although the aim was to collect as much data as possible, some sub-functions could only be measured in the present time period due to limitations in data availability and quality for the late 1980s. The mix of quantitative and qualitative research methods enables for an in-depth analysis of party youth wing functioning in the Netherlands. The next chapter elaborates on the origins of the Dutch party youth wings by presenting a short history of party youth wings in the Netherlands.

4. Party Youth Wings in the Netherlands

Ever since political parties were first founded in the Netherlands, youth wings have developed alongside them. They have gradually become a self-evident part of the Dutch political system. Figure 4.1 presents the historical development of youth wings affiliated with political parties that have parliamentary representation. Overall, it shows that the landscape of party youth wings is constantly changing, although many of the party youth wings that exist today have their roots in the 1970s and 1980s or even in the period around the war. Although the figure includes the vast majority of party youth wings in the Netherlands, this overview is not complete. Other party youth wings seem to have existed for very short periods but were less documented or institutionalized. Often, the mother parties of these youth wings also existed for a short time or were only represented in parliament for a few years.⁴⁵ Based on Figure 4.1, this chapter will present a concise history of party youth wings in the Netherlands.⁴⁶

4.1 The first wave of national party youth wings


At the end of the 19th century, youth movements arose within and alongside various political parties.⁴⁷ Starting point of Figure 4.1 is the establishment of the first national and organizationally independent party youth wing on August 12 in 1888: the *Sociaal Democratische Jongeliedenbond* (SDJB, in English: the Social Democratic Youth League). It was closely affiliated to the *Sociaal-Democratische Bond* (SDB, in English: Social Democratic League), the first socialist party in the Netherlands (Harmsen, 1971). The SDJB formed an association of several local socialist youth leagues that originated a few years earlier as a result of efforts undertaken by local party members and young people. As Harmsen (1971) describes, the youth organization can best be characterized by its socialist study activities for members, total abstinence from alcohol, the fight against child labour, antimilitarist points of view and social activities such as singing, acting and excursions. The youth organization perceived the party leader of the SDB, Domela Nieuwenhuis, as its great role model. In turn, he was supportive of the SDJB. After 1893, the SDJB weakened due to turmoil in the socialist movement and the mother party. The SDB split into two political parties: the *Socialistenbond* (SB, in English: Socialist League) and the *Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij* (SDAP, in English: Social Democratic Workers' Party). The SDJB reorganized and adopted a different name in 1896, the *Socialistische Jongelieden Bond* (SJB, in English: Socialist Youth League). The

⁴⁵ This applies, for example, to the youth branches of the *Boerenpartij* (in English: The Farmers' Party) in the 1960s and 1970s, the *Democratisch-Socialisten 1970* (in English: Democratic Socialists 1970) in the 1970s and the *Centrum Democraten* (in English: Centre Democrats) in the 1980s and 1990s.

⁴⁶ The information is primarily based on secondary sources, although in some (more recent) cases I used primary sources from youth wing archives to supplement the historical overview.

⁴⁷ Harmsen (1971) explains the emergence of these youth movements as a concrete manifestation of a generation conflict, which existed because of the industrialization and the speed with which social changes took place. He defines youth movements as associations that lack adult leaders, that are organizationally independent, and that adhere to a certain youth idealism.

Figure 4.1 Global historical overview of the youth wings of political parties in the Dutch House of Representatives



Note. This is not a complete overview as party youth wings are not always well documented or institutionalized, or existed very shortly and were extremely small. Primary sources are Harmsen (1971), Klijnsma (2007), Welp (1999), Van der Hulst (2012), party youth wing websites and Parlement.com, but also see other references in text.

increasingly radical and anarchist character of the SJB repelled the more moderate SDAP, which led to sympathy among the youth wing members for the SB (Harmsen, 1971). When the SB merged into the SDAP in 1900, the SJB decided to continue independently. The youth organization dissolved in 1908.

Another try: De Zaaier

The negative experience of the SDAP with the SJB made the party doubtful about the benefits of party-related youth movements. However, after the International Socialist Congress adopted a resolution to encourage the education and organization of the young as a means to fight militarism, the SDAP started a new youth wing, *De Zaaier* (in English: the Sower), in 1901 (Harmsen, 1971). In contrast with the SDJB, which was characterized by bottom-up efforts of young people, the *Zaaier* was a typical party-initiated youth organization. Van Veldhuizen (2015) describes that the *Zaaier* made sure adolescents got a place in the mother party, as only people aged 18 and above could become a member of the main party. It first consisted of local branches only, but the youth wing started to organize national conventions and to issue member magazines from 1906 onwards. The relationship with the mother party was far from perfect. Although the official aim of the youth wing was to educate the young workers on the principles of socialism, to the dismay of the mother party, the *Zaaier* increasingly strived for political action (Harmsen, 1971).⁴⁸ The political and organizational independence of the *Zaaier* remained a point of discussion: is supervision by older party members necessary in the political education of young people or can – and will – they develop socialist views on their own (Harmsen, 2001)? Another conflict with the mother party arose when the *Zaaier* refused to adopt an age limit of twenty for its membership. The relationship between the two organizations became even more complex when the SDAP removed a group of dissatisfied party members in 1909. This group founded a new party, the orthodox Marxist Social-Democratic Party SDP (which later became the Communist Party). The *Zaaier* followed an increasingly independent and radical course, leading to the decision of the SDAP to cut its ties with the youth wing. As a result, the *Zaaier* lost a large part of its membership base. It was not until 1914 that the youth organization officially turned to the SDP, although the *Zaaier* remained a small and even sectarian organization (Harmsen, 1971). The *Zaaier* changed its name to *Communistische Jeugdbond* (CJB, in English: Communist Youth League) in 1920.

SDAP's subsequent attempts

The SDAP again tried to establish a youth wing in 1911,⁴⁹ although this time it had to be led exclusively by adults and could not be organizationally independent. This type of party youth wing soon proved unsuccessful and ceased to exist (Harmsen, 1971). A few years later, despite profound concerns on the possible radicalizing character of a youth wing, the SDAP and the

⁴⁸ The mother party was divided on the alleged functions of a party youth movement. Some wanted to connect the youth movement mainly to anti-militarist actions, while others were convinced that the youth movement should only focus on the socialist development of young people (Harmsen, 1971).

⁴⁹ *Jongeren Organisatie der SDAP* (JO der SDAP, in English: the Youth Organization of the SDAP).

affiliated socialist trade union NVV together founded another youth wing: the *Arbeiders Jeugdcentrale* (AJC, in English: Workers' Youth Centre). Harmsen (1971) emphasizes that the SDAP and NVV were cautious. They made sure that 1) adults were involved in the governance of the AJC and 2) the AJC was carefully kept out of any political issues and discussions. With the aim to nurture and educate the young on a socialist lifestyle, the AJC grew into an “island of socialist youth community” (Harmsen, 1971, p. 190). The AJC is well known for its youth camps and other social and cultural gatherings. In its heydays, the organization had around 10,000 members (Harmsen, 1971, p. 197). This third attempt of the SDAP thus became a success. The efforts of the SDAP to create its own youth organization points to the importance that was attributed to a strong network of affiliated organizations, what was later seen as the socialist pillar (Koole, 1992).

Other parties follow suit

Other parties did not follow the example of the socialist SDAP until the 1920s and 1930s. From then on, Dutch political parties increasingly started to pay attention to the integration of young people in their organizations. As Figure 4.1 shows, no less than six national youth wings of political parties were created during these two decades. The *Vrijzinnig-Democratische Jongerenorganisatie* (VDJO, in English: Freethinking Democratic Youth Organization) was established in 1923 as the youth wing of the progressive liberal political party *Vrijzinnig-Democratische Bond* (VDB, in English: Free-thinking Democratic League). The mother party had by then already existed for about 20 years. The VDJO wanted to be a free youth movement, without a formal connection to the mother party, although they received some material support and shared the same ideological basis (Klijnsma, 2007). The youth wing operated somewhat similarly to the AJC. It promoted itself as a political study club and deliberately kept itself out of daily politics, although it was not averse to making political statements. After ten years with a limited number of members, the VDJO started to flourish in the 1930s. It had 3,200 members and 72 local units in its heydays in 1940 (Klijnsma, 2007, p. 531).

A year after the foundation of the VDJO, the *Bond van Jonge Liberalen* (BJL, English: League of Young Liberals) arose as a result of the collaboration of local youth branches. This youth wing was affiliated with the conservative liberal party *Liberale Staatspartij* (LSP, in English: Liberal States Party).⁵⁰ Like the VDJO, the BJL considered it important to be able to operate independently of the mother party. This was apparent, for example, from the ambitions of the BJL to merge with the VDJO. The youth wing had similar plans for its mother party and later even propagated an entirely new political party. These actions put such pressure on the relationship with the mother party that the LSP wanted to cut ties with the youth wing, but the issue resolved with a new party youth wing chair (Klei, 2015). Its membership base increased in the first decade to 3,400 in 1932 (Klijnsma, 2007, p. 530).

⁵⁰ The LSP was named *De Vrijheidsbond* (in English: the Freedom League) until 1937. There are indications that the youth wing was named *Centrale van Jongeren in de Vrijheidsbond* (in English: Centre of Youth within the Freedom League) until then.

The youth wings of the confessional parties also emerged during these years when local youth groups started to unite at the national level. In 1927, ten local youth groups of the Protestant *Christelijk Historische Unie* (CHU, in English: Christian Historical Union) founded a national party youth wing: the *Christelijk Historische Jongerengroepen* (CHJG, in English: Christian Historical Youth Groups). In the ten years that followed, the youth organization grew in both the number of local youth groups and members. In 1939, this youth wing had 3,361 members and 128 local youth groups (Ten Hooven & De Jong, 2008, p. 193). The CHJG was closely connected to the mother party and had the character of a study association. Education was its primary goal, although there was also room for entertainment – more so than in other party sections. The party board did closely monitor whether entertainment would not gain the upper hand at the expense of political education (Ten Hooven & De Jong, 2008).

The youth study clubs that were affiliated to the Protestant *Anti-Revolutionaire Partij* (ARP, in English: Anti-Revolutionary Party), which was founded in 1879 as the first political party in the Netherlands, also merged into one federation in 1929: the alliance of the Protestant *Anti-Revolutionaire Jongeren Actie* (ARJA, in English: Anti-Revolutionary Youth Action). The aim of the ARJA was to engage young people in the regular study of political and societal issues from an anti-revolutionary perspective (Welp, 1999). In doing so, it propagated the views and ideology of the mother party. The latter kept its grip on the youth wing by appointing two members of the ARJA's national board. The ARJA had around 3,000 members in 1939 (Welp, 1999, p. 207).

In a similar way, the *Landelijk Verband van Staatkundig Gereformeerde Studieverenigingen* (LVSGS, in English: National Union of Reformed Study Associations) of the orthodox Protestant *Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij* (SGP, in English: Reformed Political Party) came into being in 1934 when various local study associations started collaborating on the national level. The LVSGS is the predecessor of the still existing youth wing *SGP-jongeren* (SGPJ, English: SGP-youth). Its main aim was to study the party principles. Young and old could join study activities and debates about the ideology of the SGP. However, in the first decades the LVSGS was not very active. Study activities took place in the local study associations, which were supervised by local party units and had no maximum age for membership (De Groot & Kok, 2009). The local study associations were only moderately interested in the LVSGS and some even refused to join the national association.

During the Second World War

The Dutch party youth wings dissolved during the Second World War due to the ban on democratic political parties. The *Nationale Jeugdstorm* forms an exception (NJS, in English: National Youth Storm). This youth wing was a Dutch equivalent of the German *Hitlerjugend* and existed from 1934 to 1945. The NJS was strongly affiliated to the *Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging* (NSB, National Socialist Movement). It included the largest fascist youth movement in the Netherlands during WWII. While the organization went through turbulent times before 1940, the number of members increased to 12,000 during the German occupation (Oomen, 2016). Some other party youth wings, such as the liberal ones, remained active underground.

The VDJO, for instance, was remarkably more active than the mother party during the war (Klijnsma, 2007). It kept on organizing illegal study groups and member conventions, and issued a magazine. Many of its members helped in hiding Jewish friends. Such activities made it easier to re-establish the organization after the war.

So far, this historical sketch shows that more and more national youth wings of political parties arose in the Netherlands in the period between 1888 and 1945. The first socialist and social democratic parties experimented with different forms and types of youth organizations. Ultimately, a youth organization aimed at political socialization proved to be the most successful. Most of the other youth wings that emerged during this period also seemed little concerned with day-to-day politics. The majority arose as a national association of local branches and promoted itself as a study club. In this early period, party youth wings were thus predominantly focused on political education in the broadest sense of the word. In Dutch, this is traditionally called *politieke vorming* (literally translates into 'political formation' or 'political shaping'). This concept has a high overlap with the German *politische Bildung* and concerns the education of citizens in such a way that they are able to participate in the political system.

4.2 Continuity and change after WWII

Many party youth wings arose again after the war according to the pre-war configurations, but the years that followed can be characterized by change. New party youth wings came onto the scene and established youth wings transformed. Overall, the 50s and 60s can be characterized by an increase in party youth wings' political engagement and the first explicitly activist youth wings.

Changes within established party youth wings

The aforementioned BJJ, LSP's youth wing, was particularly reform-minded after the war. It believed that the mother party was not modernizing fast enough. To the disappointment of its mother party, the BJJ was one of the driving forces behind the establishment of a new liberal party, the *Partij van de Vrijheid* (PvdV, in English: Freedom Party) (Koole, 1995). In 1948, the BJJ dissolved and the PvdV merged into the VVD.

In 1946, the *Partij van de Arbeid* (PvdA, in English: Labour Party) was founded as a merger of the SDAP, VDB and a small Christian Democratic party. The political youth work continued in the affiliated youth organization *Nieuwe Koers* (in English: New Course), which included the VDJO (Olthof, 1998; Welp, 1999). The AJC, the youth wing of the former SDAP, continued independently and dissolved in 1959 after a rapid decline in membership. As Welp (1999) describes, *Nieuwe Koers* started as an independently organized youth association, but soon became encapsulated by the PvdA. The membership base had risen rapidly to over 3,000 in the first few years but declined thereafter. Due to the continuing loss of members, but also because of objections of the mother party against the increasingly politically independent course of the youth wing (Olthof, 1998), it was decided to undertake a major reform in 1959. The closed and centrally managed *Nieuwe Koers* made way for the open and decentralized *Federatie van Jongeregroepen van de PvdA* (FJG, in English: Federation of Youth Groups of

the Labour Party). The FJG united the local youth centres (in Dutch: *jongerenkernen*) with the aim to give young people their own free place in the party (Koole, 1992). PvdA members younger than 30 years old automatically became members of such youth centres. The youth wing went through difficult times for quite a while, especially because the working method and close connection with the PvdA did not match the extra-parliamentary, activist spirit that existed among young people at that time (Olthof, 1998). The situation improved in the 1970s.

The ARJA was re-established as the *Anti-Revolutionaire Jongerenstudieclubs* (ARJOS, in English: Anti-Revolutionary Youth Study Clubs) after the war (Welp, 1999). The ARP officially adopted the youth wing in the party statutes in 1946. The executive board of the mother party appointed two delegates in the national board of the youth wing, the board of the ARJOS was part of the party congress, and the annual report of the youth wing had to be discussed at the party congress (Koole, 1992). The formal connection between the ARJOS and the ARP further strengthened during the 1950s and 1960s when the representation rights of the youth wing in the ARP increased as well (Welp, 1999). During these years, the ARJOS became more occupied with political activities and less with study activities. It had nearly 5,000 members in the 1950s.

While the relationship of the ARJOS with the corresponding mother party became closer, the CHJG started moving away from the mother party in the 1960s. The youth wing changed its name to *Christelijk-Historische Jongeren Organisatie* (CHJO, in English: Christian Historical Youth Organization) in 1965, started following the mother party more critically, removed the mother party from its organizational regulations and opened up the membership for young people of other political parties (Welp, 1999). From then onwards, the membership base of the CHJO decreased significantly (see Appendix 5.1a).

New party youth wings

In these post-war years, several new party youth wings came into existence. One was the communist youth wing *Algemeen Nederlands Jeugd Verbond* (ANJV, in English: General Dutch Youth League) in 1945, which was affiliated with the *Communistische Partij van Nederland* (CPN, in English: Communist Party). Not much has been written about this youth wing. From the website [parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com), it can be derived that the foundations for the youth wing were laid in the communist resistance during the war.⁵¹ The ANJV was action-minded and aimed at spreading the ideas of communism and socializing young people. It had approximately 3,000 members in the second half of the 1940s. It is unclear how the youth organization fared, but after the refusal to merge with other small left youth wings in the early 1990s, it seems to have vanished at the end of the 20th century.⁵²

In 1947, the first catholic party youth wing was founded. The *Katholieke Volkspartij* (KVP, in English: Catholic People's Party) founded the *Katholieke Volkspartij Jongerengroepen*

⁵¹ Parliamentary Documentation Centre. (n.d.). *Algemeen Nederlands Jeugd Verbond (ANJV)*. Via https://www.parlement.com/id/vjcmdpx4gulq/algemeen_nederlands_jeugd_verbond_anjv.

⁵² See, for instance: Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis (2021). Archief ANJV 1944-1998, p. 3, via <https://search.iisg.amsterdam/Record/ARCH00214/Export?style=PDF>.

(KVPJG, in English: Catholic People's Party Youth Groups). The emergence of the youth wing was not self-evident; the KVP feared that it would endanger party unity. But the desire for the political education of the youth and the concern for losing young people made sure the party overcame that fear (Haans, 1999). This all led to a close link between the mother party and youth wing. The party youth wing was kept under strict supervision, was financially dependent on the party and was represented in the highest decision-making bodies of the KVP (Welp, 1999). The youth wing focused on both political education and the representation of Catholic youth, although the latter became increasingly important. From the 1960s onwards, the youth organization began to adopt an increasingly independent stance. It abolished the indirect and automatically conferred youth wing membership of KVP members below 30 years old, indicating a weakening relationship with the mother party. The number of youth wing members halved; only approximately 2,500 of the 45,000 KVP members under thirty years old became a member of the KVPJG (Haans, 1999; Welp, 1999).

In 1948, two years after its founding, the aforementioned PvdV merged into the liberal *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie* (VVD, in English: Liberal Party). The establishment of the still-existing youth wing *Jongeren Organisatie Vrijheid en Democratie* (JOVD, in English: Youth Organization Freedom and Democracy) was initiated by the party's executive board in 1949 (Koole, 1992). Originally, the youth organization was meant to be a politically independent training institute for liberal youth (Welp, 1999). However, the youth wing focused increasingly on the political arena. The relationship with the mother party can largely be characterized by tensions. Already at the first assembly of the JOVD it was concluded that "the JOVD should not become the trailer of the VVD; but we do want to maintain contact with the VVD (...)" (Habben Jansen, 1994, p. 15).⁵³ The JOVD became an independent organization that can best be described as a necessary irritant of the mother party. It had around 2,000 members in the first decades of its existence (Welp, 1999, p. 212).

Up to this point, we can see a trend break with the period before the war. While most youth wings at the time were mainly concerned with study activities, the new youth wings after the war explicitly manifested themselves as political actors. An exception is the *Landelijk Verband van Gereformeerde Politieke Jeugdstudieclubs* (GPJC, in English: National Association of Reformed Political Youth Study Clubs). The orthodox Protestant *Gereformeerde Politiek Verbond* (GPV, in English: Reformed Political League), founded in 1948, had several local youth study groups between 1955 and 1964. It was not until the party ended up in the House of Representatives that a national association of these groups arose in 1964: the GPJC. Not much has been written about this youth wing either. From one of the archival documents,⁵⁴ it can be derived that the GPJC took the Christian political education as the basis for all its activities. The local associations operated relatively independently. Young members of the reformed church (liberated) were allowed to join such a local youth club. The GPJC had roughly 1,500

⁵³ Original statement in Dutch: "De J.O.V.D. moet niet de bijwagen van de V.V.D. worden; maar wij willen graag contact houden met de V.V.D. (mentor)".

⁵⁴ Landelijk Verband van GPJC's (1980). *De GPJC-organisatie. Handleiding voor het GPJC werk (5^e druk)*. Groningen.

members in 1975 and grew to more than 2,000 members in the 1980s (see Appendix 5.1a). The GPJC would eventually merge with RPJO into *PerspectieF, ChristenUnie-jongeren* (PpF, in English: Perspective, Christian Union-youth) in 2000.

4.3 Dutch party youth wings since 1975

Figure 4.1 shows that, after a period of relative stability, major changes again occurred in the landscape of Dutch party youth wings after 1975. Two developments seem to underlie these changes. Firstly, state subsidies for party youth wings were introduced in 1976. Secondly, as described in Chapter 3, the 60s and 70s were characterized by an increasing secularization, depillarization and individualization of society. These trends have continued since then. The new zeitgeist resulted in the establishment and parliamentary representation of new parties, which in turn contributed to the emergence of new Dutch party youth wings.

The introduction of state subsidies for party youth wings in 1976

State subsidies for party youth wings were introduced in the Netherlands in the late 1970s. After that, party youth wings became increasingly financially independent of their mother party. In his thesis on party finance regulations in the Netherlands and Germany, Dragstra (2008) describes how discussions on the public funding of political parties started in the sixties, when most parties suffered from declining membership figures and a serious drop in incomes. Direct subsidies were highly contested at that time. As Dragstra (2008) describes, a proposal for the public funding of youth wings, drafted by the national association for party youth wings NPJCR,⁵⁵ was first rejected in 1971 out of fear of setting a precedent for directly subsidizing parties. However, after the introduction of state subsidies for independent scientific bureaus in 1972 and party institutes for education in 1975, the political support for youth wing funding increased. In 1976, the State Secretary of the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work (in Dutch: *Ministerie van Cultuur, Recreatie en Maatschappelijk Werk*) introduced a temporary subsidy scheme for party youth wings by way of an experiment.⁵⁶ The number of seats of the mother party in the House of Representatives determined the level of the subsidy. It ensured that the financial strength and related independence of youth wings increased significantly. This might partly explain the finding of Welp (1999) that the relationship between Dutch party youth wings and their mother parties has become looser in nature between 1945 and 1995.⁵⁷

The subsidy was introduced at a time when the idea prevailed that the gap between

⁵⁵ The association *Nederlandse Politieke Jongeren Contact Raad* (NPJCR, in English: Dutch Political Youth Contact Council) argued that public funding was justified because party youth wings contribute to the political education and possibilities for actual political participation of young people. The NPJCR also emphasized that, given that their young members had not many resources to their disposal, it was not possible to increase membership fees (Dragstra, 2008).

⁵⁶ Kamerstukken II 1975/76, 13 600 XVI, nr. 2, p. 26. Via:

https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/sgd/19751976/0000196213/1/pdf/SGD_19751976_0003525.pdf.

⁵⁷ Welp's explanation for this finding is that the parties have lost their mass character and therefore do not perform the typical mass-party functions as well as they used to. The few parties that never really had formal ties with a youth wing can be characterized either as semi-mass parties or as liberal parties, with the latter implying that the party youth wing had to be able to function freely as an independent youth organization.

citizens and politics should be closed by, among other things, a firm commitment to political and citizenship education (in Dutch: *politieke vorming*). The aim was to fight ignorance and apathy and to create active democratic citizens (De Jong, 2014). This idea was reflected in the public funding of party-bound youth organizations, as is evident from the commentary of the Ministry on the temporary subsidy scheme that took effect in 1981 as the successor of the experimental subsidy scheme (Ministerie van CRM, 1981, p. 12):

The experimental subsidies for political youth organizations, which started in that year [1976], aimed to offer these organizations more opportunities to realize the political education of young people for a number of years. This policy was based on the idea that becoming involved in and gaining insight into politics in a broad sense through political training activities is not only desirable from our parliamentary democracy, but also from the fact that young people are offered the opportunity to form themselves into citizens who are able and willing to help shape society.⁵⁸

The temporary subsidy scheme, which would eventually apply from 1982 to 1990, aimed at the continuation of this policy by subsidizing activities related to the political education of young people. It is clear that the Ministry assumed that party youth wings contribute to the political education of young people and that they therefore need public funding. Not everyone endorsed this assumption. Dragstra (2008, pp. 86-87) describes that the *Raad voor de Jeugdvorming* (in English: Youth Education Council) concluded in 1979 in its evaluation of the first three years of subsidy that 1) the youth wings had failed to make a substantial contribution to the political education of young people within and outside of the political parties and 2) their activities were not fundamentally different from the educational activities of the political parties themselves, so that a separate subsidy scheme for youth wings would not be justified. This evaluation was apparently set aside at the time.

From 1982 onwards, party youth wings were eligible for the grant if they 1) had at least 1,000 members across at least five provinces, and 2) were acknowledged by a political group represented in the House of Representatives. Both the number of youth wing members and the number of seats of the mother party were included in the calculation of the subsidy amount. Moreover, archival records of the CDJA show that members over 25 years old were not included in the calculation of the amount of the subsidy, and that the amount of subsidy increased with every thousand extra members.⁵⁹ Party youth wings were obliged to formally register their members and had to have their programme of activities approved by the Minister on a yearly basis (Dragstra, 2008, pp. 87-88). The latter is somewhat remarkable, because substantive control of the government on education and training was generally out of the question at that time (De Jong, 2014). In addition to the standard grant, party youth

⁵⁸ In Dutch: “De in dat jaar [1976] aangevangen experimentele subsidiëring van politieke jongerenorganisaties beoogde gedurende een aantal jaren deze organisaties meer mogelijkheden te bieden politieke vorming van jongeren te realiseren. Aan dit beleid lag de gedachte ten grondslag dat het door middel van politieke vormingsactiviteiten betrokken raken bij en inzicht krijgen in de politiek in brede zin niet alleen gewenst is vanuit onze parlementaire democratie, maar ook vanuit het gegeven dat jongeren gelegenheid wordt geboden zich te vormen tot burgers die in staat en bereid zijn mede vorm te geven aan de samenleving”.

⁵⁹ CDJA, *Bijdrage politieke jongerenorganisaties t.b.v. evaluatie tijdelijke subsidiëregeling, 1985*, n.p.

wings could submit applications for project grants, such as international exchanges.⁶⁰

As the funding of Dutch party youth wings was emphatically dependent on the development of training and education activities, it is very likely that the attention of the then existing youth wings for this task increased. After all, their budget largely depended on it. Habben Jansen (1994, p. 77) describes in the JOVD's anniversary book that the attention of the JOVD for political education indeed increased after the introduction of the subsidy in 1976, leading to the development of "course material (...) on, for example, liberalism, political movements, meeting techniques and public speaking" and to an increasing emphasis in the information and propaganda material on "that the JOVD is an organization where you can learn something".⁶¹ However, as the remainder of this chapter will show, the subsidy will in most cases not lead to the same level of occupation with political study activities as before the war.

In the two decades that followed, the subsidy scheme for party youth wings was adjusted several times (Dragstra, 2008). It got a permanent character in 1990, when the number of required members was scaled back to 750 and the grant was distributed by a neutral partnership of political youth organizations. The responsibility for the scheme moved from the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport to the Ministry of the Interior in the second half of the 1990s. Shortly thereafter the objective of the subsidy changed from the funding of activities that promote the political education to the funding of activities that promote the political participation of young people (Dragstra, 2008, p. 92). In 1999, the first law on the public funding of parties came into effect.⁶² As of then, the indirect subsidies for formal independent and affiliated institutes of political parties, such as scientific institutes and party youth wings, were included as earmarked amounts and supplemented with a subsidy granted directly to parties represented in the Dutch Lower and Upper House.

A changing party youth wing landscape

From 1975 to the turn of the century, new party youth wings were born as a result of merging or newly established political parties. On the centre-right of the political spectrum, a decrease in support for confessional parties forced the KVP, CHU and ARP to merge into the *Christen-Democratisch Appèl* (CDA, in English: Christian Democratic Appeal) in 1980. Following the example of their mother parties, the three affiliated Christian democratic youth wings, KVPJG, CHJO and ARJOS, started exploring a merger in 1977. They initially founded a federation but could not agree on the basic principles and political programme (Koole, 1992). While the KVPJG was willing to loosen the Christian principles, the ARJOS wanted to retain the evangelical foundation (Welp, 1999). It was not until four years later that the party youth wings dissolved themselves and officially merged into the *Christen-Democratisch Jongeren*

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ In Dutch: "Met name sinds in 1976 subsidie verleend werd, nam de aandacht voor vormingsactiviteiten toe. Cursusmateriaal werd ontwikkeld over bijvoorbeeld liberalisme, politieke stromingen, vergadertechniek en spreken in het openbaar. In het voorlichtings- en propagandamateriaal is steeds vaker te lezen dat de JOVD een organisatie is waar je iets kunt leren".

⁶² *Wet subsidiëring politieke partijen* (Wsppl, in English: Law on State Subsidy to Political Parties).

Appèl (CDJA, in English: Christian Democratic Youth Appeal). From 1983 onwards, local units started developing. In contrast to the ARJOS, the CDJA became less focused on study activities and more active on a political level (Sap et al., 1991). The CDJA still exists today. The current aim of the CDJA is to provide political training and to critically think along with the Christian democracy in general and with the mother party specifically.⁶³

A new party that benefited from the social changes was *Democraten 66* (D66, in English: Democrats 66). In its early years, D66 did not have any affiliated organizations. As Koole (1992) describes, D66 was convinced that separate organizations would prevent the integration of young people and women into the main party, and its rule that all members are equal and have the same rights opposed the idea of categorical groups. Two other reasons for the delay in the appointment of a youth wing were 1) the open sympathy of the JOVD for D66 and 2) the young character of the party itself.⁶⁴ After much deliberation, D66 founded the *Jongeren Aktiverings Centrum* (JoAc, in English: Youth Activation Centre) in 1980, mostly driven by the introduction of the government subsidy for party youth wings (Welp, 1999). The JoAc fell directly under the supervision of the party's executive board. A group of young members kept on fighting for the establishment of an independent youth wing that would still be affiliated with D66 but would also have more room for manoeuvre than the JoAc. This would also make the youth initiative eligible for the government subsidy for party youth wings. Their efforts resulted in the establishment of the *Jonge Democraten* (JD, in English: Young Democrats) as a "freethinking-democratic youth organization" in 1984 (Lozar et al., 2004, p. 13). Like the JOVD, the JD strives to be an independent organization that acts as thorn in the side of the mother party. However, it does emphasize its affiliation with D66. It is exemplary that the current formal aim of the youth wing is to set up political education activities that are in line with the aims of D66.⁶⁵

Another party youth wing that was founded in the year 1984 is the *Reformatorische Politieke Jongeren Organisatie* (RPJO, in English: Reformatory Political Youth Organization) of the minor Protestant *Reformatorische Politieke Federatie* (RPF, in English: Reformatory Political Federation). The mother party kept a grip on the preparations in the years preceding the foundation, as it wanted to prevent the founding of an uncontrollable youth wing (Van Baardewijk, 1994). Unlike the other newly established party youth wings, the primary goal of the RPJO was the (Reformatory) political education of young people. In order to achieve that goal, it laid great emphasis on the work of the local branches. The first few years were difficult, as evidenced by a relatively small membership base and a high turnover of members.⁶⁶ At the end of the 1980s, the organization was further expanded and the automatic link between membership of the RPF and the youth wing was released. In its heydays in 1994, the RPJO had over 1,500 members (Van Baardewijk, 1994). It eventually merged with the GPJC in PpF.

Party youth wings also emerged on the left side of the political spectrum. The *PSP-*

⁶³ CDJA, *Statuten Christen-Democratisch Jongeren Appèl (onofficiële versie)*, 2019, p. 3 (art. 1.1.3).

⁶⁴ JD, *DEMO*, 2017, 34(1), 'Interview met oprichter Erwin Nypels', p. 20.

⁶⁵ JD, *Statuten & Huishoudelijk Reglement Jonge Democraten*, 2016, p. 4 (art. 2.1).

⁶⁶ RPJO, *Jaarverslag Vereniging RPJO over Anno Domini 1989*, p. 2.

Jongerengroepen (PSP-jg, in English: PSP-Youth Groups) came into existence in 1976. As the party had already existed for several decades, the foundation of the PSP-jg seems to be the direct result of the introduction of the state subsidy for youth wings. Initially, the PSP-jg was the youth wing of the *Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij* (PSP, in English: Pacifist Socialist Party). After a group of unsatisfied party members split off and formed a new party,⁶⁷ the youth wing started to relate to both parties.⁶⁸ It therefore changed its name to *Pacifistisch Socialistische Jongerengroepen* (PSJG, in English: Pacifist Socialist Youth Groups) in 1986.⁶⁹ The PSJG focused on radical extra-parliamentary action. It was closely connected to social movements, such as those of the squatters, emancipation and anti-militarism. The youth wing characterized its own organization as discontinuous, loosely structured and informal.⁷⁰ Membership figures are largely unknown, but the received subsidy indicates that the number of members must have been over 1,000. The size of the membership base was 1,150 in 1987 (see Appendix 5.1a).

In 1980, the *PPR-Jongeren* (PPRjo, in English: PPR-Youth) was founded as the youth wing of the small left-wing *Politieke Partij Radikalen* (PPR, in English: Political Party of Radicals). This progressive Christian party had been around since 1968. Again, the introduction of the youth wing thus seems to have been the result of the introduction of the state subsidy for youth wings in 1976, although the bottom-up attempt by a number of young party members probably also played a role.⁷¹ The foundation of the PPRjo was preceded by heated discussions. Some members of the mother party were of the opinion that the PPR itself should remain a young party, so that a separate youth wing was unnecessary. The youth wing aimed at politically educating young people and encouraging them to think about societal and political issues and take action. Another central aim was to represent youth interests within the PPR.⁷² The PPRjo had on average 800 members in the 1980s (see Appendix 5.1a).

Together with two other small left parties, the PSP and PPR eventually merged into political party *GroenLinks* (GL, in English: GreenLeft) in 1990, after which it was a given that the two youth wings would develop in the same direction. The PSJG and PPRjo did so by founding *DWARS* (in English: Contrary) in 1991. Major differences existed between these two youth wings.⁷³ The PSJG, youth wing of the PSP, functioned independently, had an anarchist character and was engaged in political action and demonstrations. The youth wing of the PPR on the other hand focused more on the mother party and on parliamentary politics. This contradiction has dominated the youth wing for a long time. In its first decade, when the PSJG dominated the membership base, the youth wing had an activist character and the relationship with GL started to disintegrate. The relationship was restored in the beginning of the 21st century when *DWARS* started to become more organized. *DWARS* increasingly started to concern itself with the mother party and became more like the original PPRjo. *DWARS* still

⁶⁷ *Partij voor Socialisme en Ontwapening* (PSO, in English: Party for Socialism and Disarmament).

⁶⁸ PSJG, *Extra editie Rampspoed, 'Nieuwsbrief PSJG', 12 mei 1986.*

⁶⁹ Throughout this thesis, I will use the abbreviation PSJG for this party youth wing.

⁷⁰ PSJG, *Jaarprogramma PSP-Jongeren, 1984*, p. 2.

⁷¹ PPRjo, *Jonge Radikalenkrant, 1988, no. 3*, p. 7.

⁷² PPRjo, *PPR Jongeren Statuut, 1982 (art. 5)*, n.p.

⁷³ *DWARS*. (n.d.). *Geschiedenis*. <https://dwars.org/geschiedenis/>.

exists today. Its current statutory objective is to engage in green and left-wing politics for and by young people.⁷⁴

Other noteworthy changes in this period were the name change of the FJG into *Jonge Socialisten* (JS, in English: Young Socialists) in 1977 and the organizational changes of the LVSGS. It was not until the second half of the 1980s that the LVSGS really started flourishing as an assertive youth organization. The youth wing started receiving state subsidy, female membership got accepted and the first 'SGP Youth Day' was organized, which led to an enormous growth in the popularity of the youth organization (De Groot & Kok, 2009). In 1999, the LVSGS presented its first political programme. As the name did not suit the organizations' activities anymore, it was changed to *SGP-jongeren* (SPGJ, in English: SGP-youth) in 2000.⁷⁵

A new century: the results of increasing fragmentation

In the decades that followed, new party youth wings continued to emerge in the Netherlands. The aforementioned social and political developments kept on contributing to a changing party landscape. An example is the emergence of the *ChristenUnie* (CU, in English: Christian Union) in 2000 because of the merger of the GPV and the RPF. The two corresponding youth wings went on together as PpF. While the GPV and the RPF at first decided to become a union with two separate organizations, the two party youth wings wanted to set an example for their mother parties and merged into one organization.⁷⁶ The aim of PpF encompasses several aspects, such as convincing young people of the value of the Christian political alternative, adopting a critical stance towards actual social issues and the mother party, and the political engagement, education and socialization of the members.⁷⁷

Another party youth wing that emerged at the start of the new century is *ROOD, Jong in de SP* (ROOD, in English: Red, Young in the SP). Although its mother party, the *Socialistische Partij* (SP, in English: Socialist Party), had known some action groups for young people, it was not until 1999 that the party congress decided upon the establishment of a youth wing.⁷⁸ From 1999 to 2003, a working group for young people existed, called *ROOD, Jongereninitiatief in de SP* (in English: Red, Youth initiative in the SP). A group of young SP members took action to set up a real political youth organization within the party organization. ROOD was eventually founded in 2003 as an inherent part of the mother party, although it is formally organized independently like the other youth wings. Young SP members are automatically a member of ROOD. ROOD has the intention to involve young people in the realization of a socialist society in the Netherlands, in which human dignity, equality for all people and solidarity between people actually take shape. It also aims to promote the mother party among young people and to create a place for young people who feel attracted to the principles of the SP and want

⁷⁴ DWARS, *Akte van statutenwijziging DWARS*, 2016, p. 3 (art. 3.1).

⁷⁵ Already in the mid-late 1980s, the youth wing used the name 'SGP youth organization' as subtitle or second name. In the remainder of this thesis, the abbreviation LVSGS/SGPJ is therefore used for the 1980s.

⁷⁶ ChristenUnie. (n.d.). *De geschiedenis van een beginselpartij*. <https://www.christenunie.nl/page/85>.

⁷⁷ PpF, *Statuten Perspectief, ChristenUnie-jongeren*, 2016, n.p. (art. 5).

⁷⁸ Parliamentary Documentation Centre. (n.d.). *Rood, Jong in de SP (ROOD)*. Via https://www.parlement.com/id/vi6pizsw8qyt/rood_jong_in_de_sp_rood.

to act accordingly.⁷⁹ Although the events fall outside the study period, it is worth noting that a conflict between the youth wing and the mother party resulted in the decision of the party to officially sever ties with ROOD as its youth wing in the summer of 2021 (Korteweg, 2021). The party suspected the youth wing of misgovernment, radicalization and of being a breeding ground for Communist ideas and reforms. The direct reason for the break was the occurrence of double memberships within the youth wing, which were prohibited by the mother party. The committee that investigated the matter concluded that the two organizations grew apart and advised the party to set up a youth wing as a separate entity *within* the SP instead of as an external association.⁸⁰

The five other new party youth wings that appeared in the period of 2000 to 2020 are the result of new political parties that predominantly represent partial interests. One is the *Jonge Fortuynisten* (JF, in English: Young Fortuynisten), a relatively unknown and small party youth wing that existed for a short period as the youth wing of the right-wing populist *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* (LPF, in English: List Pim Fortuyn). The other party youth wings founded during this period still exist today. *PINK!* (in English: Heifer!), for instance, was founded in 2006 as the youth wing of the radical green *Partij voor de Dieren* (PvdD, in English: Party for the Animals). This happened right after the mother party won two seats in the House of Representatives. *PINK!* has set the objective of getting young people involved in the realization of the goals of the mother party.⁸¹

The youth movement *OPPOSITIE* (OPP, in English: Opposition) was founded in October 2015 by the party of immigrants *DENK* (in English: Think). As described on the youth wing's website, *OPPOSITIE* aims to bridge the gap between young people and politics and to critically follow politicians.⁸² They describe their target group as Dutch young people between 15 and 31 years old who want to commit themselves to fight against the shift to right-wing politics and against the hardening and brutalization of society. The political ideals are unclear as these are not described on the youth wing's website and *OPPOSITIE* refused to cooperate in this research.

Another relatively new party youth wing is the youth wing of the new radical right-wing populist party *Forum Voor Democratie* (FVD, in English: Forum for Democracy). After an election results of two seats in 2017, the party founded the *Jongerenorganisatie Forum Voor Democratie* (JFVD, in English: Youth Organization Forum for Democracy). The youth wing was immediately successful. The party claims that the JFVD amassed 1,000 members within the first six hours of their existence.⁸³ The stated aim of the JFVD is to educate young people on the pursuit of a more democratic country and the attempt to break up the so-called party cartel. It also wants to increase the political participation of young people and organize

⁷⁹ ROOD, *Statuten ROOD*, 2003, p. 2 (art. 2.1).

⁸⁰ SP, Onderzoekscommissie ROOD / commissie "van goede diensten" (2021). Onderzoeksverslag commissie ROOD, p. 18-19.

⁸¹ *PINK!*, *Statuten PINK!*, 2016, p. 1-2 (art. 2.1).

⁸² *OPPOSITIE*. (n.d.). *Welkom bij OPPOSITIE!* <http://jboppositie.nl/>.

⁸³ FVD. (2017, March 30). *Jongerenorganisatie FVD (JFVD) heeft binnen zes uur na oprichting al ruim 1.000 leden*. <https://forumvoordemocratie.nl/actueel/jfvd-binnen-6-uur-1000-leden>.

educational activities in accordance with the views of the mother party.⁸⁴

The youngest party youth wing in the Netherlands is the youth wing of the new anti-racist political party *Bij1* (in English: Together). The party won a seat in the House of Representatives in the elections of 2021. Its party youth wing, *RADICAAL* (in English: Radical), was founded in the beginning of 2018, but is still in its infancy in terms of organizational development. The aim of the youth wing is to fight for radical equality, decolonization and economic justice.⁸⁵ The number of members is unknown.

Party youth wing funding regulation today

The legal framework of party youth wings also underwent small changes in the last two decades. Since 2013, the Dutch Political parties funding Act (Wfpp) has prescribed that each political party that is represented in the Dutch parliament can assign one party youth wing as its affiliated organization for which it can receive funding. In order to do so, the law explicitly requires that the political youth organization 1) is an association that exclusively or mainly performs activities to promote the political participation of young people; 2) has at least one hundred members, who are not younger than 14 and not older than 27 years old, and who pay a membership fee of at least five euros per year; 3) has a membership base that consists of at least two-thirds of members with these characteristics; and 4) officially agrees with the formal affiliation to the mother party in writing (Wfpp, art. 3.2).

The allocation of youth wing funding nowadays still depends on 1) the number of seats of the mother party in parliament and 2) the number of members of the youth wing (Wfpp, art.8.c). The Act prescribes that the youth wing directly receives the subsidy (Wfpp, art. 8.a). In other words, this subsidy cannot be transferred to the party itself or to other institutions affiliated with the party. The law does not make mention of dual memberships, i.e. people that are a member of both the political party and the party youth wing. This implies that in case of dual membership, the party receives a subsidy for both the party member and the youth wing member, even though this concerns the same person. It is thus a profitable type of membership for political parties.

We can conclude that memberships are still crucial for the financing of Dutch political parties and their youth wings, which has a motivating effect on the mobilization function of these organizations but also leads to a dependency on the formal membership model, as becomes clear from the interview with the CDJA's chair:

Becoming a member somewhere, that is out of date. (...) Party youth wings still have that structure. I would much rather work with sympathizers or something, people who say 'look, you know, we find it challenging, the Christian Democracy, but we also recognize beautiful aspects of liberalism'. (...) [but] I cannot work with sympathizers because then I will no longer receive a

⁸⁴ JFVD, *Statuten Jongeren Form Voor Democratie*, 2017, n.p. (art. 2).

⁸⁵ RADICAAL. (n.d.). *Welkom bij de meest radicale politieke jongerenorganisatie!* <https://www.radicaal.bij1.org/>.

subsidy. If you are going to promote or invoke that or offer that possibility, you will kill yourself because then you will not get any money.⁸⁶

This excerpt also demonstrates the importance of this subsidy for the financial health of the party youth wings. Indeed, state subsidies by far exceed other sources of income of youth wings.⁸⁷

The public funding of party youth wings in the Netherlands is not likely to disappear in the near future. Recently, the final report of the Evaluation and Advisory Committee on the Political parties funding Act was published (Commissie Veling, 2018). Some of its recommendations focus on the financing of party youth wings. The committee recognizes the importance of the tasks of these organizations and states that these are in line with the tasks of political parties. It emphasizes the broad support of political parties for the current funding of party youth wings and recommends maintaining the current system of earmarking part of the party subsidy for youth wings. The committee also recommends that the allocation criteria of the party youth wing subsidy are adjusted to those for the party subsidy, i.e. with a basic amount, an amount per parliamentary seat and a fixed amount per member. Moreover, the committee suggests removing the requirement that a party youth wing needs to have at least one hundred members in order to be eligible for subsidy. At the time of writing, it is not yet clear in what way these recommendations will be incorporated in a legislative change.

4.4 Concluding notes

This is the first time that a brief history of party youth wings in the Netherlands is presented. Over the last 130 years, the Dutch party youth wing landscape has constantly changed. Youth wings emerged, merged, reorganized, disappeared or simply kept on existing. While the first party youth wing was already established in 1888, youth wings mostly emerged in the 1920s and 1930s. Other ‘waves’ of new party youth wings occurred right after the war, around the 1980s and in the new century. The Dutch party system is known for its openness and inclusiveness; it allows for the relatively easy entry of new political parties (Krouwel & Lucardie, 2008). This might explain the continuous rise of party youth wings since 1888. In case of mergers between political parties, the affiliated youth wings usually follow the example. In rare cases, it is the other way around: the youth wing is the driving force behind party change, such as in the case of the BJL. Very occasionally, a party youth wing decides to continue as an independent youth organization after the mother party merges with another party, although history shows that this is often unsuccessful.

This chapter has shown that creating and upholding an organizational tie with a party

⁸⁶ In Dutch: “Lid worden ergens, dat is niet echt meer van deze tijd. (...) PJO’s hebben die structuur nog wel. Ik zou veel liever willen werken met sympathisanten ofzo, mensen die zeggen: kijk weetje, we vinden het uitdagend, de Christendemocratie, maar we zien ook mooie aspecten uit het liberalisme. (...) Ik kan niet met sympathisanten gaan werken want dan krijg ik geen subsidie meer. Als je dat gaat bevorderen, oproepen of die mogelijkheid biedt, dan geef je jezelf de doodsteek want dan krijg je geen geld”.

⁸⁷ An analysis of the financial accounts of party youth wings in the years 2012-2017 shows that the average share of membership dues was around 16% and that of state subsidies was around 60% of the total incomes of party youth wings. The remaining part often consisted of a subsidy from the party or income from other sources.

youth wing is a popular and traditional strategy of Dutch parties for connecting with young people. The majority of the parliamentary parties – both old and new – has been in the possession of a youth wing. They arise either through top-down efforts from the party leadership or through bottom-up efforts from party members. This confirms the theoretical distinction made in section 2.1 between the perspective of intra-party politics, which emphasizes party sub-organizations as bottom-up initiatives of like-minded party members, and the perspective of party linkage, which emphasizes party sub-organizations as a deliberate strategy of political party elites. Whenever parties do not have a youth wing, this often logically results from their party organizations. For instance, the radical right-wing populist *Partij Voor de Vrijheid* (PVV, in English: The Freedom Party) has no members, and *50PLUS* (in English: the Party for the Elderly) has no interest in a young constituency. Although youth wings are often seen as a typical exponent of the pillarized mass party (Welp, 1999), their appearance thus goes beyond this particular period and party type. Habben Jansen (1994, p. 14) stresses aptly in his historical overview of the JOVD: “Every self-respecting party had a youth organization and that is actually true up until today”.⁸⁸ The public subsidy has probably been an important driver of this since its introduction in 1976. As described, the emergence of various youth wings can be linked to this subsidy and the subsidy criteria and conditions led to the promotion of certain functions of party youth wings. When studying the functioning of party youth wings over time, it is thus important to keep this context of public funding in mind.

It can also be concluded from the historical overview that roughly three different types of Dutch party youth wings seem to have existed over time: education-oriented, activist-oriented and parliamentary-oriented youth wings. Before WWII, the first type seemed to dominate. Party youth wings such as the VDJO, CHJG, ARJA and LVSGS/SGPJ explicitly presented themselves as study associations. After the war, party youth wings developed more and more as political actors. Youth wings like the ANJV, PSJG, ROOD, and to a lesser extent the PPRjo and JS, manifested an activist character and displayed a preference for extra-parliamentary action. Other youth wings focused on the parliamentary arena and promoted themselves as critics of their mother party, such as the CDJA, JD, JOVD and JS. Only the religious youth wings, like the GPJC, RPJO and SGPJ, seem to have kept themselves out of the political arena and remained almost exclusively education-oriented until the end of the 20th century. Surely, this typification is not black and white; most party youth wings demonstrated different aspects of all three types. The question is to what extent we see this reflected in an empirical assessment of the functional performance of party youth wings in both the mid-late 1980s and 2010s.

⁸⁸ In Dutch: “Iedere zichzelf respecterende partij had een jongerenorganisatie en dat geldt eigenlijk tot op de dag van vandaag”.

5. Party Youth Wings as Mobilizing Vehicles⁸⁹

5.1 Introduction

It is generally considered a challenge to mobilize young people into political activity, especially when it concerns activities in the sphere of conventional politics. Party youth wings may function as an attractive entry point into politics because of their exclusive youth-specific character. They are therefore often portrayed as important mobilizing vehicles for young people. However, this claim has not yet been systematically investigated. This chapter focuses on the performance of party youth wings regarding the mobilization function. As described in Chapter 2, the mobilization function is concerned with the promotion of the participation of young people in politics. In order to fulfil this function, youth wings must attract a considerable and representative membership, facilitate internal participation and encourage their members to participate in politics in other forms beyond youth wing membership. These three sub-functions are examined in the current chapter. To what extent do Dutch party youth wings succeed in attracting and mobilizing members? Has their ability to do so changed compared to the late 1980s? As described in Chapter 2, I expect that party youth wings have become less successful in attracting and mobilizing members because of the increasing societal disconnection of political parties and the decreasing interest of young people in conventional politics.

Table 5.1 presents the performance indicators that are identified for each of the sub-functions of the mobilization function, for which the methodological choices for measurement are described in Chapter 3. The present chapter is divided into three parts, each covering one of the three sub-functions. The first part contains a description of the findings on the first sub-function, ‘attract a representative membership’, showing how membership figures and socio-demographics of members have developed over time. The second part focuses on the sub-function ‘facilitate internal participation’ by presenting the activity levels of members within youth wings in the two periods under scrutiny. The results regarding the sub-function ‘mobilize beyond membership’ are presented in the third part of this chapter, in which the broader political participation of members is explored. In the final section, I will summarize and draw conclusions about the functioning of party youth wings as mobilizing vehicles.

Table 5.1 The mobilization function

<i>Key function</i>	<i>Sub-function</i>	<i>Indicator</i>
	Attract a representative membership	Number of individual members Socio-demographics of members
Mobilization	Facilitate internal participation	Levels of intra-youth wing activism
	Mobilize beyond membership	Political participation of members

⁸⁹ Portions of this chapter were presented as a paper at the *Politologenetmaal* 2017 in Leiden and published in *Acta Politica*: de Roon, C. (2019). Party youth wing membership in the Netherlands: the role of organization-level characteristics. *Acta Politica*, 1-19.


5.2 The ability to attract a representative membership

This first part of the chapter presents an overview of the membership levels and members' socio-demographic attributes of Dutch party youth wings in both periods under scrutiny. This allows us to determine to what extent youth wings attract a considerable and representative membership and whether their ability to do so has changed since the late 1980s.

Membership figures in 1985-1990 and 2014-2020

Figure 5.1 presents the aggregated membership of party youth wings of Dutch parliamentary parties in absolute numbers in the two periods in this investigation. On average, there were just over 17,500 members in the mid-late 1980s and just over 25,800 members in the mid-late 2010s, implying an increase in youth wing membership of 47%. Against our expectations, party youth wings nowadays are more successful in attracting members than was the case three decades ago.

Figure 5.1 Total members of Dutch party youth wings in 1985-1990 and 2014-2020



Note. T = time period, m = mean. Except for the year 1987, the total figures in T1 include a limited number of estimates based on linear interpolation (see Table 5.2). Sources are listed in Appendix 5.1b.

This presentation of absolute numbers does not take into account (changes in) the number of potential party youth wing members within Dutch society. The membership data therefore needs to be corrected for the size of the target group: the youth population. The total number of young citizens who meet the age criteria of the youth wings (see Appendix 5.2) was obtained from the Statline database of Statistics Netherlands (CBS, 2020b). Using this information, I calculated the proportion of youth wing members to the total eligible

population for each period.⁹⁰ In the period of 1985-90, the average percentage of young people being members of one of the party youth wings⁹¹ included in this study was 0.48%. In the period of 2014-20, this share rose to 0.74%. This represents an increase of 56%. In relative terms, therefore, the rise in the membership of party youth wings is somewhat higher than in absolute terms. At the same time, the proportion of the youth population that is affiliated with a party youth wing can be labelled as extremely low. It is much lower than the member/electorate ratio of Dutch political parties, which lies around 2.5% (see for example Den Ridder et al., 2015). This seems to confirm that young people have an even lower inclination to join a political party organization than their older counterparts do, although it should be noted that the two groups overlap.⁹²

We know from the party literature that aggregated data can conceal variations in membership size between organizations (Kölln, 2014b; Van Haute et al., 2017). In order to look beyond the aggregated picture, Table 5.2 displays the absolute membership figures of the individual party youth wings and the mean membership levels for both time periods. It should be remembered that eleven party youth wings existed in the most recent period, while the mid-late 1980s counted nine. The overall mean of the second time period might therefore be pushed higher by the emergence of new party youth wings. However, even when we only consider the five youth wings that occurred in both periods, the increase in membership is 34%. The table shows that the notable increase in Figure 5.1 since 2017 can largely be attributed to the formation of a new party youth wing, JFVD. Like its mother party, Forum for Democracy (FVD), the JFVD has seen a rapid membership increase since the party was first elected into parliament in 2017. The youth wing of this right-wing populist party reported a membership of no less than 4,000 in 2018.

The table also illustrates that the party youth wings show considerable variation. That is, they vary not only in membership size, but also in the way the size of their membership base develops. In the late 1980s, the JOVD of the conservative liberal party (VVD), the JS of the social democratic party (PvdA) and the LVSGS/SGPJ of the conservative Christian party (SGP) could be counted among the largest party youth wings in the Netherlands, with an average of just below or above 3,000 members. DWARS of the green party (GL), JD of the progressive liberal party (D66), JFVD and SGPJ were the largest party youth wings in the late 2010s, with around 4,500 members in 2020. The JD and SGPJ experienced a large increase in their membership base between the two periods. The increase in the number of members of

⁹⁰ Available from <https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/cijfers/detail/7461bev>. Party youth wings differ in the age range they use for membership admittance. In order to calculate the members / eligible population ratio, I related the average number of total members of a youth wing to the average number of total youths in the population that fell within the age range of that specific youth wing membership. I then added these scores to a total average. Whenever a party youth wing did not adopt a minimum age for membership, the age of 12 is applied. An overview of the membership criteria per party youth wing can be found in Appendix 5.2.

⁹¹ The assumption here is that an individual is a member of only one party youth wing. In reality, a young person can become a member of more than one youth wing, although I expect this to be rare.

⁹² The two groups partially overlap since party youth wing members can also be members of the mother party at the same time. In our 2020 survey among youth wing members, 85% of the respondents indicated being members of both organizations. Moreover, young people can also decide to become members of a political party without becoming a member of the youth wing. One must therefore be careful with this conclusion.

Table 5.2 Disaggregated membership figures of party youth wings in 1985-1990 and 2014-2020

<i>PYW</i>	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Mean 1985-90	Mean 2014-20	% change
CDJA	1500	1606	1984	1960	2119	2500	1679	1648	1539	1588	1643	1871	1997	1945	1709	-12%
PPRjo	869	818	844	1200	(1108)	(1171)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1002	-	
PSJG	(1150)	(1150)	1150	(1150)	(1150)	(1150)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1150	-	
DWARS	-	-	-	-	-	-	761	760	854	1120	2946	3349	4480	-	2039	-5%
JD	1256	1600	1600	1400	1500	(1656)	5160	5678	5720	6000	6000	5270	4598	1502	5489	265%
JFVD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2500	4000	4139	4498	-	3784	-
JOVD	3846	3342	3150	(3547)	(3381)	3200	2756	2647	2589	2476	2696	2638	2513	3411	2616	-23%
JS	3000	3000	4420	4323	4101	(2679)	1555	2200	2020	1965	1533	1753	1681	3594	1815	-49%
LVS GS/SGPJ	1207	1324	1343	2734	3312	7318*	6479	6094	6233	7346	7216	6036	4279	2873	6240	117%
OPP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	135	129	101	103	-	117	-
PINK!	-	-	-	-	-	-	524	651	778	701	1261	1062	2134	-	1016	-
GPJC	1136	(1486)	1950	1899	2500	2217	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1865	-	
RPJO	105	150	235	275	285	440	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	248	-	
PpF	-	-	-	-	-	-	1399	1234	1235	1188	1494	1579	1423	-	1365	-35%
ROOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	1472	1544	1484	1355	1349	1219	886	-	1330	-
<i>Total</i>	<i>14069</i>	<i>14476</i>	<i>16676</i>	<i>18488</i>	<i>19495</i>	<i>22331</i>	<i>21718</i>	<i>22456</i>	<i>22452</i>	<i>26374</i>	<i>30267</i>	<i>29017</i>	<i>28592</i>	<i>17589**</i>	<i>25849**</i>	<i>47%</i>

Note. Self-reported and subsidized (in grey) figures from various sources (Appendix 5.1b). Linear interpolated values are reported between brackets, which are calculated by using the available membership figures of the years 1980-1995 (Appendix 5.1a). *The 3,100 subscribers to the newly introduced magazine KLIK for 12- to 16-year-olds in 1989 are included in the SGPJ's membership figures. **Mean of sum of totals of individual years.

the SGPJ already started in 1990, which explains the rise in that year in Figure 5.1. It seems that they have been able to hold this level of members. The remaining party youth wings exhibit a negative trajectory of growth. The JS has lost almost 50% of its membership base. The CDJA, the youth wing of the Christian democratic CDA, and the JOVD suffer a decrease of about 12% and 23% respectively when comparing the two periods. The membership base of the two youth wings that originate from a merger, DWARS and PpF (Christian social party CU), was on average lower in the late 2010s than in the late 1980s before the mergers. These results confirm that the success of party youth wings to attract members differs across time and organization. This implies that party youth wing membership is not only affected by general external factors, such as an alleged decline in the political engagement of young people, but possibly also by party-level or organizational level characteristics.


Overall, the results show that party youth wings have been more successful in attracting members in the mid-late 2010s than in the mid-late 1980s, even after controlling for the size of the youth population. This is a surprising finding because the literature speaks a lot about a decline of both political youth participation (e.g. Norris, 2002; Sloam, 2013) and political parties in civil society (Mair, 2005; Van Biezen et al., 2012). In the Netherlands, the total number of individual party members has been declining since the 1960s and more or less stabilized over the last two decades (Den Ridder et al., 2015). Two other findings further clarify the positive trend in youth wing membership: 1) despite the increase only a very small proportion of the youth population chooses to join a youth wing and 2) the overall increase in membership can be attributed to only a few youth wings, such as the SGPJ, the JD and the JFVD. It is mainly the youth wings of the oldest mainstream parties – PvdA, CDA, and VVD – that suffer from a decline in their membership base between the two periods. In that sense, the findings are more in line with the extant literature on party membership (Voerman, 2016; Voerman & Van Schuur, 2011, pp. 205-206). However, the results also show that there is considerable variation in the youth wing membership trends. The differences between and within the two periods under scrutiny invite further exploration of the stability of the general membership trend. As membership is one of the few indicators for which a longer time frame is available, the focus is therefore broadened by including intermediate years in the analysis.

Including intermediate years

By adding more data points, more can be concluded about the stability of the ascendant membership trend found in the previous paragraph. What does the development of party youth wing membership look like when intermediate years are included? Changes in the state subvention system for political parties allow us to present membership figures since 2001.⁹³ Since then, party youth wings are obliged to report their exact eligible membership figures to

⁹³ I use the subsidized (ministerial) data because years with available self-reported membership data for all party youth wings are relatively scarce. Appendix 5.1a contains an overview of the available membership figures between 1960 and 2020.

Figure 5.2 Total membership trajectory of Dutch party youth wings 2001-2020



Note. PYWM = party youth wing membership. Total numbers of self-reported membership are only available for the years 2015-2020.⁹⁴ Sources are listed in Appendix 5.1b. *Election year.


the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. Figure 5.2 presents the longitudinal trend of the absolute subsidized membership figures of party youth wings between 2001 and 2020. It also includes self-reported membership figures for the years 2015 to 2020. Although there is a gap between the subsidized and self-reported levels,⁹⁵ what matters here is that the subsidized and the self-reported numbers do seem to follow the same trend.⁹⁶ Once again, a picture emerges of increasing membership: the total level of subsidized youth wing membership has more than doubled in the last eighteen years, showing a total increase of almost 130%. In order to relate this trend to the period of 1985-90, we must examine the starting point of this graph in more detail. In 2001, the total number of subsidized members of the youth organizations was 9,228. We may assume that self-reported numbers on average

⁹⁴ In other years there were too many missing values (see Appendix 5.1a). For DWARS, self-reported figures are missing for the years 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018. Overall, the subsidized number of members of DWARS is 34% lower than the self-reported numbers. Therefore, the subsidized (ministry-reported) membership figures of DWARS of these four years are multiplied by 1.34 in order to estimate the self-reported numbers.

⁹⁵ As described in Chapter 3, this can be explained by a difference between the definitions of membership in the funding Act and the definitions as adopted by parties and their youth wings. For instance, most party youth wings accept members that are younger or older than the required age as defined in the funding Act (see Appendix 5.2). The organizations might also include members who are registered but failed to pay the annual fee.

⁹⁶ The sudden decline in the subsidized membership in 2019 can be explained by a significant drop in the numbers of JFVD used by the responsible Ministry for determining the height of the yearly grant, due to identified shortcomings in the party’s annual audit. The youth wing itself claimed to have a subsidized membership of 3,502 in the annual report, but I used the official ministerial figures in Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.3 Disaggregated membership trajectories of Dutch party youth wings 2001-2020



Note. Subsidized (ministerial) figures. Sources are listed in Appendix 5.1b. JFVD and OPPOSITIE are omitted because they were not founded until 2017. *Election year.

lie around 45% higher than the number of subsidized members.⁹⁷ Based on this, I can estimate the total level of self-reported youth wing membership in 2001: around 13,380. This figure is lower than the total level of party youth wing memberships in the period of 1985-1990 (see Table 5.2), which averaged at 17,500. This suggests that the earlier impression of membership increase should be qualified; the total membership base of the youth wings has not linearly increased since the 1980s. Rather, membership numbers seem to have decreased in the 1990s, before recovering in the 2000s and 2010s. The available self-reported membership numbers over 1960-2020 in Appendix 5.1a tend to confirm this pattern. The right conclusion therefore is that the total membership of party youth wings fluctuates over time.

Figure 5.3 presents membership trajectories for each Dutch party youth wing over the period of 2001-2020. For the purpose of presentation, I distinguish three groups of organizations, depending on whether they witnessed increasing, decreasing or stable trends in membership numbers. Several party youth wings qualify the common trend as identified in Figure 5.2, while others counter the common trend. The increasing trend is predominantly a reflection of rises in membership numbers of the JD, DWARS and the JOVD. The membership levels of the JS show a more moderate increase, and PINK!, the youth wing of the Party for the Animals, did not experience an increase until 2014. The SGPJ, PpF and ROOD (Socialist Party) suffered from decreases in their membership base. The CDJA has had a relatively stable membership base. It once again becomes clear that there is great variation in the way in which the membership base of the various youth wings is developing over time. In conclusion, the success of party youth wings to attract members has changed compared to the 1980s, although not linearly and not equally for all party youth wings. Membership growth is very much not a universal phenomenon for party youth wings in the Netherlands.

Socio-demographics of members

We have seen that only a very small part of the Dutch youth population becomes a member of a party youth wing. The question is whether this small group mirrors the youth population or whether it concerns a select group of participants. This is not only relevant in terms of participation inequality, but also in light of the declining number of party members in the Netherlands. Assuming that a considerable part of the youth wing members will move on to the party, it is, in the words of Mair and Van Biezen (2001, p. 14), “crucial that we learn more about precisely who is remaining within the parties, since it is this now much reduced constituency that will do much to define party identities in the future”. In what follows, a descriptive analysis of Dutch party youth wing members’ socio-demographic attributes in both periods under scrutiny is presented, allowing for an assessment of the success of party youth wings in attracting a representative membership.

In Table 5.3, the data on the gender, age and geography of youth wing members in both time periods is contrasted with data on the youth population at large. The average Dutch party youth wing member is a male in the stage of young adulthood who is somewhat more

⁹⁷ This percentage is calculated by dividing the total self-reported membership figures by the total subsidized membership figures for the years 2015- 2020 (see Figure 5.2).

likely to live in the urban agglomerations in the west of the country (in Dutch: *Randstad*). However, we can observe differences over time. Starting with gender, men constituted 72% of the membership base of party youth wings in 1989, while in 2020 this proportion had declined to 58%. This represents a decline of 14 percentage points; just over four in ten youth wing members were female in 2020. The deviation between the respective gender proportions of party youth wing members and the youth population has thus become smaller over time.

Table 5.3 Gender, age and region of party youth wing members and the youth population in 1989 and 2020 (in %)

	Party youth wing members		Youth population ^c	
	1989 ^a	2020 ^b	1989	2020
<i>Gender</i>				
Male	71.8	58.2	51.1	50.9
Female	27.3	39.5	49.0	49.1
Unknown/other	0.9	2.3	-	-
<i>Age</i>				
Mean	22.2	24.0	21.3	21.2
<=21	45.5	28.2	50.8	52.0
>21	54.6	71.8	49.2	48.0
<i>Region</i>				
Conurbation (<i>Randstad</i>)*	48.0	54.9	44.3	46.5
<i>Total N/population</i>	<i>531</i>	<i>20592</i>	<i>3.65M</i>	<i>3.24M</i>

Sources. ^a Youth wing membership survey of Bakhuis et al. (1989). Included youth wings: CDJA, JD, JOVD, JS, PPRjo, PSJG. ^b Membership administration via personal contact in 2020 with the boards of the participating youth wings: CDJA, DWARS, JD, JS, PINK!, PpF, SGPJ.⁹⁸ DWARS does not register gender. ^c Statistics Netherlands (CBS, 2020b). Included age range is 14-28. CBS only offers binary gender options. *Concerns aggregated data for the provinces Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland and Utrecht.

The figures on age show that members nowadays are on average two years older than in 1989. While the mean age of members in 1989 was fairly similar to the population mean, the distribution has become more disproportional over time. In 2020, members were on average 24 years old, while the mean age of the youth population was 21. The proportion of members over the age of 21 amounted to around 70% in that year. This difference may be partly explained by the fact that most party youth wings nowadays accept members up to the age of 30.⁹⁹ However, the results do show that youth wings can better be characterized as organizations for young adults than for youth.

Considering the geographic location of members, the results in Table 5.3 show that the proportion of members living in the central-western conurbation (in Dutch: *Randstad*) was

⁹⁸ There is no reason to believe that the youth wings have provided incorrect information as the data on the background characteristics of the total membership database does not differ much from that of the survey sample. I therefore decided to display the population data as much as possible.

⁹⁹ The CBS population data covers the age range 14 to 28. Some party youth wings accept members that are younger or older. Appendix 5.2 includes an overview of the youth wings' membership criteria.

higher in 2020 (55%) than in 1989 (48%). The proportion of young people in the Randstad has also increased in the general youth population over time, but less rapidly. In 1989, the share of respondents living in the Randstad was 4 percentage points higher than that of the general youth population; in 2020, this concerned 8 percentage points, thus pointing to an increase in the overrepresentation of Randstad residents in party youth wings.

The membership surveys from 1989 and 2020 enable for a closer look on geography in terms of degree of urbanization and provide information on the main weekly activity of Dutch party youth wing members (Table 5.4). A comparison with the general youth population is often not possible due to missing data or nonmatching categories and demarcations, but reference is made whenever possible. In both years under scrutiny, the majority of survey respondents lived in a city with more than 100,000 inhabitants. However, this proportion has increased from 45% in 1989 to 60% in 2020, representing an increase of 15 percentage points. A comparison with the youth population in 2020 points to an overrepresentation of this group in party youth wings, as young people living in large cities constituted 43% of the Dutch population in that year.¹⁰⁰ Exact numbers on the youth population in 1989 are not available. It is thus unclear whether this overrepresentation has increased or decreased since the late

Table 5.4 Degree of urbanization and main weekly activity of party youth wing members in 1989 and 2020 (in %)

	<i>Party youth wing members</i>	
	1989	2020*
<i>Degree of urbanization**</i>		
Rural / not urbanized	5	5
Urbanized rural / hardly urbanized	18	14
Urban / moderately to strongly urbanized	24	21
Cities > 100,000 inhabitants	45	60
<i>Total N</i>	531	829
<i>Main weekly activity***</i>		
Education	70	57
Employed	24	36
Unemployed	4	3
Conscripted	2	-
<i>Total N</i>	531	893

Note. Based on membership surveys 1989 (Bakhuis et al., 1989) and 2020. *Weighted by party youth wing size. Unweighted *N* = 795 and 858 respectively. **Figures for 1989 do not add up to 100% due to nonresponse. The report from 1989 uses a now outdated classification of municipalities (before slash). For 2020, a similar scale is designed based on respondents' postal code and data of Statistics Netherlands (after slash, CBS, 2020c).¹⁰¹ ***Figures for 2020 do not add up to 100% due to the exclusion of 'other' and 'don't know/ no answer'.

¹⁰⁰ I calculated this share by combining two datasets (CBS, 2020b; CBS, 2020c). Included age range is 14 to 28. Although this gap may also be due to a bias in the survey response, the nonresponse analysis gives no indication for this (see Appendix 3.3).

¹⁰¹ For the survey respondents in 2020, I identified the municipality, the accompanying city size and urbanization classification by matching the first four numbers of their postal code with the Statline database *Gebieden in*

1980s, although there is indication that the proportion of young adults in larger cities has increased since then (Groenemeijer, 2014, pp. 30-31).

Table 5.4 also presents the distribution of the respondents over the variable 'main weekly activity' in 1989 and 2020. In both years, the majority of respondents indicated that their main activity of the week is education, although this share has declined from 70% in 1989 to 57% in 2020. The proportion of respondents with a job increased with 12 percentage points to 36% in 2020. Compared to the total population, the employed were underrepresented among youth wings in 1989, but this was no longer the case in 2020.¹⁰² A small proportion answered to be unemployed in both years. The unemployed were underrepresented when compared to the youth population, although this deviation has become smaller over time due to lower unemployment rates in the beginning of 2020 compared to 1989.¹⁰³

Although the exact data on the education level of the respondents is not available for 1989, it can be concluded from the 1989 report and 2020 survey that young people in higher educational levels are significantly overrepresented in party youth wings. In 2020, 95%¹⁰⁴ of the respondents who indicated being in education, participated in pre-university education (in Dutch: *VWO/Gymnasium*), higher professional education (in Dutch: *HBO*) or university studies (in Dutch: *WO*). Similarly, it can be derived from the survey report that the respondents in 1989 also hardly participated in education levels lower than that (Bakhuis et al., 1989, p. 16). Naturally, this is very different from the population statistics. For instance, although the number of people in higher education has increased over time, a considerable proportion was still participating in secondary vocational education (in Dutch: *MBO*) in 2020 (CBS, 2020d).¹⁰⁵

So far, this paragraph has shown that party youth wing members are not always an accurate mirror of the young population. If we compare young society with the much smaller group of citizens who are youth wing members, we see that the latter group is more likely to be reported as being male than female, aged above 21, living in urban areas and participating in higher education. These findings are not surprising; they are consistent with the literature

Nederland 2020 (CBS, 2020c). This way I designed an urbanization scale that is similar to the one used in the survey report from 1989:

-1989 category 'rural' is compared to postal codes classified as 'not urbanized';

-1989 category 'urbanized rural' is compared to postal codes classified as 'hardly urbanized';

-1989 category 'urban character' is compared to the total number of respondents minus respondents falling in the aforementioned two categories and minus respondents living in cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants;

-1989 category 'cities > 100,000 inhabitants' is compared to postal codes that are classified as '100,000 to 150,000 inhabitants', '150,000 to 250,000 inhabitants', or '> 250,000 inhabitants'.

¹⁰² The employment rate for young people aged 15 to 25 was 41.7% in 1989 (CBS, 2018) and 36.4% in the first quarter of 2020 (CBS, 2020a). Both figures concern the net employment rate of those working ≥ 12 hours per week.

¹⁰³ The unemployment rate for young people aged 15 to 25 was 11.3% in 1989 (CBS, 2018). This was 6.8% in the first quarter of 2020 (CBS, 2020a).

¹⁰⁴ The unweighted percentage is 92.

¹⁰⁵ In the school year 2019-2020, just below a quarter of those in tertiary education participated in university education (WO), slightly over 36% took part in higher professional education (HBO), and almost 40% was in secondary vocational education (MBO). In 1989-1990, more than half of the total number of Dutch students took part in secondary vocational education (MBO), around a quarter participated in higher professional education (HBO) and just over 20% in university education (WO) (CBS, 2020d).

that certain groups are more likely to be politically active than others, such as men and the highly-educated (e.g. Parry et al., 1992b; Verba et al., 1995). More specifically, the socio-cultural profile of the average youth wing member seems to correspond to the average profile of party members in the Netherlands (Den Ridder et al., 2019). Insofar as the data allows a comparison between 1989 and 2020, the degree of representativeness has increased for some demographic characteristics, such as gender and (un)employment, and decreased for others, such as age and probably geographic location. A lacking representativeness might influence the representation and legitimacy of party youth wings, as their members may act as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the organization (e.g. Den Ridder, 2014), and their background characteristics to a large part determine their grievances and who they encounter and communicate with in daily life. Moreover, this might also have consequences for the future composition of the membership base of the mother party. There is little chance that the youth wing will contribute to a diversification of party membership in the near future.

The interviews with the youth wing chairs confirm a certain lack of representativeness in membership. Moreover, they show that memberships seem to have become more homogenous in terms of geography, level of education and weekly activity since the mid-late 1980s. The former chairs of the youth wings from that period more often emphasized a certain degree of diversity among their members. For instance, the former chair of the JOVD mentioned high school students, university students and full-time employed members: “So it [the youth wing] was diverse. (...) It was certainly not a student association”. The former chair of the PSJG also emphasized the variety of occupations among the members, of which some were students but most were not. Only the former chair of the JD explicitly stated that students made up the largest part of the membership base: “It [the youth wing] was actually rolled out from the university cities”. A majority of youth wing chairs of the late 2010s emphasized the overrepresentation of higher educated young adults in university cities. The chair of PINK! elaborated: “The vast majority of members are between 20 and 30 [years old], they are mainly students. (...) We did attempt to focus more on high school students. (...) But we notice that it is difficult”.¹⁰⁶ The chairs of DWARS and the JD also claimed that their youth wing is most successful in university cities. The chair of the JOVD shortly summarized: “They [the party youth wings] have all actually become student organizations”.¹⁰⁷ It must be noted, however, that the chairs of the religious party youth wings indicated a strong presence of their organization in villages and the countryside. This is similar to the 1980s.

The survey results allow us to move beyond the common trends and observe some noteworthy differences between the party youth wings. Due to missing disaggregated data, this is only possible to a limited extent for 1989. It can be derived from the report of Bakhuis et al. (1989, pp. 13, 17, 43) that one in four members of the JD and the CDJA was female, while

¹⁰⁶ In Dutch: “Het overgrote deel van de leden is tussen de 20 en 30, het zijn voornamelijk studenten. (...) we hebben pogingen gedaan om ons meer te richten op middelbare scholieren. (...) We merken dat dat lastig is”.

¹⁰⁷ In Dutch: “Allemaal zijn het eigenlijk studentenorganisaties geworden”.

Table 5.5 Profile of members broken down by party youth wing based on population and survey data (2020, in %)

	<i>Total</i>	<i>CDJA</i>	<i>DWARS</i>	<i>JD</i>	<i>JS</i>	<i>PINK!</i>	<i>PpF</i>	<i>SGPJ</i>
<i>Gender</i>								
Male	58.2	70.4	n/a	64.8	67.4	27.8	59.1	50.4
Female	39.5	29.3	n/a	28.8	32.0	69.8	40.7	49.1
Unknown/other	2.3	0.3	n/a	6.4	0.5	2.4	0.2	0.5
<i>Age</i>								
Mean	24.0	24.7	24.0	25.1	24.2	26.4	24.9	18.6
<=21	28.2	20.0	25.1	15.1	20.0	4.5	15.3	68.4
>21	71.8	80.0	74.9	84.9	80.0	95.6	84.7	31.6
<i>Region***</i>								
North	6.7	11.4	9.4	6.9	12.4	11.9	9.6	1.2
South	10.0	20.6	11.2*	11.2	13.7	13.9	4.4	3.1
East	23.2	20.6	15.4	14.2	18.1	15.5	28.8	44.8
West	58.0	47.4	64.0*	67.7	55.9	58.8**	57.2	58.8
<i>Total population</i>	<i>20592</i>	<i>1997</i>	<i>4480</i>	<i>4598</i>	<i>1681</i>	<i>2134</i>	<i>1423</i>	<i>4291</i>
<i>Degree of urbanization****</i>								
Not urbanized	5.1	7.3	1.7	0.5	3.5	(0)	(0)	19.1
Hardly urbanized	13.9	21.8	1.7	6.8	15.3	(8.7)	(23.1)	33.7
Moderately urbanized	8.2	13.3	8.6	6.3	7.1	(0)	(7.7)	13.0
Strongly urbanized	30.2	21.2	32.8	22.9	27.1	(52.2)	(26.9)	28.0
Very strongly urbanized	42.6	36.3	55.2	63.5	47.1	(39.1)	(42.4)	6.1
<i>City size</i>								
Cities >100,000 inhabitants	58.8	44.2	81.0	78.6	62.4	(65.2)	(50.0)	12.2
<i>Main activity</i>								
Education	57.3	52.0	65.1	59.9	69.8	(45.8)	(46.4)	52.1
Employed (>12 hrs p/week)	36.3	46.4	25.4	37.2	21.9	(45.8)	(46.4)	41.4
Unemployed	3.0	0.6	6.3	1.4	2.1	(4.2)	(0)	2.3
Other / don't know	3.4	1.1	3.2	1.4	6.3	(4.2)	(7.1)	4.2
<i>Currently in education</i>								
Other level	13.8	15.1	7.3	8.9	16.5	(9.1)	(0)	35.4
<i>Of which pre-univ. educ.</i>	<i>8.7</i>	<i>4.3</i>	<i>7.3</i>	<i>6.5</i>	<i>6.5</i>	<i>(9.1)</i>	<i>(0)</i>	<i>18.4</i>
Higher prof. educ. (HBO)	18.7	21.5	12.2	9.7	20.9	(36.4)	(23.1)	27.9
University (WO)	67.5	63.4	80.5	81.5	62.7	(54.5)	(76.9)	36.8
<i>Country of birth</i>								
Born in NL	97.7	97.8	98.4	98.6	92.7	(95.8)	(96.4)	99.2
Father born in NL	92.8	93.3	93.7	93.7	86.5	(79.2)	(100.0)	99.2
Mother born in NL	89.8	94.4	82.5	91.3	85.4	(83.3)	(96.4)	99.2
<i>Total N</i>	<i>-</i>	<i>252</i>	<i>77</i>	<i>288</i>	<i>133</i>	<i>29</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>397</i>

Note. Gender, age and geography were drawn from the membership administration via the youth wings boards. The rest concerns data from the 2020 membership survey, of which the totals are weighted by party youth wing size. Values are reported in brackets when $N < 50$. *DWARS' population data could not be totally disaggregated by province: South includes Zeeland, West includes Flevoland. **Also includes Flevoland. ***North: Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe; East: Overijssel, Gelderland, Flevoland; West: Utrecht, Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland, Zeeland; South: Noord-Brabant, Limburg. ****Based on the classification of Statistics Netherlands (CBS, 2020c).

this was about a third for the PPRjo and JOVD, and 40% for the JS and PSJG.¹⁰⁸ The mean age of the respondents was not far apart for the various youth wings: from 21,6 for the JOVD to 23,3 for the CDJA. The proportion of respondents living in a large or small city was largest for all youth wings, but this share was the highest in the case of the JD and the PSJG. The JOVD and CDJA both had a relatively larger proportion of respondents living in rural areas and the scores of the JS and PPRjo corresponded to the total mean.

For 2020 (Table 5.5), the first thing that stands out is that the CDJA, JD and JS were characterized by larger proportions of male members compared to the total average gender distribution in 2020. In contrast, PINK! had a surprisingly high proportion of female members. The SGPJ was the only youth wing that exhibited an almost equal number of male and female members, which is a surprising finding because the youth wing started admitting female members not that long ago.¹⁰⁹ The members of the SGPJ were predominantly aged 21 or below, while PINK! had almost no members aged below 21. The SGPJ also stands out when it comes to the geographic location of its members. Its members were located in less strongly urbanized areas of the East and West of the country. This strongly indicates that the SGPJ constituency, just like that of the mother party, is located in the so-called Bible belt region of the Netherlands. DWARS and the JD, on the other hand, are characterized by a stronger overrepresentation of young people living in urbanized areas and cities with over 100,000 inhabitants. Overall, the SGPJ mainly has a moderating effect on the total average overrepresentation of party youth wing members on many of the characteristics under scrutiny.

In addition to the aforementioned characteristics, the 2020 survey asked about the country of birth of the respondents and their parents as a proxy for migration background. The results show that the large majority of respondents in 2020 was born in the Netherlands and had parents who were born there. Only the respondents from DWARS, JS and PINK! show some diversity in this regard. As the number of young people with a migration background was much higher among the general youth population,¹¹⁰ it can be concluded that this group is markedly underrepresented among party youth wing members. As previous findings in the field of political party membership point to the underrepresentation of ethnic minorities, this is not surprising (Heidar & Wauters, 2019).

5.3 The ability to facilitate internal participation

The previous section tells us something about the general support for party youth wings and the representativeness of their membership base, but it gives no indication of the activity levels of these young members. The next question to be answered is whether party youth wings are successful in mobilizing those who join into youth wing activity, and whether their

¹⁰⁸ In contrast to the other results from 1989, these gender percentages concern population data; they are reported by the party youth wings themselves.

¹⁰⁹ In 1987, the LVSGS/SGPJ allowed girls to become a member, but it was not until 2006 that the youth wing allowed girls to participate fully in the organization (De Groot & Kok, 2009).

¹¹⁰ The proportion of young citizens aged 15 to 25 with a migration background is approximately 28% (CBS, 2020b).

ability to do so has changed compared to the late 1980s.¹¹¹ This section focuses on three survey measures of youth wing activism: time devoted to the youth wing, holding a position and participation in various types of youth wing activities. When interpreting the results it must be kept in mind that a positive bias cannot be ruled out here because active members are more likely to participate in a study like this (e.g. Faas & Schoen, 2006). As described in Chapter 3, this means that, particularly in the case of party youth wings with a lower sample size, there is a smaller likelihood that the findings reflect a true, generalizable result.

Time spent on the party youth wing

The most direct measure of party youth wing activism is the number of hours spent on youth wing activities by members in an average week. As illustrated in Table 5.6, the survey data shows that almost 31%¹¹² of the respondents was completely inactive in 2020, while almost four in ten respondents spent between zero and two hours per week on youth wing activity. The same question was asked to youth wing members in 1989 (Bakhuis et al., 1989, p. 30). It can be derived from the survey report that 36.4% of the respondents answered that they spent no time on youth wing activity.¹¹³ This percentage corresponds to another question posed in 1989, which asked respondents to estimate how active they were relative to other members and to which 39% indicated being 'barely active'. This already tells us that the proportion of inactive members seems to have remained fairly stable in 2020 compared to 1989. Between 30-40% of the respondents devoted no time at all to the party youth wing in both years.

The majority of surveyed members thus devoted some time to the youth organization, although this can vary from a few minutes a month to several hours a week. Has the amount of time spent by the members on the youth wing changed over time? Unfortunately, a lack of reported data in the 1989 survey report complicates answering this question. The limited available data, presented in Table 5.7, allows a cautious comparison over time in two different ways. Firstly, it is possible to compare the total share of respondents who indicated spending more than four hours per week on the party youth wing. There is little difference between 1989 (15%) and 2020 (17%). Although data is not available for the young democrats (JD) in 1989, the image arises from the description in the report that their members were somewhat more active than the average youth wing member. The actual total average for 1989 will therefore probably be slightly higher. Secondly, the researchers in 1989 calculated the average time spent by active members on the party youth wing based on the midpoint values of each

¹¹¹ Chapter 3 already described that, since the raw data is not available for the 1989 survey, differences over time and between youth wings cannot be statistically tested and are thus interpreted in a qualitative manner.

¹¹² The unweighted percentage is 36. As reported in Chapter 3, party youth wings with high weight factors are DWARS and PINK!. However, the respondents of these two party youth wings are more active than average (Table 5.6), which is most likely caused by an overrepresentation of active (board) members in the sample (also see Table 5.8). A positive bias can thus not be ruled out. Weighting makes this distortion even greater.

¹¹³ I calculated this percentage by combining the reported share of male and female respondents indicating that they do not spend time on youth wing activities with the information on the number of male and female respondents (page 14 and 31 of the report).

of the response ranges. Although this can only give a rough estimate of the average amount of time spent by youth wing members, it can be useful as a measure for comparison. I therefore also calculated these averages for 2020 (see Table 5.7). On average, respondents devoted 2.2 hours per week on the party youth wing in 1989 and 2 hours¹¹⁴ per week in 2020. Again, no substantial differences are found. It can thus be concluded that the proportion of (in)active members and their time commitment to the party youth wing appears to be fairly stable compared to the late 1980s.

Table 5.6 Time devoted to the party youth wing in the average week (2020, in %)

	<i>Total*</i>	<i>CDJA</i>	<i>DWARS</i>	<i>JD</i>	<i>JS</i>	<i>PINK!</i>	<i>PpF</i>	<i>SGPJ</i>
None	31	31	18	38	28	(12)	(38)	45
0-2 hours	37	39	31	35	43	(36)	(54)	41
2-4 hours	13	16	15	11	13	(28)	(3)	7
4-6 hours	9	8	18	7	7	(8)	(3)	3
More than 6 hours	9	4	17	8	8	(16)	(3)	1
Don't know/NA	2	1	1	2	2	(0)	(0)	3
<i>Total N</i>	<i>1071</i>	<i>207</i>	<i>72</i>	<i>254</i>	<i>119</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>37</i>	<i>340</i>

Note. Survey question: "How much time do you devote to [PYW] in an average week?" Values are reported in brackets when $N < 50$. Aggregated data for these answer categories in 1989 is not available. *Weighted by party youth wing size. Unweighted $N = 1054$.

Table 5.7 Youth wing members' time commitment in 1989 and 2020

<i>Party youth wing</i>	<i>>4 hours (in %)</i>		<i>Mean (in hours)*</i>	
	<i>1989</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>1989</i>	<i>2020</i>
CDJA	8	12	1.5	1.6
PPRjo	11	-	1.5	-
PSJG	8	-	1.3	-
DWARS	-	35	-	3.2
JD	n/a	15	2.4	1.7
JOVD	35	-	3.4	-
JS	34	14	3.2	1.9
LVS GS/SGPJ	-	4	-	0.9
PINK!	-	(24)	-	(3.0)
PpF	-	(5)	-	(1.0)
<i>Total average**</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>2.2</i>	<i>2.0</i>

Note. Survey question: "How much time do you devote to [PYW] in an average week?" In 2020, unweighted $N = 1054$ and weighted $N = 1071$, in 1989 $N = 531$. Values are reported in brackets when $N < 50$. *Based on the midpoints of each answer category. For the category >6 hours, this value was set at 9. **Totals for 2020 are weighted by party youth wing size. Unweighted figures are 12% and 1.6 respectively.

The tables allow for an exploration of certain differences in levels and trends of youth wing activism across party youth wings. Again, caution should be exercised because of possible sampling issues. In 1989, the young liberal conservatives (JOVD) and the young socialists (JS) stood out as youth wings with active members, with an average of over 3 hours per week

¹¹⁴ The unweighted average is 1.6. See footnote 112.

spent on the activities of the youth wing and 35% and 34%, respectively, of the respondents spending more than four hours per week on party youth wing activity. In 2020, it seems that the members of green youth wings DWARS and PINK! were more active than the members of the other party youth wings, but the total number of respondents is too low for meaningful interpretations. Of the other party youth wings, the conservative Calvinist SGPJ stands out as having the least active respondents in 2020: 45% devoted no time on the party youth wing, and only 4.4% spent more than four hours a week. Considering the between-groups variation in the developments in youth wing activism over time, there are some declining and some increasing trends (Table 5.7). For instance, the time commitment of members of the JS seems to have declined over time. In 2020, respondents spent on average 1.3 hours less per week on party youth wing activity, and fewer respondents spent more than four hours per week than in 1989. However, it also must be noted that the JS had a small proportion of inactive respondents in 2020 (28%¹¹⁵). While the time commitment has decreased, the number of active members may not have. An opposite example is DWARS, although again sampling may contribute to this outcome. Respondents from DWARS devoted on average 1.8 hours more to the youth wing in 2020. Moreover, around half of the respondents from the pacifist-socialist PSJG and the radical PPRjo indicated spending no time at all on youth wing activities, while only 18% of the DWARS respondents indicated being totally inactive. Only the intra-youth wing activism of the members of the Christian democratic youth wing (CDJA) remained more or less at the same level. In 1989, 8% of the respondents indicated spending more than four hours per week on the youth wing. This was 11.8% in 2020. Both in 1989 and in 2020, a large group of CDJA respondents indicated devoting zero to two hours per week to the youth wing (46% and 39%). There is unfortunately not enough data available for the JD to make such comparisons over time.

Holding a position within the party youth wing

Levels of party youth wing activism can also be assessed based on the proportion of members active in certain positions within the organization. Examples are a board or committee membership. The party youth wing membership surveys of 1989 and 2020 both provide insight into the extent to which respondents hold office within the youth wing. Such a measure can help verify the finding in the previous paragraph, while also providing an indication of the quality of member participation. Respondents were asked in 1989 whether they were either a non-paying supporter of the youth wing,¹¹⁶ a paying member without being active in a board, or a paying member that is active in a board or another organizational manner (Bakhuis et al., 1989, p. 19). In total, 41% opted for the latter option, while 49% indicated being a paying member without holding a certain position and 9% considered themselves to be a non-paying member. In 2020, when asked about holding a position within the party youth wing, on average 63% of the respondents answered that they did not fulfil a position at the time of

¹¹⁵ See Table 5.6. This percentage is unknown for 1989.

¹¹⁶ In Dutch: *steunlid*.

responding to the survey.¹¹⁷ In other words, 37% of the respondents held a position in a board, committee or working group in 2020; a proportion that is not much different from the 41% in 1989. This relatively stable trend in the share of volunteering members is consistent with the previous finding that the time commitment of members has remained constant over time.

The differences across party youth wings on this measure are also similar to the previous measure of youth wing activism. The JS and JOVD again stand out as having active respondents in 1989, now in terms of the proportion of respondents who opted for the answer 'I am a paying member and active in a board or organizational manner' (around 50%). Respondents from the PSJG and the PPRjo opted less than average for holding a position in 1989 (19% and 29% respectively). In 2020, the respondents from DWARS and PINK! were more inclined to hold office within the youth wing, while the respondents from the SGPJ seemed least active in terms of holding a certain position within the organization. In addition, we can perceive similar developments over time. The proportion of respondents from the JS that indicated fulfilling some type of position within the party youth wing declined to 27.6% in 2020 (see Table 5.8). DWARS shows an increase of around 20-30% in this regard. Moreover, the 1989 report states that the CDJA did not deviate from the total average of 41% active in a board or another organizational manner, which corresponds more or less to the share of respondents who fulfilled a function in 2020 (36%).

The above findings demonstrate that the members of party youth wings vary in their levels of participation: some are passive and spend no time at all on youth wing activities, some are fulltime activists, and others are somewhere in between. Moreover, the overall extent of member activism of party youth wings in the Netherlands has remained stable in 2020 compared to 1989. The degree to which party youth wings function as a channel of participation thus seems consistent over time. This is comparable to a previous study conducted among party members in the Netherlands, the Leiden Party Member Survey (LPMS), which finds no clear developments in the levels of party activism (Den Ridder, 2014, p. 83). What is surprising is that the general share of inactive youth wing members (less than 40%) appears to be much smaller than that of political parties. The LPMS shows that around 70% of the party members that participated in the study is inactive (Den Ridder, 2014; Den Ridder et al., 2015). Members of D66 and the VVD appear somewhat more active, but still more than 55% considers itself inactive. Although it is likely that this difference between youth wing members and party members has something to do with an overrepresentation of active party youth wing members in the 1989 and 2020 survey (see Chapter 3), the age of youth wing members might also play a role. There are indeed scholars who suggest that younger members are generally more likely to be active within political parties than older members, especially when they belong to a party wing dedicated to young members (Cross & Young, 2008). Even if we consider a positive bias, this finding implies that although party youth wings attract a smaller proportion of their target audience than their mother parties, their membership base is relatively more involved within the organization.

¹¹⁷ The unweighted average percentage is 68. See footnote 112.

The stable trend in intra-youth wing activism deviates from the positive trend in membership figures between the 1980s and the 2010s. On a societal level, the combination of a stable share of intra-party youth wing activists and an increasing membership base thus points to an increase in the gross member activity. Please note, however, that the degree of member activism is not known for all Dutch party youth wings of which membership figures were presented in the previous section. At the level of the individual organizations, the trends in the degree of activism and the number of members also seem to diverge. For instance, the CDJA has experienced a decline in membership between the two time periods, but members' activism has remained stable. Another example is the JD, of which the membership base has grown, but the degree of member activism has not. Enrolment trends do not seem to transform member activity within party youth wings, at least not in an unambiguous way.

Types of youth wing activities in 2020

While the amount of time spent on activities and volunteering in certain positions tells us something about the quality of participation, it remains unclear what type of positions and other activities members engage in. In estimating the number of hours spent on the youth wing per week, members will vary in what activities they think of. Some activities are relatively non-time-consuming, such as paying a membership fee or reading the member magazine, while campaigning and being a national board member are examples of high-intensity activities (e.g. Whiteley & Seyd, 2002). The previous findings are therefore complemented with an analysis of the involvement of members in the different types of party youth wing positions and activities. The survey of 2020 allows us to get more detailed information on this. Unfortunately, the 1989 survey did not ask respondents about their involvement in various activities, making it impossible to compare these measurements over time.

Firstly, the 2020 survey asked about the type of positions respondents could fulfil within the party youth wing either at the time of responding or in the past (Table 5.8). Of the respondents in 2020, 59% indicated that they did not hold a prior position within the party youth wing.¹¹⁸ Slightly more than 45% did not hold a position in the past nor the present.¹¹⁹ This number decreases to 39% when we exclude those who had been a member for less than a year.¹²⁰ This means that the majority at some point during their membership fill a position within their youth wing on either the national, regional or local level. These respondents most often opted for a national committee or working group. Respondents also mentioned regional or local board positions regularly, especially as positions that were held in the past. Within CDJA and JS, filling positions in local committees or working groups seems less common. The SGPJ also stands out as a youth wing where members are less active in certain organizational positions.

¹¹⁸ The unweighted average percentage is 65.6. See footnote 112.

¹¹⁹ The unweighted average percentage is 52.9. See footnote 112.

¹²⁰ The unweighted average percentage is 47.7. See footnote 112.

Table 5.8 Share of members holding office within the party youth wing (2020, in %)

	<i>Total*</i>	<i>CDJA</i>	<i>DWARS</i>	<i>JD</i>	<i>JS</i>	<i>PINK!</i>	<i>PpF</i>	<i>SGPJ</i>
<i>No position</i>								
• At present	63	64	47	69	72	(52)	(73)	74
• In the past	59	64	42	58	58	(48)	(56)	83
<i>National board</i>								
• At present	3	5	3	1	3	(12)	(0)	1
• In the past	6	8	11	6	7	(8)	(0)	1
<i>Regional/local board</i>								
• At present	13	21	14	8	10	(24)	(6)	13
• In the past	24	24	27	25	34	(48)	(13)	5
<i>National committee or working group</i>								
• At present	18	13	29	18	15	(12)	(24)	8
• In the past	21	17	41	18	11	(22)	(22)	6
<i>Local committee or working group</i>								
• At present	18	6	13	15	3	(0)	(3)	12
• In the past	17	5	24	30	8	(9)	(13)	7
<i>Total N**</i>	<i>1047/1020</i>	<i>204/196</i>	<i>72/71</i>	<i>248/247</i>	<i>116/115</i>	<i>24/23</i>	<i>33/32</i>	<i>328/317</i>

Note. Survey questions: “Are you currently holding any of the following positions within [PYW]?” and “Have you held any of the following positions within [PYW] in the past?”. Multiple answers possible. Values are reported in brackets when $N < 50$. *Weighted by party youth wing size. Unweighted $N = 1026/1001$. **Displayed $N =$ current/in the past.

The 2020 survey also allows us to get more information about the engagement of members in 13 different types of youth wing activities.¹²¹ Six of these items focused on the frequency of attendance to various party youth wing gatherings in the past year, such as a social activity, conference or training. Table 5.9 presents the results. It becomes clear that some types of activities are more popular than others. Between 40% (SGPJ) and 70% (DWARS) of respondents indicated having attended a social activity on an occasional or (very) regular basis. Meetings and conferences were attended occasionally or (very) regularly by around one-half to three-quarters of the membership, as were other gatherings, such as discussions, theme events or excursions. These three types of gatherings are found to be more popular than trainings, political activities or campaign activities. However, the attendance varies between party youth wings. Highest levels of attendance are found in DWARS, the JS and PINK!, although the low sample size of the latter youth wing hampers a meaningful interpretation. Respondents from the SPGJ opted the least for participation in the various gatherings. This especially concerns training and campaign activities: 82% and 72% of the SPGJ respondents respectively indicated rarely or never visiting these two types of gatherings. Respondents from the three party youth wings located on the left spectrum of the political playing field, DWARS, JS and PINK!, seem more protest-minded: they reported having

¹²¹ See Chapter 3. A factor analysis did not identify any subscales.

participated in political and campaigning activities more often than the respondents from the other party youth wings.

Table 5.9 Participation in various youth wing gatherings in the past year (2020, in %)

		<i>Total**</i>	<i>CDJA</i>	<i>DWARS</i>	<i>JD</i>	<i>JS</i>	<i>PINK!</i>	<i>PpF</i>	<i>SGPJ</i>
Attend a social activity	• Rarely or never	41	34	31	47	35	(20)	(54)	60
	• Every now & then	24	28	24	21	25	(28)	(27)	24
	• (Very) often	34	37	44	31	40	(52)	(19)	16
Attend a meeting or conference	• Rarely or never	41	39	28	47	42	(20)	(51)	55
	• Every now & then	22	24	22	18	20	(24)	(22)	23
	• (Very) often	37	36	49	34	38	(56)	(27)	22
Attend a training or course	• Rarely or never	56	57	46	53	50	(32)	(65)	82
	• Every now & then	22	25	25	24	28	(20)	(22)	14
	• (Very) often	21	16	28	21	19	(48)	(14)	4
Participate in a political act	• Rarely or never	45	62	26	58	37	(20)	(54)	55
	• Every now & then	29	22	26	26	33	(36)	(43)	31
	• (Very) often	25	15	46	15	29	(44)	(3)	14
Participate in a campaign activity	• Rarely or never	56	54	47	63	46	(28)	(70)	72
	• Every now & then	23	24	21	23	25	(48)	(11)	17
	• (Very) often	20	20	31	12	28	(24)	(16)	11
Attend another type of gathering	• Rarely or never	36	39	28	45	32	(16)	(46)	44
	• Every now & then	30	28	28	25	33	(28)	(32)	38
	• (Very) often	33	32	43	29	35	(56)	(22)	18
<i>Total N</i>		<i>1071*</i>	<i>209*</i>	<i>72</i>	<i>254*</i>	<i>119</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>37</i>	<i>339*</i>

Note. Does not always add up to 100% due to the omission of the ‘don’t know’ category. Survey question: “As a member of [PYW] you can be active in different ways. Can you indicate how many times you have participated in the activities below in the past year?” Values are reported in brackets when *N*<50. *The exact *N* may slightly differ per item due to item-nonresponse. **Weighted by party youth wing size. Unweighted *N* = 1055.

Aside from participation in various youth wing gatherings, the 2020 survey included seven other items on intra-youth wing activism. Table 5.10 provides an overview. Participation varies between the different types of activities. Of these seven items, the two most popular activities were visiting the website of the party youth wing and reading the member magazine. This may not be surprising since these two activities require relatively little effort. Respondents reported less often that they participated in canvassing for the mother party, a form of participation that is much more time-demanding. While the website is visited relatively often, it is noteworthy that member participation in online discussions or on social media was lower in most party youth wings. Again, participation also varies between the party youth wings. Most notable is the SGPJ, which stands out as an organization whose respondents did not participate much in high-intensity activities, but did want to stay informed about the youth wing through the website and the member magazine.

Besides determining which activities are more popular or less popular among the respondents, it is possible to deduce the number of different types of activities that

Table 5.10 Participation in various youth wing activities in the past year (2020, in %)

		Total**	CDJA	DWARS	JD	JS	PINK!	PpF	SGPJ
Help organize activities	• Rarely or never	54	54	43	62	59	(24)	(57)	68
	• Every now & then	15	16	11	16	11	(24)	(22)	13
	• (Very) often	31	29	44	21	30	(52)	(22)	19
Go door to door for the mother party	• Rarely or never	73	66	49	78	61	(92)	(87)	91
	• Every now & then	16	21	31	10	19	(8)	(8)	6
	• (Very) often	10	12	19	11	19	(0)	(5)	2
Join an informal political discussion in PYW	• Rarely or never	43	38	32	45	38	(24)	(57)	65
	• Every now & then	24	25	25	22	29	(32)	(19)	21
	• (Very) often	31	36	42	31	33	(44)	(24)	14
Visit the website	• Rarely or never	27	29	14	36	24	(20)	(14)	37
	• Every now & then	41	46	34	39	36	(44)	(60)	43
	• (Very) often	32	24	51	24	40	(36)	(27)	20
Be active on social media about PYW	• Rarely or never	56	53	54	66	56	(28)	(60)	61
	• Every now & then	25	27	19	20	24	(48)	(22)	25
	• (Very) often	18	19	25	13	20	(20)	(19)	13
Attend an online discussion of PYW	• Rarely or never	59	67	50	60	56	(24)	(78)	78
	• Every now & then	23	22	26	22	23	(40)	(19)	15
	• (Very) often	17	10	22	17	20	(36)	(3)	7
Read the member magazine	• Rarely or never	24	18	28	35	24	(36)	(14)	7
	• Every now & then	30	34	33	38	35	(20)	(27)	21
	• (Very) often	45	47	36	26	40	(44)	(60)	72
<i>Total N</i>		1070*	209*	72	254*	119	25	37	339*

Note. Does not always add up to 100% due to the omission of the 'don't know' category. Survey question: "As a member of [PYW] you can be active in different ways. Can you indicate how many times you have participated in the activities below in the past year?" Values are reported in brackets when $N < 50$. *The exact N may slightly differ per item due to item-nonresponse. **Weighted by party youth wing size. Unweighted $N = 1054$.

Table 5.11 Number of different types of activities respondents participated in 'every now and then', 'often', or 'very often' in the past year (2020 survey, in %)

	Total*	CDJA	DWARS	JD	JS	PINK!	PpF	SGPJ
One or two types	18	19	14	20	14	(8)	(16)	27
Three to five types	20	17	15	17	19	(8)	(38)	29
Six to eight types	16	18	17	18	16	(4)	(11)	19
More than eight types	41	41	50	33	46	(76)	(32)	22
<i>Mean</i>	7	7	8	6	7	(9)	(6)	5
<i>Total N</i>	1073	210	72	255	119	25	37	340

Note. Survey question: "As a member of [PYW] you can be active in different ways. Can you indicate how often you have participated in the activities below in the past year?" Thirteen types are included (see Table 5.9 and 5.10). Columns do not add up to 100% because of the omission of respondents answering solely 'rarely to never' or 'don't know'. Values are reported in brackets when $N < 50$. *Weighted by party youth wing size. Unweighted $N = 1058$.

respondents participated in as a measure of how diversified youth wing membership is. This can be examined by looking at the distribution of the respondents over the number of different types of activities in which they participated in the past year. Table 5.11 presents the total amount of times respondents answered ‘every now and then’, ‘often’, or ‘very often’ to the thirteen items of Table 5.9 and 5.10. The figures show that a large part of the respondents indicated that they were active in three or more ways, meaning that their involvement was broader than participation in a single activity, such as attending only social activities or solely participating online. Surprisingly, for most party youth wings, the highest proportion of respondents even indicated that they participated in more than eight different activities either on an occasional or (very) regular basis in the past year (on average 40.7%¹²²). There is thus a large group of ‘usual suspects’ that can be found at most of the activities of the party youth wing.

In conclusion, the members of the party youth wings vary in the types and number of activities they participate in. A relatively large proportion of the youth wing’s membership base seems to be active in some way, either by holding a certain position or by participating in different types of gatherings and other activities, although the aforementioned potential sampling bias might play a role here. The most popular activities nowadays are reading the member magazine and visiting the website, but social activities, meetings or conferences, and other gatherings such as discussions, theme events or excursions are also well-attended.

5.4 The ability to mobilize beyond membership

The third sub-function of the mobilization function is the promotion of political activism of members outside of the party youth wing. A lack of data unfortunately hampers a valid comparison of the current time period to the late 1980s. This part of the chapter will therefore consider the individual political participation levels of Dutch party youth wing members in 2020 only. If these turn out to be higher than those of the general youth population, the question remains whether this is due to a mobilizing effect emanating from the youth wing membership or due to certain predispositional or self-selection mechanisms that ensure that youth wing members are more susceptible to politics anyway. Although the current research design does not allow for a definitive answer, this ‘mobilization versus self-selection issue’ will be addressed here indirectly.

Voting behaviour

The most obvious form of political participation to be analysed is voting participation. Not only is voter turnout considered the most common and direct form of political participation, it can also be seen as an important responsibility of political parties to encourage citizens to vote. As described in Chapter 3, voting behaviour is measured by asking youth wing members about their intention to vote in national elections. Unfortunately, this question was only included in the 2020 survey, making it impossible to compare the present-day electoral participation of

¹²² The unweighted average proportion is 34.4%. See footnote 112.

youth wing members with that in 1989.¹²³

In 2020, no less than 94.4% of the respondents answered that they would vote if elections for the House of Representatives would take place at that point in time. None of the remaining respondents chose the answer option 'no', 5.1% opted for non-eligibility to vote.¹²⁴ That these scores can be labelled as high is evident when we compare the results to the findings of the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study (DPES) on the electoral participation of young people in general. The DPES consists of a series of national surveys that, among others, measures the reported turnout in parliamentary elections. Although it needs to be acknowledged that there might be a small difference between the reported intention to vote and the reported turnout after an election, the two are generally found to be strongly correlated (e.g. Bassili, 1995). Despite being a point of constraint, the intended vote is therefore considered here as a proxy for reported voting behaviour. Van der Meer et al. (2018, p. 49) estimated for 2017 that 76.1% of the young people aged 18 to 24 participated in the elections for the House of Representatives, which is the highest measured turnout among young people since 1981.¹²⁵ The difference with the share of youth wing respondents of the 2020 survey who indicated having the intention to vote is 18.3%. Even if we would take into account a discrepancy between turnout intention and reported voting behaviour, there is thus indication that youth wing members are more likely to turn out on election day than the average young person in both time periods. In this context, it should be emphasized that this is not just any group of voters. Scholars have more than often expressed their concerns about a lagging electoral participation of young people (e.g. Blais et al., 2004; Fieldhouse et al., 2007; Norris, 2003). Particular importance is attached to the emergence of first-time voters, so that the habit of voting is acquired in an early stage while establishing a lasting propensity to vote throughout one's life (Franklin et al., 2004). What the exact mobilizing effect is of the party youth wings on the voting behaviour of their members remains unclear. Besides, youth wings may not only stimulate turnout among their own members, but also among young people in general as they undertake campaign activities and have a certain outreach through the members. A different research model is needed to investigate such effects.

Broader political participation

Other forms of political participation can be considered in order to get a more complete picture of the relationship of youth wing members towards the political system. Conceptualizing participation more broadly, the survey of 2020 asked respondents to state whether they had participated in various political activities over the last five years. This question is almost identical to the one used in the DPES of 2017 (Van der Meer et al., 2017)

¹²³ In 1989, respondents were asked whether they would vote for the mother party in a future election. This is a fundamentally different question than the intention to vote on Election Day. Bakhuis et al (1989) report that 80% of the respondents would do so. The remaining respondents answered not knowing (15%) or not wanting to vote for the mother party (5%). The only possible over-time comparison is that 12% more respondents opted for a vote on the mother party of the youth wing in 2020 (92%) than in 1989 (80%).

¹²⁴ The unweighted average percentages are: 92.9 would vote, 0.1 would not vote, 6.3 ineligible to vote.

¹²⁵ Of the 25-34 year olds, an estimated percentage of around 79 took part in the ballot.

and the Social Cohesion and Well-being surveys (S&W) of Statistics Netherlands (Schmeets, 2017). It therefore allows for direct comparison between the political participation of youth wing members and that of young people in general. Table 5.12 presents the results.

Table 5.12 Political participation of youth wing members versus the youth population (in %)

	<i>PYW survey</i> 2020 ^a	<i>DPES</i> 2017 ^b	<i>S&W</i> 2012/2016 ^c
Involved radio, TV or newspaper	39	9	26
Involved political party or organization	52	1	2
Joined public hearing, government discussion meeting	41	5	4
Contacted politician or civil servant	48	4	5
Joined action group	33	1	3
Joined protest or demonstration	54	7	7
Signed a petition	78	-	26
Joined political discussion/action via internet, e-mail, text message	65	12	14
Other	45	6	4
<i>Total N</i>	888	447	n/a

Note. Survey question: “There are various ways to try to bring something to the attention within politics or to exercise influence on politicians or the government. Would you indicate for each of the following possibilities which you have utilized during the past 5 years?”

^a Party youth wing (PYW) survey conducted in 2020. Total scores are weighted by party youth wing size. Unweighted *N* = 860. The exact *N* per item may slightly differ due to item-nonresponse.

^b Dutch Parliamentary Election Study (Van der Meer et al., 2017). Respondents aged 18-30. Unweighted *N* = 586.

^c Social Cohesion and Well-being survey conducted annually by Statistics Netherlands (CBS). Averages for young people aged 15-25 in the period of 2012-2016 (Schmeets, 2017, p. 8). Total *N* for all ages is 7,500 per year.

Dutch party youth wing members appear to be very active politically. No less than 94.6% of the respondents reported that they had undertaken one or more political activities in the last five years. Half of the members participated in five or more of the activities listed in Table 5.12.¹²⁶ Signing a petition and joining a political discussion or action by e-mail or text message were the most practiced activities. These activities can be classified under the label ‘new forms of political participation’, which are found to be more popular among young people than the conventional forms of political participation (Norris, 2003; Quintelier, 2007). Less popular were joining an action group or involving media, although still more than one third of the respondents answered that they used these forms of political action to bring something to the attention of politicians or to exercise influence on the government.

The difference with the general youth population is substantial. The results of both the DPES and S&W survey show that the average young person participates much less than the average party youth wing member. Most of the political activities were mentioned by less than 7% of the respondents of these two studies. Some higher scoring activities were involving the media, signing a petition and joining a discussion via e-mail or text message, although the difference with youth wing members is still considerable. Just over half of the young

¹²⁶ Unweighted figures are 92.9% and 41.3% respectively.

respondents of the DPES indicated not being active in any of the presented forms of political participation. In the party youth wing survey, that share was 5.4%.¹²⁷ This represents a difference of 46 percentage points.

A breakdown of the data reveals a few notable differences between the party youth wings (see Appendix 5.3). Respondents from the conservative Calvinist youth wing (SGPJ) scored lower on all forms of political participation than the respondents from other youth wings, except for the item 'signed a petition'. The image that the members of the left-wing youth wings DWARS, the JS and PINK! are more protest-minded on average than those of other youth wings is reaffirmed. These respondents indicated participating more in action groups, protests and demonstrations and petitions, while the respondents from the CDJA, JD, PpF and SGPJ generally scored relatively low on these items. In contrast, respondents from the CDJA scored relatively high on the items that can be labelled as conventional forms of political action: 'involved political party or organization', 'joined public hearing or government discussion meeting' and 'contacted political or civil servant'.

In conclusion, while studies show that young people are generally less politically active, these results show that the youth wings of political parties consist of politically active young people. This is consistent with the empirical finding that politically active individuals can be found in voluntary associations (e.g. Quintelier, 2008; Verba & Nie, 1972; Verba et al., 1995). At the least, party youth wings function as a valuable meeting place for the politically active young. It remains unclear to what extent youth wing dynamics actually play a role in catalysing the external political participation of their members. The next paragraph will discuss this issue.

Self-selection or mobilization?

The question is to what extent the high level of political activity among youth wing members is actually a result of the membership or whether there was already a certain predisposition to participate in politics (e.g. Leighley, 1996; Quintelier, 2008; Verba et al., 1995). In the latter scenario, these individuals with a higher "participation proneness" (Verba & Nie, 1972, p. 194) are argued to be more likely to join political associations (self-selection). One could indeed argue that the choice to become a member of an overtly political group such as a party youth wing is already an indication of a propensity toward political activity. Party youth wings then solely represent a participation channel for those young people who are or would be politically active anyway. However, next to self-selection mechanisms, mobilizing efforts of associational leaders and socializing structures of associations may play a role (e.g. Leighley, 1996; Quintelier, 2008). Party youth wings can thus also be argued to play an enhancing role in the political participation of their members. Voluntary association affiliations, especially those with a political character, are generally thought to have advancing effects on the political participation of young people (Quintelier, 2008). Young people in particular are less likely to have political connections, knowledge and prior experience with participation (e.g. Plutzer, 2003). The membership of a party youth wing can be perceived as an important resource that

¹²⁷ Unweighted percentage is 7.1.

helps overcome these costs. The question is: is it because of the (un)intentional socialization and mobilization of the party youth wing that the members are more politically active or are these young people more susceptible to political participation anyway?

In order to correct for this endogeneity problem, one ideally designs a study in which both party youth wing members and young people in general are part of the same (longitudinal) survey so that the impact of youth wing involvement on political participation can be modelled, while correcting for self-selection, socioeconomic, attitudinal and parental factors. Unfortunately, this is not available. As an alternative approach, it is chosen to assess members’ perception of the mobilization efforts of their youth wing. Although this is an indirect and suboptimal measure that only includes perceived mobilization efforts, it provides some indication regarding the functioning of party youth wings as mobilizing agents. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with the following statement: “My party youth wing encourages members to be politically active outside the youth wing as well” (Table 5.13). In total, almost half of the respondents indicated that this statement is applicable or totally applicable, while only 12% opted for (totally) not applicable.¹²⁸ There are differences across party youth wings, but the answer category (totally) applicable scored highest in all youth wings. A considerable group of members thus perceives the party youth wing as a mobilizing agent, although there is also a large part of the membership that either indicates not knowing the answer or that chooses the middle category.

Table 5.13. Member perception of party youth wing mobilization efforts (2020, in %)

	<i>Total*</i>	<i>CDJA</i>	<i>DWARS</i>	<i>JD</i>	<i>JS</i>	<i>PINK!</i>	<i>PpF</i>	<i>SGPJ</i>
(Totally) not applicable	12	16	9	15	11	(8)	(10)	15
Neither/nor	16	21	11	17	20	(21)	(7)	19
(Totally) applicable	48	44	60	36	48	(63)	(48)	41
Don’t know	24	19	20	32	22	(8)	(36)	26
<i>Total N</i>	<i>985</i>	<i>193</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>232</i>	<i>105</i>	<i>24</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>300</i>

Note. Survey item: “My party youth wing encourages members to be politically active outside the youth wing as well”. Values are reported in brackets when *N*<50. *Weighting by party youth wing size. Unweighted *N* = 955.

In sum, members of a party youth wing are more politically active than young people in general. A large part of the members believes that their youth wing plays an encouraging role in this regard. Unfortunately, it is not possible in the current study to disentangle the mechanisms that play a role in the causal relationship between youth wing membership and higher levels of political participation. It is possible to delve deeper into the political socializing activities of these organizations. This will be discussed in Chapter 7.

5.5 Conclusions

The aim of this chapter was to determine the performance of party youth wings on the mobilization function. This function, defined as the promotion of political participatory acts of young individuals, consists of three sub-functions: attract a representative membership,

¹²⁸ Unweighted percentages are 43.2 and 13.8 respectively.

facilitate internal participation and encourage members to participate in politics in other forms than youth wing membership. Although it was expected that party youth wings would nowadays be less successful in fulfilling these sub-functions, the results of this investigation show that there is no reason to believe that the performance of youth wings has worsened compared to thirty years ago.

Considering the first sub-function, the overall number of party youth wing members has increased since the second half of the 1980s, although this trend has not been constantly upward and differs across party youth wings. The noticeably low membership rate leads to the conclusion that party youth wings have not been mass-based organizations in the last decades, but rather small-scale party sub-organizations. Moreover, during both time periods under scrutiny, the memberships of Dutch party youth wings did not accurately mirror the population of young people. The average party youth wing member is more likely to be reported as male than as other genders, aged above 21, living in urban areas and participating in higher education. The gender gap has been closing over time, although the descriptive congruence seems to have worsened for age and residence. In addition, young people with a migration background are found to be underrepresented in the investigated party youth wings in the late 2010s. Findings on the second sub-function show that, although members vary in the extent to which they actively participate in youth wing activities, the overall activist density within party youth wings has remained relatively constant compared to the late 1980s. The empirical analysis of the third sub-function has shown that members of a party youth wing in the late 2010s are more politically active than young people in general. Unfortunately, this could not be assessed for the time period of 1985-90. Although the exact mobilizing effect of membership could not be determined here, the perception of members is that a party youth wing plays an encouraging role in this regard. In conclusion, party youth wings provide a participatory linkage to the world of politics.

In addition to these general findings, the results of this chapter invite us to explore similarities and differences across party youth wings. This cannot be done systematically for each sub-function and period as data is sometimes missing, but several notable results can be highlighted. Against the general trend, the membership figures of the CDJA, JS, JOVD and PpF declined considerably between the mid-late 1980s and 2010s. The first three youth wings in particular stand out as they are affiliated to the traditionally major political parties CDA, PvdA and VVD. Chapter 3 already described that the dominance of these three parties in the Dutch political landscape has been eroding since the 1990s (Louwerse et al., 2019b). The underlying developments may thus also have affected the affiliated youth wings.

Furthermore, there are indications that the party youth wings have become more similar in terms of their membership composition. In 2020, more party youth wings had a strong presence in urban areas and characterized themselves as student organization than in the late 1980s. This applies to a lesser extent to youth wings with a religious character. The SGPJ in particular deviates from this picture due to its strong presence in the so-called Bible belt region of the Netherlands and its lower number of members in higher education.

On other indicators that were measured in 2020 only, party youth wings are also found

to function relatively similarly. The SGPJ is an exception; its members seem less engaged in both internal activities and external forms of political participation. In addition, it can be cautiously concluded that the members of the DWARS, JS and PINK! are more protest-minded than members of other party youth wings. In both the internal and external activity measures, they seemed to prefer the more unconventional types of political activity. This partly confirms the conclusion of Chapter 4 that there are different types of youth wings: some party youth wings lean more towards activism than others.

6. Party Youth Wings as Representation Channels

6.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter we looked at the extent to which Dutch party youth wings perform as mobilizing vehicles, that is, whether they promote the participation of young individuals in politics. The focus of the current chapter is on the extent to which party youth wings themselves participate in the political process by representing the political views and interests of their constituency. The general view is that the voice of young people is not sufficiently heard in political decision-making processes. As party sub-organizations, youth wings function closely to the political realm, thus having the potential to contribute to democratic governance by acting as a representative body for young people. The question is to what extent they fulfil this representation function, and whether their ability to do so has changed since the mid-late 1980s. As elaborated on in Chapter 2, it is expected that it has become more difficult for party youth wings to represent the interests of their supporters within the party, mainly because of organizational changes in the mother parties due to individualization, professionalization and a greater focus on procedural functions instead of representative functions. This may increasingly lead youth wings to seek out external channels to articulate their interest. Such party organizational changes may, however, also be observed within the youth wings themselves, as a result of which they might be better able to aggregate interests, communicate these to the outside world and nurture and support young political candidates.

The performance on the representation function is assessed by analysing three sub-functions: the aggregation of political interests, the articulation of political interests, and the enhancement of descriptive representation. Successful party youth wings gather political interests in a political programme in which members have a say and which is congruent with the ideological position of the members, articulate the policy preferences within and beyond the mother party, and ‘deliver’ young candidates for political office. Table 6.1 presents the accompanying performance indicators, for which the methodological choices for measurement are described in Chapter 3. The present chapter accordingly consists of three parts: in the first part, the functioning on the sub-function ‘aggregate political interests’ is assessed, the second part focuses on the efforts for the articulation of the youth wing’s political interests, and the third part of the chapter captures the degree of success in enhancing the descriptive representation of young people.

Table 6.1 The representation function

<i>Key function</i>	<i>Sub-function</i>	<i>Indicator</i>
Representation	Aggregate political interests	Adoption of a political programme
		Participation opportunities in programme development
		Salience- and position-based ideological congruence
	Articulate political interests	Insider access: use of various party channels
		Outsider access: media appearance
	Enhance descriptive representation	Youth wing members’ share of parliamentary seats
Strategies for influencing candidate selection		

6.2 The ability to aggregate political interests

Bringing together the various political interests that exist among constituents is an important element of the representation function. As described in Chapter 2, members play an important role in passing on views that are important among young people in society. They must jointly determine the political positions of the party youth wing, which in turn can be propagated and guide the efforts made to influence political decision-making processes. In this section, it is determined to what extent party youth wings succeed in gathering their constituency's interests by analysing 1) the adoption of a political programme, 2) the role members play in the design of the programme, and 3) the extent to which the ideological priorities are congruent with those of the membership base. Unfortunately, the latter can only be assessed for party youth wings in 2020 due to shortcomings in the survey from 1989.

The adoption of a political programme

The most tangible result of the aggregation process is the adoption of a political programme. It becomes evident from the archives and interviews that it was less common in the mid-late 1980s for party youth wings to have a political programme than in the mid-late 2010s (Table 6.2). During the first time period, only the young Christian democrats (CDJA), the young democrats (JD), the young liberal conservatives (JOVD) and the young socialists (JS) bundled their political views. While the CDJA, JOVD and JS had a longer tradition of publishing political programmes, the JD had only just been founded in 1984 and published its first political programme in 1989.¹²⁹ The religious youth wings GPJC, RPJO and LVSGS/SGPJ seemed to aim primarily for the political education of their members rather than political representation. Indeed, the first political programme of the SGPJ, the youth wing of the Reformed Political Party (SGP), was not presented until 1999 (De Groot & Kok, 2009, p. 47), and within the RPJO, the youth wing of the Reformatory Political Federation (RPF), the first discussion about publicizing political views did not start until 1992 (Van Baardewijk, 1994, pp. 52-53). The former chair of the GPJC, the youth wing of the Reformed Political League (GPV) explained in the interview why there was no political programme: "There were some [local] clubs, especially in Groningen, that were more focused on action (...) but the rest had more of a study character (...) We followed the line of the GPV".¹³⁰ The progressive Christian youth wing (PPRjo) and the pacifist-socialist youth wing (PSJG) also did not have a political programme. The annual policy plan 1989-1990 of the PSJG did mention the need for a youth programme "to know what we are for and against",¹³¹ but it never seems to have been drafted. It should be noted that both youth wings were nevertheless concerned with political affairs, as

¹²⁹ JD, *Programma van werkzaamheden 1989*, p. 17.

¹³⁰ In Dutch: "Er waren ook wel wat clubs, met name in Groningen, die wat meer gericht waren op actie. (...) De rest had toch vooral meer een studiekarakter. (...) Het was toch vooral het volgen van de lijn van het GPV".

¹³¹ PSJG, *Jaarplan vanaf het najaar van '89 tot najaar '90*, p. 8. In Dutch: "Jongerenprogramma: Er is behoefte onder PSJG'ers om te weten waar we nu voor en tegen zijn. Het moet geen gewoon saai programma worden (...)"

evidenced by the willingness to take action described in the internal documents and the interviews.¹³²

Table 6.2 Party youth wings with and without a political programme in both time periods

	1985-1990	2014-2020
No political programme	GPJC, LVSGS/SGPJ, PPRjo, PSJG, RPJO	JS, ROOD
Political programme	CDJA, JD, JOVD, JS	CDJA, DWARS, JD, JOVD, PINK!, PpF, SGPJ

In the period of 2014-2020, all party youth wings had a political programme, except for the JS and ROOD, the youth wing of the Socialist Party. The latter youth wing considered a political programme unnecessary because of the high correspondence between its political views and those of the mother party. The JS abolished the use of a political programme in 2011, so that motions and amendments would become free-standing decisions.¹³³ Members of the JS can file such political proposals at the general members meeting, although the chair of the JS was sceptical about this in the interview in 2014: “No one ever pays attention to what happens to those motions, I think that it is just another exercise [in political decision-making]”.¹³⁴ The other youth wings do work with a political programme in which they express their views. Such a programme functions as a touchstone for their external political behaviour. The chair of the JD touched upon this in the interview: “Our independence is mainly expressed in that if we publish something, we check it against the programme of the JD, not that of D66”.¹³⁵

Participation opportunities in programme development

The underlying assumption behind the adoption of a political programme as the ultimate outcome of the aggregation process is that the members of the organization are actively involved in the design of its content. In other words, only when the members have a say in the process of establishing the programme can there be a convergence of different political views and interests (Gauja, 2013b). In case there is a political programme, the performance of party youth wings on this sub-function therefore also depends on the way in which this internal policy development process is organized. The available sources and interviews show that all four party youth wings with a political programme in the 1980s had a formal decision-making model which allowed members to be involved in the process one way or the other (Table 6.3). The CDJA, JOVD and JS made use of a representative model of participation. In this model,

¹³² Various archival documents of the PPRjo mention political brochures and participation in demonstrations, such as those about nuclear weapons and student grants. There is no mention of a political programme, but the members determined political positions on current issues during the biannual congress. The former PSJG chair states in the interview that he does not remember a political programme, and argues that even if they had one, it did not play a large role. Characterizing the PSJG as situated on the far left wing of Dutch politics, he explains that the PSJG was predominantly active within social movements and via extra-parliamentary actions.

¹³³ JS, *Leidraad voor moties, resoluties en beslispunten, Voorjaarscongres 2012*, p. 1.

¹³⁴ In Dutch: “Ten eerste let iemand daarna nooit meer op wat er met die moties gebeurt en ik denk dat dat ook weer gewoon een oefening is, zo zie ik dat dan altijd maar”.

¹³⁵ In Dutch: “Ik denk onafhankelijkheid uit zich vooral in dat als wij iets naar buiten brengen, we dat toetsen aan het programma van de JD, niet die van D66”.

representatives of the wider membership vote on the adoption of the political programme (Gauja, 2013b). The JOVD reported on the adoption of its political programme by the general member meeting in 1985,¹³⁶ which consisted of delegates of the local branches.¹³⁷ Similarly, the CDJA reported that after their draft ‘political pamphlet’ is discussed within the various branches of the organizations, “it will be adopted by the CDJA council, in which all provincial branches are represented”.¹³⁸ The internal documents of the JS in the period of 1985-1990 are inconclusive on how its ‘youth program’ was exactly adopted in 1981, although the 20th anniversary booklet does mention its treatment at a national congress (Van der Heide et al., 1998, p. 51). The regulations at the time dictated that each branch chooses from among its members the delegates that fulfil a representative role at the national assemblies.¹³⁹ For the JD it is also unclear through what exact process the political programme was adopted in 1989, but the youth wing described in its programme of activities to the Ministry that the general assembly of members is the highest body of the association, in which the JD uses the “one man, one vote system”.¹⁴⁰ This means that the direct participation model was applicable, that is, members vote on an individual basis on the policy of the youth wing in membership-wide conferences (Gauja, 2013b).

Table 6.3 Internal decision-making model of party youth wings in both time periods

	1985-1990	2014-2020
Representative	CDJA council , GPJC, JOVD , JS , LVSGS/SGPJ	-
Direct	CDJA congress , JD , PPRjo, RPJO	CDJA , DWARS , JD , JOVD , JS , PpF , PINK! , ROOD, SPJG

Note. Based on party youth wing statutes. Label in bold when the youth wing had a political programme.

In the second half of the 2010s, all party youth wings with a political programme seemed to make use of the direct participation model (Table 6.3). The young greens (DWARS), young democrats (JD), the radical green youth wing (PINK!) and the Christian Union’s youth wing (PpF) adopted explicit provisions in their regulations on the required approval of the programme by the general assembly, in which individual members have the right to vote.¹⁴¹ The other party youth wings with a political programme seemed to work in the same way,

¹³⁶ “Verspreid over 2 algemene vergaderingen is dit PKP door het congres behandeld en met een aantal wijzigingen aangenomen” (*JOVD, Jaarverslag 1985*, p. 11).

¹³⁷ Article 16.3 of the statutes in 1981: “De algemene vergadering bestaat uit afgevaardigden van de afdelingen”.

¹³⁸ *CDJA, Bijlage CDActueel 14 april 1984*, p. 1. In Dutch: “Het is de bedoeling dat dit [het politiek pamflet] binnen het CDJA in de komende maanden uitvoering zal worden besproken, bijvoorbeeld in provincies en kernen. In het najaar zal het worden vastgesteld door de CDJA-raad, waarin alle provinciale afdelingen vertegenwoordigd zijn”.

¹³⁹ Article 23 of the regulations in 1988.

¹⁴⁰ *JD, Programma van werkzaamheden, 1989*, p. 7.

¹⁴¹ See the following provisions in the statutes and internal rules (HR):

-DWARS (2016): art 12.3 (p. 4).

-JD (2016): art 17.1 (p. 4) and ‘Bijlage F’ art 1.1 (p. 33).

-PpF (2016): art 16.2 and 16.3 (p. 6), art. 20 HR (p. 6).

-PINK! (2016): art. 10 (p. 6) and art. 3 HR (p. 14).

although the process was not explicitly regulated. The chair of the CDJA explained in the interview how they go about it, stressing the role of individual members:

We have a political programme of about 25 pages in which we express our views. And we also amend it every congress. So then members may hand in amendments. We always have almost a half-day for that, for talking about it and having discussions about it (...).¹⁴²

The SGPJ reported in their annual report 2014 that their political ‘core ideas’ have been adopted by the members at the annual member meeting.¹⁴³ For the JOVD, the exact procedure for determining the political programme remains unclear, although it has changed its statutes since the 1980s, as individual members had the right to vote at the general member meeting in 2018.¹⁴⁴

In conclusion, two developments can be identified on the basis of these results: 1) more party youth wings define their political views and priorities in a political programme in the present time than in the period of 1985-1990, and 2) whenever they do so, the individual members have the final say on the political course of the youth wing through the voting process at the general members meeting. In the 1980s, the representative participation model seemed to predominate within the few youth wings that had a political programme. The three party youth wings of the largest mainstream parties – the CDJA of the Christian democratic CDA, the JS of the social democratic PvdA, and the JOVD of the liberal conservative VVD – since then shifted from an indirect to a direct democratic model in their internal political decision-making procedures. This is in line with the literature on organizational change within political parties, which shows that parties increasingly allow individual members to play a direct role in the party’s decision-making procedures (e.g. Cross & Katz, 2013; Scarrow, 1999, 2007). Such changes have also been observed in the Netherlands, particularly in the case of the CDA, PvdA and VVD (Lucardie & Voerman, 2011, p. 193). On a side note, there are also party youth wings that nowadays make use of the direct member democracy in their internal decision-making processes, while the affiliated mother party still employs the indirect delegate model.¹⁴⁵

The finding that more party youth wings had a political programme in which individual members have a say in the late 2010s than in the late 1980s leads to the conclusion that Dutch party youth wings seem better at aggregating the political interests of their members. We should, however, be careful with also linking this conclusion to the finding that individual members are at present given direct opportunities to participate in the internal political decision-making process. Scholars differ on whether such a development empowers individual members and thereby enhances inclusiveness, representation and attractiveness (e.g. Gauja, 2013b; Scarrow, 2007), or whether it actually marginalizes members as it empowers decision-

¹⁴² In Dutch: “(...) hebben we een politiek programma van ongeveer 25 pagina’s waarin we onze standpunten naar voren brengen. En dat amenderen we ook elk congres. Dus dan mogen leden daar amendementen op indienen. Daar hebben we altijd bijna een dagdeel voor, dat we dat bespreken en er discussies over voeren (...)”.

¹⁴³ “In de jaarvergadering is Kernideeën 2.0 aangenomen door de leden” (2014, p. 30).

¹⁴⁴ Article 7.3 of the statutes in 2018.

¹⁴⁵ At the time of writing, both the SGP and the SP still make use of the representative model in which delegates of the local party branches have the right to vote at the party congress.

making power at the top due to a lack of strong intermediate representative structures (e.g. Katz, 2001; Katz & Mair, 1995). However, the latter is not confirmed in research on Dutch parties (Lucardie & Voerman, 2011), and the question is whether such mechanisms are applicable to the youth wings of political parties. Because of the high turnover of members, for instance, a highly organized elite or cadre within party youth wings is less self-evident. Moreover, party youth wing elites are positioned closely to the members due to the relatively small size of the organizations (Chapter 5) and are directly dependent on their support. At last, participation in policy development might enhance the political education and self-development of the members (see also Pateman, 1970, p. 105), something which might be considerably important in an organization for an inexperienced and young age group.

Saliency-based ideological congruence in 2020

Moving beyond the internal policy development process, the ability of party youth wings to aggregate the political interests of their members can be assessed in more detail by analysing the outcome of this process: the actual congruence between the ideological priorities of the party youth wing and the youth wing's members. This paragraph focuses on the issue saliency congruence between the youth wing's political programme and the members, while the next paragraph will look at the similarity in ideological positions. As described in Chapter 3, the adopted quantitative approach measured saliency-based ideological congruence through the amount of attention dedicated to designated policy areas by youth wings in their manifesto in the late 2020s, and the importance attached to designated policy areas by members in the survey of 2020, supplemented with the results of other more subjective survey items on congruence. Reference is made to the 1989 survey whenever possible. The analysis was limited to the content categories that were actively presented in the survey¹⁴⁶ and to those party youth wings that had a political programme and participated in the survey.¹⁴⁷

The results are presented in Table 6.4. The first sub-column of the 'total' column displays the average percentages for the total volume of available political programmes.¹⁴⁸ On average, the Dutch party youth wings devoted most attention in their programmes to the

¹⁴⁶ In the content analysis of the political programmes, there was a category 'no political theme, unclear, or intertwined' (0.8%), which I excluded here as it was not part of the survey question. Moreover, the survey question and the content analysis of the political programmes included the category 'other'. Particularly in the case of the political programmes, this category is a collection of various issues, such as agriculture, privacy or moral issues. I coded around 14.9% of the political programmes accordingly. In the survey, the answer option 'other' was not often used (3.2%). Only the respondents from PINK! opted more often for this category (14.1%), which can be explained by a missing theme in the survey question that this youth wing explicitly supports: animal welfare. Overall, respondents tend to choose for one of the political categories listed and only opt for the category 'other' when they are fully convinced about a political issue. This is different for the political programmes, in which often all sorts of themes come to the fore. In order to arrive at a reliable congruence measure, I therefore excluded the category 'other' from the analysis.

¹⁴⁷ To recall, the JS had no political programme and the JOVD did not participate in the survey. They are therefore excluded from the analysis.

¹⁴⁸ I calculated the amount of text devoted to one issue category as a percentage of the total text in order to control for the length of the programme. I calculated the total average by dividing the sum of the percentages by the number of party youth wings.

Table 6.4 Congruence between issue saliency in political programmes and that of survey respondents (2020)

Policy categories	Total			CDJA			DWARS			JD			PINK!			PpF			SGPJ		
	% P	% S*	Diff	% P	% S	Diff	% P	% S	Diff	% P	% S	Diff	% P	% S	Diff	% P	% S	Diff	% P	% S	Diff
International affairs	19.7	4.2	15.5	20.7	2.9	17.8	14.5	4.3	10.2	21.0	4.1	16.9	9.6	(6.6)	3.0	30.5	(8.7)	21.8	21.8	2.1	19.7
Education	10.6	16.8	6.2	6.9	12.3	5.4	13.0	17.4	4.4	5.8	17.9	12.1	12.0	(14.8)	2.8	14.5	(18.5)	4.0	11.3	17.4	6.1
Environment & climate	14.1	23.7	9.6	13.0	14.5	1.5	16.8	33.2	16.4	8.3	25.2	16.9	29.2	(39.3)	10.1	7.1	(19.6)	12.5	10.2	9.2	1.0
Public administration	7.4	1.8	5.6	10.7	2.7	8.0	4.1	1.1	3.0	8.8	2.4	6.4	5.4	(1.6)	3.8	7.8	(3.3)	4.5	7.3	1.0	6.3
Health care	11.0	11.2	0.2	8.2	11.1	2.9	6.4	8.2	1.8	9.6	9.0	0.6	17.2	(11.5)	5.7	5.3	(13.0)	7.7	19.3	16.5	2.8
Economics	7.0	6.3	0.7	5.1	7.6	2.5	12.5	3.8	8.7	5.2	10.4	5.2	4.9	(3.3)	1.6	8.1	(5.4)	2.7	6.2	5.5	0.7
Security & safety	4.9	4.3	0.6	5.9	6.3	0.4	5.0	0.5	4.5	7.3	1.7	5.6	1.4	(0.0)	1.4	5.6	(1.1)	4.5	4.3	13.7	9.4
Labour	4.6	2.0	2.6	3.7	2.7	1.0	4.6	1.6	3.0	4.6	2.0	2.6	4.6	(0.0)	4.6	6.8	(1.1)	5.7	3.3	3.2	0.1
Defence	4.9	3.4	1.5	7.7	4.3	3.4	3.0	0.0	3.0	6.9	1.7	5.2	4.5	(0.0)	4.5	3.9	(3.3)	0.6	3.3	10.7	7.4
Culture & media	3.3	1.0	2.3	6.7	1.8	4.9	3.3	1.1	2.2	6.7	1.2	5.5	1.6	(0.0)	1.6	1.7	(0.0)	1.7	0.0	1.3	1.3
Mobility	2.7	2.0	0.7	2.0	2.4	0.4	4.2	3.3	0.9	6.5	2.3	4.2	1.6	(0.0)	1.6	2.0	(1.1)	0.9	0.0	1.2	1.2
Immigration	3.6	4.0	0.4	6.7	9.1	2.4	5.0	1.1	3.9	3.4	3.5	0.1	1.3	(1.6)	0.3	1.9	(2.2)	0.3	3.2	7.5	4.3
Social security	3.1	9.2	6.1	0.0	6.2	6.2	5.1	15.8	10.7	2.3	7.4	5.1	2.9	(14.8)	11.9	3.3	(8.7)	5.4	5.2	2.9	2.3
Housing	3.1	10.1	7.0	2.8	16.1	13.3	2.5	8.7	6.2	3.6	11.6	8.0	3.7	(6.6)	2.9	1.4	(14.1)	12.7	4.7	7.7	3.0
Total/average**	100	100	4.2	100	100	5.0	100	100	5.6	100	100	6.7	100	100	4.0	100	100	6.1	100	100	4.7
Total N (survey)	-	839	-	-	191	-	-	66	-	-	231	-	-	24	-	-	31	-	-	296	-

Note. Values in brackets when $N < 50$. Values ≥ 10 in bold.

P = political programme. For an overview, see Appendix 3.5. Totals reflect the average of the six programme percentages so that the impact of the variable programme size is excluded.

S = survey responses. Party youth wing membership survey conducted in 2020. Survey question: "Which of the following political themes do you think are the most important for Dutch politics in the next five years? Maximum three answers possible". Percentages are based on total number of answers. *Scores weighted by party youth wing size. Diff = the absolute difference between P and S. **The total score for Diff is the average of all absolute differences, which resembles the total salience-based programme-member congruence score (see formula in footnote 36).

category of international affairs, around 20%. Other issues that were relatively salient are environment & climate (14%), health care (11%) and education (11%). The second sub-column displays the total percentages for the survey respondents.¹⁴⁹ The issue categories deemed most important for Dutch politics by the survey respondents are the environment and climate (24%), education (17%), health care (11%) and housing (10%). The third sub-column displays the absolute difference, thus indicating the degree of resemblance between the issue salience of the programmes of the party youth wings and that of the survey respondents. The higher the score, the less congruent the two are. It is shown that on international affairs, and to a lesser extent on environment and climate, both were the most different from each other in issue salience. While the programmes of the party youth wings devoted relatively much attention to international affairs, the survey respondents did not attach the same level of importance to this category. For the issue category environment and climate, it was exactly the other way around. On the other issues, the issue salience of the political programme and the members of the party youth wing did not diverge much. They were particularly congruent on health care, immigration, security and safety, economics and mobility. The total average difference, which can be referred to as the salience-based congruence score, is 4.2. These findings suggest that the political programmes of the party youth wings and the members are fairly similar in the extent to which they emphasize certain policy areas.

The scores of the individual youth wings in Table 6.4 indicate to what extent they correspond to or deviate from the overall picture. The political programmes of all youth wings except PINK! indeed put considerably more emphasis on the issue of international affairs than the corresponding survey respondents did. The respondents from the JD, DWARS, PINK! and PpF stressed the issue of the environment and climate to a larger extent than the programmes of these youth wings did. PINK! has the lowest average difference score (4.0), thus showing the highest congruence between programme and members, although it must be noted that the number of survey respondents is low. The congruence score of the SGPJ (4.7) is also lower than that of most other youth wings, although it becomes clear that the SGPJ's respondents put more emphasis on the issues safety and security and defence than the political programme does. DWARS has a somewhat higher congruence score than other youth wings. In addition to the issues of international affairs and environment and climate, the DWARS programme and respondents deviated mainly in their attention for the issues of social security and economics. The JD scores least well on programme-member congruence, with an average difference score of 6.7, predominantly because the political themes environment and climate and education did not receive as much attention in the political programme as they did from the youth wing's respondents. Moreover, the JD programme mainly stressed the issue of international affairs, while the JD respondents did not consider this issue to be important.

Surely, members are bound to always have some level of disagreement with the issue salience of their party youth wing. That there is a certain gap between the issue saliency of the youth wing and the priorities of the members also becomes apparent when respondents

¹⁴⁹ Weighted by party youth wing size.

are directly asked about it. Respondents were also asked to indicate which political themes in practice receive the most attention from their youth wing, after which they were asked to what extent this meets their own political interests. Overall, the majority of respondents were fairly positive about this. Slightly more than half of the respondents answered ‘very good’ or ‘good’ and a third of the respondents opted for ‘sufficient’ (Table 6.5). Around 8% answered ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’. These scores resemble the results of the 1989 survey. In 2020, as Table 6.5 shows, the respondents from the CDJA were only moderately or less positive about this, while respondents from DWARS and PpF seemed rather convinced of the correspondence between what issues the party youth wing pays attention to and their own political interests, although a low sample size should be taken into account. Bakhuis et al. (1989, p. 37) report that respondents from the PSJG and PPRjo were most positive about the attention of their youth wing for political themes in 1989, unlike those from the CDJA, JS and JOVD. The findings for 2020 differ slightly from those in Table 6.4, on the basis of which, for example, you would expect the JD to score most poorly on this item. The subjective experience of salience-based congruence may thus deviate from an objective assessment. This will be assessed in more detail in the next section.

In conclusion, Dutch party youth wings function fairly well on the salience-based ideological congruence. Most political programmes tend to pay too much attention to international affairs and too little attention to the environment and climate when compared to their members’ preferences, but on other issues the programmes and the members are quite similar. When directly asked about it, youth wing members are predominantly positive about the extent to which the issues that receive most attention of their party youth wing meet their political interests. The latter seems to have remained stable over time.

Table 6.5 Extent to which respondents indicate that the devoted attention to issues by the youth wing meets their own interests (in %, breakdown for 2020)

	<i>Total</i> 1989	<i>Total</i> 2020*	CDJA	DWARS	JD	JS	PINK!	PpF	SGPJ
(Very) good	55	52	23	73	44	51	(71)	(30)	45
Sufficient	26	33	44	24	39	30	(25)	(40)	37
(Very) poor	12	8	23	0	9	14	(4)	(20)	6
Don’t know / no answer	-	7	11	3	8	5	(0)	(0)	12
<i>Total N</i>	531	944	189	66	225	98	24	30	282


Note. Survey question: “To what extent does this [the amount of attention devoted by the party youth wing to certain political themes] correspond to your own political interests?”. Values in brackets when $N < 50$. *Weighted by party youth wing size. Unweighted $N = 914$.

Position-based ideological congruence in 2020

While these results conceived ideological congruence between the members and party youth wings in terms of general issue salience, it can also be conceived in terms of ideological positions. In the survey, respondents were asked to score their own position, that of the party youth wing and that of the mother party on a general left-right dimension and on the issues

of euthanasia, income disparities, minority integration and European unification. The proximity on these dimensions provides valuable additional information about the ideological match between party youth wings and their members.

Figure 6.1 Spatial distribution of respondents' mean left-right positions of self, youth wing and mother party (2020)



Note. Survey question: "Political views are often said to be left or right. When you think of your own views, those of [party youth wing] and those of [mother party], where would you place them on the scale below?". Label in brackets when $N < 50$. See Appendix 6.1 for sample sizes, means, SDs and CIs.

Starting with the 10-point left-right scale, it is found that across party youth wings on average a rather small number of respondents indicated being perfectly congruent with the youth wing: around 18%. The majority of the remaining respondents reported lower levels of incongruence: 42% positioned themselves 1 point off. Almost 27% reported a 2-points difference and just over 10% of the respondents answered having a difference of three points with regard to the position of the youth wing. Although this implies that the majority consciously differentiated the own ideological position from that of the party youth wing, the scope of this differentiation remains limited. Considering the total absolute difference between the positions of the respondents and the party youth wing, an average distance of 1.4 is found.¹⁵⁰ The mean left-right positions are plotted in Figure 6.1 in order to provide insight into the ideological positions as perceived by the survey respondents. A straight dotted line signals the point where there is optimal congruence, i.e. where the differences are zero. Although there are no straight lines, it can again be concluded that on average the respondents placed the positions of their party youth wing and mother party relatively close to their own position on the left-right scale. Overall, they did tend to position themselves 1) as most deviant and 2) somewhat more to the left of both the youth wing and the mother party. The ideological positions of the party youth wing and the affiliated mother party were in most cases estimated as being close together. The SGPJ is a clear exception, as we can see that the survey respondents considered the party youth wing to be more right-wing than the

¹⁵⁰ 95% CI: 1.3, 1.5. Weighted by party youth wing size. In order to arrive at the total average absolute difference, I converted negative values into positive values by multiplying the value by -1. The average absolute difference scores of the various party youth wings are not far apart; a one-way ANOVA revealed no significant differences between the youth wings, $F(6, 882) = .24, p = .96$.


mother party and their own position. Moreover, except for DWARS and the JS, the figure indicates that respondents reported the position of the corresponding mother party as more similar to their own. Indeed, almost 27% of the respondents reported perfect congruence with the mother party, slightly more than 40% reported a 1-point difference, and around 24% chose a position 2 points off. The total average absolute difference between the positions of the respondents and the party is 1.2.¹⁵¹

The results are supplemented with self-placement scores of survey respondents regarding their own position, the party youth wing's position and the mother party's position on the substantive policy issues of euthanasia, income disparities, minority integration and European unification. The proportion of respondents who indicated perfect congruence is higher on these scales than on the left-right scale: 28% for the European unification scale, just over 29% for the euthanasia scale, 32% for the integration scale and almost 38% for the income disparities scale. Accordingly, the total average absolute difference between the positions of the respondents and the party youth wing on the one hand, and between the positions of the respondents and the party on the other hand, are lower for these policy scales than for the left-right scale. This is confirmed by Appendix 6.1, which shows that the absolute difference between the average estimated own position and that of the youth wing is low for most party youth wings.

The plotted mean positions in Figure 6.2 do show several noteworthy variations. The average scores on the euthanasia scale point to a relatively high congruence between the stance of the respondents and the corresponding party youth wings, particularly in case of the SGPJ, JD and DWARS. In all cases, the respondents scored the position of the mother party as most deviant and more to the left of the scale. Respondents from DWARS, JD, JS and PINK! were clearly in favour of euthanasia, while, not surprisingly, the confessional party youth wing respondents scored lower on this scale. On the issue of income disparities, the respondent-youth wing congruence is highest for the CDJA, SGPJ and PINK!. All party youth wings score higher than 4.5, indicating that they lean towards the ambition of reducing income disparities. In the majority of cases, the respondents estimated their party youth wing to be more in favour of reducing income disparities compared to the corresponding mother party. This is particularly the case for the JD. Considering the mean scores on the issue of minority integration, the SGPJ and PpF show the greatest congruence on this item. Moreover, it can be derived from the figure that respondents positioned themselves more in line with the mother party compared to the party youth wing. The spatial distribution shows a tendency towards the centre of the scale for all party youth wings. Respondents from the JD in particular believed that they are somewhat less inclined than the youth wing itself towards the position that minorities are allowed to maintain their own culture. On the issue of European unification, the positions of the party youth wings are further apart. At one extreme are the

¹⁵¹ 95% CI: 1.1, 1.2. Weighted by party youth wing size. In order to arrive at the total average absolute difference, I converted negative values into positive values by multiplying the value by -1.

Figure 6.2 Spatial distribution of respondents' mean positions of self, youth wing and party on euthanasia, income disparities, minority integration and European unification (2020)



Note. Overarching survey question: “Here are some political controversies. You are asked to indicate your own opinion, that of [party youth wing] and that of [mother party]”. Label in brackets when $N < 50$. See Appendix 6.1 for sample sizes, means, SDs and CIs.

respondents from the SGPJ, who believed that the European unification has gone too far. Respondents from DWARS and the JD, at the other extreme, were of the opinion that the European unification must continue. The respondent-youth wing congruence is highest for DWARS and the JS on this issue. The respondents from the CDJA, JD and SGPJ on average positioned themselves a bit more to the right of their party youth wing on this scale and estimated the position of the mother party as slightly more similar to their own position. For PINK! and PpF, this is the other way around, and the respondents estimated the position of the corresponding mother party as much further to the right on this scale. However, their low sample size and wide confidence interval must be taken into account (see Appendix 6.1).

All in all, apart from a few individual cases, the respondents do not deviate substantially from their party youth wing. The level of position-based ideological congruence is thus relatively high for Dutch party youth wings, although there is some variation between the ideological scales and the party youth wings. The majority of respondents reported some level of ideological incongruence on all five scales. At the same time, it can be argued that full congruence does not exist. When interpreting these results, it must be taken into account that the respondents were asked to place themselves, the party youth wing and the corresponding mother party on the presented scales. It might be that members who are less involved in the party youth wing are less informed about the political positions, although a passive membership alone already implies a certain degree of knowledge. That being said, it can be cautiously concluded that it was the experience of the respondents that their ideological positions are fairly similar to those of their party youth wing, meaning that the members' issue preferences can be well-represented.

6.3 The ability to articulate political interests

The second sub-function of the representation function consists of the articulation of political interests by party youth wings before relevant political actors. This section will be concerned with an analysis of the access of party youth wings to the political arena, which is considered a crucial step towards political influence. To recall, party youth wings can have access in two ways: 'inside' via the mother party or 'outside' via public visibility in the media. Each will be discussed consecutively.

Insider access

The study of intra-party factionalism has a long tradition in the literature on political parties (e.g. Boucek, 2009; Sartori, 1976; Zariski, 1960). Although often ignored, party youth wings may act as one of several factions within the party and as such may direct their articulation efforts towards the internal decisional bodies, for instance in the case of divergent political agendas and priorities. In order to determine the functioning of party youth wings on the internal interest articulation, it is assessed in this paragraph to what extent they have access to the internal decision-making processes of the mother party. This can be both formal and informal in nature and take place via various party channels. In what follows, therefore, I not only study the formal representation rights of a party's youth wing, but also what happens in

practice. To this end, both a content analysis of the party regulations and the annual reports of the youth wings were conducted for both time periods (see Chapter 3 and Appendix 3.6), the results of which are supplemented with findings from the interviews.

Table 6.6 presents which party channels are mentioned in the party regulations, in the annual reports of the youth wings and in the interviews with the youth wing chairs in the context of internal interest articulation efforts. The first striking result is that the use of various party channels in order to wield political influence within the mother party by Dutch party youth wings has increased since 1985. In 2016, all youth wings were in contact with members of the parliamentary group of the mother party and all youth wings but the youth wing of the Socialist Party (ROOD) sought access to the mother party's congress. Moreover, the majority of party youth wings reported being in contact with the party's executive board or other party bodies about their political interests. In 1985, the CDJA, JOVD and JS, the three youth wings of the major political parties, had internal access in particular via various party channels in order to get their voice heard. This was less the case for the other party youth wings at the time. In what follows, the insider access of the party youth wings in both time periods is elaborated on in more detail.

Table 6.6 Development in insider access of party youth wings to national party channels

Party youth wing	Around 1985				Around 2016			
	Parl. gr.	Board	Congr.	Other	Parl. gr.	Board	Congr.	Other
CDJA	i	f	f	f	i	f	f	i
PPRjo					-	-	-	-
PSJG			i*	i	-	-	-	-
DWARS	-	-	-	-	i	i	i	
JD	i				i		i	i
JOVD	i	i	i	i	i	f	i	
JS		f	f	f	i	f	i**	i
LVSJS/SGPJ				i	i		f	i
PINK!	-	-	-	-	i		i	
GPJC				i	-	-	-	-
RPJO					-	-	-	-
PpF	-	-	-	-	i		f	
ROOD	-	-	-	-	i	i		i
<i>Total</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>5</i>

Note. Based on regulations, annual reports and interviews. Parl.gr. = parliamentary group, board = executive board, congr. = party congress, other = other party channels, such as committees and the party council, f = access described in annual report or interview is formally laid down in the provisions, i = access described in annual report or interview has an informal character. *The available party regulations date from 1978, which do not mention the youth wing, while the annual report and former chair do mention a right to speak and hand in amendments at a PSP congress. **In the interview in 2014, the chair of the JS mentions the formal right to hand in amendments and motions at the party congress and member council, but this right disappeared in 2016.¹⁵²

¹⁵² In 2016, the PvdA changed the statutes and regulations due to a newly introduced way of member democracy. The one-person-one-vote model replaced the delegate model of representation. Since then, the party board and individual members are able to submit proposals, amendments and motions.

In the second half of the 1980s, seven party youth wings reported having undertaken efforts to exert internal political influence. The impression arises that the Christian democratic CDJA, the social democratic JS and the conservative liberal JOVD in particular were consciously engaged in influencing the mother party. This immediately becomes evident from role characterizations such as the CDJA as a “hornet”¹⁵³ and the JOVD and JS as a “thorn in the side”¹⁵⁴ vis-à-vis the mother party. The so-called ‘hornet function’ of the CDJA, the youth wing of the largest government party at the time, was to point the CDA to its ideals and to move the party in a certain direction, as the former chairman explained in the interview. He described various ways in which the CDJA proceeded, such as by submitting proposals or lobbying the parliamentary group and the party administration in the run-up to a meeting of the party council. Also worth mentioning are initiatives such as the so-called ‘parliamentary counselling groups’,¹⁵⁵ in which CDJA members discussed a theme or idea with members of parliament of the CDA, or the ‘agenda committee youth policy’, in which the CDJA participated together with two MPs and two other representatives of the mother party (CDJA, 1985, p. 38). The CDJA thus consciously tried to get access to all possible party channels to exert political influence. The JOVD and the JS were also doing so, although perhaps to a slightly lesser extent. The former JOVD chairman indicated in the interview that the attempts to influence the mother party were mainly aimed at (former) JOVD members with a seat in the House of Representatives, besides which he met with the party’s administration and spoke at party congresses. This is also evident from the annual report, in which it is stated that the JOVD met with representatives of the VVD to discuss its “political core programme”.¹⁵⁶ In this context, the former chair emphasized that the JOVD saw itself as an independent organization, which also lobbied other parties, although they were most related to the VVD. The JS exercised its formal rights by filing amendments at the party congress and by attending meetings of the leadership of the mother party, the PvdA. The former chair explained in the interview: “We just wanted to make the world a better place, and we wanted to do that through the party that had the most influence on the left flank, which was the PvdA”.¹⁵⁷ He elaborated that he tried to change the draft election manifesto via the meetings of the party leadership, and that he attended weekends hosted by the mother party’s parliamentary group. The annual report of the JS also mentions various publications by the JS that aimed to influence the political course of the mother party.¹⁵⁸

Other party youth wings reported having some access to the party’s decision-making processes, although that was more in the form of thinking along rather than deliberate

¹⁵³ In Dutch: *horzel*. Interview with the former chair of the CDJA, 2020. This function was explicitly expressed in, among other things, the CDJA column called ‘hornet’ in the party magazine: “(...) de meest geïnstitutionaliseerde vorm van ludieke actie niet onvermeld blijven: ‘Horzel’ in CDActueel, een column waarin fel wordt uitgehaald naar het CDA wanneer dat nodig is” (Sap, Scholten, & Van den Born, 1991, p. 57).

¹⁵⁴ In Dutch: *luis in de pels*. Interview with the former chairs of the JS and JOVD, 2020.

¹⁵⁵ In Dutch: *fractiebegeleidingsgroepen*. Interview with the former chair of the CDJA, 2020.

¹⁵⁶ *JOVD, Jaarverslag 1985*, p. 11. In Dutch: *Politieke Kern Programma (PKP)*.

¹⁵⁷ In Dutch: “Daarnaast wilden we natuurlijk gewoon dat de wereld ging verbeteren, en dat wilden we doen via de partij die de meeste invloed had aan de linkerflank, dat was de partij van de arbeid”.

¹⁵⁸ *JS, Jaarverslagen algemeen bestuur 1984 - 1985*, p. 3.

orchestrated lobby attempts. The LVSGS/SGPJ had set up a successful magazine in the mid-1980s, which, according to the former chair, was used to exert political influence within the mother party (SGP). The chair of the GPJC explained in the interview that the youth wing did send delegates to an advisory body of the mother party (GPV)¹⁵⁹ and did participate in committees that prepared the election manifesto, but that they were not that much interested in putting pressure on the mother party. From the interview with the former chairman of the JD it appears that the JD was also not looking for that:

We were not concerned with this much. The Young Democrats did not speak at the D66 congress. We did not join a parliamentary group meeting or any other D66 meeting as the Young Democrats. (...) Secondly, it was not appreciated by the party whenever you did so. (...) The aim was not primarily to engage in political influence.¹⁶⁰

The PSJG may be the odd one out here, as it had a more activist character and mainly focused on extra-parliamentary actions. The former chair did describe how the youth wing tried to pull the mother party (PSP) in the direction of social movements, for instance via proposals and playful actions at the party congress. The remaining party youth wings from that time, the RPJO and PPRjo, did not mention any efforts to influence party decisional bodies in their annual reports. The former chair of the RPJO confirmed this in the interview: “We had no voting rights at the party congress (...) zero influence on the content of decision-making [of the party]”.¹⁶¹

In contrast to 1985-90, all Dutch party youth wings seemed to be more or less engaged in lobbying the mother party in the period of 2014-20. They did so primarily by making use of their powers at party congresses and by contacting the party’s MPs (Table 6.6). For example, the CDJA speaks of an adopted resolution by the party congress,¹⁶² DWARS describes various successes at the party congress,¹⁶³ the JD reports five passed motions,¹⁶⁴ and PpF mentions no less than 30 submitted motions and amendments to the election manifesto of the mother party.¹⁶⁵ The JOVD does not mention such formal proposals, but reports a speech of its chair at the party congress and a plea for the legalization of soft drugs.¹⁶⁶ Only ROOD did not exert influence at party congresses. The youth wing of the SP seemed to limit itself to informal contact with the mother party, focusing exclusively on issues “where they can contribute”,

¹⁵⁹ This body (in Dutch: *de Verbondsadviesraad*) consisted of representatives from the provincial branches and the youth wing, and advised the party leadership of the GPV about political issues.

¹⁶⁰ In Dutch: “We hielden ons hier niet zoveel mee bezig. De Jonge Democraten sprak niet op het congres van D66. We gingen niet naar een fractievergadering of een andere bijeenkomst als de Jonge Democraten. (...). Secundair werd het door de partij ook niet zo in dank afgenomen als je het deed. (...) Soms probeerde je er wat mee te bereiken maar dat was niet altijd primair de doelstelling”.

¹⁶¹ In Dutch: “We hadden bijvoorbeeld geen stemrecht op het partijcongres (...) nul invloed op de inhoud van de besluitvorming”.

¹⁶² CDJA, VIII. CDJA, in *Jaarverslag 2016 CDA en gelieerde organen en organisaties op landelijk niveau*, p. 158.

¹⁶³ DWARS, *Congresreader Dwars Groenlinkse Jongeren Zomercongres 2017 Groningen*, p. 12.

¹⁶⁴ JD, *Bestuursverantwoording 2015-2016, in Jonge Democraten September ALV 75 Congresboek versie 3*, p. 12.

¹⁶⁵ PpF, *Jaarverslag '16-'17, in Bijlagen bij besluit wob-verzoek over financiering politieke partijen – 2016*, p. 5.

¹⁶⁶ JOVD, *Secretarieel Jaarverslag 2016 aangeboden aan de Jaarlijkse Algemene Vergadering 2017, 1 april 2017*, p. 11.

mostly youth topics: “We are not going to grumble about political positions like a little club within the SP, it just does not work that way. And that is what you are also SP member for, to discuss it there [within the party]”.¹⁶⁷ The parliamentary group was also a more popular party arena for party youth wings to exert influence in 2016. In some cases, this involved attending the parliamentary group meetings, in other cases individual members of parliament were approached about a specific issue. Although the chair of the JOVD indicated not joining parliamentary group meetings in order to preserve independence, the youth wing does report “frequent contact with various MPs”.¹⁶⁸ And while the CDJA does not cover anything about this in the annual report, the chair described in the interview that he has a lot of contact with members of the parliamentary group of the mother party “about what is going on, to express a little support too, but also, because you know what is going on, to be critical”.¹⁶⁹ In addition to the two aforementioned party channels, some party youth wings reported contact with the party management or other party bodies. The latter mainly concerned contact with the election programme committee of the mother party.

At the same time, it should be noted that in the interviews most chairpersons nuanced the opportunities for exerting influence or described the boundaries thereof. Such as the SGPJ chair who, to his “great irritation”, was not allowed to speak at the members' meeting of the mother party, or the chair of the JS, who described that he was not allowed to say anything at the meeting of the parliamentary party of the PvdA. The former chair of the CDJA indicated that he always had to fight for his right to speak during the party congress, as “1) there was never enough time and 2) there was always a reason why it was not a good time for deviant ideas to be heard”.¹⁷⁰ The JD chairman pointed out that the role of the JD is limited to putting things on the agenda, as ultimately the individual members of D66 determine where things go. Similarly, the former chair of the JOVD from the 1980s indicated that the influence at the time should not be overestimated, as “in the end, the parliamentary party does what it wants”. The chairman of DWARS emphasized that the degree of influence depends on the subject:

On some subjects we really have influence, what we say is really appreciated, they are interested in our opinion. On other subjects we are not needed, and we obviously do not have an equally sharp vision on everything, because that depends on what you as members study and what you write a vision on.

Other chairs argued that there is not always a need to exert influence within the mother party. This seems to be related to whether the mother party is part of the opposition or the coalition.

¹⁶⁷ Interview 2014, in Dutch: “We gaan niet als een clubje binnen de SP mopperen over standpunten, zo werkt het gewoon niet. En daar ben je SP'er voor, om het daar bespreekbaar te maken”.

¹⁶⁸ *JOVD, Secretarieel Jaarverslag 2016 aangeboden aan de Jaarlijkse Algemene Vergadering 2017, 1 april 2017*, p. 11.

¹⁶⁹ In Dutch: “Maar ik vind het heel belangrijk wat ik net al zei (...), dat ik graag met Kamerleden praat over wat speelt er, beetje ondersteunen ook, maar ook doordat je weet wat er speelt kritisch kunnen zijn. Dus ik heb veel contact met de Kamer”.

¹⁷⁰ In Dutch: “Dat moesten we altijd bevechten, want 1) er was nooit tijd voor en 2) er was altijd een reden dat er nu niet een afwijkend geluid moest worden gehoord”.

The chair of PINK!, for instance, indicated that “there are few differences of opinion with the mother party, which itself is already acting as a thorn in the side”. When asked whether the JOVD would be less critical when the VVD would be part of the opposition, the chair of the JOVD, answered: “Yes, because then they often stay closer to their views. Then it is much less interesting to say something about it”.¹⁷¹ Similarly, the former CDJA chair stated that they wanted to remind the CDA, “as a party of power”, of its ideals. This was also mentioned by the former chair of the JS, who argued that the JS was much more left-wing than the PVDA because the party would continue to shift to the right due to coalition partnerships. A cautious conclusion could therefore be that the youth wings of the political parties find it primarily important that the party remains close to its ideology. When a party has to make compromises within a coalition, this ideology will naturally have to be compromised, leading to a more critical role of the youth wing.

Another interesting result to emerge from the data in Table 6.6 is that the insider access of Dutch party youth wings is not limited to that which has been formally laid down in the statutes and bylaws of their party.¹⁷² In both time periods, formal access alternated with informal types of insider access. In many cases, political parties did not include any provision on the representative access of party youth wings at all. This was particularly the case in the late 1980s, when only two party youth wings, the CDJA and the JS, were formally assigned representation rights. These rights did depict a strong connection between these youth wings and their mother parties. For instance, the CDJA had the right to send representatives with voting rights to the party congress (art. 66), and its board members had an ex officio right to fully participate in the party council (art. 68) and executive board the CDA (art. 70). The JS was able to delegate an advisory member to the party’s executive board (art. 42) and to various executive bodies at the decentral level (art. 22, 25), and was authorized to submit proposals and speak to the party congress (art. 41). Compared to the period of 2014-2020, the representation rights of these two party youth wings have now decreased somewhat in strength,¹⁷³ while other party youth wings were granted certain formal representative rights. With respect to the party’s executive board, the CDJA did have the right to assign a delegate with voting rights (art. 32.1) in 2016, and the PvdA and the VVD included in the statutes of around 2016 that a delegate of the youth wing is allowed to attend meetings of the national executive board with an advisory vote (art. 10.2 and art. 17.19, respectively). The CDA, CU and SGP codified the representative access of the youth wing at the party congress: the three youth wings had the right to hand in proposals at the party congress in the late 2010s.¹⁷⁴ It

¹⁷¹ In Dutch: “Denk je dat je minder kritisch zou zijn als de VVD in de oppositie zou zitten?” “Ja, want dan blijven ze vaak ook dicht bij hun standpunten. Dan is het veel minder interessant om daar wat over ze zeggen”.

¹⁷² An overview of the consulted intra-party regulations is presented in Appendix 3.6.

¹⁷³ The reduction of the formal representative access of these party youth wings was a result of party organizational changes. For example, both the CDA and PvdA party council ceased to exist, meaning that provisions on representation within this governing body were removed. Within the PvdA, the decision-making process has changed to such an extent that party sub-organizations lost their rights at the party congress (see also footnote 152).

¹⁷⁴ This concerns the following provisions in the party statutes and internal rules (HR): CDA art. 23.9 (HR, 2016), CU art. 11.1 (*Reglement Partijcongres*, 2015), and SGP art. 21.3 (2015). See Appendix 3.6.

can thus be concluded that more party youth wings had formal representation rights within the mother party in the mid-late 2010s than in the mid-late 1980s, although four party youth wings still did not enjoy formal rights for articulating their interests within the party organization. Moreover, the existing provisions were limited in strength. They often concerned one or two party arenas and did not go much further than a right to propose or advise, although having a seat at the board table does give access to the core party decisional bodies. Although party regulations are often taken as a starting point, as they “tend to reflect the existing balance of power within the party as a political system” (Katz & Mair, 1992a, p. 7), the present findings underline the need to study the insider access of party sub-organizations beyond party regulations. One must be careful with drawing conclusions from changes in the formal bond between party and youth wing (Welp, 1999).


In conclusion, the findings represent an increase in the extent to which party youth wings seek to exert influence on the political decision-making process via the mother party since the second half of the 1980s. They are clearly successful in getting access to the core party decisional bodies and expressing their voice, regardless of what has been formally laid down in regulations. It has to be emphasized, however, that it is not possible to draw any conclusions about the success of party youth wings in actually having an impact. Together with the findings of the previous section that the aggregation efforts and political profile of party youth wings have also increased, the findings suggest that Dutch party youth wings are increasingly taking on a political character. They are therefore, more than in the past, a faction that must be taken into account in studies of intra-party politics.

Outsider access

Aside from exerting influence within the mother party, party youth wings may also try to influence political decision-making processes through external channels. The ultimate channel is the media, although it is not self-evident that party youth wings succeed in their efforts to attract attention: “It is one thing to seek media attention; to make it to the news is another”, while at the same time it is also argued that media attention is generally “biased towards actors possessing prominent insider positions” (Binderkrantz, 2012, pp. 117-118). This paragraph will present the results of the analysis of party youth wing appearance in five Dutch national newspapers in both time periods under scrutiny. Admittedly, such mentions will not always concern intentional political behaviour, nor is media coverage a guarantee of political influence. But they do reflect the extent to which party youth wings get the opportunity to publicly express their political interests through the media. Figure 6.3 presents the aggregated media appearances of party youth wings of parliamentary parties in absolute numbers in 1985-90 and 2014-19. In total, there were 811 appearances in the mid-late 1980s and 667 appearances in the mid-late 2010s. This represents a net decline of 17.8%, a result that implies that youth wings were less successful in attracting media coverage in the 2010s.


Figure 6.4 displays the figures for the individual party youth wings. It shows that the media prominence which youth wings enjoy is far from equally distributed across the youth

Figure 6.3 Development in total party youth wing appearances in national newspapers



Note. Absolute numbers. T = time period, m = mean, s = sum. Excluding advertisements and passing references.¹⁷⁵
 Included newspapers: *De Telegraaf, De Volkskrant, Het Parool, NRC Handelsblad, Trouw* (Appendix 3.7).

Figure 6.4 Development in individual party youth wing appearances in national newspapers



Note. Absolute numbers. *The score of DWARS for the late 1980s is the sum of media appearances of the PPRjo and PSJG. **The score of PpF for the late 1980s is the sum of media appearances of the GPJC and RPJO.

¹⁷⁵ Party youth wings can be mentioned in residual newspaper content such as advertisements, reviews or even puzzles, or in passing in order to provide context or background information. In the period of 1985 to 1990, advertisements about events, vacancies or political action were much more common, for which nowadays online media is used. Although these kinds of mentions may add to the visibility of the youth wing, such media appearances cannot be counted as coverage of the political influence of party youth wings.

wings. In the second half of the 1980s, the three youth wings of the – at that time –traditionally dominant and governing parties made up the bulk of the party youth wing appearances: the young Christian democrats (CDJA), the young liberal conservatives (JOVD) and the young socialists (JS). Compared to these three, the other party youth wings were weakly represented in the media sources examined. The interviews do give the impression that the party youth wings were all concerned with getting media attention at the time. They sent out press releases, occasionally submitted letters to the newspapers or gave interviews, and on rare moments appeared on TV. The goal was not only to get their message across, but also to gain publicity in order to recruit new members. Most youth wings tried to get into the newspaper through substantive reflections on policy issues, while the PSJG did so by attracting attention through extra-parliamentary actions. The chairs of the youth wings of the smaller political parties indicated in the interviews that it was often difficult to get media attention, especially beyond local newspapers.

In the second half of the 2010s, the number of media appearances was somewhat more spread out across the various youth wings. It can be derived from the figure that the CDJA, JS and JOVD suffered from a decline in media coverage between the two periods, although the JOVD still stood out with a share of 27% of the total youth wing media appearances in the mid-late 2010s. Other party youth wings with a relatively high share of mentions in this time period are the JD (18.7%) and the JS (18.3%). The interviews demonstrate that the media were perceived by all party youth wings as an important means for gaining publicity and gaining political influence. For instance, even the chairs of the SGPJ and PpF, the youth wings of two small Protestant parties, described the media as an important “lever” and “battering ram” respectively. Similarly, the chair of the JOVD indicated that the youth wing strategically uses the media as a tool for agenda setting within the mother party: “Because it is then better known to a wider audience and they [the VVD] themselves have to respond, so they are forced to think about it”.¹⁷⁶ The chair of ROOD pointed to the importance of media attention for reaching the constituency instead of influencing the political decision-making: “We try to use the media to make our actions bigger, better known, so that more young people see that and more young people start to act”.¹⁷⁷

The results presented so far show that Dutch party youth wings have been somewhat less successful in attracting media attention in the late 2010s than in the late 1980s. This decrease can be attributed to the youth wings of the oldest mainstream parties – the Christian democratic CDA, the social democratic PvdA, and the liberal conservative VVD. However, the CDJA, JS and JOVD, along with the JD, were still the most featured in the newspaper media in the period of 2014-2019 compared to the other youth wings. It must be noted that the decline in media attention and differences across party youth wings cannot be attributed solely to the

¹⁷⁶ In Dutch: “In de media is dat ook, maar dan is het bekender bij een breder publiek en zelf moeten ze ook wel reageren dus dan worden ze gedwongen erover na te denken”.

¹⁷⁷ In Dutch: “Dus wij proberen de media te gebruiken om onze acties groter te maken, bekender te maken, zodat meer jongeren dat zien en meer jongeren in beweging komen”.

youth wings themselves. Factors such as newspaper characteristics,¹⁷⁸ resources,¹⁷⁹ issue characteristics¹⁸⁰ and mother party performance and conflict may also play a role. Zooming in on the latter, it seems obvious that the dominance of the party plays an important role, since political parties that are part of the government coalition receive relatively more attention in the media (Vliegthart & Van Aelst, 2010, p. 345). This also seems to apply to the affiliated youth wings. The interviews provide several other examples of how the mother party plays a role in seeking and getting media access. Most chairs from both time periods stressed the importance of relating their media expressions to the mother party, such as brought forward by the chair of DWARS, the youth wing of GreenLeft (GL): “The easiest way to get into the media is by going against your mother party”. The chair of the JS elaborated: “The media are actually only interested in two things: 1) criticism of the PvdA or 2) reflections when the PvdA is not doing well”.¹⁸¹ The former chair of the JD therefore noted that criticism of the mother party is a “nice way to get publicity”. However, the pursuit of such a strategy seems to depend on the situation of the mother party. The chair of PINK! explained that in case of conflicting views with their mother party, the Party for the Animals (PvdD), they do not approach the media because the party is “small and fragile”. The larger governing parties thus seem easier to criticize. This shows that different dynamics need to be taken into account when interpreting the findings.

While these results provide important information about the extent of outsider access of party youth wings, information about the quality of the media appearances is missing. In what follows, the focus is therefore broadened by including the results of the content analysis, which allows us to assess whether the nature of the party youth wing mentions in the newspaper media has also changed over time (Table 6.7).

Firstly, it is possible to break down the figures to mentions in headlines and various newspaper categories. From this it can be derived that the prominence of party youth wings in the newspapers seems to have declined. In 21.5% of the cases in the period of 1985-1990, the headline mentioned a youth wing, as compared to 7.8% in 2014-2019. Headlines often serve as short summaries of the article, thus showing the relative importance of the party youth wing in the content. In addition, looking at various content categories of newspapers, the proportion of youth wing appearances in neutral news reports has declined from 75.9% in

¹⁷⁸ Examples are the rise of digital news reporting or altered reporting methods. Changes in the volume of the newspapers may also play a role. A rough scan of the occurrence of definite and indefinite articles (‘de’, ‘het’, ‘een’) during one month of 1986 and 2016 indicates a decrease in the size of the newspapers under scrutiny, except for *NRC Handelsblad*. *Trouw* and *Het Parool* seem to have decreased with around 50%, *De Volkskrant* with just over 35% and *De Telegraaf* with approximately 20%. However, this does not automatically need to have consequences for the appearance of party youth wings.

¹⁷⁹ An important development in this regard is the explosive growth of social media, providing youth wings with the means to spread information online and to start political campaigns without traditional media coverage.

¹⁸⁰ Several chairs indicated that media attention, among other things, depends on what issues are being discussed in the political arena and what issues the youth wings bring forward. It seems that on those issues that are inseparable from the younger generation, such as education, they tend to receive more media attention. It differs per period whether such issues are topical.

¹⁸¹ In Dutch: “(...) alleen zijn media eigenlijk maar geïnteresseerd in twee dingen: 1. De kritiek op de PvdA of 2. Beschouwingen als het slecht gaat met de PvdA”.

the late 1980s to 56.1% in the late 2010s. On the other hand, the share of mentions in the category ‘comment/opinion’ has increased with almost 18 percentage points to 34% in the recent period. Commentary sections are often less prominently situated than news articles, but they do provide room for political actors to freely put their own views in the spotlight.

Table 6.7 Development in youth wing appearance in national newspapers to news characteristics

		1985-1990		2014-2019		Difference in pp.
		#	%	#	%	
<i>Headlines</i>	Party youth wing is mentioned	174	22	52	8	-14
	Party youth wing is not mentioned	637	79	615	92	13
	<i>Total</i>	<i>811</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>667</i>	<i>100</i>	-
<i>Content categories</i>	News report*	598	76	374	56	-20
	Commentary or opinion	128	16	227	34	18
	Personal profile or interview	24	3	39	6	3
	Newspaper appendix	38	5	27	4	-1
	<i>Total</i>	<i>788**</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>667</i>	<i>100</i>	-
<i>Type of appearance</i>	Party youth wing has authored the article***	64	8	124	19	11
	Party youth wing is quoted directly	265	34	205	31	-3
	Views/actions of party youth wing are referred to	344	44	235	35	-9
	Party youth wing is mentioned by others	27	3	17	3	0
	Other appearances	88	11	86	13	2
	<i>Total</i>	<i>788**</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>667</i>	<i>100</i>	-

Note. *This category also includes in-depth background articles. **Does not add up to 811 because of 23 missing contents in the online newspaper database. ***Also falls under the content category of ‘commentary or opinion’.

Whether or not party youth wings indeed author their own articles, can be derived from the analysis of the type of appearance (Table 6.7). Party youth wings can appear in newspaper articles as the author, as an organization from which quotes, views and actions are described, or as mentioned by others. It can be concluded that all forms have declined, except for authorship. The proportion of authored pieces relative to the total media appearances increased from 8.1% in 1985-1990 to 18.6% in 2014-2019. A little more than a third of the total appearances in both time periods concern direct quotes of party youth wings. The share of referrals to views or actions of party youth wings has declined with 8.5 percentage points to 35%. The number of mentions by others or other appearances in newspaper articles have remained relatively stable over time. Arguably, the first three categories are most important for the articulation of political interests. Particularly those articles authored by party youth wings themselves can be understood as a conscious strategic move. But giving quotes and generating attention for views and actions are also direct expressions of political influence. These results tell us that if a party youth wing appears in the newspaper, it is now more often than before in the form of an opinion piece than in another form. Indeed, most youth wing

chairs of the late 2010s highlighted this proactive media strategy in the interviews, such as the chair of PpF, who pointed out that they “on average write a column or opinion article once every month”, particularly in the Christian daily newspapers. Only ROOD, the youth wing of the Socialist Party, indicated not making use of opinion articles: “Some youth wings think they have influence through opinion pieces and things like that, I don't believe in that at all”.

The question of this paragraph was whether party youth wings are able to make their views heard via the media and whether this ability has changed over time. It has become clear that party youth wings receive attention from the largest national newspapers, although they have become less successful in attracting this media attention over time. Both the quantity and the quality of media appearances in national newspapers under scrutiny declined slightly since the second half of the 1980s. However, the traditional media are still seen by the party youth wings as an important means for gaining publicity and getting their political views into the spotlight, which is remarkable considering the rise of social media since the 1980s. This has become evident from both the interviews and from the increased number of written opinion pieces published in the newspapers. The chair of DWARS summarized the importance of the media for the youth wing as follows: “It is not only in the direction of GroenLinks that we are engaged in substantive matters, but we also try to make an independent voice heard, to approach the media ourselves, so to have a say in the overall politics”.¹⁸²

6.4 The ability to enhance descriptive representation

While the previous two sections focused on the substantive representation by party youth wings, this section will analyse the descriptive representation. This sub-function concerns the presence of youth wing members in representative positions. As described in Chapter 2, there have been concerns for some time that young people are underrepresented in legislative bodies (e.g. IPU, 2016). Party youth wings have the potential to identify, nurture and support young political candidates, and hereby enhance the presence of young people in political office. In order to assess the functioning of Dutch party youth wings regarding this function, this section will analyse the share of youth wing members with a seat in national parliament and contrast that to the total number of members of parliament (MPs) under the age of 30. In addition, it will explore the role of party youth wings in the candidate selection process.

Youth wing members' share of parliamentary seats

Both periods under scrutiny include MPs who were aged below 30 when they entered the Dutch House of Representatives (Table 6.8). In the period of 1985-1990, there were three such MPs, all of whom were involved in the youth wing of their political party. One was a member of the JS, the other two were involved in the CDJA. In the period of 2014-2020, four of the five MPs that entered parliament at the age of 29 or below were a member of a party youth wing. This concerns two members of the JD, one of the JOVD and one of PINK!

¹⁸² In Dutch: “Het is niet alleen richting GroenLinks dat we inhoudelijk bezig zijn maar we proberen ook gewoon zelfstandig inhoudelijk geluid te laten horen, zelf de media op te zoeken, dus de algehele politiek bijsturen”.

Table 6.8 Young MPs with involvement in a party youth wing

	<i>1985-1990</i>	<i>2014-2020</i>
Number of MPs aged <30 y/o	3	5
Number of MPs aged <30 y/o from PYW	3	4
PYW	CDJA (2), JS (1)	JD (2), JOVD (1), PINK! (1)

Note. PYW = party youth wing.


This points to an ability of party youth wings to promote the representation of young people in national parliament, but the number of cases is too low to draw firm conclusions. In order to study this in more detail, I therefore adopt a wider time frame. Although this means going beyond the comparison of the two selected time periods, it provides a better picture of the performance of party youth wings on this sub-function. Data is available since it became possible for individuals under 30 years old to be elected. The minimum age for election was lowered to 25 in 1963¹⁸³ and the first young person aged just below 30 won a seat in 1967. In total, 62 MPs have entered parliament below their thirties since then. The results confirm the performance of youth wings on this sub-function: 41 out of 62 MPs (66%) that entered the House of Representatives below their thirties have a background in a party youth wing (see Appendix 6.2 for an overview). In one case, a young MP had been involved in a party youth wing of another party. All other MPs have a background in the youth wing that is affiliated to their own political party.

The number of MPs aged below 30 on their inauguration date is plotted over time in Figure 6.5. The proportion of young MPs with youth wing involvement has been above 50% since 1970, with peaks of 78% in the period of 1980-1990 and 83% in 1990-2000. In the last two decades, we can see that this proportion was about 65%. Especially since the beginning of this century, there has been an increase in the total number of elected officials under the age of 30. The absolute number of young MPs with youth wing involvement has thus also increased.

The aggregated data can be broken down by party (Table 6.9). Surely, the performance of the distinctive party youth wings on this sub-function depends for a large part on the number of seats the mother party has in parliament. It indeed becomes clear that the CDJA, JS and JOVD have been most successful in delivering young MPs, of which the mother parties can be characterized as large, mainstream parties for a large part of the study period. As Appendix 6.2 shows, they were particularly the main suppliers in the period until 2000. Only three MPs of other political parties, D66, PSP and SGP, entered parliament with a background in the youth wing in the period of 1960-2000. Another noteworthy result is that the young parliamentarians of the VVD were always involved with the affiliated youth wing, while for the PvdA this laid slightly above 50%. A party that also relied to a relatively smaller extent on its youth wing for submitting youth candidates for the House of Representatives is the socialist SP.

¹⁸³ It was again lowered in 1983, from 25 to 18 years old.

Figure 6.5 Number of Dutch MPs aged <30 y/o on inauguration date per decade (1960-2020)



Note. $N = 62$. *PYW = party youth wing involvement.

Table 6.9 Number of MPs aged <30 y/o on inauguration date per party (1960-2020)

Mother party / youth wing	Total young MPs	Of which involved in a PYW	% PYW involvement
CDA / CDJA	10	7	70
CU / PpF	1	1	100
D66 / JD	6	4	67
GL / DWARS*	5	4	80
LPF / JF	3	0	0
PvdA / JS	17	9	53
PvdD / PINK!	1	1	100
PVV / -	2	1**	50
SGP / SGPJ	1	1	100
SP / ROOD	7	4	57
VVD / JOVD	9	9	100
Total	62	41	66

Note. PYW = party youth wing. *Including the data for the PPR and the PSP, these parties merged into GL in 1990.

**The person concerned was a member of the JOVD; the PVV was founded in 2006 and has no youth wing.

Strategies for influencing candidate selection

It has become clear that party youth wings contribute to paving the way to national parliament for young adults, although their exact role cannot be uncovered with these statistics. Data from interviews and other documents provide more clarity on this. Although the precise candidate selection methods differ per political party (e.g. Hazan & Voerman, 2006), in general three stages can be identified in which party youth wings exert influence on the selection and election of young candidates: the stage in which the provisional list is drafted, the stage in which the final list is adopted and the stage in which votes are obtained

during the election.¹⁸⁴

There are many examples of efforts undertaken by party youth wings in both time periods in order to influence the nomination of candidates. Take, for instance, Ewout Klei's book on the JOVD, in which he describes several cases of how the youth wing lobbied the mother party to get (ex-)JOVD members on election lists over time (Klei, 2015, pp. 40, 70, 76). The JOVD chair of the late 1980s remembered in the interview that he, together with other board members, called all chairpersons of the regional divisions of the mother party to promote young candidates for the parliamentary elections.¹⁸⁵ The CDJA undertook similar efforts, as evidenced by the 1985 annual report, which explicitly states that the CDJA exerted influence on the nomination procedure for the parliamentary elections.¹⁸⁶ This is echoed in the interview by the former chair of the CDJA. He claimed that the youth wing's power was actually greatest in the nomination process when it tried to build coalitions with the regional branches of the mother party, as these played an important role in the adoption of the list of candidates for the CDA. The chair of the youth wing of the PvdA, the third major party at the time, did not recall that the JS was explicitly concerned with influencing the nomination of candidates, although the campaign materials of the JS for the 1989 elections do mention such efforts.¹⁸⁷ It must be noted that attempts to influence the selection of candidates were also undertaken by the youth wings of the smaller parties in the late 1980s. For instance, the former chairman of the LVSGS/SGPJ said in the interview that he, unlike his predecessors, was on a mission to get more young people into positions within the ranks of the mother party. His attempts were successful: "Everywhere in the [party's] institutions you saw young people appear (...) such as in the electoral associations, but also on the electoral lists for the municipal council, the provincial councils, and the Senate and House of Representatives".¹⁸⁸

Party youth wings still undertook such efforts in the second half of the 2010s, which seem to have professionalized since then. In the interview that was conducted in 2014, the chair of the CDJA explained how they took the initiative to ensure that young people were on the local election lists of the mother party:

We started the 'Generation 2014' project two years ago. We have simply trained more than 175 young people, trained them to become aspiring councillors. (...) I went on the road, and my predecessor also went to all those CDA branches, to say: make sure that a young person whom we trained gets into the top 5. Don't put them on 13 or ineligible (...).

¹⁸⁴ The Netherlands, with its system of proportional representation, has a single nationwide district, meaning that political parties need to adopt one candidate list for national elections (Andeweg, Irwin & Louwerse, 2020).

¹⁸⁵ Until 2016, the VVD consisted of regional divisions (in Dutch: *kamercentrales*) of which the chairs generally had an influential position, particularly in case of the nomination process for the parliamentary elections (until 2004). They were therefore informally called the 'party barons'. See also Voerman & Dijk (2008, p. 133).

¹⁸⁶ *CDJA, Jaarverslag 1985, in Jaarverslag CDA 1985, p. 37.*

¹⁸⁷ On one of the campaign flyers of the JS from 1985-1990, a young candidate states: "(...) De Jonge Socialisten proberen de standpunten van de partij te beïnvloeden, en de aanpak van die partij te verbeteren. Door in verschillende regio's mensen voor de kandidatenlijst te leveren, geven we aan dat we in die partij een rol willen spelen".

¹⁸⁸ In Dutch: "Je zag overal in de instituties jongeren verschijnen. (...) Bijvoorbeeld [in] de kiesverenigingen, maar ook [op] de kandidatenlijsten voor de gemeenteraad, de provinciale staten, de eerste en tweede kamer".

The chair of DWARS described a similar training programme that was set up in 2014:

For the municipal council campaign, we also had ‘Trajectory 2014’, which was a trajectory for all DWARS members who wanted to run for election. They had a number of meetings where they were prepared for all aspects of the council and campaign work.

I will address these training programmes in more detail in Chapter 7. It must be noted that the attempt to get young people from the youth wing onto electoral lists was not entirely one-sided. The party itself also sometimes seemed to take the initiative by recruiting candidates from among the active members of the youth wing, as youth wing members could build a certain political track record and stand out through their membership.¹⁸⁹

The efforts of the youth wings are not limited to the stage of compiling the provisional electoral lists. The second stage, in which the final list is adopted, also provides opportunities to promote the selection of young candidates, although fewer examples of such efforts by youth wings were encountered in the interviews and documents. In an interview with the women's network of the University of Utrecht, Sharon Dijksma, who was elected to the House of Representatives in 1994 at the age of 23, aptly elaborated how her party youth wing made sure she ended up in a higher position than initially proposed by the selection committee:

I was then put in 42nd place, which was really ineligible at the time. However, I was not satisfied with that, I thought: the progressive PvdA, which exclaims that it wants to attract more young people, and especially young women, must be able to do better. And fortunately, my organization (...) felt the same way. So, they held a brief but fierce lobby for me during the PvdA congress and I was placed higher on the list.¹⁹⁰

Considering the last stage, the actual parliamentary elections, there are some examples of specific campaigning efforts by youth wings for young candidates on electoral lists during the elections. PpF reported in its annual report 2017-2018 how the youth wing tried to influence the local elections:

Most local branches have had good contacts with the local campaign team of the ChristenUnie and were able to put a young candidate in the spotlight, for example. Most youth ambassadors were themselves on the candidate list and participated in the campaign from that position.¹⁹¹

The chair of the CDJA also mentioned in the interview that they campaign for their youth candidates. These examples illustrate in what way party youth wings actively take up the

¹⁸⁹ As mentioned, for instance, in the interviews conducted in 2020 by the former chairs of the LVSGS/SGPJ, JOVD, and the JS.

¹⁹⁰ *Pandora*, September 1994, 9(3), p. 6. In Dutch: “Men heeft mij toen op een 42^e plaats gezet, wat in die tijd echt onverkiesbaar was. Ik nam daar echter geen genoegen mee, ik dacht: de progressieve PvdA, die toch roept dat ze meer jonge mensen, en vooral jonge vrouwen aan zich wil binden, dat moet beter kunnen. En mijn organisatie (Jonge Socialisten-IR) dacht er gelukkig net zo over. Dus hebben ze een korte maar hevige lobby voor me gevoerd tijdens het PvdA-congres en werd ik hoger op de lijst geplaatst”.

¹⁹¹ *PpF*, *Jaarverslag perspectief '17 – '18*, p. 9-10. In Dutch: “De meeste lokale afdelingen hebben goede contacten gehad met het lokale campagneteam van de ChristenUnie en konden bijvoorbeeld een jonge kandidaat extra in het zonnetje zetten. De meeste jongerenambassadeurs stonden zelf op de kandidatenlijst en hebben vanuit die positie meegedaan aan de campagne”.

gauntlet to get young people elected in representative decision-making bodies. They tend to focus mainly on the first stage in which candidates are nominated. More specifically, youth wings lobby party elites set up specific training programmes and campaigns for young candidates, although it should also be noted that we cannot draw any conclusions about the precise effect or the extent to which each party youth wing undertakes such efforts for every passing election.

These results lead to the overall conclusion that party youth wings seem to play an important role in enhancing the descriptive representation of young people. In the history of Dutch politics, not many young citizens have entered parliament before their thirties, but when they did, it is likely they had been involved in the youth wing of their political party. The findings support the recommendation of the Inter-Parliamentary Union that strengthening party youth wings is “a potentially effective way to elect more young parliamentarians” (IPU, 2016, p. 29) and the statement of the United Nations that “youth wings can be instrumental in the increased nomination of young candidates” (United Nations Development Programme, 2013, p. 29). Assuming that a diverse composition of legislatures matters for the responsiveness to various social needs and for sending cues that diverse groups are welcome in the political process, party youth wings contribute to the Dutch democratic system by boosting the presence of young people in representative positions.

6.5 Conclusions


The purpose of the current chapter was to examine the functioning of Dutch party youth wings on the representation function, which consists of three sub-functions: the aggregation of political interests, the articulation of political interests and the enhancement of descriptive representation. Based on the results, the impression emerges that party youth wings in the Netherlands have become increasingly active on the representation function.

For the sub-function ‘aggregation of political interests’, it is demonstrated that, compared to the mid-late 1980s, more party youth wings nowadays have a political programme, whereby individual members have the opportunity to play an active role in its design. Moreover, it is found for party youth wings in the late 2010s that, overall, they are fairly ideologically congruent with their members. The results on the articulation sub-function have shown that party youth wings were able to get more internal access within the mother party for exerting political influence in the late 2010s than in the late 1980s. However, it is also shown that their outsider access, i.e. media attention, has slightly declined between the two periods under scrutiny. Party youth wings did get a higher number of written opinion pieces published in the newspapers in the mid-late 2010s. Lastly, it is revealed that party youth wings play an important role in boosting the descriptive representation of young people. Ever since the minimum age to run for the House of Representatives was lowered to below 30 years old, the majority of MPs aged below 30 have had involvement in a party youth wing.

In conclusion, party youth wings play an important role as representation channels for their young constituencies. Although it was expected that party youth wings would function less well in this respect since the period of 1985 to 1990, this chapter shows that this is not

the case. Rather, the opposite conclusion can be drawn: more party youth wings had an explicit (conventional) political character and put themselves forward as representative bodies in the late 2010s. It must be noted that the findings presented in the present chapter do not tell us anything about the actual policy success of party youth wings. It has become clear, however, that party youth wings are capable of generating pressure on the core decisional bodies of our democracy in accordance with political interests supported by their young constituency.

Figure 6.6 Dutch party youth wings on the dimension of political representation



Again, the findings presented here enable us to explore differences and similarities across party youth wings. These are summarized in a qualitative manner in Figure 6.6. It positions the individual party youth wings on the dimension of political representation, taking into account the indicators for which results in both time periods were reported. During the chapter, it has become more and more apparent that there are youth wings that are more and youth wings that are less engaged in political representative activities. This distinction is particularly visible for the 1980s. At that time, mainly the CDJA, JOVD and JS were involved in political programme formation, lobbying the mother party internally, appearing in the newspaper media, and delivering young candidates for parliament. The JD also had a programme but was less actively engaged in exerting influence. The PPRjo and the PSJG were politically oriented but seem to have been somewhat less active and engaged in a different, more action-based way. The PSJG in particular focused on extra-parliamentary action. The religious youth wings GPJC, LVSGS/SGPJ and RPJO were hardly politically active. These differences between party youth wings seem to correspond to the youth wing types identified in the conclusions of Chapter 4. There it was concluded that the religious youth wings were mainly education-oriented and that the PSJG, and to a lesser extent the PPRjo, could be classified as activist-oriented. These youth wings clearly behaved differently from the CDJA, JD, JOVD and JS in the late 1980s, the latter of which were more parliamentary-oriented.

In the late 2010s, the differences between Dutch party youth wings seemed to have narrowed (Figure 6.6). With the exception of the JS and ROOD, all party youth wings had a political programme on which the individual members have the direct final say. They were all more or less engaged in exerting influence within the party and emphasized that the media

are an important means for getting a political message across. This trend of politicization of party youth wings has made their performance on the representation function more similar over time. It seems that, while the CDJA, JOVD and JS have been operating in the same manner, the other youth wings have shifted towards their working method. In terms of the classification of Chapter 4, Dutch party youth wings have become more parliamentary-oriented. It must be noted that some do still display activist-oriented traits. ROOD in particular seems to behave differently from the other youth wings, as it mainly focuses on (local) political actions.

7. Party Youth Wings as Socializing Agents

7.1 Introduction

In the previous two chapters, the functioning of Dutch party youth wings as mobilizing vehicles and representation channels was examined. The present chapter focuses on the functioning of party youth wings as agents of political socialization. While it takes time to learn the ways of political and party life, party youth wings have the potential to boost and accelerate this process for young people, especially when it is taken into account that the youth wings' constituents find themselves in a politically formative period of their life (Kinder, 2006; Neundorf & Smets, 2017). The socialization function has indeed been attributed to the political parties' youth wings in the literature (Cross & Young, 2008; Mycock & Tonge, 2012), but rarely has it been studied with what effect or in what way they fulfil this function.

Party youth wings may contribute to the process of socializing young citizens for democratic participation by promoting the development of political knowledge, skills and networks. Ideally, one would measure the performance of party youth wings in this regard by assessing the direct effect of youth wing involvement on these three aspects. This asks for a field experiment or longitudinal study that controls for the effect of other mechanisms at play, such as self-selection (e.g. Quintelier, 2013; Van Ingen & Van der Meer, 2016). As described in Chapter 3, not only does this require a completely different research set-up, the data availability also does not allow such an exact assessment in the periods under scrutiny. This is why the present chapter will primarily focus on answering the question in what way, rather than to what extent, Dutch party youth wings fulfil the socialization function in the second half of the 1980s and 2010s. To my knowledge, such an approach has not been adopted so far, while it does provide more insight into the role a political association such as a party youth wing can play in the attempt to integrate young people into the political system.

The way party youth wings give substance to the socialization function is explored based on two sub-functions: the provision of political education and training, which focuses on the enhancement of political knowledge and skills, and the facilitation of social interaction, which focuses on the promotion of political discussions and networks (see Chapter 2). The accompanying performance indicators are presented in Table 7.1. In what follows, an extensive and qualitative exploration of organizational sources such as annual reports, policy plans and member magazines is reported and supplemented with findings from the membership surveys and from elite interviews.

Table 7.1 The socialization function

<i>Key function</i>	<i>Sub-function</i>	<i>Indicator</i>
Socialization	Provide political education and training	Focus of education and training
		Organizational structures of education and training
	Facilitate social interaction	Perception of members and chairs
		Political discussions
		Network-building mechanisms
		Perception of members and chairs

7.2 The ability to provide political education and training

An important part of the political socialization function is the provision of political education and training¹⁹² to young people. The introduction of the public funding of party-bound youth organizations in 1976 was emphatically based on this sub-function (see Chapter 4). It is to be expected that this financial incentive led to the engagement of party youth wings in political education and training. However, it is unclear what form this took in the mid-late 1980s and 2010s. In this section, I will compile a classification of party youth wings as educational agents by means of an inductive content analysis of text data, such as annual reports, policy plans and member magazines. This enables a comparison of political education and training efforts across party youth wings and over time. As described in Chapter 3, the focus of the current analysis is on the explicit political education and training efforts by party youth wings. Those activities that serve a purely political, social or organizational purpose are excluded.

From the multitude of sources, two dimensions emerge on which the functioning of party youth wings in the field of political education and training may diverge: 1) a primary focus on the development of political knowledge versus political skills and 2) a professional versus non-professional approach to the organization of political education and training. Firstly, the kind of activities undertaken by party youth wings show that the primary focus of the political education and training efforts can either lie on the development of political knowledge or skills. Traditionally, Dutch party youth wings educated young people in ideology, party principles or the broader political system by organizing seminars and study conferences (see Chapter 4). Over time, political skills training has become part of the repertoire, which revolves around learning the political craft. This comprises, for example, debating, campaigning, organizational skills and leadership skills. The exploration will show that skills have become increasingly central in the provision of education and training since the late 1980s. Secondly, the organizational approach to political education and training can be characterized as more or less professional. The question is whether party youth wings take central control of the education and training expertise within the organization, evidenced by a clear division of tasks, accountability and collaboration with the mother party, or whether this is left to individual local branches that are often less equipped to do so.¹⁹³ It is found that youth wings have been increasingly organizing education and training in a professional manner since 1985-1990.

In what follows, the two dimensions will be discussed in more detail, after which the Dutch party youth wings will be classified accordingly. This not only advances the understanding of how party youth wings fulfil this sub-function, it also allows for the

¹⁹² As described in Chapter 4, this is traditionally called *politieke vorming* in Dutch. This concept has a high overlap with the German *politische Bildung*. It revolves around acquiring knowledge and a certain set of skills in order for citizens to become familiar with and be able to participate in the parliamentary democracy. There is no suitable English translation available. I will therefore adopt the terms political education and training.

¹⁹³ Various sources show that local branches are generally characterized by instability. For example, the former GPJC chair explains in the interview that the number of branches varied greatly: "Sometimes you could set up a [local] GPJC three times in a certain location in ten years". The result is that knowledge and expertise have to be developed repeatedly, and as a result, the way of working is almost automatically less professional.

identification of inter-youth wing differences and developments over time. Surely, the classification process is necessarily characterized by a certain degree of abstraction. Classifying party youth wings as similar does not mean they are identical in their political education and training, but it does mean that they have adopted a more similar approach than other youth wings.

Dimension 1: The focus of political education and training

A first important step towards determining whether and how a youth wing is explicitly engaged in the political education and training of its members (and beyond) is by exploring the activities undertaken to that end in both time periods under scrutiny. This paragraph shows that the large majority of Dutch party youth wings had explicit attention for political education and training in both time periods, although they differ to what extent the focus was on knowing about politics or practicing politics. This therefore forms the first dimension of party youth wings as educational agents.

1985-1990

Judging by what is reported in the annual reports, policy plans and member magazines, five forms of political education and training efforts can be distinguished in the 1980s: 1) activities for new members, 2) activities for members in general, 3) activities for the active cadre, 4) education and discussion materials for members (other than the regular member magazines), and 5) activities for young people outside the organization.

Firstly, the education and training of members within some Dutch party youth wings in the mid-late 1980s started with an invitation to an introductory meeting. The format varied from a national weekend or day to meetings at the local level. The Christian democratic youth wing (CDJA), the young democrats (JD) and the young socialists (JS) annually organized three to four introductory weekends in different parts of the country, while the liberal conservative youth wing (JOVD) offered introductory courses at the municipal level and the progressive Christian youth wing (PPRjo) organized one or two national 'new member days' per year. Other youth wings did not report such events. The aim was to introduce new members to the organization and its political foundations. The announcement in the members' magazine of the JS offers a bit more insight into what happened during such an introduction meeting: "We will talk about the origins of the labour movement, the political ideas of the JS and the way in which we view the ideas of the PvdA".¹⁹⁴ The introductory activities of other party youth wings show a similar emphasis on imparting organizational and political knowledge, as evidenced by purpose descriptions such as "becoming acquainted with the CDJA, its foundation, its structure and activities"¹⁹⁵ and "becoming acquainted with the JD and its views".¹⁹⁶

Secondly, youth wings organized various education and training activities for members in general. There are many examples of lectures, study days, seminars, theme evenings and

¹⁹⁴ JS, *Links-Af, November 1985, 12(7)*, p. 8. In Dutch: "Er zal gepraat worden over het ontstaan van de arbeidersbeweging, de politieke ideeën van de JS en de wijze waarop we tegen de ideeën van de PvdA aankijken".

¹⁹⁵ CDJA, *Draaiboek 1986*, p. 10.

¹⁹⁶ JD, *Evaluatie scholing en vorming jonge democraten, periode november 1987 tot oktober 1988*, p. 1-2.

weekends. There was the CDJA's study day on human rights in 1986, the JS' theme day on conventional military equipment in 1987, the JOVD's course on liberalism in 1988, and the JD's theme day on Europe, to name a few. Related to this are the organized excursions or study trips for youth wing members.¹⁹⁷ These kinds of thematic activities were not limited to the national level, as local branches also organized substantive meetings or excursions themselves. Skills trainings for members were a lot less common. Only two party youth wings in the 1980s seemed to organize this type of activity for the membership base: the JOVD and the JD. The JOVD offered courses on PR skills, speaking in public, meeting and discussion techniques, and congress participation.¹⁹⁸ The JD organized a speaking skills training.¹⁹⁹ Other youth wings organized skills trainings, but did so specifically for members active in organizational positions. This will be discussed next.

Thirdly, most party youth wings paid more or less attention to the education and training of their active cadre in this period. Only the conservative Calvinist LVSGS/SGPJ,²⁰⁰ the progressive Christian PPRjo²⁰¹ and the pacifist-socialist PSJG were barely committed to training their administrators and other organizational volunteers. The purpose of this type of education and training was to promote the expertise of active members so that the functioning of the organization would improve.²⁰² It often took the form of (a combination of) a training weekend, management course or intervision meeting for those in organizational positions. For instance, the CDJA's administrative documents show that three training weekends for the active cadre and one weekend for regional boards were planned in 1988.²⁰³ Similarly, the JD's annual planning for 1988 announced a cadre weekend, two cadre training sessions and a cadre day.²⁰⁴ The content mainly focused on organizational and management skills, although in some cases political knowledge was central. An example of the former is the political skills weekend for active members of the JS that focused on "making, formulating and implementing policy", campaigning and the working method of the JS.²⁰⁵ An example of the latter is the exclusive political top management course that the JOVD organized together with the mother party, which focused on a critical consideration of political issues from a liberal perspective.²⁰⁶

¹⁹⁷ Common excursions were those to the national or the European parliament, although some also chose to visit businesses, civil society organizations or other organizations abroad.

¹⁹⁸ *JOVD, HB-info 1987, 6*, p. 9-13.

¹⁹⁹ *JD, Jaarverslag 1987*, p. 10.

²⁰⁰ It was not until 1990 that the idea arose within the LVSGS/SGPJ to set up a management course for the board members of the local study associations (*LVSGS/SGPJ, Ons Contact, Oktober 1990*, p. 21).

²⁰¹ The youth wing does announce a cadre course in the 1986 annual programme (*PPRjo, Jaarprogramma 1986: feitelijke opsomming van werkzaamheden*, p. 1), but it is unclear whether this has actually taken place.

²⁰² The RPJO also focused on the functioning of the mother party, as one of the objectives was to impart political skills to the members so that they are able to fulfil management positions within the RPF organization in the future (*RPJO, Beleidsnota van de RPJO voor de Jaren 1987 & 1988*, p. 1).

²⁰³ Examples of programme components are the foundation and structure of the CDJA, meeting and communication techniques, the functioning of the municipal council and planning and organizing skills (*CDJA, DB stukken: het Kursuspakket, (Vormings)activiteiten*, n.p.).

²⁰⁴ *JD, ORGI, 16 December 1987, 3(10)*, p. 8-10.

²⁰⁵ *JS, Links-Af, December 1988, 15*, p. 12.

²⁰⁶ *JOVD, Jaarverslag 1989*, n.p.

Another custom at the time was to produce education materials for the local branches or for the members directly. Some distributed discussion papers with the aim to initiate internal discussions. Examples are the PPRjo's discussion papers on topics such as military service and feminism²⁰⁷ and the JD's discussion papers written by the national working groups.²⁰⁸ Others produced thematic materials that were used as study material and input for the substantive training of members in courses or thematic meetings. For instance, the JS produced multiple thematic booklets with basic knowledge about subjects such as youth unemployment and the environment.²⁰⁹ Another example is the so-called 'teaching letters series'²¹⁰ of the RPJO about political movements and public administration as study material for its members. A few youth wings also made more practical course materials and manuals available for their organization, such as the JS' tutor manuals²¹¹ or the JOVD's education & training manual.²¹² Only in the documents of the LVSGS/SGPJ did I not find such initiatives.

Lastly, the data show that party youth wings also paid attention to the political education of non-members in this period, often being high school students. The religious party youth wings GPJC, LVSGS/SGPJ and RPJO did so individually by manufacturing teaching materials for schools. The former chair of the GPJC, the youth wing of the GPV, described a "cooperation with civic education teachers of the large Reformed school communities" in the interview, via whom they distributed lesson materials in the form of "a separate magazine for young people about certain subjects".²¹³ The LVSGS/SGPJ developed a similar initiative in 1989 when it introduced a new political magazine for those aged 12 to 16,²¹⁴ which, according to the former chair, was distributed among schools. Instead of a magazine, the RPJO developed and distributed a video film about the practice of politics within political parties over 700 Christian schools for civic education class.²¹⁵ The other party youth wings, CDJA, JD, JOVD, JS, PPRjo and PSJG, created a partnership called 'M50'²¹⁶ in 1983 in order to educate and train young people outside their organizations in politics (Habben Jansen, 1994, p. 80). More specifically, the goal of M50 was to raise political awareness among young people across party lines by developing general political education activities for young people.²¹⁷ With the help of

²⁰⁷ RPJO, *Publiciteitsnotitie 1985*, p. 2.

²⁰⁸ JD, *Jaarverslag 1987*, p. 10.

²⁰⁹ JS, *Geen schuivend paneel, maar één geheel: Beleidsplan van het Algemeen Bestuur en de werkgroepen 1987-1988*, p. 8-9.

²¹⁰ In Dutch: *lesbriefseries*.

²¹¹ JS, *Geen schuivend paneel, maar één geheel: Beleidsplan van het Algemeen Bestuur en de werkgroepen 1987-1988*, p. 8.

²¹² JOVD, *Jaarverslag 1988*, p. 14.

²¹³ Interview 2020, in Dutch: "(...) die samenwerking met leraren maatschappijleer van de grote gereformeerde scholengemeenschappen, daar maakten wij een apart blaadje voor de jongeren over bepaalde onderwerpen, een soort lesbrief, en die werden dan vier keer per jaar ofzo uitgebracht".

²¹⁴ LVSGS/SGPJ, *Jaarverslag van het LVSGS, 1989*, p. 4.

²¹⁵ RPJO, *Jaarverslag Vereniging RPJO over Anno Domini 1988*, p. 1.

²¹⁶ M50 is short for *Motie 50*, which refers to the motion that was proposed in the House of Representatives in order to install the partnership and provide it with government funding. The three largest youth wings, the CDJA, JOVD and JS, managed to achieve this by lobbying their mother party, as officials at the Ministry were originally against the idea (interview former chair CDJA, 2020). The successor of M50 is *ProDemos*.

²¹⁷ CDJA, *Jaarverslag 1986, in Jaarverslag CDA 1986*, p. 32.

a government subsidy, M50 set up various thematic projects that took shape as excursions, publications or high school lessons. The former chair of the JS explained in the interview how one of the core activities, called 'Finding your way around the *Binnenhof*', was set up: "(...) school classes came to The Hague by bus, slept for a week in the youth hostel and followed a programme at the *Binnenhof* or at a newspaper (...). That week they learned how the political process works in the Netherlands".²¹⁸

2014-2020

For the period of 2014-2020, the same categories of education and training by Dutch party youth wings can be distinguished, although the production of substantive discussion materials (other than regular member magazines) seems to be rare or non-existent. The details of the other four types of activities are explained below: activities for new members, activities for members in general, activities for the active cadre and activities for non-members.

Firstly, all party youth wings but the SGPJ held introduction meetings for new members in the second half of the 2010s.²¹⁹ The CDJA, JD, JS and JOVD did this in the form of an introduction weekend, often in addition to one-day introduction meetings. The other youth wings organized new member evenings or days. The green youth wing, DWARS, introduced a series of four evenings for new members "to develop political skills and get to know our organization".²²⁰ Recurring elements in the programmes of the introductory meetings were speeches by prominent speakers, workshops or a visit to parliament. For example, the JOVD reported a "traditional guided tour through parliament and various training courses by JOVD trainers"²²¹ and the programme of the CDJA's introduction weekend included a presentation about the CDJA and a visit to both the party headquarters and the House of Representatives.²²²

Secondly, a wide range of other education and training activities were provided to members in the form of one-day or multi-day meetings. A distinction can be made between a focus on political content or skills. Popular ways to educate members on political topics were by organizing master classes, lectures, political weekends, summer schools or excursions. Examples of annual multi-day programmes are the JOVD University,²²³ the political weekends

²¹⁸ Interview 2020, in Dutch: "Wij hebben bijvoorbeeld 'Wegwijs op het Binnenhof' bedacht met z'n allen. Dan kwamen de schoolklassen met de bus naar Den Haag, die sliepen een week in de jeugdherberg en die kregen dan een programma op het Binnenhof of bij een krant, of maakten zelf een krant. En die week leerden ze hoe het politieke proces in Nederland werkt". The *Binnenhof* is a complex of parliamentary buildings in the city centre of The Hague.

²¹⁹ Although the sources do not indicate this, it is possible that local chapters of the SGPJ organized introductory meetings.

²²⁰ DWARS, *Beleidsplan 2020*, p. 9. In Dutch: "DWARS 101 is een traject voor nieuwe DWARS'ers om politieke vaardigheden te ontwikkelen en kennis te maken met onze organisatie".

²²¹ JOVD, *Secretarieel Jaarverslag 2017: Aangeboden aan de Jaarlijkse Algemene Vergadering 2018*, p. 21. In Dutch: "Het programma bestond onder andere uit de traditionele rondleiding in het Tweede Kamergebouw en diverse trainingen door JOVD-trainers".

²²² CDJA. (2017, September 3). *6 & 7 oktober – CDJA Introductieweekend*. <https://cdja.nl/blog/6-7-oktober-cdja-introductieweekend/>.

²²³ Aimed at stimulating participants to discuss political topics from an academic perspective, see for example the annual reports over 2017 and 2018.

of the CDJA²²⁴ and JD,²²⁵ and the summer schools that were organized by many of the party youth wings.²²⁶ Examples of one-day meetings with an emphasis on political content and knowledge acquisition are the annual DWARS symposium, the annual excursions of the Christian Union's youth wing (PpF) to Brussels and The Hague, and the 'SGPJ cafes' series with speakers. In addition to these thematic meetings, most party youth wings offered an array of skills training courses in the late 2010s. DWARS, the JD, JOVD and JS did so by maintaining a central file with training courses that committees or branches could use. The JS explained: "The JS Academy is our training programme under which various skills courses are offered. We offer political skills trainings, such as debating and negotiation, as well as more practical skills, such as vlogging and photography".²²⁷ Training sessions were also offered on the national level, such as the political skills workshop 'PINK! Academy'²²⁸ and the lengthy programme of PpF for members who want to develop their basic political skills.²²⁹ Other skill-building activities may have taken place occasionally, such as ROOD's 'super weekend' aimed at training members in activism in 2017.²³⁰ It is noteworthy that debating skills and skills needed for a career in politics often received special attention in this time period. There were occasional debating training courses, some youth wings set up a debating committee or an annual debate tournament and all youth wings but ROOD organized the 'PYW-parliament' together, an annual large-scale debate simulation in the House of Representatives. Six of the nine party youth wings (CDJA, DWARS, JD, JS, JOVD and PpF) reported a training offer for young people interested in pursuing a political career. This often concerned lengthy trajectories, such as the 'Generation JOVD trajectory', described on the website as "a six-month trajectory in which participants are helped with starting their career in politics, the public sector or business".²³¹ Although this JOVD programme served broader career goals, the initiatives of the other party youth wings mainly focused on preparing members to run for political office. The 'generational projects' of the CDJA in collaboration with the mother party, for instance, took place since 2014 in the run-up to elections with the aim of "scouting, training

²²⁴ The programme of this annual weekend revolved around one political theme, such as 'community spirit' in 2018 (CDJA, *Jaarverslag 2018*, in *CDA Jaarverslag 2018*, p. 19).

²²⁵ See, for instance, JD, *Beleidsplan Bestuur Broer: Landelijk bestuur september 2019 – september 2020*, p. 3.

²²⁶ PINK!, PpF and SGPJ did not report such an initiative. The board of DWARS announced a summer school at the general meeting in 2017, but it is unclear whether this has been followed up (*DWARS, Congresreader, Zomercongres 2017 Groningen*, p. 17).

²²⁷ JS. (n.d.). *Scholing*. <https://js.nl/over-de-js/scholing/>. In Dutch: "De JS Academie is ons scholingsprogramma waaronder verschillende vaardighedenleergangen worden aangeboden. We bieden zowel politieke vaardigheden zoals debatteren en onderhandelen als meer praktische vaardigheden zoals vloggen en fotograferen aan".

²²⁸ PINK!, *Jaarverslag 2017*, p. 6.

²²⁹ PpF, *Jaarverslag Perspectief: Seizoen 2014-2015*, p. 6.

²³⁰ ROOD, *II Verantwoording activiteiten ter bevordering van politieke participatie van jongeren, in Activiteitenverslag Behorende bij het Financieel verslag en overzichten 2017 Wet financiering politieke partijen Socialistische Partij*, p. 21.

²³¹ In Dutch: "een traject van een half jaar waarin deelnemers worden geholpen bij de start van hun carrière in de politiek, de publieke sector of het bedrijfsleven". JOVD (n.d.). *Generatie JOVD*. https://jovd.nl/dit_is_de_jovd/academy/generatie_jovd.

and helping young people in their campaign (...).²³² Only PINK!, ROOD and the SGPJ did not offer such programmes.

Thirdly, training activities for the active cadre were also common in the mid-late 2010s within Dutch party youth wings. Except for the SGPJ, activities were organized for board members and other volunteers in order to improve the functioning of the organization. This usually took place in the form of a meeting of board members of regional and local branches, during which they followed workshops and exchanged experiences and ideas. The frequency varied: within the CDJA there was one annual day, the JOVD had three such days per year, ROOD organized an annual weekend, the JD organized two weekends per year and DWARS organized both a weekend and an annual cadre day. The JS did not have such a cadre meeting, but offered a management training to new local boards.²³³ Some other party youth wings also offered extra training activities in addition to the cadre meeting. The JD, for example, encouraged local boards to follow a management training.²³⁴ Since 2018, DWARS offered a training programme for members who have the ambition to fulfil a position within the youth wing.²³⁵ Similarly, after several years of using the mother party's management training, PINK! set up its own course in 2019 for members who want to become active in PINK! or another political organization.²³⁶

Lastly, party youth wings still worked together in the field of external education and training, albeit in a less institutionalized way than in the late 1980s. In 2017, the collaborating youth wings CDJA, DWARS, JD, PINK! and PpF launched the 'PYW-School Package Youth & Politics'.²³⁷ The CDJA reported as follows:

This school package is as objective as possible and contains a presentation / PowerPoint, lesson preparation, manual for guest teachers and standard letter to be sent to schools. Individuals and branches can approach schools with this - whether or not in collaboration with other PYWs - and provide guest lectures. The aim is to bring young people and politics into contact with each other and to draw attention to our political youth organizations.²³⁸

²³² CDJA, *Jaarverslag 2015 Vereniging CDJA*, p. 12. In Dutch: "het doel om jongeren te scouten, trainen en te helpen bij hun campagne (...)".

²³³ JS, *Jaarverslag 2019 Jonge Socialisten in de PvdA*, p. 6.

²³⁴ JD, *E Bevordering van de politieke participatie van jongeren, in de verantwoording van D66 in het kader van de Wet financiering politieke partijen 2017*, p. 11.

²³⁵ DWARS, *Jaarverslag 2018, in Verantwoording Vereniging GroenLinks Wet Financiering Politieke Partijen 2018*, p. 31.

²³⁶ PINK!, *Jaarverslag 2018*, n.p.

²³⁷ JD, *Beleidsplan landelijk bestuur 2017-2018*, in: *Congresboek ALV 78 JD*, p. 24.

²³⁸ CDJA, *Jaarverslag 2016, VIII. CDJA, in CDA en gelieerde organen en organisaties op landelijk niveau*, p. 151. In Dutch: "Dit zoveel mogelijk objectief ingestoken scholenpakket bevat een presentatie/PowerPoint, lesvoorbereiding, handleiding voor gastdocenten en standaardbrief om naar scholen te kunnen versturen. Individuen en afdelingen kunnen hiermee scholen benaderen – al dan niet in samenwerking met andere PJO's – en een gastles verzorgen. Inzet is om jongeren en politiek met elkaar in contact te brengen en onze politieke jongerenorganisaties onder de aandacht te brengen".

PINK! and the SGPJ undertook such initiatives independently. Since 2017, PINK! has developed teaching materials on several substantive themes that teachers can use in their education.²³⁹ The SGPJ reported in 2019 that about 75 guest lessons had been provided in schools.²⁴⁰

Positioning party youth wings

Several observations can be made from the above exploration regarding the education and training activities of Dutch party youth wings in 1985-1990 and 2014-2020. Party youth wings generally aim to educate and train young people politically, although they differ in the extent to which they do so via activities that are explicitly organized for this purpose. In the 1980s, youth wings that were less concerned with the organization of explicit education and training activities for their members were the LVSGS/SGPJ, PPRjo and PSJG. In the 2010s, only the SGPJ fell into this category. Moreover, although a quantitative overview cannot be provided, the internal documents point to a more extensive, diverse and annually recurring range of education and training activities in the second half of the 2010s. Organizing explicit education and training activities seems to have become more self-evident over time. In addition, Dutch party youth wings paid more attention to the development of political skills in the late 2010s than in the late 1980s.

Based on the above exploration, I positioned the youth wings on the dimension of a primary focus on the development of political knowledge versus a primary focus on the acquisition of political skills in Figure 7.1. For the period of 1985-1990, the youth wings are almost all situated on the left side of the dimension. As described in Chapter 4, becoming acquainted with the political ideology and principles, and studying societal issues through that lens, is a traditionally dominant element in the education and training efforts by party youth wings. This was for a large part still the case in the 1980s. The activities at that time revolved around the political content, as is clear not only from the character of the activities but also from the production of substantive discussion materials. The various education and training objectives of the youth wings confirm this.²⁴¹ During the 1980s, the attention for skills increased in most party youth wings, but the focus was on board members and other volunteers in order to improve the functioning and ensure the continuity of the organization. Indeed, the former chair of the CDJA reflects in the interview on the training offer in the late 1980s and concludes that it “was still in its infancy”. Only the JOVD offered multiple skills trainings for its members, in addition to the activities that aimed to promote the


²³⁹ PINK!, *Jaarverslag 2017*, n.p.

²⁴⁰ SGPJ, *Jaarverslag 2019 SGP-jongeren*, p. 31.

²⁴¹ For instance, the CDJA formulated its objective as follows: “To know more about politics, that is, in short, the aim of the educational work of the CDJA” (*CDJA, Draaiboek 1986*, p. 10). Another example can be found in the GPJC’s policy plan, which defined political education as: “het bevorderen van het ontwikkelingsproces in een persoon, waardoor deze komt tot een beter verstaan van de wil van God In het politieke leven, de waarde daarvan gaat aanvoelen en zich ook in het politieke leven gaat gedragen als een kind van God” (*GPJC, Concept beleidsplan 1986-1995 (deel 1)*, p. 10). The vision on education and training of the JD from 1988 formulated three objectives: politics, social skills and organization (*JD, ORGI, herfst 1988, 4*, p. 11-13). The last two objectives, which focus on political and organizational skills respectively, were seen as subordinate to the first, which concerns becoming acquainted with various political ideas, learning to formulate one’s own opinion and being able to contribute to a discussion accordingly.

understanding of the various political families and liberalism in particular. It is therefore situated in this period in the middle of the dimension in Figure 7.1. I also positioned the PSJG in between, but for a different reason. It did not focus on either knowledge or skills, as it did not organize explicit education and training activities in the mid-late 1980s other than its participation in M50. This corresponds to the youth wing's own characterization of the organization as discontinuous, loosely structured and informal.²⁴²

Figure 7.1 Dutch party youth wings on the dimension of focus



Compared to the second half of the 1980s, the majority of party youth wings have shifted the primary focus of their education and training activities from knowledge to skills. In the 2010s, there were extensive programmes for skills development and youth wings integrated skills workshops in other meetings such as introduction events. Moreover, the production of thematic discussion materials for internal education and training purposes had become rare. The shift in attention to political skills may be most apparent from the appearance of programmes that prepare young people for a political career. There are two party youth wings that can still be characterized as primarily knowledge-oriented in their education and training activities in the late 2010s: ROOD and SGPJ. For ROOD, the predominant focus on societal issues and political themes became evident from the manifold excursions and lectures, and the summer school. Although the SGPJ was less concerned with political education and training, whenever it organized education activities, these predominantly revolved around substantive themes based on Christian politics. The CDJA and JS are placed in the middle of the dimension, as there is no indication of a specific emphasis on either political knowledge or political skills in the training and education offer. There were skills training sessions, but also substantive courses. For the CDJA, this is also evident from the

²⁴² PSJG, *Jaarprogramma PSP-Jongeren, 1984*, p. 2.

policy plan for 2020, which expressed the ambition to focus on both political substantive education and skills development.²⁴³

Dimension 2: The organization of political education and training

The above shows only one side of the functioning of Dutch party youth wings on this sub-function, namely what type of activities took place in both time periods. It does not, however, tell us with what degree of professionalism the activities were organized. The need for more insight into this aspect can be illustrated by a comment from a board member of the young socialists who was responsible for education and training in the 1980s: “JS members do not give the education and training work the highest priority (...) when it comes to the executive work it often turns out that the agendas are already full of the daily political handiwork”.²⁴⁴ This paragraph therefore moves from the character of the political education and training activities to the organization behind the activities. The question is to what extent party youth wings adopted a professional approach in both periods. Three organizational elements unfold from the various sources that are considered important indicators thereof: task assignment, accountability, and collaboration with the mother party. The specific assignment of the task, financial and performance reporting and use of the mother party’s expertise are considered crucial indicators of the importance attached to political education and training and the degree to which it was approached in a professional manner. In what follows, these elements are described per period. They together form the second dimension of party youth wings as educational agents: the professional versus non-professional organization of political education and training.

1985-1990

Firstly, it can be inferred from the organizational documents how roles and responsibilities with regard to political education and training were arranged within the Dutch party youth wings in the late 1980s. Table 7.2 provides an overview of the task allocation within youth wings to a board member, employee, committee or in-house trainers network on the national level in the years from 1985 to 1990. Only the LVSGS/SGPJ, PSJG and RPJO had no person or body responsible for political education and training. The other party youth wings did assign the task, whereby the Christian democratic CDJA and liberal conservative JOVD were most organized in this regard, as they score positively on all of the four bodies mentioned. Furthermore, we can infer from Table 7.2 that there are differences between party youth wings in how the task was assigned. Four out of nine party youth wings had a central board of which one of the members was responsible for political education and training activities.

²⁴³ CDJA, *Jaarplan 2020*, p. 5, 10-11.

²⁴⁴ JS, *Jaarverslagen AB Jonge Socialisten in de PvdA, 84-85*, p. 19. In Dutch: “JS’ers geven S&V-werk niet de hoogste prioriteit (...). Natuurlijk is het nodig om elke keer weer op het belang van S&V voor een organisatie als de JS te wijzen, (...) maar als het neerkomt op het uitvoerende werk blijkt vaak dat de agenda’s al vol zitten met het dagelijkse politieke handwerk”.

Although the weight of this position may have varied across party youth wings,²⁴⁵ this person generally took care of policy development and of the management and organization of activities. Party youth wings also differed in whether they had an employee for the political education and training task or not. While the youth wing of D66, the JD, indicated that it deliberately chose not to hire an employee,²⁴⁶ five other party youth wings did the opposite.

Table 7.2 The formal organization of political education and training in 1985-1990

	<i>Board member</i>	<i>Staff member</i>	<i>Committee or working group</i>	<i>In-house trainers</i>	<i>Accountability*</i>		<i>Collaboration with party</i>
					<i>Financial</i>	<i>General</i>	
CDJA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes***	Yes	Yes	Yes
GPJC	No**	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
JD	Yes	No	Yes***	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
JOVD	Yes	Yes	Yes****	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
JS	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
LVS/GS/SGPJ	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
PPRjo	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
PSJG	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
RPJO	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
<i>Total</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>4</i>

Note. Based on annual reports, policy plans and financial statements. *Financial: Does the party youth wings specify the costs for political education and training in the financial statement? General: Does the annual report explicitly include a report of political education and training activities? **The GPJC's national board was also the board of the GPJC foundation for education and training.²⁴⁷ ***Since 1989. ****Since 1988.

The CDJA, JOVD and JS appointed a staff member specifically for education and training²⁴⁸ and the PPRjo and GPJC had an employee with training and education in their range of duties. It should be noted that the youth wing of the PvdA, the JS, did not benefit much from the staff member education and training in the mid-1980s, as the central board was involved in a long-term conflict with this person.²⁴⁹ In three cases, a committee or working group for education and training was installed in the 1980s, of which the activities diverged. The CDJA's education

²⁴⁵ The weight of the position may vary per youth wing, for instance because of board size, personal qualities or organizational culture. Within the JD, for example, the board position of secretary for training and education was deemed very important and the agenda of the board contained education and training by default (interview former chair).

²⁴⁶ The JD indicated that it did not want to hire staff members because then there would be too few resources left for the actual political education and training of members (*JD, Programma van werkzaamheden 1989*, p. 12).

²⁴⁷ This foundation coordinated the political education and training efforts within the GPJC (*GPJC, Jaarprogramma 1988*, p. 2, 8). In order to receive the subsidy in the 1980s, party youth wings needed to be independently functioning legal entities (Dragstra, 2008, p. 85). The sources show that several youth wings therefore chose to establish a foundation, although in practice the foundation was often fully integrated into the youth wing organization.

²⁴⁸ The CDJA and JOVD appointed two staff members for 20 hours a week (*JOVD, Jaarverslag 1985*, p. 2; *CDJA Draaiboek 1986*, p. 27). This is unknown for the JS. I found an example of the duties of such an employee in the CDJA's plan of action for 1986 (p. 27): the implementation of training activities for the active cadre, the development of projects and materials, and the support of the education committee.

²⁴⁹ *JS, Jaarverslagen AB Jonge Socialisten in de PvdA, 84-85*, p. 8-9.

committee,²⁵⁰ for instance, consisted of so-called 'regional clubs' that were managed by a national core group. The core group registered the needs, set priorities, distributed the practical work and maintained contact with other relevant bodies of the youth wing and the mother party.²⁵¹ The JOVD, on the other hand, founded a committee in 1988 to examine the available course materials and the minimum requirements for courses.²⁵² Lastly, two party youth wings created their own pool of in-house trainers: the CDJA and the JOVD. The latter had its own network of trainers, who were trained via a special course for instructors.²⁵³ The CDJA introduced a similar network of voluntary CDJA 'training sergeants' in 1989 to carry out training activities on demand.²⁵⁴

Secondly, the finances and annual reports of Dutch party youth wings on the national level can be explored in order to assess to what extent the central boards were accountable for the political education and training that took place within their organization. Table 7.2 provides an overview of the party youth wings that included education and training as a specific item in their financial overview.²⁵⁵ The column shows that six youth wings included an item on political education and training in their annual account or budget in the late 1980s: CDJA, GPJC,²⁵⁶ JD, JOVD, JS and PPRjo.²⁵⁷ A board member of the JOVD explained in the members' magazine: "There is an educational aspect to all sides of the whole of the activities of the organization. The specific budget [for education and training] is aimed at giving certain aspects thereof further attention".²⁵⁸ The other youth wings, LVSGS/SGPJ, PSJG and RPJO, did not specify education and training costs in their financial reports. In addition, Table 7.2 also provides an overview of the party youth wings that explicitly reported their education and training efforts in the annual report. Five out of nine party youth wings did so. Although the omission of a report on education and training does not automatically mean that activities did not take place or that costs were not incurred, it does indicate the low importance that was attached to accountability and planning in political education and training.

Another organizational element of the education and training structure that emerges

²⁵⁰ In Dutch: *vormingscommissie*.

²⁵¹ *CDJA info*, 1985, 4(3), p. 1.

²⁵² *JOVD, Jaarverslag 1988*, p. 14.

²⁵³ *JOVD, Jaarverslag 1985*, p. 19.

²⁵⁴ *CDJA, Jaarverslag 1990, in Jaarverslag CDA 1990*, p. 20.

²⁵⁵ Based on that part of the party youth wing's financial statement that they themselves define as education and training. I omitted exact numbers as youth wings adopted diverging demarcations and levels of detail. Moreover, costs fluctuated annually and personnel costs were not included. It is therefore not possible to draw conclusions about the exact amounts of expenditure on political education and training.

²⁵⁶ The GPJC takes a slightly different approach than the other youth wings since its financial statement was split into a section for the youth wing itself and a section for the foundation that was specifically set up for political education work among reformed youth (see footnote 247). The item 'activities' on the financial report of the foundation therefore naturally refers to all education and training activities (*GPJC, Jeugd & Politiek 1985*, 23(3), p. 41).

²⁵⁷ The PPRjo calls it 'substantive work', the accompanying text explains that this refers to the training courses, new member days and national theme day (*PPRjo, Jaarplan 1988*, p. 15).

²⁵⁸ *JOVD, Driemaster, 1986, 38(8)*, p. 21. In Dutch: "In het geheel van de bezigheden van de organisatie zit aan alle kanten een V&S-aspect in het functioneren. Het specifieke V&S-budget is erop gericht bepaalde aspecten daaruit nadere aandacht te geven. Daarvoor worden cursussen gegeven".

from the documents is the collaboration of Dutch party youth wings with their mother party. Four youth wings, the CDJA, GPJC, JD and JOVD, sought the expertise of the education and training institute of the mother party. The CDJA's education committee not only had regular consultations with the CDA's cadre and training foundation, but the CDJA's employee education and training was also delegated to the board of this foundation.²⁵⁹ Moreover, this collaboration additionally took shape at the local level, where the mother party created education committees at the end of the 1980s, in which CDJA members often participated.²⁶⁰ Similarly, the young democrats reported on the guidance of the political education and training institute of D66 in setting up the education and training programme of the JD.²⁶¹ The cooperation of the JOVD with the mother party in the field of education and training was part of a formal cooperation agreement between the two organizations.²⁶² The JOVD set up courses together with the VVD and invited VVD youths to their courses.²⁶³ Lastly, the Protestant GPJC was in consultation with the political training institute of the mother party (GPV) to coordinate activities and policy with regard to young people.²⁶⁴ For these party youth wings, the collaboration with the mother party was thus an important part of the educational structure.

2014-2020

In the late 2010s, all Dutch party youth wings assigned the responsibility for the implementation of training and education to a person and/or body at the national level (Table 7.3). The vast majority of cases had a board member who had education and training in their portfolio. Noteworthy is that party youth wings barely made use of an employee for the implementation of political education in this period. Only the SGPJ reported having a policy advisor who supports the central board in various areas, including guest lectures at schools and organizing activities of an educational nature.²⁶⁵ Some party youth wings had a special committee for the political education and training. The education committee (in Dutch: *vormingscommissie*) of the CDJA organized activities aimed at providing a deeper understanding of societal issues and the Christian Democratic foundations of the party.²⁶⁶ DWARS' education committee supported the board in organizing training activities that focus on both the training of skills and the acquisition of knowledge.²⁶⁷ The JOVD founded a committee for education and training in 2015. In 2017 the educational structure was changed

²⁵⁹ CDJA, *Jaarverslag 1988*, in *Jaarverslag CDA 1988*, p. 54.

²⁶⁰ CDJA, *Jaarverslag 1989*, in *Jaarverslag CDA 1989*, p. 70.

²⁶¹ JD, *Jaarverslag 1987*, p. 13.

²⁶² Although the JOVD continued to emphasize its organizational independence, it entered into a cooperation agreement for the first time in 1984 with the mother party for coordinating activities for young people (*JOVD, Jaarverslag 1988*, p. 21-27). The agreement that took effect in 1990 states about education and training: "The organizations will create a qualitatively and quantitatively adequate range of activities, whereby the organizations' own identity must not be lost" (Habben Janssen, 1994, p. 146).

²⁶³ JOVD, *Jaarverslag 1987*, p. 15,22.

²⁶⁴ GPJC, *Jaarverslag 1987 Landelijk Verband van G.P.J.C.'s en Stichting G.P.J.C.*, p. 11.

²⁶⁵ SGPJ, *Jaarverslag 2019 SGP-jongeren*, p. 31.

²⁶⁶ CDJA, *Jaarplan 2018*, p. 7.

²⁶⁷ DWARS, *Beleidsplan 2020*, p. 9.

to a ‘JOVD academy’ with a steering committee responsible for the substantive management of the training offer, the support of regional learning schools and the training of (new) instructors.²⁶⁸ PINK! founded an education committee in 2020 to support the organization of courses and to manage the pool of members who are trained in providing training.²⁶⁹ Not only the JOVD and PINK! managed their own team of in-house trainers, but DWARS, the JD and the JS did so as well. DWARS, for example, set up the ‘DWARS academy’ in 2016, which concerns a team of trained instructors who can be called upon by committees and local branches when they wish to organize training activities.²⁷⁰ The JD and JS had a similar set-up.

Table 7.3 The formal organization of political education and training in 2014-2020

	<i>Board member</i>	<i>Staff member</i>	<i>Committee or working group</i>	<i>In-house trainers</i>	<i>Accountability*</i>		<i>Collaboration with party</i>
					<i>Financial</i>	<i>General</i>	
CDJA	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
DWARS	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
JD	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
JOVD	Yes	No	Yes**	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
JS	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PINK!	No	No	Yes***	Yes***	Yes	No	Yes
PpF	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
ROOD	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
SGPJ	No	Yes****	No	No	No	No	Yes
<i>Total</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>6</i>

Note. Based on annual reports, policy plans, financial statements and websites. *Financial: Does the party youth wings specify the costs for political education and training in the financial statement? General: Does the annual report explicitly include a report of political education and training activities? **Since 2015. ***Since 2020. ****The SGPJ has a policy advisor who seems to support the organization in organizing (educational) activities.

Table 7.3 also shows whether Dutch party youth wings included a financial overview and evaluation of the political education and training activities in their annual accounts in this time period. Firstly, it is reported whether party youth wings specify the expenditure that is labelled by them as expenses for political education and training in their financial statement. All but two of the youth wings took the costs for political education and training into consideration in financial accounting. Secondly, the majority of party youth wings reported about their political education and training efforts in their annual reports. Only PINK! and the SGPJ fell short in this regard.

The last column of Table 7.3 shows that collaboration with the mother party continued to be part of the education and training structure of a number of party youth wings in the late 2010s. Especially the JOVD maintained a close cooperation with the training institute of the mother party, as can be derived from the 2017 annual report: “The long-term collaboration

²⁶⁸ JOVD, *Huishoudelijk reglement 2018*, art.39, p. 26.

²⁶⁹ PINK! (n.d.). *Scholingscommissie*. https://www.pinkpolitiek.nl/actief/bij_de_scholingscommissie/, consulted 24 February 2021.

²⁷⁰ DWARS, *Activiteitenverslag DWARS 2017*, in *Verantwoording Vereniging GroenLinks Wet Financiering Politieke Partijen 2017*, p. 26.

between the JOVD Academy and the Haya van Someren Foundation has paid off. In 2017, training courses of the JOVD worked their way up to a level at which VVD accreditation has come very close”.²⁷¹ There are many other examples of youth wing-party cooperation in the field of education and training. There was the assistance of the training institute of the CDA to the CDJA’s training programme for young political candidates²⁷² and the joint summer school of the JS and the youth section of the scientific institute of the PvdA.²⁷³ Board members of PINK! participated in the management training of the mother party until 2016.²⁷⁴ In the annual reports of PpF, a ‘fellow programme’ is mentioned that was offered in collaboration with the mother party (CU). The SGPJ set up a two-day ‘academy’ in collaboration with the scientific institute of the SGP for members to delve into substantive themes.²⁷⁵ DWARS, the JD, and ROOD did not mention any cooperation with the mother party in their documents.

Positioning party youth wings

The above exploration shows that 1) Dutch party youth wings differ in the extent to which they structure the education and training task within their organization and 2) the number of Dutch party youth wings with a professional educational structure has increased over time. Figure 7.2 demonstrates the location of the party youth wings from both periods on this dimension. In the 1980s, there are a number of youth wings that adopted little to no professional approach to education and training: LVSGS/SGPJ, PPRjo, PSJG, and RPJO. They generally relied on the local branches for the organization of meetings on substantive themes. For instance, the RPJO mentions the local branches as the place where “political and social topics must be discussed regularly and thoroughly in the light of the Bible” and work must be done “on educating those in leadership positions”.²⁷⁶ The organizational sources do not show any monitoring or management by the central organization in these cases. I placed the JS in the middle of the dimension, as it tried to approach the organization of the education and training activities in a professional way, but as described above, the sources indicate that these attempts sometimes failed in practice. The CDJA, GPJC, JD and JOVD did adopt a professional approach as evidenced by a strong system of central management, which consisted of clearly allocated tasks, accountability and a collaboration with the mother party. Other than the CDJA, JD and JOVD, the GPJC placed great emphasis on the role of its ‘local clubs’, but did try to impose a more professional structure from the national level.

In the second half of the 2010s, the differences between the party youth wings are smaller. The only youth wing that was organized weakly in this area was the SGPJ. Although

²⁷¹ JOVD, *Jaarverslag 2017*, p. 24. In Dutch: “De langdurige samenwerking tussen de JOVD Academy en de Haya van Somerenstichting heeft haar vruchten afgeworpen. In 2017 hebben trainingen van de JOVD zich opgewerkt naar een niveau waarop een VVD-accreditatie zeer dichtbij is gekomen”.

²⁷² CDJA, *Jaarverslag 2018*, in *CDA Jaarverslag 2018*, p. 24.

²⁷³ JS, *Jaarverslag 2019 Jonge Socialisten in de PvdA*, p. 4.


²⁷⁴ PINK!, *Jaarverslag 2017*, p. 10.

²⁷⁵ SGPJ, *Jaarverslag 2019 SGP-jongeren*, p. 31.

²⁷⁶ RPJO, *Handleiding voor RPF-jongeren voor het oprichten van RPJO-afdelingen en voor het stimuleren van RPJO-activiteiten, 1985*, p. 1. In Dutch: “regelmatig en grondig politieke en maatschappelijke onderwerpen besproken worden in het licht van de Bijbel” en moet er gewerkt worden “aan kadervorming”.

the SGPJ’s policy memorandum 2018-2022 shows that it had explicit attention for education and training and aimed to develop a formal education and training structure, the extent to which this ambition has been put into practice is questionable. The CDJA, DWARS, JD, JOVD and JS were highly organized. The other three youth wings fall in between. For instance, ROOD had a board member assigned with the task of political education and training, but its formal education and training structure was less developed in other areas. We can thus conclude that there are more youth wings in the late 2010s that maintained central control over this sub-function by assigning the responsibility for the implementation of training and education to a person and/or body at the national level, managing their own trainers pool, reporting on political education and training in annual accounts and collaborating with the mother party in this area. The most notable change since 1985-1990 is that party youth wings stopped hiring employees for the implementation of political education. At that time, it was more common for a party youth wing to have such an employee. It should be noted that the youth wings of the three major political parties, the CDJA, JOVD and JS, that had an employee specifically for educational work, could afford it; they employed three to four people at the same time in that period. Instead of with employees, party youth wings in the more recent period worked often with a designated board member, committee, flexible layer of trainers and/or the expertise from the mother party.

Figure 7.2 Dutch party youth wings on the dimension of professionalism




A classification of party youth wings as educational agents

The large majority of Dutch party youth wings deliberately integrated political education and training activities into the daily practice of their organization, which were mainly aimed at its own members. While some already did this to a great extent in the 1980s, such as the JOVD and CDJA, others increased these efforts over time, such as the successors of the PPRjo, RPJO and PSJG. The differences in the performance on this sub- function between the two periods and across the party youth wings become most visible when we combine the above

exploration into a two-dimensional classification. Figure 7.3 presents the classification of the youth wings as educational agents on the dimensions of focus and professionalism of the political education and training. It illustrates the two identified trends: from a primary focus on knowledge to a primary focus on skills and from a non-professional approach to a professional approach to political education and training. This can be interpreted as follows. Party youth wings in the mid-late 1980s, more so than today, were instruments for the ideological integration of young people into the party-political system, whereby the emphasis was on developing ideals and principles through meetings that revolved around political knowledge. As such meetings are inherent to the existence of a party youth wing, there was less need for a tightly organized education and training system. This might explain why the former chair of the PSJG indicates in the interview that education and training made up one of the main pillars of the organization,²⁷⁷ while no formal education and training activities were organized. In many cases, formal education and training was mainly present from an HR perspective. Still, today political-ideological principles are to some extent woven into the education and training structures of party youth wings, although in a much less visible way. The emphasis is on the practical benefit of the education and training activities for young people, as evidenced by the large number of skills training courses. This asks for a more professional structure of education and training, including a large pool of experienced trainers and a variety of courses. In that sense, Dutch party youth wings have increasingly become vehicles for career development.

Figure 7.3 A classification of Dutch party youth wings as educational agents



²⁷⁷ In Dutch: “Zeker, (...) we praatten veel over dingen, we kwamen bij elkaar, we organiseerden concerten (...). De vorming was eigenlijk ons hoofd ding. Naast maatschappelijke invloed uitoefenen, was vorming de tweede poot die we hadden”.

The perception of members

Although it is not possible to conclusively determine the effect of the educational activities and structures of Dutch party youth wings on young people, the membership surveys do provide the opportunity to explore how respondents perceived the alleged educational effects of party youth wing membership. This paragraph therefore supplements the previous qualitative assessment with a short discussion of the survey results. It is shown that the subjective evaluation of the party youth wing as educational agent has remained stable since the 1980s. A considerable part of the respondents was positive about the performance of their youth wing on this sub-function, particularly those that display higher activity levels.

In both 1989 (Bakhuis et al., 1989) and 2020, survey respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement to several statements about increased knowledge and skills. Table 7.4 presents the results of the two following statements: “Without [PYW] membership I would never have known so much about politics” (1989 and 2020) and “[PYW] ensures that members know more about politics” (only in 2020). The scores on the first statement are roughly the same for both years. Just below 40% of the respondents in 1989 and 2020 agreed, another 40% disagreed with the statement and the remaining respondents did not provide an answer or took a neutral position. This means that around 4 in 10 respondents believed that their youth wing membership has a positive effect on their political knowledge. When asked whether the party youth wing ensures that members know more about politics, 87% of the respondents in 2020 answered that this statement is (totally) applicable, while only 2% disagreed. There are no large differences across party youth wings (see Appendix 7.1). Respondents thus seem convinced that party youth wing membership increases the level of political knowledge of members, but just not always in their own case.

Table 7.4 Member perception of increased political knowledge (in %)

<i>Answer scale in 1989 / in 2020</i>	<i>Without PYW membership I would never have known so much about politics</i>		<i>PYW ensures that members know more about politics</i>
	Total 1989	Total 2020*	Total 2020*
(Totally) disagree / not applicable	39	44	2
Neutral / Neither/nor	n/a	14	6
(Totally) agree / applicable	39	38	87
Don't know or no answer	n/a	4	6
<i>Total N</i>	531	985	892

Note. PYW = party youth wing. *Weighted by party youth wing size. Unweighted N = 955 and 856 respectively.

Respondents also rated the following statement in 1989 and 2020: “By being a member of [PYW] I have become much more articulate” (Table 7.5). It can be argued that being articulate is an essential skill in politics, as one needs to be able to express political ideas in an effective way. Again, the results for both years are fairly similar. In 1989, 39% agreed and 32% disagreed with the statement. In 2020, 35% found that the statement is applicable, while 42% did not. This means that around 4 in 10 respondents believed that their youth wing membership has a positive effect on their ability to be articulate. In 2020, I added the following

statement to the questionnaire: “[PYW] insufficiently ensures that members develop their political skills” (Table 7.5). A majority of the respondents disagreed (57%). A breakdown of the data reveals some notable differences between the party youth wings (see Appendix 7.1): respondents from the SGPJ were less positive about the effects of the membership on their articulation skills and respondents from the CDJA and JS were on average less positive about the youth wing’s commitment to the skills development of the members.

Table 7.5 Member perception of increased political skills (in %)


<i>Answer scale in 1989 / in 2020</i>	<i>By being a member of PYW I have become much more articulate</i>		<i>PYW insufficiently ensures that members develop their political skills</i>
	Total 1989	Total 2020*	Total 2020*
(Totally) disagree / not applicable	32	42	57
Neutral / Neither/nor	27	18	15
(Totally) agree / applicable	39	35	11
Don’t know or no answer	2	5	13
<i>Total N</i>	<i>531</i>	<i>986</i>	<i>892</i>

Note. PYW = party youth wing. *Weighted by party youth wing size. Unweighted N = 956 and 856 respectively.

It should again be noted that a positive bias cannot be ruled out here because active members are more likely to participate in a study like this (e.g. Faas & Schoen, 2006). Higher participation levels may be associated with a more positive perception of the educational effects of the youth wing. Indeed, a positive relation is revealed between the average weekly amount of hours devoted to the party youth wing and the average scores of agreement to the statements “By being a member of [PYW] I have become much more articulate” and “Without [PYW] membership I would never have known so much about politics” (Figure 7.4). The more time a respondent spends per week to the party youth wing, the more the statements were found applicable to the respondent’s situation.²⁷⁸ It is to be expected that members who are more active will be exposed to training and education activities more often, and are therefore more positive about the effects thereof. However, based on the current data, the reverse cannot be ruled out: namely, that those young people who were eager to learn and who were positive about the education and training opportunities therefore became active within the youth wing.

²⁷⁸ A one-way ANOVA demonstrates a significant difference in the mean score of agreement with the two statements between the various activity levels, $F(4,928) = 97.8, p = .000$ and $F(4,936) = 36.3, p = .000$ respectively.

Figure 7.4 Mean score of agreement to statements by activity levels of members in 2020



Note. PYW = party youth wing. Weighted by party youth wing size. Error Bars: 95% CI. Y-axis: statement agreement was scored on a scale from 1 (*totally not applicable*) to 5 (*totally applicable*). X-axis: the average time devoted to the party youth wing in the average week. The category 'don't know/no answer' is omitted.

7.3 The ability to facilitate social interaction

The above showed that Dutch party youth wings attempt to increase the development of political knowledge and skills in young individuals in various ways. Although such political resources contribute to one's integration into the political system, it is not the only aspect of youth wing membership that is inherently tied to political socialization. This section shifts the attention to the social component of membership. As outlined in Chapter 2, party youth wings offer a context for social interaction that is particularly relevant for political socialization because of their political character and closeness to society's core political decision-making. Following the reasoning of Stolle and Hooghe (2004), there are two ways in which social interaction within the context of party youth wings may contribute to political socialization. Firstly, social interaction among members may lead to exposure to civic norms and values that have an enduring impact on political involvement. It is found that particularly when social interaction contains politically relevant information, i.e. consists of political discussion, this makes people more active in politics (McClurg, 2003). Secondly, youth wing members have the opportunity to enter networks that are situated closely to the centre of the political system, which individuals may use for participation efforts or which may make them available for mobilization for quite some time during the life cycle (see also Hooghe et al., 2004; Leighley, 1996). In other words, this acquired social capital can be perceived as a particular kind of political resource available to an individual (Coleman, 1988). It will be remembered from the beginning of this chapter that it is not possible to conclusively study the direct and lasting effects of social interaction within party youth wings on political socialization, but it is possible to explore mechanisms for political discussion and network building within party youth wings in both time periods. This will be the focus of this section.

Political discussion

Political discussion seems to be inherently linked to the character of a party youth wing. In fact, discussion may be so ubiquitous that an exploration might yield little in terms of variation over time and between party youth wings. Although the available data is limited, I will explore by means of the membership surveys and interviews whether there is variation in the degree and manner in which youth wing members are exposed to political discussion over time.

The membership surveys of 1989 and 2020 asked respondents to indicate in what way they make their voice heard within their party youth wing. Although this is not a direct measure of political discussion, the answer options provide insight into the ways in which members interact politically. Table 7.6 presents the results. The first three answer options represent a formal setting in which political discussions within party youth wings take place. The share of respondents who opted for ‘by voting at the general assembly of members’ and ‘by participating in conferences’ has remained stable over time: both answers were given by around four in ten respondents in both survey years. The share of respondents indicating that they make their voice heard by participating in discussions at the local level has declined. In 1989, 53% opted for this answer (Bakhuis et al., 1989), and 35% did so in 2020. However, the share of respondents who make their voice heard via informal conversations within the youth wing has increased from 32% in 1989 to 54% in 2020. This points to an increase in informal political discussions. In the 2020 survey, the option ‘online / social media’ was added, as members nowadays have the opportunity to engage in online political discussions of their party youth wing. This is a less popular option: 26% of the respondents indicated that they make their voice heard online. An overview of the data broken down by youth wing is adopted in Appendix 7.1.²⁷⁹

Table 7.6 Ways in which members make their voice heard within their youth wing (in %)

	Total 1989	Total 2020*
By participating in discussions at the local level	53	35
By voting at the general assembly of members	41	40
By participating in conferences	39	43
Via informal conversations	32	54
Online / social media**	-	26
Total N	531	1046


Note. Survey question: “How do you make your voice heard within [PYW]?” Multiple answers possible. PYW = party youth wing. The answer options ‘none of the above’ and ‘don’t know/no answer’ of the 2020 survey are omitted. *Weighted by party youth wing size. Unweighted N = 1025. **Only in 2020.

²⁷⁹ Although this reveals some differences across the party youth wings, I did not report these in the main text because of the potential impact of the earlier reported overrepresentation of active members, particularly in the samples of DWARS and PINK! (see Chapter 3 and 5). These two party youth wings indeed scored higher on almost all answer options, while the respondents from the SGPJ again showed the lowest scores. Most importantly, the distribution of respondents over the five answer options was more or less the same for each party youth wing, i.e. informal conversations were the most popular way in all party youth wings, except for DWARS.

The 2020 membership survey asked respondents directly how often they participated in political discussions. Table 5.10 in Chapter 5 already showed that on average a small majority of the respondents occasionally or often joins an informal political discussion in their party youth wing: 24% answered occasionally and 31% opted for (very) often, while 43% of the respondents chose rarely or never.²⁸⁰ Respondents from the conservative Calvinist youth wing (SGPJ) participated the least in informal political discussions;²⁸¹ without them, the total figures are 25%, 36% and 38% respectively. Moreover, members were asked about their engagement in online political discussions of their party youth wing. As can be derived from Table 5.10, this is a less popular activity: 59% of the total respondents indicated rarely or never attending an online discussion of their party youth wing, 23% said to do so occasionally, and only 17% opted for often or very often. This is not due to a lack of presence of party youth wings on the internet, as they all have websites and are on multiple social media sites.²⁸² Again, respondents from the SGPJ stand out because they score much lower on this item.²⁸³

The participation levels of respondents are likely to be associated with these two items. Indeed, the more time a respondent spends per week to the party youth wing, the more frequently an informal or online political discussion in the party youth wing is joined (Figure

Figure 7.5 Mean score of discussion attendance by activity levels of members in 2020



Note. Scores are weighted by party youth wing size. Error Bars: 95% CI. Y-axis: frequency of attendance was scored on a scale from 1 (*rarely or never*) to 4 (*very often*). X-axis: the average time devoted to the party youth wing in the average week. The category 'don't know/no answer' is omitted from the analysis.

²⁸⁰ Again, the aforementioned potential sampling bias might play a role (see Chapter 3 and previous footnote).

²⁸¹ 65% of the SGPJ respondents indicated never joining an informal political discussion.

²⁸² That some party youth wings are trying to stimulate online discussion on their platforms is evident from the organizational sources. For instance, the CDJA reported in 2018 that the new website contains a member portal, which gives room for debate among members (*CDJA, Jaarverslag 2018, in CDA Jaarverslag 2018, p. 10*).

²⁸³ No less than 78% of the SGPJ respondents indicated never joining an informal political discussion.

7.5).²⁸⁴ More involvement means more opportunity for engagement in political discussions, although the reverse may also be true as opportunities for discussion may affect the decision to become more involved.

The importance of political discussions within party youth wings comes up in the interviews with the chairs from both periods. The former chair of the young democrats (JD) of the progressive liberal D66, for example, sees it as a function of a party youth wing “that it is a safe environment to talk about politics with like-minded people or peers”.²⁸⁵ The chair of PINK!, the youth wing of the Party for the Animals (PvdD), also emphasized the added value of discussing politics in more detail with like-minded people:

You often meet people in your environment who think very differently about this. And then it is wonderful to be among all people who recognize that. Not only that confirmation, but also that you can go into it a little deeper. Because the discussions about animal rights outside the PvdD are quite superficial, compared to the nice conversations you can have within such a youth organization.²⁸⁶

This indicates that political discussion is interwoven in the informal social interaction within party youth wings. This can also be illustrated by an excerpt from the interview with the former chair of the youth wing of the Pacifist Socialist Party: “(...) at those summer camps, that you all drive an old bus to southern Italy and then discuss numerous topics and have fun and drink and smoke a lot and then go back again”.²⁸⁷ Nevertheless, the chairs also pointed to the importance of the formal settings of their youth wing in which political discussion takes place and is stimulated. For instance, the former chair of the JD mentioned the role of political committees and the general member meetings in the late 1980s: “We also had all kinds of committees with members, who prepared a piece or report that was then presented to the congress, to which amendments could be tabled. (...) And there was serious substantive discussion about it”.²⁸⁸ Similarly, the following text fragment of the 2019 annual report of the youth wing of GL (GreenLeft) illustrates how committees can contribute to political discussions among members today:

In 2019, the substantive committees contributed to DWARS' internal debate. Not only by means of discussion and conversations within the committees themselves, but also by organizing

²⁸⁴ A one-way ANOVA demonstrates a significant difference between the various activity levels in the frequency of attendance of informal political discussions, $F(4,1047) = 286.7$, $p = .000$, and online discussions, $F(4,1041) = 116.2$, $p = .000$.

²⁸⁵ In Dutch: “dat het een veilige omgeving is om met soortgenoten of leeftijdgenoten over politiek te praten”.

²⁸⁶ In Dutch: “Je komt vaak in je omgeving mensen tegen die daar heel anders over denken. En dan is het heerlijk om tussen allemaal mensen te zijn die dat herkennen. Niet alleen die bevestiging, maar ook dat je er wat dieper op in kunt gaan. Want de discussies die over dierenrechten gevoerd worden buiten de PvdD zijn vrij oppervlakkig, in vergelijking met wat voor leuke gesprekken je binnen zo'n jongerenorganisatie kunt hebben”.

²⁸⁷ In Dutch: “Ook op die zomerkampen, dat je met zijn allen in een oude bus naar Zuid-Italië rijdt en dan discussieert over tal van onderwerpen en lol maakt en veel drinkt en blowt en vervolgens weer terug gaat”.

²⁸⁸ In Dutch: “We hadden ook allerlei commissies waar leden inzaten, die dan een stuk of rapport voorbereidden dat werd dan voorgelegd aan het congres, daar werden weer amendementen op ingediend. (...) En daar werd serieus inhoudelijk over gediscussieerd”.

various activities and substantive evenings on current themes or topics that are relevant to our association.²⁸⁹

Indeed, the various sources show that party youth wings in both periods explicitly attempted to stimulate political discussion among their members by setting up political committees or working groups, conferences and debates or discussion evenings. There is some indication that such initiatives have been intensified over the years. For instance, the various party youth wings' annual reports from both time periods show that the number of party youth wings with a political committee / working group structure in the period of 2014-2020 was higher than in 1985-1990, as was the number of committees and working groups within the youth wings.²⁹⁰ Related to this is the finding that more party youth wings adopted a political programme in the late 2010s (see Paragraph 6.2). This may be positively related to the prevalence of political discussions, as noted by the youth wing of the Christian Union:

No political programme of *PerspectieF* has been published in recent years. It is good to think about having one put to the vote at the [general member meeting] within the near future. There seems to be a lack of political awareness within the association, especially at conferences. Perhaps a political programme, and the accompanying amendments, can bring political discussion to the association.²⁹¹

Lastly, Section 7.2 of this chapter described an increased attention of party youth wings for activities with a focus on debating skills since the second half of the 1980s. Again, this is an indication of the intensification of the political discussion structures within party youth wings.

Network building

Within the context of the various activities and structures, youth wing members connect with others and make new acquaintances, and in this way expand their social network. As described, the networks that young people can build within party youth wings are particularly relevant for political socialization. This paragraph will explore the network building opportunities within party youth wings in both time periods. Such mechanisms are not easy to measure, but the combination of interviews, membership surveys and other organizational sources enables a first exploration.

²⁸⁹ DWARS, *Jaarverslag 2019*, p. 4. In Dutch: "Ook in 2019 hebben de inhoudelijke commissies bijgedragen aan het interne debat van DWARS. Niet alleen door middel van discussie en gesprekken binnen de commissies zelf, maar ook door verschillende activiteiten en inhoudelijke avonden te organiseren over actuele thema's of onderwerpen die relevant zijn voor onze vereniging".

²⁹⁰ In the late 1980s, the CDJA, PPRjo, JD, JOVD and JS had committees or working groups that dealt with various political issues. Although the exact number fluctuates per year, the JD and JOVD each had around 8 to 12 of them, while the others had 2 or 3. In the late 2010s, only PINK! and ROOD did not have such bodies. The majority had around 6 to 9 committees or working groups, with the exception of the JD, which had around 15 of these, and PpF, which had around 4.

²⁹¹ PpF, *Jaarverslag 2019-2020*, p. 6. In Dutch: "Afgelopen jaren is er geen politiek programma van *PerspectieF* verschenen. Het is goed om erover na te denken om er binnen afzienbare termijn alsnog een op de ALV ter stemming te laten brengen. Binnen de vereniging lijkt soms politiek bewustzijn te ontbreken, zeker op congressen. Wellicht kan een politiek programma (en de bijbehorende amendementen) politieke discussie brengen in de vereniging".

Firstly, several chairs underlined the opportunity and usefulness of meeting new people within their youth wing in the interview. The chair of the JS, for example, elaborated: “You will come into contact with many politicians, but also professors on specific subjects, we often invite journalists or other interesting speakers. You meet people”.²⁹² The former chair of the youth wing of the VVD pointed to the lasting value of such encounters: “The JOVD network (...) concerns people that you know from that time which has been very formative for you. (...) because of that, making contact also becomes very easy”.²⁹³ The chair of PINK! similarly stated: “I have also made friends within PINK! and other party youth wings; people I still speak to regularly. In any case, they are nice contacts. Who knows what it will do for you”.²⁹⁴ Perhaps it will come as no surprise that the youth wing chairs are convinced of the network-building opportunities. After all, the chairmanship is pre-eminently about having relevant political contacts.

Table 7.7 Importance of ‘chance to make new friends / acquaintances’ in the decision to become a youth wing member (in %)

	Total 1989	Total 2020*
(Very) unimportant	31	30.1
Not important / not unimportant	34	21.9
(Very) important	34	47.6
<i>Total N</i>	531	568

Note. Survey question: “How important have each of the following reasons been in your decision to join [PYW]?” PYW = party youth wing. *Weighted by party youth wing size. Unweighted *N* = 563. The answer option ‘don’t know/no answer’ (only in 2020) is omitted.

Table 7.8 ‘By being a member of [PYW], young people expand their social network’ (2020, in %)

	Total*	CDJA	DWARS	JD	JS	PINK!	PpF	SGPJ
(Totally) not applicable	3.8	4.7	1.4	5.6	2.9	(0.0)	(6.5)	6.0
Neither/nor	6.5	8.8	5.7	5.2	5.7	(4.2)	(3.2)	10.6
(Totally) applicable	80.7	78.8	85.7	77.2	82.9	(91.7)	(74.2)	74.1
Don’t know	9.0	7.8	7.1	12.1	8.6	(4.2)	(16.1)	9.3
<i>Total N</i>	986	193	70	232	105	24	31	301

Note. PYW = party youth wing. Values in brackets when total *N*<50. *Weighted by party youth wing size. Unweighted *N* = 956.

We therefore move to an exploration of the motivations, perceptions and participation of members. Table 7.7 shows to what extent the opportunity to meet new friends and

²⁹² In Dutch: “Je komt in contact met heel veel politici, maar ook hoogleraren over een bepaald onderwerp, journalisten nodigen we ook vaak uit, of interessante andere sprekers. Je ontmoet ook mensen”.

²⁹³ In Dutch: “Dat zie je wel in dat JOVD-netwerk, (...) dat je mensen kent uit die tijd die heel vormend is geweest voor je. Maar dan is het contact leggen ook heel makkelijk”.

²⁹⁴ In Dutch: “Ik heb ook wel vrienden gemaakt binnen PINK! en bij andere PJO’s, mensen waar ik nog regelmatig mee spreek. Het zijn toch in ieder geval wel leuke contacten. Wie weet wat je daar nog eens aan hebt”.

acquaintances plays a role in the decision of respondents to become a youth wing member. The share of respondents who found this (very) important has risen from 34% in 1989 to 48% in 2020. For one in two respondents in 2020, the chance to make new friends contributed to the decision to become a member of the youth wing. An overview of the survey data of 2020 broken down by youth wing is adopted in Appendix 7.1. In addition, survey respondents in 2020 rated the following statement: “By being a member of PYW young people expand their social network” (Table 7.8). The results show that the vast majority is convinced of this: 81% of the respondents believed that this statement is (totally) applicable, while only 4% did not.

Another relevant aspect is to what extent youth wing members join social activities within the party youth wing. Table 5.9 and Table 5.10 in Chapter 5 already showed that social activities are among the most popular types of activities in 2020. For all party youth wings but the SGPJ, more than half of the respondents attends a social activity on an occasional or (very) regular basis.

Lastly, we can explore the character of the social activities within party youth wings in both periods. There are indications that it was less common for some party youth wings to organize informal social activities in 1985-1990 than is the case today. For example, the former chair of the CDJA reported in the lustrum booklet (Sap et al., 1991, p. 43):

I attempted to get the social element a bit more into the association. That was a controversial point at the time. With the mindset of: if you do something about socializing, it quickly leads to a disco culture as with the JOVD.²⁹⁵

Indeed, parties or drinks, such as after a substantive evening meeting or during a conference weekend, are more common in the JOVD documents than in the documents of other youth wings. However, I also encountered these within the organizational sources of a number of other party youth wings. Within the PSJG, for instance, social activities were just as important, and were organized independently of other activities, for example in the form of movie evenings, parties or joint holidays. Perhaps to a lesser extent, the left-wing youth wings JS and PPRjo also reported such social activities. The sources of the confessional party youth wings, on the other hand, generally lack references to social gatherings. In the second half of the 2010s, it was very common to report in formal documents on the social gatherings that took place. Common social activities were New Year's drinks, introductory drinks, dinners and parties. The relatively new phenomenon of a ‘political café’ also points to the increased importance of the social aspect of activities. The summary of the JS may point to how the mind-set about this has changed in the last decades: “By organizing both substantive and fun activities we try to increase the involvement of young people in politics”.²⁹⁶

This section focused on the performance of Dutch party youth wings on the sub-

²⁹⁵ In Dutch: “Als laatste punt heb ik pogingen ondernomen om het gezelligheids-element wat meer in de vereniging te krijgen. Dat was toen trouwens een omstrepen punt. Zo in de sfeer van: als je iets aan gezelligheid doet dan leidt dat snel tot een disco-cultuur zoals bij de JOVD”.

²⁹⁶ JS, *Activiteitenverslag 2017 – Jonge Socialisten in de PvdA*, p. 2. In Dutch: “Door middel van het organiseren van zowel inhoudelijke als gezellige activiteiten proberen we de betrokkenheid van jongeren bij de politiek te vergroten”.

function 'facilitate social interaction' in both periods under scrutiny, by exploring mechanisms for political discussions and network building. Although it is not possible to draw firm conclusions based on the data at hand, it is confirmed that political discussions and network building mechanisms were inherently part of the party youth wing organizations in the mid-late 1980s and 2010s. Youth wing members express their opinions in both formal and informal youth wing settings, although informal conversations are found to have been a more popular way to make one's voice heard in the late 2010s than in the late 1980s. Moreover, there are indications that both the structures that stimulate political discussion and the organization of social gatherings have intensified over time. Overall, a considerable proportion of the youth wing's membership base seemed to join informal political discussions in the late 2010s, and the vast majority was convinced that youth wing membership leads to an expansion of one's social network.

7.4 Conclusions

The aim of the present chapter was to determine the performance of party youth wings on the socialization function. This function, defined as the promotion of the political socialization of young individuals, consists of two sub-functions: provide political education and training, and facilitate social interaction. While the data at hand did not allow for an assessment of the direct socializing effects of youth wing involvement on young individuals, it was possible to perform an in-depth exploration of the various socializing mechanisms at play within Dutch party youth wings in both time periods under scrutiny.

This leads to the following conclusions on the sub-function 'provide political education and training'. Firstly, I demonstrated that party youth wings paid more attention to the development of political skills in the most recent period compared to three decades ago. Secondly, it is found that they more often structure the education and training task within their organization in a professional way. These two trends are reflected in the classification of Dutch party youth wings as educational agents, which was made on the basis of the knowledge - skills oriented dimension and the non-professional - professional approach dimension. Lastly, it was shown that active members in particular benefit from the political education and training efforts of their youth wing. Just like the chairs, they most positively evaluate the impact of the political education and training provided by the party youth wing.

The exploration of the sub-function 'facilitate social interaction' revealed that it is likely that the degree of informal political discussion within the party youth wings has increased and that discussion structures have intensified since the late 1980s. Moreover, more party youth wings attach importance to the social component of membership and party youth wings nowadays report more often on social gatherings compared to the late 1980s. Members in the late 2010s are convinced that youth wing membership leads to an expansion of one's social network.

Although becoming a member of a party youth wing may already imply a certain political proneness, within the youth wing a member can generally further acquire, discuss and crystallize political knowledge and ideas, and gain the appropriate political skills and social

network in order to act accordingly in the wider political system. In conclusion, political socialization, the traditional function of political parties often attributed to the classic mass party model, is still very much alive today within the Dutch party youth wings.

The in-depth exploration in this chapter has revealed similarities and differences between party youth wings that seem to correspond to the identified clusters of party youth wings in the preceding chapters. In the second half of the 1980s, youth wings resembled each other in terms of an orientation towards political knowledge in the education and training offered by them, but they differed in the extent to which they organized such activities and whether they did so in a professional way. The parliamentary-oriented party youth wings CDJA, JD, JOVD and JS were highly active in this regard and predominantly adopted a professional approach to the organization of education and training. These were also the youth wings that had political committees or working groups (as did the PPRjo). The other party youth wings, which were previously marked as education- or activist-oriented, again functioned in a different way. The LVSGS/SGPJ, PPRjo and PSJG were less active and less professional in organizing education and training. The latter also applies to the RPJO, although this youth wing was somewhat more active in offering education and training to its members. These four party youth wings relied mainly on the local branches to perform this function. The GPJC did so as well, but did have a more professional education and training structure in place.

These differences have become somewhat smaller over time. In the second half of the 2010s, party youth wings focused more often on political skills in their educational structures and adopted a professional approach regarding the education and training within the organization. The SGPJ and ROOD are exceptions as they focused more on political knowledge while having a non-professional structure of education and training.

8. Conclusion and Discussion

While political parties continue to play a central role in the governance of our modern democratic societies, many are concerned that their presence at the societal level is waning. Young people in particular seem to refrain from participation in party politics. At the crossroad of political parties and political youth participation are the youth wings of political parties. This study has examined the functioning of these semi-independent party sub-organizations for young people in the Netherlands in two time periods: the late 1980s and the late 2010s. The main research question was whether the ability of Dutch party youth wings to mobilize, represent and socialize young people into the political system has changed over time. This was studied by comparing the performance of nine party youth wings in each time period on three key functions and eight accompanying sub-functions through the use of both quantitative and qualitative methodologies. Each of the sub-functions was operationalized in different indicators, which were in turn measured by an analysis of (archival) documents, membership surveys, and/or semi-structured interviews with board members of the included youth wings. The rich variety of aspects examined yielded valuable insights on the functioning of Dutch party youth wings in the second half of the 1980s and the second half of the 2010s.

8.1 Summary of findings

Although party youth wings form a modest part of the Dutch political landscape, they are an important feature of party democracy. This is already evident if we look at their history. Ever since the rise of parties, youth wings have emerged alongside them. The will to have a youth wing has almost always been stronger than any of the possible concerns political parties might have with such an affiliation. This has probably been fuelled by the availability of state subsidies for party youth wings since the late 1970s. This study has shown that party youth wings contribute to the mobilization and socialization of the involved citizens of the future, and the representation of youth interests within the political system. The degree to which party youth wings in the Netherlands perform their functions has not declined. They have come to perform some of the studied functions better, and others differently, than in the mid-late 1980s. An overview of the findings is set out in Table 8.1.

Still effective mobilizing vehicles for a small group of advantaged and politically active young people

The mobilization function includes the efforts of party youth wings to mobilize young people into political activity. The central finding is that Dutch party youth wings are still effective mobilizing vehicles, but only for a small group of advantaged and politically active young people. I examined the performance of youth wings on three sub-functions: attract a representative membership, facilitate internal participation and encourage members to participate in politics in other forms than youth wing membership.

Table 8.1 Summary table of main findings (aggregate picture)

Summary	Indicator	1985-1990 versus 2014-2020	General
Mobilization: Dutch party youth wings are still effective mobilizing vehicles for a small group of advantaged and politically active young people	Membership figures	Absolute and relative increase; although not linear	Considerable variation across PYW; very small share of the youth population becomes a member.
	Representativeness of membership	Increase for gender and (un)employment; decrease for age and probably also geographic location	Average member is male, is in the stage of young adulthood, is in higher education, and resides in the city.
	Intra-youth wing activism	Fairly stable	Relatively low share of inactive members; less time-demanding activities are most popular (in 2020).
	Political participation of members	-	PYW members display much higher political participation levels than young people in general (in 2020).
Representation: Dutch party youth wings are increasingly acting as representation channels for young people	Adoption of a political programme	Increase: more PYW have a political programme	-
	Participation in programme development	Shift from a representative to a direct model of participation	-
	Ideological congruence	-	Both the issue-salience and the ideological positions of PYW and their members are fairly congruent (in 2020).
	Insider access: use of party channels	Increase in use; more PYW have formal representation rights within the party	-
	Outsider access: media appearance	Decrease in quantity and quality; increase in authored opinion pieces	Media is perceived as an important means for gaining publicity and getting political views across.
	Members' share of parliamentary seats	Slight increase	The majority of young MP's aged <30 y/o since 1963 had a background in a PYW; sharp increase in 21 st century.
Socialization: In their role as socializing agents, Dutch youth wings have shifted the emphasis from ideological political knowledge to political skills and socializing opportunities	Influencing candidate selection	-	PYW lobby during the draft of the provisional list, the adoption of the final list and the elections.
	Focus of education and training	Shift in primary focus from ideological and political knowledge to political skills	Education and training activities are intentionally integrated into the PYW organization.
	Organizational structures of education and training	Increase in professional organizational structures of education and training	-
	Political discussions	Increase in informal political discussion; indication that discussion structures have intensified	-
	Network-building mechanisms	More PYW attach importance to the social component of membership; PYW more often report social gatherings	-

The total number of youth wing members has increased since the late 1980s. Membership of a political party youth wing has thus not lost its appeal in the Netherlands. On the contrary, more young people nowadays find their way to a party youth wing than three decades ago. This is a surprising result since the scarce literature on this particular subject indicates that party youth wings are in decline in several long-established democracies (Hooghe et al., 2004; Jungblut & Weber, 2017; Mair & Van Biezen, 1999; Offe & Fuchs, 2002; Rothstein, 2002). Belgian youth wings are even characterized as having “suffered declines in membership that are far more dramatic than those of equivalent adult structures” (Forbrig, 2003, p. 15). As described, the literature on political involvement and political parties points in the same direction. It is generally believed that young people more and more refrain from participation in conventional forms of politics (e.g. Norris, 2003; Sloam, 2013). One would thus expect that young people distance themselves from organizations that function in the sphere of traditional politics. Added to this are the concerns on the decreasing societal presence of political parties and their aging membership base (e.g. Mair, 2005; Scarrow & Gezgor, 2010). This all contributes to the noteworthiness of the finding that there is no impending demise of Dutch party youth wing membership: the aggregate capacity of youth wings to attract members changed for the better since the second half of the 1980s.

This conclusion must be qualified in several ways. Firstly, the data have uncovered great variation between party youth wings in the extent to which they individually experience an expanding or shrinking membership base, leading to the conclusion that membership increase is by no means a universal phenomenon. The youth wings of the three long-established mainstream parties - PvdA, CDA, and VVD - in particular have experienced losses between the two time periods under scrutiny. This accords with earlier observations that these traditional major parties in particular have lost a significant portion of their membership since the 1980s (Voerman & Van Schuur, 2011, pp. 205-206). On a side note, this finding underlines the importance of including party-level analyses when studying developments in political memberships, as has been emphasized by others (Kölln, 2014b; Van Haute et al., 2017). Secondly, another important finding was that the trend in party youth wing membership is not constantly upward over the entire time interval of interest. Data from the intervening years has shown that the total Dutch party youth wing membership reached a low point around the turn of the century before rising again. The total memberships of the Dutch political parties also declined in the nineties and has fluctuated since the beginning of the century (Voerman, 2016). Thirdly, it must be concluded on the basis of the presented findings that, although the total number of members has increased over time, only a very small proportion of the Dutch youth population decides to join party youth wings. One cannot speak of mass-based organizations, but rather of small-scale party sub-organizations. The conclusion is therefore that although the general rate of party youth wing membership is increasing, this rate is low and varies between party youth wings and over time.

The question was not only to what extent party youth wings attract members, but also whom they attract. Whenever party youth wings exert representative power and socialize young people politically, it is important to know whether those young people that are joining

them share characteristics with the youth population at large. For both time periods under scrutiny, it is found that Dutch party youth wings do not mirror the population of young people. The average Dutch party youth wing member is more likely to be reported as male than female or other genders, aged above 21, living in urban areas and participating in higher education. In addition, young people with a migration background were underrepresented in the investigated party youth wings in 2020. These findings are consistent with previous studies that found that certain groups are more likely to be politically active than others, such as men and the highly-educated (e.g. Parry et al., 1992b; Verba et al., 1995). Moreover, the socio-demographic profile of the average youth wing member seems to correspond largely to the average profile of party members in the Netherlands (Den Ridder et al., 2019). There have been some noteworthy changes in the profile of the members of Dutch party youth wings when we compare the late 2010s to the late 1980s. Even though men still outnumber women, the gender disparity seems to have reduced over this period. Such a trend is generally not found for the respective mother parties (Den Ridder et al., 2019; Scarrow & Gezgor, 2010). There are also characteristics on which the descriptive congruence of Dutch party youth wings seems to have worsened. The data suggest that members are considerably older in the late 2010s than was the case in the late 1980s. Party youth wings might better be typified as organizations for young adults than for adolescents. There is also an indication that the overrepresentation of city and 'Randstad' residents among party youth wing members has increased. It clearly depends on the socio-demographic attribute whether the descriptive representativeness of the youth wing's membership bases has improved or not. This does not directly allow us to draw conclusions regarding the substantive representativeness as well, although some have argued that the underrepresentation of certain categories in politics leads to both an underrepresentation of perspectives and a sense of exclusion (e.g. Phillips, 1995). If we consider party youth wings as some sort of harbinger for the future composition of political parties or representative bodies, then gender equality may increase at that level, but further diversity will likely lag behind.

The mobilizing potential of party youth wings and the quality of the membership also depend on the internal activity levels of the members. A well-functioning political association needs the active involvement of its members. Not just to keep the organization running, but also to be able to determine the right political course and to let members benefit from their involvement, for instance in terms of the development of skills, knowledge and opinions. Although conclusions should be treated with caution due to survey methodological limitations, it is found that the overall levels of party youth wing activism have remained fairly stable compared to the late 1980s. This corresponds to findings on party activism in the Netherlands (Den Ridder, 2014, p. 83). There is also suggestive evidence that, when compared to party activism studies, the proportion of inactive youth wing members is relatively low. This accords with the observation of Cross and Young (2008) that young party members in general, and party youth wing members in particular, are more active than older party members. Such a finding is particularly important for the mother parties because it is also suggested that these young members are more likely to display higher levels of party activism in the future (Cross

& Young, 2008). In 2020, the most popular member activities were those that are less time-demanding, such as reading the member magazine and visiting the website. Well-attended types of party youth wing gatherings appeared to be social gatherings, formal meetings and conferences, and other meetings such as discussions, theme events or excursions.

When examining the functioning of party youth wings as mobilizing vehicles, their impact on the 'external' political participation of the members cannot be ignored. I compared the political participation of the members of the studied youth wings to that of young people in general in 2020 only due to missing data for the late 1980s. A member of a Dutch party youth wing is found to be more likely to vote during national elections and display substantially higher levels of participation in political activities than the average young person. In other words, the youth wings of political parties consist mainly of politically active young people. It is well-established that those involved in voluntary associations are more active politically (e.g. Parry et al., 1992a; Quintelier, 2008; Stolle & Rochon, 1998; Verba & Nie, 1972). It is challenging, however, to draw conclusions about whether such findings can be attributed to the associational membership or to certain (self-)selection mechanisms. In other words, those who become members of party youth wings may already be prone to political activism before joining. The results do indicate that about half of the members recognize certain intentional mobilization efforts of party youth wings. Moreover, considering that young people in particular have fewer political connections, knowledge and prior experience with participation (e.g. Plutzer, 2003), it is likely that a combination of self-selection and mobilization/ socialization effects occur. Party youth wings probably have the ability to fan any small political fires that exist within their members, but no definite conclusions can be drawn here.

More vigorous representation channels for young people

The second key function of party youth wings, the representation function, revolves around the efforts of youth wings to represent young people's interests within the political system. The central finding is that Dutch party youth wings are increasingly acting as representation channels for young people. Three sub-functions were examined: aggregate political interests, articulate political interests and enhance descriptive representation.

More party youth wings aggregated the interests of their members in a political programme in the second half of the 2010s than in the second half of the 1980s. Members had a say in the process of establishing the programme, but in contrast to the earlier time period, this involvement in 2020 did not take shape via representatives that vote on behalf of the wider membership, but via direct participation of individual members. This is consistent with the trend of more direct opportunities for member involvement in political parties' decisional arenas (e.g. Cross & Katz, 2013; Lucardie & Voerman, 2011). While member involvement potentially leads to a convergence of political interests and thus to a certain level of congruence between the ideological priorities of the party youth wing and the youth wing's members, this was assessed in more detail for the late 2010s by examining both the salience-based and position-based ideological congruence. Both measures point to a fairly close

member-youth wing proximity. Firstly, the attention devoted to certain policy areas in the political programmes of the party youth wings highly corresponded to those policy areas that were deemed important by the members. Congruence was only found to be lower for the issue categories international affairs and environment and climate. While members often found the environment and climate the most important political theme, it did not receive the same amount of attention in the programmes. For the international affairs category, it was the other way around: the topic took up a relatively large amount of space in the programmes compared to the low importance attached to this topic by the members. Secondly, the members considered their own ideological positions on the left-right dimension and several policy issues as reasonably close to those of their youth wing and the corresponding mother party. Such internal ideological congruence is considered an important precondition for the quality of the political linkage mechanism (e.g. Giger & Lefkofridi, 2014; Mansbridge, 2009).

The next crucial step in the representation of the political interests of their members is to articulate these within the political arena. Comparable to interest groups (e.g. Binderkrantz, 2005; Grant, 2000, 2004), I have argued that party youth wings have two strategies at their disposal: 'insider' strategies that focus on exerting influence on the mother party's political decision-making processes and 'outsider' strategies that include efforts to exert pressure via public visibility. Starting with the first, I found that Dutch party youth wings made more use of various party channels for wielding political influence within the mother party in the late 2010s than in the 1980s. They most often gained access to the parliamentary group or made use of their powers at the party congress. Only in two cases in the 1980s were these efforts supported by provisions on the insider access of party youth wings in the statutes and bylaws of the corresponding mother parties. Such provisions occurred more often in party regulations the late 2010s, although there were still political parties without any provision on the representative access of party youth wings in their regulations. Next to seeking internal access to the mother party, youth wings may try to influence politics through external channels. Dutch party youth wings still received attention from the ultimate outsider channel, the largest national newspapers, in the mid-late 2010s, but to a lesser extent than in the mid-late 1980s. Moreover, while their news coverage was less prominent in the late 2010s, youth wings more often took matters into their own hands by submitting opinion articles. Party youth wings still see the media as an important means for gaining publicity and getting their political views into the spotlight. It has to be remembered that the insider and outsider access of youth wings does not tell us anything about the actual impact or result of these efforts.

Another way for party youth wings to contribute to the political representation of young people is by enhancing the descriptive presence of young people in legislative institutions. Young people are underrepresented in national legislatures (IPU, 2016; Sundström & Stockemer, 2021), which may not only lead to an underrepresentation of their distinct interests, but may also send cues that politics is not for the young. I found that the majority of the young members of parliament that entered the Dutch House of Representatives below their thirties since 1963 has a background in the youth wing of their party. This proportion was slightly lower in the 1980s compared to the 2010s. The absolute

number of elected officials under the age of 30, and thus the number of young MPs with youth wing involvement, has particularly risen since the turn of the century. Party youth wings proactively try to exert influence on the selection and election of young candidates by lobbying party elites, setting up specific training programmes and campaigning for young candidates. This not only highlights the relevance of party youth wings as a stepping stone for ambitious young politicians, but also confirms their role as recruitment pool for the mother party (Hooghe & Stolle, 2003).

An educational shift from ideological and political knowledge to skills and socializing

The socialization function holds that party youth wings operate as a political school for young people. The central finding is that, in their role as intentional socializing agents, Dutch party youth wings have shifted the emphasis from ideological and political knowledge to political skills and socializing opportunities. The way in which party youth wings fulfil this key function was examined by assessing their performance on two sub-functions: the provision of political education and training, which focuses on the enhancement of political knowledge and skills, and the facilitation of social interaction, which focuses on the promotion of political discussions and networks.

Party youth wings in the 1980s deliberately integrated political education and training activities into the daily practice of their organization, and did so even more in the late 2010s. The first part of Chapter 7 uncovered two qualitative trends in the nature of the explicit political education and training efforts of party youth wings. Firstly, while the development of political knowledge was predominantly emphasized during the second half of the 1980s, political skills have become increasingly central in the provision of education and training since then. The historical overview in Chapter 4 already showed that many party youth wings traditionally promoted themselves as a political study clubs. The educational activities in the 1980s revolved around political ideology and principles. Although there was some attention for skills, this mainly focused on the development of the active cadre in order to improve the functioning and ensure the continuity of the youth wing organization. In the late 2010s, most party youth wings were primarily skills-oriented in their education and training activities: they offered extensive skills and career programmes to their members. The second trend is that of the shift from a non-professional to a professional organization of political education and training activities since the late 1980s. At that time, there were fewer party youth wings that 1) assigned the responsibility for the implementation of training and education to a person and/or body at the national level, 2) managed their own trainers pool, 3) reported on political education and training in annual accounts and 4) collaborated with the mother party in this area. In short, it can be concluded that Dutch party youth wings, as socializing agents, have turned from instruments for ideological integration into vehicles for the career development of young people.

Next to political education and training activities, the social interaction within party youth wings can be relevant for the political socialization of the members. More specifically, both political discussions and network building have previously been found to be positively

related to one's future political participation (Hooghe et al., 2004; Leighley, 1996; McClurg, 2003). Both political discussions and network building mechanisms were inherently part of the party youth wing organizations in the mid-late 1980s and 2010s. There has been an increase in the prevalence of political committees, political programmes and the attention for debating skills. In addition, both chairs and members were convinced that youth wing membership leads to the expansion of one's social network. It is found that social incentives for youth wing membership have increased since the late 1980s. Although informal social gatherings were important in some party youth wings in 1985-1990, this has become more widespread and self-contained within youth wings today. It might not be possible to draw firm conclusions, but the findings point to an intensification of political discussions and network building within Dutch party youth wings over time.

Diminishing differences across party youth wings

The above provides a clear aggregated picture of the functioning of Dutch party youth wings in two time periods. Although data was not always available for each youth wing in each time period, the aggregated findings on the country level do conceal several noteworthy differences across the youth wings. The historical overview of chapter 4 already pointed out that, broadly speaking, three types of party youth wings have existed over time: education-oriented, activist-oriented and parliamentary-oriented youth wings. Several findings of the current study indicate that these types underlie functional differences between party youth wings in the second half of the 1980s. The biggest difference in functional performance lies between the youth wings of the oldest mainstream parties in the Netherlands (CDJA, JOVD and JS), which can be marked as parliamentary-oriented, and the other party youth wings. As already mentioned, the CDJA, JS and JOVD have shown a decline in membership since the 1980s. These three youth wings did possess a political programme and at the time tried to influence the decision-making bodies of their mother party by seeking internal access through various party channels, while other youth wings did so sparingly or not at all. The CDJA and JS even enjoyed formal representation rights at the time. Moreover, the CDJA, JOVD and JS displayed relatively high levels of media appearance in the 1980s compared to the other youth wings. They are the only youth wings that suffered from a decline in appearance in the Dutch national newspapers; the media appearances of the other party youth wings have (slightly) increased since the mid-late 1980s. The CDJA, JOVD and JS have also borne relatively many young MPs under thirty years old since the 1960s; a finding that logically follows from the large number of parliamentary seats of their mother party. Lastly, these three youth wings already had a more or less professional education and training structure during the second half of the 1980s. In short, the CDJA, JOVD and JS were relatively more organized and active on the three key functions in the late 1980s than the other party youth wings were.

The other six youth wings functioned differently at that time. They were generally smaller in terms of membership numbers and seats of their mother party in parliament. The education-oriented party youth wings, the GPJC, LVSGS/SGPJ and RPJO, tend to cluster together in terms of functioning. They followed the ideological line of the mother party and

were not very concerned with political affairs and representation. Rather, they presented themselves as study association for Christian politics, in which a strong emphasis was placed on the local branches. In terms of explicit education and training efforts, the LVSGS/SGPJ and the RPJO were not professionally organized, while the GPJC had set up a relatively professional top-down educational structure. The activist-oriented PSJG was also of a different kind. Its functional performance in the mid-late 1980s deviated from the parliamentary- and education-oriented youth wings in the sense that it primarily engaged in politics in an extra-parliamentary way. Moreover, the PSJG was barely involved with the intentional political education of its members. The remaining two party youth wings, the JD and PPRjo, most resembled the parliamentary-oriented youth wings at the time as they were mainly focused on conventional, parliamentary politics. However, they were less actively involved in exerting influence within the mother party. It must be noted that the PPRjo also had some activist-oriented traits, as it regularly organized political actions.

These differences between the party youth wings seem to have narrowed over time. As described, the findings of the present study revealed a trend of politicization of party youth wings. The aforementioned youth wings, or their successors, were all involved in political representation to a greater or lesser extent in the late 2010s. The large majority made an effort to exert influence through the mother party. Explicit education and training for the purpose of a political career became more and more important. Moreover, most youth wings now had implemented a professionally organized education and training structure. The three distinct youth wing types identified in Chapter 4 thus seem to have disappeared from the Dutch party youth wing landscape; the parliamentary-oriented type became the dominant type in the late 2010s. It must be noted that two party youth wings can still be characterized as different in this period: ROOD and the SGPJ. ROOD primarily engaged in mobilizing and representing young people on a local level, and in doing so focused mainly on political themes with a heavy youth component. It thus has activist-oriented traits. For the rest, the youth wing followed the ideological and political line of the mother party, the SP. ROOD was also unique in the late 2010s in that it, together with the SGPJ, was primarily knowledge-oriented in its education and training offer. Although the label 'study association' has disappeared since the late 1980s, the SGPJ still focused on substantive themes based on Christian politics in its intentional education and training. This youth wing thus still has certain education-oriented traits. However, it must also be noted that the SGPJ is the only youth wing that was still relatively weakly organized in this regard in the late 2010s.

8.2 Reflections on the patterns of functional change and differences

At the beginning of this thesis, I formulated the expectation that the capacity of party youth wings to fulfil the mobilization and representation function has declined due to 1) the same societal trends that negatively affected their mother parties and 2) the latter's organizational transformations. At the same time, I expected that the socialization function of party youth wings gained importance due to a larger emphasis of parties on their procedural functions. This research finds no serious deterioration in the functioning of party youth wings in the

Netherlands when comparing the period of 1985-1990 to 2014-2020. On the contrary, the majority of party youth wings fulfilled some of the sub-functions better in the late 2010s than they did in the late 1980s. How is this possible at a time when political (youth) participation is declining and political parties are transforming? And how can we explain the diminished differences between party youth wings? This section will explore possible answers.

This study showed that more young people decided to become members of party youth wings in the late 2010s than in the late 1980s. At the same time, levels of internal member activism seem to have remained fairly stable. There is thus no support for theories that contend that the participation of young people in conventional politics is an ever-declining phenomenon due to societal trends such as social modernization. The question is what may have caused this revived interest of young people. It might be that, because of the increased number of young members of parliament (see Chapter 6) and the recent increase in young political party leaders in the Netherlands (NOS op 3, 2018), more cues are sent today that conventional politics is also for young people. At the same time, research on the effect of women's descriptive participation on the political activity of female citizens has yielded mixed results (for a review, see Hinojosa, 2021). Another explanation may be that newly emerged political issues have sparked the action-mindedness of young people. The climate crisis comes to mind as an example, particularly because of the generational conflict that is inherent to this issue: besides the fact that there is more at stake for younger people, the older political elites have often been accused of being incapable of reversing climate change. Indeed, the youth wings with an explicit green profile, the JD, DWARS and PINK!, have grown in recent times. The findings in Chapter 5 also point to the influence of the emergence of new party youth wings: the JFVD has had a considerable positive effect on the total membership figures.

I also showed that the functional performance of the CDJA, JOVD and JS differed from other party youth wings in the second half of the 1980s, and that Dutch party youth wings are nowadays more active as representation channels than in that period. Both findings may be explained by the aforementioned changes in the political landscape of the Netherlands since the early 1990s (Andeweg et al., 2020; Louwerse et al., 2019b; Otjes, 2018). Before that time, the electoral results and government participation were largely predictable. The youth wings of the three major parties CDA, PvdA and VVD already knew prior to the elections that their mother party would win a considerable number of seats in parliament and would thus retain its dominant position in the political landscape. Participation in the coalition would not only lead to certain compromises but also to a weaker ideological profile of the mother party. Such a situation creates both opportunity and necessity for a political approach of the affiliated youth wings. They see a role for themselves in preventing the party from drifting away from its ideological basis. This might explain the presence of political programmes and internal lobbying attempts of the CDJA, the JOVD and the JS in the late 1980s. Moreover, because of the prominent position of their mother parties, they had more resources for political socialization and received more media attention, giving them room to publicly articulate the interests of their constituency. As a result, the CDJA, JOVD and JS can best be characterized as 'party challengers' as opposed to 'party advocates' during this period.

In contrast, the youth wings of the other political parties in the 1980s, which often had a small number of seats in parliament, were aware that their chances of success in exerting real political influence were slim. Besides, it is of little use to the youth wing to further weaken the position of the mother party by publicly opposing the party. The often permanent position in the opposition also ensured that the mother party was committed to its ideals and presented itself as a steadfast alternative to the governing parties. For these reasons, the necessity for the affiliated party youth wings to exert political pressure was largely lacking. This situation clearly made the role of the youth wing as 'party advocate' more self-evident.

Since then, the predictability of the Dutch election results has decreased considerably. The increased electoral volatility and the related increased number of political parties ensure that no party can assume electoral support or government participation. As mentioned before, the three traditional parties (CDA, PvdA, VVD) lost a large share of the votes since 1989 (e.g. Andeweg et al., 2020; Louwerse et al., 2019b; Otjes, 2018). This may have fuelled the demonstrated membership decline of the affiliated youth wings. Moreover, it may be that, because of the increased electoral unpredictability and party competition, youth wings have become more politically active compared to the 1980s. They need to be prepared for a mother party that wins or loses elections; a party that is part of the government or the opposition. Both the JD and PpF, for example, have experienced several times in recent decades what it is like to have a mother party in government. Both youth wings are more politically oriented than (their predecessors) in the second half of 1980s. Now more than ever, Dutch party youth wings thus have to navigate between a role as 'party challenger' and as 'party advocate'. Interestingly, this might imply that the voice of the young is present more than ever within political parties. The question remains whether the party also listens.

While the above predominantly may explain the increased political character of Dutch party youth wings, it may also partly explain the finding that their education and training offer is organized in a more professional way compared to the 1980s. Namely, since election results are unpredictable and the number of seats of a party fluctuates more often, nurturing and preparing political candidates is of constant importance. An alternative explanation is the increased importance of the procedural role of parties. As described in Chapter 2, the relationship of political parties with society at large is under pressure, as a result of which they seem to place more emphasis on their procedural functions, such as the recruitment of political leaders and party staff (Mair, 2003). In a context of declining party memberships, the recruitment pool of youth wings may therefore be of increasing importance to parties. Added to this is the finding of this study that the number of young MPs has increased significantly since the beginning of this century, which has resulted in an absolute growth in the use of the recruitment pool of the party youth wings. Both developments point to the need for a professionalized education and training offer of youth wings, especially if we add another factor into the equation: the professionalization of the organizations of the mother parties. This ties in with the rise in the number of professional party politicians, who enter politics at a relatively young age and build a career within the party before entering parliament (Ohmura et al., 2018; Turner-Zwinkels & Mills, 2020). The finding that the emphasis within the

education and training offer has shifted from ideological and political knowledge to political skills and socializing opportunities fits the image of the increasing relevance of party youth wings as vehicles for political careers. In addition, the diminished distinctiveness of the ideological profiles of Dutch political parties may have contributed to this shift (Andeweg et al., 2020). It may be concluded that the party youth wings have adapted to the modern cadre party model of their mother parties over time (Koole, 1994).

A normative interpretation

The functions of party youth wings have so far been used as a framework for empirical testing. While this has yielded a lot of valuable information about the activities of party youth wings and the role they play in a party democracy, the question remains whether or not on the basis of these findings we can conclude that the *proper* functioning of party youth wings has improved. There is no clearly defined and objective benchmark for assessing the functional performance of party youth wings as good or bad. Such an evaluation depends on what perspective is applied and is therefore not a value-free exercise. From a party perspective, for instance, one might be worried that the increased political character of party youth wings threatens party unity. From a youth perspective, however, one might celebrate that the voice of young people increasingly resounds within parties. Such evaluations will largely depend on which democratic norms or standards are adhered to. This is also clearly reflected in the party literature: concerns about the alleged decline of parties all rest on (implicit) normative assumptions about the workings of democracy (Van Biezen, 2004a). In order to illustrate the impact of various democratic considerations on the evaluation of party youth wing functioning, several findings are considered from various dominant democratic strands of thought.

One of the main findings is that, even though the membership figures of Dutch party youth wings may have increased over time, the membership base of youth wings consists of a small group of advantaged young people. From a liberal democratic perspective, this may not necessarily be a cause for concern. Liberal democratic theories perceive democracy not as an end in itself, but as a political method. A well-known thinker of this strand of thought is Schumpeter, who contended that effective citizen participation has to be limited to giving input in politics by means of voting in elections so that high-quality political elites acquire the power to decide (Schumpeter, 1943). From this perspective, political parties play a role in both “facilitating the recruitment-by-cooptation by means of which the continuing democratic commitment of elites is assured” and enabling “leaders to govern effectively” (Katz, 1997, p. 53). Supporters of this democratic strand of thought would therefore probably value the finding that party youth wings are able to recruit and nurture future political leaders. The fact that the members of party youth wings are not representative of the young subset of society is not a problem. On the contrary, according to this democratic view the overrepresentation of highly educated people within youth wings is evaluated positively because this would increase the quality of recruitment. A statement by Henn et al. (2002, p. 172) about party youth wings in the UK corresponds to this democratic perspective: “Their importance lies in

their continuing ability to recruit and socialize a distinct elite of potential candidates and advisers rather than a mass network of supporters”.

Adherents of the pluralist version of liberal democratic theory will also be less concerned with the performance of party youth wings on the mobilization function. For them, the finding that party youth wings act as representation channels is most important. Pluralist theorists emphasize the significant role of multiple organized groups in balancing power relations and distributions during and in between democratic elections (Held, 2006; Saward, 2003). Political parties, as other political groups, should collect and aggregate interests and present them in policy alternatives. As this study has shown, party youth wings contribute to this process as they establish a substantive link between young people and the mother party. By aggregating and articulating the interests of young people internally, youth wings may counter the potential unreasonable exploitation of this social group in the political process.

Supporters of other democratic perspectives might probably emphasize other aspects of the functioning of party youth wings. Some will be concerned about the low representativeness of the membership base of party youth wings because of a belief that this could negatively affect the quality of political representation of interests (Mansbridge, 1999). The voices of those who participate are more likely to be heard than the voices of citizens who do not participate, leading to possible inequality in pursued interests. For instance, scholars that are concerned about the dominance of the higher educated in the political processes in the Netherlands might be worried about the overrepresentation of young people in higher education within the party youth wings (e.g. Bovens & Wille, 2011). Similar remarks can be made about the lack of ethnic or geographic diversity among youth wing members. Others might be particularly disappointed about the finding that party youth wings attract only a very small subset of young society. Participatory democrats emphasize the need for regular and high levels of participation by citizens. Their model can be characterized as “one where maximum input (participation) is required and where output includes not just policies (decisions) but also the development of the social and political capacities of each individual” (Pateman, 1970, p. 43). At the same time, participatory democrats probably would probably value the finding that party youth wings are democratically organized vehicles for participation and socialization, offering small-scale participatory contexts that advance the development of good citizenship (see also Allern & Pedersen, 2007).

Since the early 1990s, a deliberative turn in democratic theory can be identified (Dryzek, 2004). Deliberative theorists focus on the institutionalization of sensible interaction or discussion between free and equal citizens in order to come to legitimate democratic decisions (e.g. Fishkin, 2009). Instead of a focus on the aggregation of fixed preferences, they emphasize the importance of the process that precedes this: the mutual exchanges that form and transform citizen preferences. From this perspective, the value of political parties depends on the extent to which they incorporate and organize deliberative practices for ‘members on the ground’ (Wolkenstein, 2016). The same may account for their youth wings. The finding that the focus of youth wings’ education and training has shifted from knowledge to skills will therefore probably be greeted with dismay by scholars of this strand of thought.

They may, however, be reassured by the finding that Dutch party youth wings attempted to stimulate political discussion in both time periods, and that there is indication of an intensification of the political discussion structures. It must be noted that deliberative practices of youth wings should be better researched in order to be able to draw further conclusions.

8.3 Implications and limitations

Although most Western political parties possess a youth wing with the aim to build a connection between the party and young people, relatively little attention is paid to these sub-organizations in the literature on parties. This study is unique in the sense that it fills this gap by systematically assessing party youth wing performance in the Netherlands over time on eight sub-functions using a combination of multiple sources and methods. This section highlights several implications of the research findings for theory and practice.

In Chapter 2, I described the changing political behaviour of citizens and the challenges that this has presented to political parties. Some are concerned that the decline in party involvement and increase in electoral volatility point to weaker representational capacities of parties. Others indicate that the latter need not have diminished because of the parties' capacity to adapt. The findings of the present study can be viewed in this light. The increasingly common strategy of parties to set up an internal sub-organization for the young has various implications for the party. On the one hand, these are advantageous for the party. Hooghe et al. (2004, p. 207) previously painted a bleak picture of the shrinking membership base of Belgian youth wings and the consequences for their mother parties: "in the near future, parties will (...) be confronted with the fact that one of their main sources for the provision of new members is drying up". This study shows that the situation is not as bad in the Netherlands. There is a relatively small but growing group of young citizens involved in conventional politics via party youth wings. If we assume that party youth wings are indeed one of the sources for the provision of new members, then this is good news for the future of Dutch parties as membership organizations. It must be noted that this applies less to the traditional parties because their youth wings did show symptoms of decline, which may be interpreted as a confirmation that the heydays of the traditional mainstream political parties in the Netherlands are indeed over (Louwse et al., 2019a). New growth via the youth wings is important, as party members are found to be important for establishing representational linkages with voters (e.g. Den Ridder, 2014; Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2012). Moreover, some have pointed out the risks of an ageing membership base of parties (Scarrow & Gezgor, 2010). If we find the substantive and descriptive representation of young people within parties important, the youth wings should be cherished. Considering the access that youth wing members have to various party channels and positions, they may even help the political party rejuvenate its image.

On the other hand, the findings of this study also point to less advantageous implications for the party. The youth wing members can be classified as, in the words of Rohrschneider & Whitefield (2012), loyal partisans. Not only has the total number of youth

wing members increased in the Netherlands, it was also found that party youth wings started to behave more politically since the 1980s. Political parties nowadays thus regularly have to deal with a critical voice from their young constituency. These developments may have contributed to the representational strain that political parties increasingly experience: they want to stay ideologically close to their loyal partisans as well as appeal to the growing number of non-partisans in the electorate as much as possible (Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2012). In addition, the media is more important than ever for reaching non-partisans, meaning that a professional party will try to avoid intra-party disagreements that might lead to negative media coverage. Even then, one may think that the representation of the interests of the young partisans within the party is worth it all. However, a critical look at the representational capacity of the youth wings does reveal some shortcomings. The finding that party youth wings have no strong social roots and do not accurately mirror the youth population in terms of socio-demographic characteristics, hangs like a dark cloud over their functioning. This may have consequences for their ability to articulate the interests of young people. Moreover, assuming that some of the youth wing members move on to the mother party, it may have consequences for the diversity of the party's membership base and future candidates and nominees.

A related implication of this study is that political parties and party scholars should be aware of an increasingly present intra-party group amidst of declining relationships with other collateral organizations. While scholars in the past often focused on formal arrangements within the party, such as rights of access of collateral organizations (e.g. Allern & Verge, 2017; Poguntke, 2002), such an approach leads to an underestimation of both the prevalence and leeway of party sub-organizations such as party youth wings. This study has shown that party youth wings are successful in seeking access to the party's core decisional bodies, even in cases where such access has not been codified in party regulations. This underlines the warning of Katz and Mair (1992a) that the reality of a political party often deviates from that described in its official documents. This not only underlines the importance of taking party youth wings more seriously as an intra-party group in the body of literature on intra-party politics, but also of studying informal political dynamics within political parties.

Implications can also be considered of the finding that party youth wings have generally become more professional in their political education activities, and today are more focused on the development of political and professional skills of their members than on ideological integration. If these youth wing members move on to the party, there is a good chance that they take up the career path of a typical career politician early on, meaning that the party's recruitment pool of (young) professional politicians will grow, possibly resulting in even more rejuvenation of political bodies. This ties in with a context in which both the political career and the party have become more professionalized (Ohmura et al., 2018; Turner-Zwinkels & Mills, 2020). The question that remains unanswered is to what extent these young party members are ideologically integrated, particularly when considering that the ideological distinctiveness of political parties has already diminished (Andeweg et al., 2020).

Lastly, this study has implications for the literature on political participation. It confirms

that “a proportion of young citizens perpetuate a classic tradition of political involvement by joining political parties” (Bruter & Harrison, 2009b, p. 1260). This may be surprising as young people are often characterized as politically disengaged or engaged in informal and unconventional forms of politics (e.g. Norris, 2003; Sloam, 2013). On the basis of that characterization, we might expect that youth-led organizations such as party youth wings act in more unconventional ways. I found no indication that they do. On the contrary, this study has shown that Dutch party youth wings are now more often parliamentary-oriented than in the mid-late 1980s; they try to exert influence through the mother party and prepare their members for a political career. Moreover, they still only use the traditional membership model. Surely, party youth wings occasionally undertake playful political actions. But in general, they conform to the customs of conventional political practice. Scholarly research to young people that *are* active in the sphere of conventional politics therefore remains important, particularly when we consider the finding that among them we may find those who will lead tomorrow’s European nations (Bruter & Harrison, 2009b; Hooghe et al., 2004).

Limitations

Certain methodological restrictions and choices limit the scope of the findings of this study. A first limitation is that this study was only conducted in the Netherlands. The Netherlands was chosen as a typical case of a country that has witnessed considerable changes in the landscape of political parties in the past decades. As in other Western countries, declining party memberships and increasing electoral volatility point to an increasing disconnection between Dutch political parties and society at large (e.g. Louwse et al., 2019b). However, a selection of a single country naturally imposes restrictions to the generalizability of the findings. In some important respects, the Dutch political system is atypical. This may have impacted the functioning of party youth wings. For instance, it is likely that the available state subsidy has steered the existence and functioning of Dutch party youth wings. Although we know that party youth wings are also common in party democracies without such a government subsidy, there is one less incentive in these countries for parties to uphold the relationship and for youth wings to set up a solid organization. Another example is the relatively easy entry of new political parties in the Netherlands (Krouwel & Lucardie, 2008), which has probably stimulated the number of party youth wings. It is also likely that, as this low electoral threshold allows for smaller parties to be effective, there are more party youth wings with a small membership base. As described, this might negatively affect their room for exerting political influence. In countries where the number of parties is lower and parties are larger, the affiliated youth wings may have more political power.

A second limitation is that this study is based on a comparison of two demarcated time periods. It is therefore not clear how party youth wings functioned before these time periods or in the intervening period. There may be passing fluctuations or the two time periods may be related through sequences of events or long-term trends. Moreover, the impact of changes that have occurred between the time periods under scrutiny cannot be disentangled from the influence of certain factors and events within a time period (Haydu, 1998).

A third limitation concerns the research data. Due to the retrospective nature of the research, I was largely dependent on the availability of secondary data. Not all desired data for the mid-late 1980s could be found, and whenever it was found, it did not always present itself in the desired form. Moreover, both the 1989 and 2020 surveys did not include all youth wings of the parties present in the House of Representatives. The religious party youth wings GPJC, RPJO and LVSGS/SGPJ did not participate in the 1989 survey. In 2020, four party youth wings declined participation: JFVD, JOVD, OPPOSITIE and ROOD. In addition, I was dependent on the available questions from the 1989 survey; these had to be repeated as literally as possible in 2020 to ensure comparability. In the interview data, only the former chair of the PPRjo is missing.

8.4 Avenues for future research

This study on party youth wing functioning raises further questions and issues. Here, I present four avenues for further research into party youth wings. Firstly, it would be interesting to study the nature and actual impact of the representation efforts of party youth wings in more detail. As we have seen that youth wings have access to both the internal party organization and the media, party youth wings should be taken seriously as intra-party group. One way to explore this further is from the perspective of claim-making representation (Saward, 2010). Saward (2010) encourages us to perceive representation as a dynamic process in which the focus does not solely lay on conventionally elected actors, but also on unelected political actors as they continuously make representative claims. This can be applied to party youth wings, who, although officially unelected, claim to represent young people. One can ask what representative claims are made by party youth wings in what way, and how these are received and judged by the affiliated mother party and their constituency. Such a study also provides more insight into the way youth wings position themselves politically in relation to the party. This may shed more light on the mechanisms that lead to ideological (dis)agreement between the youth wing and the party, and, more specifically, into the conflicting demands of articulating interests within the party out of ideological considerations and assimilating to party wishes out of career considerations (Weber, 2017b).

Secondly, building on the previous suggestion, future research may explore the challenging role versus the supporting role of party youth wings vis-a-vis the mother party in more detail. Youth wings are likely to alternate these two roles. When exactly do they prefer one role over the other? At what point does the balance tip from contributing to the functioning of the mother party to impairing it? In other words: What determines a youth wing's loyalty to the party? One factor that might be taken into account is the degree of control that the mother party tries to exercise over the youth wing. A negative experience with the youth wing may lead to 'tightening the leash', which may lead to a vicious circle. As incidents of the past have learned us, a conflict with the youth wing can have great consequences for the organisation and reputation of the mother party. Most recently, a conflict between ROOD and the SP led to severing ties with the youth wing (Korteweg, 2021). This was somewhat surprising because the youth wing was previously known to be mainly

supportive of the mother party. Although this incident falls outside the studied time frame, it confirms that Dutch political parties should take into account that their youth wing functions largely independent. Studying such cases from the perspective of intra-party conflict can enlarge our understanding of the dynamics behind youth wing – party conflicts.

Thirdly, there is a need for a cross-national study in order to determine whether the patterns found in this study are also applicable to other countries. Although a single-country design is a good starting point for an understudied phenomenon, there is also reason to expect that there are cross-country differences. For instance, Bruter and Harrison (2009a) conclude on the basis of a few examples that the size of party youth wings and their relationship with the mother party vary across countries. Moreover, in several non-Western countries, the phenomenon of party youth wings is closely linked to the prevalence of political violence, such as in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Paalo, 2017). A cross-national study could take into account the impact of state-level factors on the functioning of party youth wings, such as public funding opportunities and the party system.

Fourthly, additional research may be conducted on the recruitment and socialization mechanisms within party youth wings. This study has, among other things, provided an insight into the political activity levels of members, the number of young MPs with a youth wing background and the socialization activities of Dutch party youth wings. Yet there is still a lot to know about how youth wing membership precisely affects young individuals' future engagement and (political) career development. To what extent and why do youth wing members move on to the mother party or not? Does youth wing membership affect other forms of (future) conventional or unconventional participation? What role do youth wing membership and other factors, such as self-selection, networks and other relevant experiences, play in one's political career? Such questions are not easy to answer; they often require longitudinal panel data on both (former) youth wing members and non-members.

Research on the presented topics will further enhance our understanding about the functioning of the youth wings of political parties. I hope that this study will serve as an impetus for such future research. Party youth wings provide an important entry point into the world of conventional politics; a world that still does not fully recognize the value of the participation and interests of young people.

Appendices

Appendix 3.1 List of consulted archives

Christen-Democratisch Jongeren Appèl (CDJA)

Nationaal Archief, Den Haag: Christen Democratisch Appèl (CDA), 1980-1988, nummer toegang 2.19.112, inventarisnummers 671-673, 675, 676, 678-680, 709, 711-713, 717-722, 984-987, 990-993, 996, 997.

Gereformeerd Politiek Jongeren Contact (GPJC)

Archief- en Documentatiecentrum [van de Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland], Kampen: Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond (GPV), 1948-2000, ARCHIEF STICHTING GPJC, inventarisnummers 428, 429, 434, 435, 437, 453-458, 482, 490, 494, 496, 505, 517, 520, 521, 525, 563, 564, 1022.

Jonge Democraten (JD)

Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen (DNPP), Rijksuniversiteit Groningen: het archief van de Jonge Democraten (JD) 1980-2015, XVIII.1, inventarisnummers 16, 20-29, 64-65, 84, 192, 209-213, 249, 252, 253, 262.

Jongeren Organisatie Vrijheid en Democratie (JOVD)

Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen (DNPP), Rijksuniversiteit Groningen: online archief JOVD via <https://jovd-digitaal.dnpp.nl/>.

Jonge Socialisten in de PvdA (JS)

International Institute of Social History (IISG), Amsterdam: Archief Jonge Socialisten in de PvdA, ARCH00398, inventarisnummers 75-79, 95, 148-150, 155-156, 161, 166, 354, 370, 397-399, 400, 430, 437, 444, 445, 509-512, 518-521.

Landelijk verband van Staatkundig Gereformeerde Studieverenigingen (LVSGS)

Nationaal Archief, Den Haag: Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP), nummer toegang 2.19.203, inventarisnummers 162, 163, 169, 171, 172, 196, 199-201, 206, 207, 212, 234, 236.

Politieke Partij Radicalen Jeugd (PPRjo)

Katholiek Documentatie Centrum (KDC), Nijmegen: archief Politieke Partij Radicalen, archiefnummer 579, inventarisnummers 583, 1458-1460, 1496, 1604-1612, 1669, 1972, 1979-1984, 2340, 2358, 2449, 2648, 2689, 2787-2788, 2789, 2801, 2803, 2667.

Pacifistisch Socialistische Jongerengroepen (PSJG)

International Institute of Social History (IISG), Amsterdam: Archief PSP. Jongerengroepen, ARCH01106, inventarisnummers 2, 9, 19-20, 26, 27, 73, 76, 78, 79.

Reformatorische Politieke Jongerenorganisatie (RPJO)

Historisch Documentatiecentrum voor het Nederlands Protestantisme (1800-heden), Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam: de Reformatorische Politieke Federatie (RPF) en de Christen Unie, inventarisnummer 97 (geen plaatsingslijst).

Appendix 3.2 Party youth wing membership survey questionnaire 2020

Start page

Mijn promotieonderzoek aan de Universiteit Leiden gaat over politieke jongerenorganisaties (PJO's). Onder meer via dit ledenonderzoek, dat ook onder andere Nederlandse PJO's wordt gehouden, hoop ik daar meer kennis van te verkrijgen. Jouw deelname is dan ook van cruciaal belang voor zowel het inzicht in jouw PJO als in het functioneren van PJO's in het algemeen.

Het invullen van de vragenlijst duurt ongeveer 15 minuten. Ik hoop dat je dat volledig en serieus zult doen. Deelname is uiteraard vrijwillig en je kunt op elk moment zonder opgave van reden stoppen. Misschien weet je op enkele vragen het antwoord niet of heb je over sommige onderwerpen geen mening. Je kunt die vraag of dat onderdeel van die vraag overslaan.

Een zorgvuldige, vertrouwelijke behandeling van jouw gegevens is gegarandeerd. In de publicaties op basis van dit ledenonderzoek zullen gegevens in geen geval tot individuele personen herleidbaar zijn. De anonieme data worden uitsluitend bewaard in een beveiligde omgeving van de universitaire server.

Door verder te gaan, geef je aan dat je de uitleg van de studie hebt gelezen, dat je met vrijwillige deelname akkoord bent en dat jouw gegevens voor wetenschappelijk onderzoek gebruikt mogen worden. Voor meer informatie over dit onderzoek kun je contact met me opnemen.

De waarde van dit onderzoek wordt mede bepaald door het aantal mensen die eraan meedoen. Ik hoop daarom van harte op ook jouw medewerking! Bij voorbaat hartelijk dank.

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Universiteit Leiden

Onder begeleiding van: prof. dr. Ingrid van Biezen (promotor).

Om te beginnen een aantal algemene vragen over het lidmaatschap van de politieke jongerenorganisatie (PJO).

Q1 Hoelang ben je al lid van [PJO]?

- Ik ben geen lid (meer) van [PJO] -- NAAR EINDE VRAGENLIJST
- Minder dan een jaar
- 1 tot 2 jaar
- 2 tot 3 jaar
- 3 tot 4 jaar
- 4 tot 5 jaar
- 5 tot 6 jaar
- 6 tot 7 jaar
- 7 tot 8 jaar
- 8 tot 9 jaar
- Langer dan 10 jaar

Weet niet / wil niet zeggen

Q2 Ben je op dit moment lid van [de moederpartij van PJO]²⁹⁷?

Ja

Nee

Weet niet / wil niet zeggen

Q3 Ben je op dit moment lid van een andere politieke partij?

Ja

Nee

Weet niet / wil niet zeggen

Q4 Hoe ben je van het bestaan van [PJO] op de hoogte gekomen? Meerdere antwoorden mogelijk.

Door mijn ouders/verzorgers

Door andere familieleden

Door vrienden/kennissen

Via een folder/brochure

Via de traditionele massamedia (radio, televisie, krant)

Door een wervingsactie van [PJO]

Door een doorverwijzing van de politieke 'moederorganisatie'

Via school/werk

Via internet/social media

Overige, namelijk: ...

Weet niet / wil niet zeggen

Q5-*split sample*. Hoe belangrijk is elk van de volgende redenen geweest bij jouw beslissing om lid te worden van [PJO]?

	Ze er onbelang- rijk	Onbelang- rijk	Niet bel./ niet onbel.	Belangrijk	Ze er belangrijk	Weet niet
a. Zo raak ik beter over politiek geïnformeerd.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
b. Politiek speelt in mijn familie een grote rol.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
c. Zo kan ik actief met politiek bezig zijn.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
d. Om invloed uit te oefenen op de landelijke politiek.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
e. Voor activiteiten die georganiseerd worden.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
f. Kans om nieuwe vrienden/kennissen te maken.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
g. Vrienden of kennissen zijn lid.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
h. Ik ambieer een loopbaan in de politiek.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

²⁹⁷ In het vervolg van deze vragenlijst verder afgekort tot [partij].

i. Om steun te geven aan de beginselen van [PJO].	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
j. Overige, nl...	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q5-split sample. In onderzoek heeft men diverse redenen gevonden waarom mensen lid zijn van een politieke partij. Hieronder staat een aantal van die redenen. Kun je voor elk van deze redenen aangeven hoe belangrijk of onbelangrijk deze voor je was toen je besloot lid van [PJO] te worden?

Ik ben lid geworden...	Volstrekt onbelangrijk	Niet zo belangrijk	Tamelijk belangrijk	Zeër belangrijk	Weet niet
a. omdat het prettig is met gelijkgestemden samen te werken.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
b. omdat ik hierdoor politieke invloed wil uitoefenen.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
c. omdat ik hierdoor interessante mensen ontmoet.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
d. omdat het belangrijk is voor mijn loopbaan.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
e. omdat ik het mijn plicht als burger vind om politiek bezig te zijn.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
f. om bestuurlijke ervaring op te doen.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
g. om uiting te geven aan mijn sympathie voor [PJO].	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
h. omdat het in mijn omgeving gebruikelijk is.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
i. om ook op politiek terrein uiting te geven aan mijn levensovertuiging.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
j. om me voor de doelstellingen van [PJO] te kunnen inzetten.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
k. om bij te dragen aan de invloed van [PJO].	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
l. omdat [PJO] zich inzet voor mensen zoals ik.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
m. om me meer in de politiek te kunnen verdiepen.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
n. omdat familie, vrienden en kennissen erop aandringen.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
o. om maatschappelijk vooruit te komen.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
p. om aardige mensen te ontmoeten.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
q. om me voor een rechtvaardiger samenleving in te zetten.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
r. om de politieke koers van [PJO] te beïnvloeden.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
s. omdat ik een politieke functie ambieer.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
t. om steun te geven aan de beginselen van [PJO].	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q6 Als lid van [PJO] kun je op verschillende manieren actief zijn. Kun je aangeven hoe vaak je, in het afgelopen jaar, hebt deelgenomen aan de onderstaande activiteiten?

	Zelden of nooit	Zo nu en dan	Vaak	Zeër vaak	Weet niet
a. Deelname aan een sociale activiteit van [PJO], zoals een borrel of feest.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
b. Een vergadering of congres van [PJO] bijwonen	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
c. Een cursus of training van [PJO] bijwonen.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

d. Deelname aan een politieke actie van [PJO], zoals een petitie of demonstratie.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
e. Deelname aan een campagneactiviteit van [PJO].	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
f. Een [PJO] bijeenkomst zoals een themadag, discussieavond, meet-up of excursie bijwonen.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
g. Meehelpen bij het organiseren van PJO activiteiten.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
h. Van deur tot deur gaan uit naam van [partij].	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
i. De website van [PJO] bezoeken.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
j. Actief zijn op sociale media over [PJO].	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
k. Deelname aan een online discussie van [PJO].	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
l. Deelname aan informele politieke discussies binnen [PJO].	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
m. Het landelijke ledenblad van [PJO] lezen.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q7 Hoeveel tijd besteed jij **gemiddeld** per week aan [PJO]?

- Geen -- NAAR VRAAG 9
- 0 tot 2 uur per week -- VRAAG 9 EN 10 NIET
- 2 tot 4 uur per week -- VRAAG 9 EN 10 NIET
- 4 tot 6 uur per week -- VRAAG 9 EN 10 NIET
- Meer dan 6 uur per week -- VRAAG 9 EN 10 NIET
- Weet niet / wil niet zeggen -- VRAAG 9 EN 10 NIET

Q8 Wat is voor jou een reden om naar activiteiten van [PJO] te gaan? Meerdere antwoorden mogelijk.

- Het is leerzaam/interessant
- Het is gezellig
- Om op de hoogte blijven van de ontwikkelingen binnen [PJO]
- Om nieuwe mensen te ontmoeten
- Om vrienden/bekenden weer te zien
- Om mijn stem te laten horen
- Overig, nl...
- Weet niet / wil niet zeggen

Q9 Waarom ben je momenteel minder of nauwelijks actief binnen [PJO]? Meerdere antwoorden mogelijk.

- Pas kort lid
- Gebrek aan contact met andere [PJO]-leden
- Persoonlijke omstandigheden (verhuizing, gezondheid, gebrek aan tijd, etc.)
- Ontevredenheid over activiteiten binnen [PJO]
- Ontevredenheid over mogelijkheden om de politiek beter te begrijpen en politieke vaardigheden te leren
- Ideologische ontwikkeling van [PJO]
- Onvoldoende invloed op koers van [PJO]
- Ontevredenheid met [PJO] organisatie
- Lidmaatschap levert mij niets op
- Slecht landelijk imago van de partij

- Onvoldoende interesse of behoefte
- Slechte bereikbaarheid
- Actief bij [partij]
- Leeftijd van leden sluit niet aan
- Overig, nl...
- Weet niet / wil niet zeggen

Q10 Denk je dat je in de toekomst (weer) actiever wordt als lid van [PJO]?

- Ja
- Nee
- Misschien
- Weet niet / wil niet zeggen

Q11 Vervul je **op dit moment** een van de volgende functies binnen [PJO], en zo ja welke? Meerdere antwoorden mogelijk.

- Ik vervul momenteel geen functie binnen [PJO]
- Ik zit in het landelijk bestuur
- Ik zit in een regionaal/lokaal bestuur
- Ik zit in een landelijke commissie of werkgroep
- Ik zit in een lokale commissie of werkgroep
- Overig, nl...
- Weet niet / wil niet zeggen

Q12 Heb je **in het verleden** een van de volgende functies binnen [PJO] vervuld? Meerdere antwoorden mogelijk.

- Ik heb in het verleden geen functie binnen [PJO] vervuld
- Ik zat in het landelijk bestuur
- Ik zat in een regionaal/lokaal bestuur
- Ik zat in een landelijke commissie of werkgroep
- Ik zat in een lokale commissie of werkgroep
- Overig, nl...
- Weet niet / wil niet zeggen

Q13 Hoe laat jij je stem horen binnen [PJO]? Meerdere antwoorden mogelijk.

- Door mee te discussiëren op afdelingsniveau
- Door het stemmen op de algemene ledenvergadering (ALV)
- Door deelname aan congressen
- Via informele gesprekken
- Online/sociale media
- Geen van bovenstaande
- Weet niet / wil niet zeggen

Q14 In welke mate zijn de volgende stellingen van toepassing?

	Helemaal niet van toepassing	Helemaal wel van toepassing	Weet niet

a. Zonder mijn lidmaatschap van [PJO] had ik nooit zoveel over politiek geweten.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
b. Door lid te zijn van een PJO ben ik veel mondiger geworden.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
c. Ik probeer weleens vrienden en/of kennissen over te halen om lid te worden van [PJO].	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
d. [PJO] zet zich onvoldoende in om nieuwe leden te werven.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
e. In [PJO] zijn relatief weinig leden actief.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
f. Door lid te zijn van [PJO] vergroten jongeren hun sociale netwerk.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
g. Binnen [PJO] is er voor gewone leden onvoldoende gelegenheid om invloed uit te oefenen.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
h. In politieke discussies binnen [PJO] hebben gesprekspartners vaak tegengestelde meningen.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
i. [PJO] moedigt leden aan om ook buiten de PJO politiek actief te zijn.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

In vragenlijst CDJA: In welke afdeling(en) van het CDJA ben je actief?

De volgende vragen gaan over de Nederlandse politiek.

Q15 Denk je dat jongeren via hun PJO-lidmaatschap invloed kunnen uitoefenen op de landelijke politiek?

- Ja
- Alleen op bepaalde gebieden
- Nee
- Weet niet / wil niet zeggen

Q16 Hieronder staan een aantal politieke thema's. Welke van deze thema's **vind jij het belangrijkste** voor de Nederlandse politiek in de komende vijf jaar? Maximaal **drie** antwoorden mogelijk.

- Milieu en klimaat
- Onderwijs
- Vervoer
- Zorg
- Immigratie
- Openbaar bestuur
- Economie
- Wonen
- Buitenlandse zaken
- Werk
- Sociale zekerheid
- Veiligheid
- Cultuur en media
- Defensie
- Overige, nl...
- Weet niet / wil niet zeggen

Q17 Hieronder staan een aantal politieke thema's. Aan welke van deze thema's besteedt [PJO] in de praktijk het meeste aandacht? Maximaal **drie** antwoorden mogelijk.

- Milieu en klimaat
- Onderwijs
- Vervoer
- Zorg
- Immigratie
- Openbaar bestuur
- Economie
- Wonen
- Buitenlandse zaken
- Werk
- Sociale zekerheid
- Veiligheid
- Cultuur en media
- Defensie
- Overige, nl...
- Weet niet / wil niet zeggen

Q18 In hoeverre komt dit tegemoet aan jouw eigen politieke interesses?

- Zeer goed
- Goed
- Voldoende
- Matig
- Slecht
- Weet niet / wil niet zeggen

Q19 Van politieke opvattingen wordt vaak gezegd dat zij links of rechts zijn. Wanneer je denkt aan jouw eigen opvattingen, die van [PJO] en die van [partij], waar zou je die dan op de onderstaande schaal plaatsen?

	Links										Rechts
Eigen positie	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Positie [PJO]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Positie [partij]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

Q20 Hier volgen enkele politieke strijdpunten. Je wordt gevraagd jouw eigen mening, die van [PJO] en die van [partij] als geheel aan te geven.

a. Sommige mensen vinden dat euthanasie altijd verboden moet zijn. Anderen vinden dat euthanasie mogelijk moet zijn als de patiënt daarom vraagt. Natuurlijk zijn er ook mensen met een mening die daar tussenin ligt. Waar zou je jezelf, [PJO] en [partij] als geheel plaatsen op een lijn van 1 tot en met 7, waarbij 1 betekent dat euthanasie moet worden verboden en 7 dat euthanasie mogelijk moet zijn?

eigen mening 1 euthanasie verboden ----- euthanasie toegestaan 7
 mening [PJO] 1 euthanasie verboden ----- euthanasie toegestaan 7
 mening [partij] 1 euthanasie verboden ----- euthanasie toegestaan 7

b. Sommige mensen vinden dat de verschillen in inkomens in ons land groter moeten worden (bij cijfer 1). Andere vinden dat deze verschillen kleiner moeten worden (bij cijfer 7). Natuurlijk zijn er ook mensen met een mening die daar tussenin ligt. Waar zou je jezelf, [PJO] en [partij] plaatsen?

eigen mening	1 inkomensverschillen groter -----	inkomensverschillen kleiner 7
mening [PJO]	1 inkomensverschillen groter -----	inkomensverschillen kleiner 7
mening [partij]	1 inkomensverschillen groter -----	inkomensverschillen kleiner 7

c. In Nederland vinden sommigen dat allochtonen hier moeten kunnen leven met behoud van de eigen cultuur (bij cijfer 1). Anderen vinden dat zij zich geheel moeten aanpassen aan de Nederlandse cultuur (bij cijfer 7). De mening van weer anderen ligt daar tussenin. Waar zou je jezelf, [PJO] en [partij] plaatsen?

eigen mening	1 behoud eigen cultuur -----	geheel aanpassen 7
mening [PJO]	1 behoud eigen cultuur -----	geheel aanpassen 7
mening [partij]	1 behoud eigen cultuur -----	geheel aanpassen 7

d. Sommige mensen en partijen vinden dat de Europese eenwording nog verder zou moeten gaan (bij cijfer 1). Anderen vinden dat de Europese eenwording al te ver is gegaan (bij cijfer 7). Waar zou je jezelf, [PJO] en [partij] plaatsen?

eigen mening	1 eenwording moet verder -----	eenwording is al te ver 7
mening [PJO]	1 eenwording moet verder -----	eenwording is al te ver 7
mening [partij]	1 eenwording moet verder -----	eenwording is al te ver 7

Q21a Als er nu verkiezingen zouden zijn voor de Tweede Kamer, zou je dan gaan stemmen?

- Ja -- NAAR VRAAG 21b / NIET 21c
- Nee -- NAAR VRAAG 22
- Misschien -- NAAR VRAAG 21b / NIET 21c
- Ik mag (nog) niet stemmen -- NAAR VRAAG 21c
- Weet niet / wil niet zeggen -- NAAR VRAAG 22

Q21b Op welke partij zou je dan waarschijnlijk stemmen?

50PLUS, CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, DENK, Forum voor Democratie, GroenLinks, Partij voor de Dieren, PvdA, PVV, SP, SGP, VVD, Andere partij, namelijk ..., Blanco, Weet niet / wil niet zeggen

Q21c Op welke partij zou je stemmen als je wel kiesgerechtigd was?

50PLUS, CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, DENK, Forum voor Democratie, GroenLinks, Partij voor de Dieren, PvdA, PVV, SP, SGP, VVD, Andere partij, namelijk ..., Blanco, Weet niet / wil niet zeggen

Q22 Er zijn verschillende manieren om iets politiek aan de orde te stellen of invloed uit te oefenen op politici of de overheid. Wil je de volgende mogelijkheden bekijken, en dan aangeven van welke daarvan je in de afgelopen vijf jaar gebruik hebt gemaakt?

- a. De radio, televisie of krant ingeschakeld [ja/nee]
- b. Een politieke partij of organisatie ingeschakeld [ja/nee]
- c. Meegedaan aan een door de overheid georganiseerde inspraakbijeenkomst, hoorzitting of discussiebijeenkomst [ja/nee]

- d. Contact opgenomen met een politicus of ambtenaar [ja/nee]
- e. Meegedaan aan een actiegroep [ja/nee]
- f. Meegedaan aan een protestactie, protestmars of demonstratie [ja/nee]
- g. Meegedaan aan een handtekeningenactie [ja/nee]
- h. Via internet, email of SMS/WhatsApp meegedaan aan een politieke discussie of actie [ja/nee]
- i. Of heb je iets anders gedaan om iets politiek aan de orde te stellen of invloed uit te oefenen op politici of de overheid? [ja/nee]

Q23 In welke mate zijn de volgende stellingen van toepassing?

	Helemaal niet van toepassing			Helemaal wel van toepassing			Weet niet
a. [PJO] voert actief campagne voor de [partij] in verkiezingstijd.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
b. [PJO] heeft weinig invloed op de politieke koers van de [partij].	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
c. [PJO] is zichtbaar aanwezig in de media (krant, televisie en radio).	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
d. [PJO] draagt eraan bij dat de stem van jongeren in de politiek wordt gehoord.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
e. [PJO] draagt eraan bij dat jonge mensen een politieke functie vervullen.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
f. [PJO] zorgt ervoor dat de leden meer weten over politiek.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
g. [PJO] zorgt er onvoldoende voor dat de leden hun politieke vaardigheden ontwikkelen.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
h. [PJO] besteedt te weinig aandacht aan de politieke onderwerpen die ik belangrijk vind.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
i. De politieke standpunten van [PJO] moeten overeenkomen met die van [partij].	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Tot slot nog enkele vragen over jezelf.

Q24 Wat is je geboortjaar? ...

Q25 Tot welk geslacht behoor je?

- Man
- Vrouw
- Anders
- Wil niet zeggen

Q26 Wat is je hoogst voltooide opleiding?

- Basisschool
- Speciaal onderwijs of praktijkonderwijs
- VMBO
- HAVO
- VWO/Gymnasium
- MBO

- HBO
- WO
- Anders, nl
- Weet niet / wil niet zeggen

Q27 Welke omschrijving is het beste (betreft grootste deel van de week) op jou van toepassing?

- Ik ben schoolgaand/studerend
- Ik ben werkzaam (voor meer dan 12 uur per week) -- NAAR VRAAG 29
- Ik ben werkzoekend/werkloos -- NAAR VRAAG 29
- Anders, nl... -- NAAR VRAAG 29
- Weet niet / wil niet zeggen -- NAAR VRAAG 29

Q28 Welke opleiding volg je momenteel?

- Basisschool
- Speciaal onderwijs of praktijkonderwijs
- VMBO/MAVO
- HAVO
- VWO/Gymnasium
- MBO
- HBO
- Universiteit
- Anders, nl...
- Weet niet / wil niet zeggen

Q29 Wat zijn de eerste vier cijfers van je postcode?

Q30 Is een van jouw ouders lid van een politieke organisatie?

- Ja
- Nee
- Weet niet / wil niet zeggen

Q31

- | | | |
|--|----------|-----------------------------|
| a. Ik ben geboren in Nederland | Ja / Nee | Weet niet / wil niet zeggen |
| b. Mijn vader is geboren in Nederland | Ja / Nee | Weet niet / wil niet zeggen |
| c. Mijn moeder is geboren in Nederland | Ja / Nee | Weet niet / wil niet zeggen |

Heb je nog verbeterpunten of opmerkingen voor [PJO]? Denk bijvoorbeeld aan suggesties voor de activiteiten, een beschrijving van de sfeer, of tips om leden te activeren.

.....

Heb je algemene opmerkingen over de vragenlijst? Dan kun je deze hieronder kwijt.

.....

Hartelijk dank voor het invullen van de vragenlijst. Jouw antwoorden zijn geregistreerd.

Appendix 3.3 Nonresponse analysis and weighting (2020 survey)

Nonresponse to survey requests may lead to the over- or underrepresentation of certain groups in the sample. In what follows, the 2020 survey sample distribution and the population distribution will be compared on four characteristics: party youth wing size, gender, age and region. As described in Chapter 3, the comparison on the first characteristic in particular shows considerable differences between the sample and the population for a number of party youth wings. Therefore, weights were calculated and applied in order to compensate for this over- or under-sampling of party youth wings.

Nonresponse analysis: party youth wing size

Table A3.1 presents both the share of each party youth wing in the sample and the share of each party youth wing in the total population of the seven party youth wings in 2020. The fifth column consists of the weights that will ensure that the share of each party youth wing in the sample is equal to the share of that party youth wing in the population whenever aggregated analyses are conducted.

Table A3.1 Survey 2020: response rates and weight factors for size correction

<i>PYW</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>% of total response</i>	<i>% members of total population (of 7 PYW)*</i>	<i>Weight factor</i>
CDJA	252	20.6	9.7	0.4699
DWARS	77	6.3	21.8	3.4499
JD	288	23.6	22.3	0.9467
JS	133	10.9	8.2	0.7494
PpF	45	3.7	6.9	1.8750
PINK!	29	2.4	10.4	4.3633
SGPJ	397	32.5	20.8	0.6391
<i>Total</i>	<i>1221</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>-</i>

Note. *Based on the total self-reported membership figures of party youth wings for January 2020 (see Appendix 5.1).

Nonresponse analysis: gender

For each party youth wing, it is analysed whether the sample distribution on gender deviates from the distribution in the population. The total scores in Table A3.2 show little to no deviation. Also for the individual party youth wings it can be established that there is little to no deviation between the sample and the population. In other words, the sample of most party youth wings is representative of the population with respect to gender. It must be noted that DWARS and PINK! do not register the gender of their members. It is therefore not certain for these two party youth wings whether the survey correctly reflects the population for gender.

Nonresponse analysis: age

Does the sample distribution on age deviate from the distribution in the population? In order to answer this question, the sample and population are divided into two groups: members below 21 and members above 21 years old. In most cases, the sample slightly deviates from the population, but not convincing enough to apply complex weight factors (Table A3.3).

Table A3.2 Comparison of survey respondents to the population on gender*

PYW	2020 Sample (N = 856)			2020 Population		
	n (%) female	n (%) male	n (%) other/ no answer	n (%) female	n (%) male	n (%) other/ missing
CDJA	40 (22.3)	138 (77.1)	1 (0.6)	586 (29.3)	1406 (70.4)	5 (0.3)
DWARS*	32 (50.8)	26 (41.3)	5 (8.0)	-	-	-
JD	69 (33.3)	137 (66.2)	1 (0.5)	1251 (28.8)	2809 (64.8)	278 (6.4)**
JS	35 (36.8)	60 (63.2)	0 (0.0)	595 (32.0)	1252 (67.4)	10 (0.5)
PpF	12 (42.9)	16 (57.1)	0 (0.0)	579 (40.7)	841 (59.1)	3 (0.2)
PINK!*	14 (58.3)	8 (33.3)	2 (8.3)	-	-	-
SGPJ	110 (42.3)	147 (56.5)	3 (1.2)	2102 (49.1)	2156 (50.4)	21 (0.5)
<i>Total</i>	<i>312 (36.4)</i>	<i>532 (62.1)</i>	<i>12 (1.4)</i>	<i>5113 (36.8)</i>	<i>8464 (60.9)</i>	<i>317 (2.3)</i>

Note. Population demographics were received via personal communication. Nonresponse is excluded. *DWARS & PINK! do not register the gender of their members. **The JD stopped registering gender since 2019 (missing cases = 81).

Table A3.3 Comparison of survey respondents to the population on age

PYW	2020 Sample (N = 849)		2020 Population	
	<21 y/o n (%)	>=21 y/o n (%)	<21 y/o n (%)	>=21 y/o n (%)
CDJA	45 (25.6)	131 (74.4)	274 (14.0)	1683 (86.0)
DWARS	20 (31.7)	43 (68.3)	816 (17.5)	3850 (82.5)
JD	44 (21.4)	162 (78.6)	414 (9.6)	3890 (90.4)
JS	31 (32.3)	65 (67.7)	259 (14.1)	1579 (85.9)
PpF	5 (17.9)	23 (82.1)	132 (9.3)	1290 (90.7)
PINK!	2 (8.7)	21 (91.3)	17 (0.8)	2117 (99.2)
SGPJ	122 (47.5)	135 (52.5)	2925 (68.4)	1354 (31.6)
<i>Total</i>	<i>269 (31.7)</i>	<i>580 (68.3)</i>	<i>4837 (23.48)</i>	<i>15763 (76.52)</i>

Note. Population demographics were received via personal communication in 2019. The age of respondents in the sample was calculated by extracting the year of birth from 2019.

Nonresponse analysis: geography

Is there a need to adjust for survey nonresponse by geography? Most party youth wings reported the distribution of their members over the various branches or provinces, enabling for a comparison with the distribution in the survey sample. Because the number of provinces in the Netherlands is too high in relation to the sample size to perform a solid nonresponse analysis, provinces are regionally grouped according to the NUTS 2016 classification of the European Union.²⁹⁸ This classification identifies four regions in the Netherlands: North, South, East, West. Table A3.4 presents the results. Again, no major

²⁹⁸ Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003, p. 30-31:

North: Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe

East: Overijssel, Gelderland, Flevoland

West: Utrecht, Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland, Zeeland

South: Noord-Brabant, Limburg

deviations are revealed here. With the exception of a few individual cases, which are no cause for concern, the survey correctly reflects the population for region.

Table A3.4 Comparison of survey respondents to the population on geography

<i>PYW</i>	<i>2020 Sample (N = 797)</i>				<i>2020 Population</i>			
	<i>North n (%)</i>	<i>South n (%)</i>	<i>East n (%)</i>	<i>West n (%)</i>	<i>North n (%)</i>	<i>South n (%)</i>	<i>East n (%)</i>	<i>West n (%)</i>
CDJA	17 (10.3)	34 (20.6)	27 (16.4)	87 (52.7)	212 (11.4)	385 (20.6)	385 (20.6)	883 (47.4)
DWARS	5 (8.3)	5 (8.3)*	15 (25.0)	35 (58.3)*	439 (9.4)	528 (11.2)*	724 (15.4)	3006 (64.0)*
JD	14 (7.3)	18 (9.4)	40 (20.8)	120 (62.5)	297 (6.9)	484 (11.2)	613 (14.2)	2917 (67.7)
JS	8 (9.4)	17 (20.0)	16 (18.8)	44 (51.8)	209 (12.4)	230 (13.7)	305 (18.1)	941 (55.9)
PpF	0	0	6 (23.1)	20 (76.9)	136 (9.6)	62 (4.4)	409 (28.8)	812 (57.2)
PINK!	1 (4.3)	4 (17.4)	8 (34.8)	10 (43.5)	241 (11.9)	282 (13.9)	315 (15.5)	1195 (58.8)**
SGPJ	3 (1.2)	12 (4.9)	82 (33.3)	149 (60.6)	53 (1.2)	133 (3.1)	1915 (44.8)	2178 (50.9)
<i>Total</i>	<i>48 (6.0)</i>	<i>90 (11.3)</i>	<i>195 (24.5)</i>	<i>464 (58.2)</i>	<i>1587 (7.8)</i>	<i>2104 (10.4)</i>	<i>4666 (23.0)</i>	<i>11932 (58.8)</i>

Note. For the sample data, region was identified by using the four numbers of the postal codes that respondents reported in the survey. Population demographics were received via personal communication.

*DWARS' population data could not be totally disaggregated by province; therefore, the category South includes Zeeland and West includes Flevoland. **Also includes Flevoland.

Appendix 3.4 Party youth wing elite interview protocol

Introduction

- Introduction about myself and affiliation.
- Short description of the study.
- Aim, use and procedure of the interview.

Interview questions by category

1. Algemeen beeld:

- a. Herinnert u zich nog wanneer u lid bent geworden? [former chairs only]
- b. Kunt u iets vertellen over hoe [PJO] toentertijd georganiseerd was? [former chairs only]
- c. Hoe ziet/zag u de rol en positie van [PJO] in de Nederlandse politiek?
- d. Wat zijn/waren de functies van een politieke jongerenorganisatie als [PJO]?

2. PJO en functies (interviewschalen voorleggen en om toelichting vragen):

De [PJO] dient/diende als een politieke machtsbasis voor haar leden.

Helemaal niet 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 Helemaal wel

De [PJO] heeft/had invloed op de besluitvorming van [moederpartij].

Helemaal niet 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 Helemaal wel

De [PJO] heeft/had invloed op de politieke besluitvorming in Nederland.

Helemaal niet 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 Helemaal wel

De [PJO] heeft/had invloed op de publieke opinie.

Helemaal niet 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 Helemaal wel

De [PJO] biedt/bood mogelijkheden voor de politieke vorming van haar leden.

Helemaal niet 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 Helemaal wel

De [PJO] zet/zette zich in om jongeren te overtuigen van het gedachtegoed van [moederpartij].

Helemaal niet 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 Helemaal wel

De [PJO] vervult/vervulde een belangrijke rol bij de rekrutering en selectie van politiek talent.

Helemaal niet 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 Helemaal wel

De [PJO] zorgt/zorgde ervoor dat de leden een waardevol sociaal netwerk konden opbouwen.
[former chairs only]²⁹⁹

Helemaal niet 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 Helemaal wel

3. Mogelijke verdiepende vervolgvragen over de relatie PJO en moederpartij [dependent on time left]:

- a. Hoeveel contact heb/had je als voorzitter van de [PJO] met de landelijke fractie van [moederpartij]?

²⁹⁹ I added this statement to the interview protocol in a later stage of the study.

- b. Hoe is/was de relatie tussen de [PJO] en [moederpartij]? Welke factoren bepalen/bepaalden deze relatie tussen de [PJO] en [moederpartij]? Doorvragen op factoren: bijv. waarom is (on)afhankelijkheid zo belangrijk?
- c. Noem een aantal standpunten of thema's die voor de [PJO] en [moederpartij] hetzelfde en afwijkend zijn/waren?
- d. Hoe gaat/ging de [PJO] om met afwijkende standpunten? Proberen/probeerden jullie [moederpartij] te overtuigen? (doorvragen interne bevoegdheden PJO)
- e. Noem een aantal standpunten of thema's waar de [PJO] zich in het politieke landschap mee onderscheidt/onderscheidde?

4. Mogelijke verdiepende vervolgvragen over de relatie PJO en jongeren [dependent on time left]:

- a. Wat doet/deed de [PJO] aan nieuwe ledenwerving? (doorvragen ledenaantal)
- b. Wat doet/deed de [PJO] aan ledenactivering? (doorvragen % actief binnen de [PJO])
- c. Hoeveel contact heb/had je als voorzitter van de [PJO] met jongeren in het algemeen?
- d. Hoe zie je de relatie van de [PJO] met jongeren in het algemeen?
- e. Noem een aantal standpunten of thema's die voor de [PJO] en jongeren in het algemeen hetzelfde en afwijkend zijn/waren?
- g. Hoe gaat/ging de [PJO] om met afwijkende standpunten? Proberen/probeerden jullie jongeren te overtuigen?

Closing the interview [dependent on time left]:

- Als u een politieke jongerenorganisatie zou bestuderen, wat zijn dan voor u de allerbelangrijkste onderwerpen?
- Heeft u interesse in het eindproduct?
- Dank en afscheid.

Appendix 3.5 Coding procedure political programmes

Data sources: the political programmes of contemporary party youth wings, retrieved via personal contact and party youth wing websites. Table A3.2 provides an overview of the coded programmes.

Coding process: the goal of the thematic content analysis is to assess issue saliency, that is, the extent to which various topics are addressed in the political programmes of the party youth wings.³⁰⁰ The coding process therefore consisted of the following steps:

- Copy freestanding chunks of text to separate rows in excel (excluding preambles and texts in pictures and tables).
- Isolate headings in rows (not to be coded).
- Split a chunk of text whenever more than one policy issue is mentioned consecutively.
- Code each chunk of text when it reflects a certain political theme (see Table A3.5). In case more than one theme can be identified and the text cannot be split, choose the most dominant one. In order to promote precision, the programmatic context of the particular chunk of text must be taken into account here.
- Compute how many characters are used per chunk of text (per row) and calculate the share of characters related to each code relative to the size of the total program.

Table A3.5 Description of policy categories in the coding scheme

	<i>Category</i>	<i>Content</i>	<i>Example</i>
1	Environment & climate	Nature, pollution, circular economy, waste, energy, use of natural resources, parks, water, climate deal, sustainability measures	“De overheid heeft een rol bij het verduurzamen van de energievoorziening op een haalbare en betaalbare manier. Ook moeten we inzetten op een circulaire economie” (SGPJ, p. 43)
2	Education	Educational levels, types of schools, access to education, student grants, education quality, programme design, tuition fees, co-participation	“De JOVD vindt het belangrijk dat er kritisch wordt gekeken naar de administratieve last en regeldruk binnen het onderwijs: het bijhouden van kwaliteitsindicatoren kan bijdragen aan een verbetering van de kwaliteit van het onderwijs, maar moet geen dagtaak op zich zijn” (JOVD, p. 48)
3	Mobility	Public and private transport, traffic jams, mobility networks, vehicle tax, electric vehicles, road safety	“De maximumsnelheid op de weg gaat terug naar 100 km/u. De maximumsnelheid op het spoor wordt verhoogd” (DWARS, p. 22)
4	Health care	Health care providers, youth and elderly care, health insurance, medicine, health research, quality of care, abortion, euthanasia, nutrition, health care costs, informal care	“De Jonge Democraten vinden dat zorgverzekeraars als regisseur op de zorgmarkt moeten optreden door kwalitatief hoogstaande, patiëntgerichte en betaalbare zorg selectief in te kopen” (JD, n.p.)
5	Immigration	Refugees, civic integration, children’s pardon, asylum policy, refugee treaty	“Nederland neemt jaarlijks 5000 vluchtelingen via het UNHCR-programma op” (DWARS, p. 33)
6	Public administration	Elections, form of government, civic participation, referenda,	“Er zijn meer voordelen dan nadelen aan de monarchie. De politiek moet er dan ook voor waken

³⁰⁰ We are not interested in the exact positions or viewpoints of the party youth wings, i.e. whether they are pro or con certain policy measures. Moreover, it would be extremely time-consuming to include this in the coding process. I therefore disregarded this in the present research.

		rule of law, party system, administrative structure, integrity, policy preparation, public finances	om niet continu te zagen aan de stoelpoten van de constitutionele monarchie. Dit is schadelijk voor onze staatsinrichting. De monarchie blijft een waardevol onderdeel van ons staatsbestel” (PpF, p. 9)
7	Economy	Industry, import, export, innovation, entrepreneurship, competition, financial market, tax system	“De basis voor de economie is een goed gereguleerde markt waarin iedereen deel kan nemen. De overheid speelt een faciliterende rol en treedt op als marktmeester” (JD, n.p.)
8	Housing	Housing market, housing fraud, housing associations, social housing, student housing, mortgage, neighbourhood, building vacancy	“Door de relatieve krapte binnen de sociale huursector heeft het bijbouwen van sociale huurwoningen prioriteit” (JOVD, p. 43)
9	International affairs	EU, UN, Euro, international cooperation, development aid, international trade, diplomacy, human rights, international security, globalization	“Voortaan zal dan 1% van het BNP naar ontwikkelingshulp gaan, en primair gericht zijn op mensen in plaats van Nederlandse bedrijven” (PINK!, p. 20)
10	Labour	Labour market, unions, (self-) employment, application process, taxes on labour, retraining of employees, types of leave	“Werkgevers moeten zorgdragen voor hun werknemers, door werknemers in staat te stellen zich door te ontwikkelen. Dit stelt werknemers in staat langer en in goede gezondheid door te werken (...)” (CDJA, p. 59)
11	Social security	Benefits, unconditional basic income, pension, poverty	“Hoewel een cultuurverandering, en nieuwe economische structuren, nodig zijn voor lange termijn, kan een vorm van basisinkomen een interessante oplossing bieden om op korte termijn te voorzien in bijstand die zowel recht doen aan menselijke waardigheid als aan rechtvaardigheid” (PpF, p. 40)
12	Security & safety	Police, crime prevention, cybercrime, criminal law, correctional facilities, intelligence	“DWARS is tegen de wettelijke invoering van minimumstraffen” (DWARS, p. 6)
13	Culture & media	Art, cultural institutions, festivals, culture education, cultural heritage, cultural aid system, broadcasting system, social media, fake news	“De Jonge Democraten zijn dan ook geen voorstanders van een door de overheid gecontroleerde mediacommissie die media beoordeelt op waarheidsgehalte of betrouwbaarheid” (JD, n.p.)
14	Defence	NATO, weaponry, peacekeeping missions	“De 2 procentnorm van de begroting voor defensie-uitgaven is hierbij van essentieel belang en dient zo spoedig mogelijk gehaald te worden. Voor het CDJA is de NAVO nog altijd de ‘hoeksteen’ van onze veiligheidsstrategie, en dient dit zo te blijven” (CDJA, p. 7)
15	Other	Agriculture, fishery, livestock farming, prostitution, sports, drugs policy, privacy, diversity, religion, animal welfare, family affairs, technology, science	“Dieren krijgen een vaste plaats in de draaiboeken van hulpdiensten en in rampenplannen. Dierenambulances krijgen net als andere hulpdiensten vergunningen om snel ter plaatse te kunnen zijn en noodhulp te verlenen aan dieren” (PINK!, p. 9)
16	No theme, unclear, or intertwined	-	-

Note. The policy categories correspond to the political themes adopted in the membership survey 2020.

Table A3.6 Overview of coded political programmes for time period 2014-2020

Christen-Democratisch Jongeren Appèl (CDJA)	'Politiek Programma CDJA. November 2019'
DWARS, GroenLinkse Jongeren	'Eerlijk duurt het langst. Dwarse ideeën voor een andere samenleving 2016-2021'
Jonge Democraten (JD)	Online politiek programma via visie.jd.nl , retrieved 6 December 2019
Jongeren Organisatie Vrijheid en Democratie (JOVD)	'Politiek Programma JOVD 2019-2020'
Jonge Socialisten in de PvdA (JS)	Not applicable. The JS decided in 2011 to abolish the political programme. ³⁰¹
Perspectief, ChristenUnie-jongeren (PpF)	'Politiek Programma 2016-2018'
PINK!	'Politiek Programma PINK! Versie tot voorjaarscongres 2019. Maak werk van je idealen'
ROOD, Jong in de SP	Not applicable
Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij-Jongeren (SGPJ)	'Kernideeën 2019-09'

³⁰¹ JS, *Leidraad voor moties, resoluties en beslispunten, Voorjaarscongres 2012*, p. 1.

Appendix 3.6 Coding procedure insider access: annual reports and intra-party regulations

Content analysis of annual reports of party youth wings:

Data sources: annual reports of party youth wings, retrieved via party youth wing archives (for 1985-1990, see Appendix 3.1), party youth wing and government websites and personal contact (2014-2020).³⁰² An overview of the coded documents is adopted in Table A3.8 and A3.9. I chose to analyse annual reports over the years 1985 and 2016 as these years both precede a year with a national election. This ensures comparability and the detection of internal articulation efforts in the run-up to the elections.³⁰³

Coding process: text units in the annual reports / board activity reports of party youth wings about the mother party in the context of political interest articulation are identified, gathered in one document, and coded to party channel by using the following table. Some examples are set out in Table A3.7. It must be noted that the annual reports of the party youth wings vary in terms of length, form and detail. This is why it was not possible to produce frequencies of insider access.

Table A3.7 Examples of isolated and coded texts

<i>Content</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Example</i>
Parliamentary group	Report mentions contact with MP's of the mother party in the context of political issues	"Met Vera Bergkamp (...) is nauw samengewerkt op het XTC-dossier. Onder aansporing van de JD heeft zij de eerste stappen gezet naar het decriminaliseren van XTC" (JD, 2016, p. 11)
Executive board	Report mentions contact with the executive board of the mother party in the context of political issues	"De contacten met het CDA-bestuur worden behartigd via de GOJA-vertegenwoordigers in dagelijks- en partijbestuur. (...) In 1985 staan die in het teken van de vaststelling van modelprogramma en landelijk verkiezingsprogramma" (CDJA, 1985, p. 38)
Party congress	Report mentions activities on the national congress of the mother party, such as proposals submitted or speeches given	"Na een aangenomen motie op het PvdA-congres in februari volgde in april een toezegging van de minister om een disclaimer bij misleidende budgetpolitiek te regelen" (JS, 2017, p. 6)
Other party bodies	Report mentions contact with other bodies of the mother party in the context of political issues, such as the party council* or party committees	"De JOVD was vertegenwoordigd op de VVD-landbouwdag in februari. In april vond een gesprek plaats tussen de landbouwcommissies van VVD en JOVD. In maart werd deelgenomen aan de VVD-themadag milieu (...)" (JOVD, 1985, p. 18)

Note. *In some parties, party councils do not occur or ceased to exist. This category is most applicable to the period of 1985-1990.

³⁰² The responsible Ministry publishes annual and financial reports of political parties because of the Government Information Act (WOB, in Dutch: *Wet openbaarheid van bestuur*).

³⁰³ In the period of 1985-1990 there were two election years: 1986 and 1989. I chose to include the annual reports of 1985 the party youth wings in the content analysis, as more annual reports are available for that year than for 1988. The annual report of the PSJG is missing in 1985. I decided to analyse the report of 1988-1989 instead.

Table A3.8 Overview of coded annual reports for time period 2014-2020

Christen-Democratisch Jongeren Appèl (CDJA)	'VIII. CDJA' in: 'Jaarverslag 2016 CDA en gelieerde organen en organisaties op landelijk niveau', p. 141-161
DWARS, GroenLinkse Jongeren	'Algemene bestuursverantwoording', en 'Verantwoording individuele bestuursleden' in: 'Congresreader Dwars Groenlinkse Jongeren Zomercongres 2017 Groningen'
Jonge Democraten (JD)	'Bestuursverantwoording 2015-2016' in: 'Jonge Democraten September ALV 75 Congresboek versie 3', p. 9-29
Jongeren Organisatie Vrijheid en Democratie (JOVD)	'Secretarieel Jaarverslag 2016 aangeboden aan de Jaarlijkse Algemene Vergadering 2017', 1 april 2017
Jonge Socialisten in de PvdA (JS)	'Activiteitenverslag 2016 – Jonge Socialisten in de PvdA' in: 'de jaarstukken aan van de vereniging Jonge Socialisten in de PvdA 2016', p. 2-12
Perspectief, ChristenUnie-jongeren (PpF)	'Jaarverslag '16-'17' in: 'Bijlagen bij besluit wob-verzoek over financiering politieke partijen – 2016'
PINK!	'Bestuursverslag, voorliggend op het voorjaarscongres 2017' in: 'Jaarverslag 2016', 29 april 2017
ROOD, Jong in de SP	'II Verantwoording activiteiten ter bevordering van politieke participatie van jongeren' in: 'Activiteitenverslag Behorende bij het Financieel verslag en overzicht 2016, Wet financiering politieke partijen, Socialistische Partij', p. 17-31 ('Bijlagen bij besluit wob-verzoek over financiering politieke partijen – 2016')
Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij-Jongeren (SGPj)	'SGP-jongeren jaarverslag 2016', in: 'Financieel verslag 2016 en de overzichten 2016 van SGP (bijlage bij controleverklaring d.d. 28 juni 2017)' ('Bijlagen bij besluit wob-verzoek over financiering politieke partijen – 2016')

Table A3.9 Overview of coded annual reports for time period 1985-1990

Christen-Democratisch Jongeren Appèl (CDJA)	'CDJA' in: 'Jaarverslag CDA 1985', p. 35-38
Gereformeerd Politiek Jongeren Contact (GPJC)	'Jaarverslag 1985. Landelijk verband van G.P.J.C.'s en Stichting G.P.J.C.' in: Bundel Jaarvergadering 1986
Jonge Democraten (JD)	'Jaarverslag 1985'
Jongeren Organisatie Vrijheid en Democratie (JOVD)	'Jaarverslag 1985'
Jonge Socialisten in de PvdA (JS)	'Jaarverslagen Algemeen Bestuur 1984-1985'
Landelijk verband van Staatkundig Gereformeerde Studieverenigingen (LVSGS)	'Jaarverslag 1985 van de secretaris van het Landelijk Verband van Staatkundig Gereformeerde Studieverenigingen ter goedkeuring aangeboden aan de Huishoudelijke Vergadering, bijeen te Gouda op vrijdag 21 maart 1986 ter gelegenheid van de 44 ^e jaarvergadering.'
Politieke Partij Radicale Jeugd (PPRJ)	'Concept bestuursverantwoording over periode december '84 tot april '85'
Pacifistisch Socialistische Jongerengroepen (PSJG)	'Jaarverslag mei '88 t/m oktober '89'
Reformatische Politieke Jongerenorganisatie (RPJO)	'Jaarverslag Anno Domini 1985'

Content analysis of intra-party regulations:

Data sources: party websites and the repositories of the Documentation Centre Dutch Political Parties (via dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl). Tables A3.11 and A3.12 provide an overview of the coded regulations.

Coding process: the goal of the content analysis is to identify provisions in the intra-party regulations that focus on arranging the access of the party youth wing to the decision-making processes of the mother party. The content analysis consisted of three steps: 1) labeling provisions when the corresponding party youth wing is mentioned, 2) gathering these provisions in one document, 3) unitising the labelled provisions by isolating them per subsection of the concerning article, and 4) coding the provisions as 'representation' or 'no representation'. Some examples are set out in Table A3.10.

Table A3.10 Examples of coded provisions

Representation	“Het algemeen bestuur van de jongerenorganisatie kiest uit zijn midden een adviserend lid van het partijbestuur. Dit adviserend lid dient partijlid te zijn” (PvdA, 1988, art. 42)
Representation	“Het partijbestuur bestaat uit: a. stemhebbende leden: (...) 5. twee leden van het bestuur van de jongerenorganisatie , waaronder de voorzitter” (CDA, 1985, art. 70)
Representation	“Meerdere stemmen komen toe aan: b. de afgevaardigde van Perspectief , ChristenUnie-jongeren die daartoe door Perspectief is aangewezen; deze afgevaardigde krijgt bovenop de stem die hem op basis van het vorige lid toekomt, een meerder aantal stemmen gelijk aan vijf (5)” (CU, 2017, art. 19.3)
Representation	“Toegang tot de partijdag, alsmede tot een algemene vergadering waarin een verkiezingsprogramma wordt vastgesteld, hebben behalve (...), het bestuur van de politieke jongerenorganisatie als bedoeld in artikel 25 (...)” (SGP, 2015, art. 21.1)
No representation	“De Centrale Verbondsraad vormt het dagelijks bestuur van het Verbond. Tot zijn taak behoort: h. het onderhouden van contact met het Landelijk Verband van Gereformeerde Politieke Jeugdstudieclubs ” (GPV, 1984, art. 12)

Table A3.11 Overview of coded intra-party regulations for time period 2014-2020

Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA)	‘Statuten’, ‘Huishoudelijk reglement’, 2016
ChristenUnie (CU)	‘Statuten ChristenUnie’, November 2016 ‘Reglement Partijcongres’, June 2015
Democraten ’66 (D66)	‘Statuten en huishoudelijk reglement’, April 2016
GroenLinks (GL)	‘Statuten GroenLinks’, January 2017 ‘Huishoudelijk reglement GroenLinks’, December 2016
Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA)	‘Statuten en huishoudelijke reglementen’, February 2016
Partij voor de Dieren (PvdD)	‘Statuten’, June 2012 ‘Huishoudelijk Reglement Partij voor de Dieren’, November 2013
Socialistische Partij (SP)	‘Statuten van de SP’, May 2009 ‘Huishoudelijk reglement van de SP’, May 2009
Staatsgereformeerde Partij (SGP)	‘Partijstatuten’, January 2015 ‘Algemeen Reglement’
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD)	‘Statuten en huishoudelijke reglement’, December 2015

Table A3.12 Overview of coded intra-party regulations for time period 1985-1990

Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA)	'Statuten en Reglementen', 1985
Democraten '66 (D66)	'Statuten en Huishoudelijk Reglement', November 1986
Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond (GPV)*	'Statuten van het Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond', June 1984
Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij (PSP)	'Statuten & Huishoudelijk Reglement PSP', November 1987
Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA)	'Statuten en Huishoudelijk reglement voor de Partij van de Arbeid', 1988
Politieke Partij Radikalen (PPR)	'Statuten en huishoudelijk reglement', April 1988
Reformatorische Politieke Federatie (RPF)	'Statuten. Huishoudelijk Reglement', May 1989
Staatsgereformeerde Partij (SGP)	'Statuten, Algemeen Reglement, Program van Beginselen, Gemeenteprogram SGP', February 1989
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD)	'Statuten en Huishoudelijk Reglement', December 1977

Note. *The GPV had separate regulations for the annual general meeting of the party, which was only partially present in the archives. The youth wing might have been mentioned in the missing articles of that regulation.

Appendix 3.7 Coding procedure outsider access: newspaper appearances

Data sources: based on availability of Dutch national newspapers in two databases:

- Database of Digital Daily newspapers 'Delpher', covering 1618 to 1995.
- Newspaper database 'Nexis Uni', covering the period from 1995.

The national newspapers that are not available for the two time periods under scrutiny are excluded from the analysis, as well as *Nederlands Dagblad* due to low circulation (Table A3.13).

Table A3.13 Overview of the availability of national newspapers in the two databases

<i>Newspaper</i>	<i>Year of foundation</i>	<i>Period included in Nexis Uni</i>	<i>Period included in Delpher</i>	<i>Circulation in 2017*</i>
AD/Algemeen Dagblad	1946	Since 1991	-	340.758
De Telegraaf	1893	Since 1999	1893-1994	385.501
De Volkskrant	1919	Since 1995	1940-1995	239.219
Het Financieele Dagblad (FD)	1943	Since 1994	1943-1945	47.363
Het Parool	1940	Since 1992	1945-1990	49.455
Nederlands Dagblad	1967	Since 2007	1967-1994	19.593
NRC Handelsblad	1970	Since 1990	1970-1995	138.589
NRC.NEXT	2006	Since 2006	-	31.464
Reformatorisch Dagblad	1971	Since 2018	-	42.967
Spits	1999-2014	2007-2014	-	-
Trouw	1943	Since 1992	1943-1995	98.882

Note. The newspapers that are shown in bold are available in both databases for the selected time periods in this study. *Mediamonitor 2017.³⁰⁴

Unit of coding: party youth wing mentions.

Coding process: in both databases searches were conducted for each party youth wing by using specific search strings (see below). The results were filtered on the preferred time period, either 1 January 1985 to 31 December 1990 or 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2019, and newspapers (shown in bold in Table A3.13). The remaining items were exported to Excel. I then merged these bibliographies into one database, after which I checked and coded each news article according to the list of variables (see below). If the same youth wing appeared in two news reports it was registered twice, and different youth wings appearing in the same news report were registered individually. To test the reliability of the categorization of variable 16 'type of appearance' (used in Chapter 6), 100 randomly selected observations of youth wing appearances were re-coded by a second coder, resulting in a Cohen's Kappa of 0.683.

Search string: searching on party youth wing names only is not sufficient for extracting a complete overview of articles that mention party youth wings from the two newspaper databases. For instance, ROOD (in English: Red) and Pink! are obviously terms that produces many results without concerning

³⁰⁴ Commissariaat voor de Media (2017). Dagbladen in 2017. Via <https://www.mediamonitor.nl/mediamarkten/dagbladen/dagbladen-in-2017/>.

the youth wing of the Socialist Party or the Party for the Animals. The search keywords are displayed in Table A3.14. They are used with Boolean operators in the search engines of the databases.

Table A3.14 Overview of the keywords used in the search engines of both newspaper databases

[party youth wing name], [party youth wing abbreviation], [party name]-jongeren, [party name]-jongerenorganisatie, [party name]-jongerenafdeling, jongerenorganisatie van de/het [party name], jongerenafdeling van de/het [party name], jongeren van de/het [party name]

Variables (codebook):

1. Search string
2. Party youth wing abbreviation
3. Newspaper name
4. Newspaper code
 - 1 = NRC Handelsblad
 - 2 = De Telegraaf
 - 3 = De Volkskrant
 - 4 = Trouw
 - 5 = Het Parool
5. Section
6. Content
 - 1 = News (incl. background articles)
 - 2 = Opinion, commentary, column
 - 3 = Profile, biography, interview
 - 4 = Appendix (newspaper magazines etc., can be recognized by a separate table of content or page numbering)
 - 5 = Other (puzzles, TV reviews, ads, unclear, etc.)
7. Page number on which the article starts
8. Word count (only available for data from NexisUni database)
9. Date given in full
10. Year
11. Cabinet (from start date to end date demissionary cabinet)
 - 1 = Lubbers I
 - 2 = Lubbers II
 - 3 = Lubbers III
 - 4 = Rutte II
 - 5 = Rutte III
12. Headline
13. URL
14. Short description
15. PYW in headline: Is the name of the party youth wing mentioned in the (sub-)headline?
 - 0 = No
 - 1 = Yes
16. Type of appearance
 - 1 = The group or its representative has authored the article
 - 2 = The group is quoted directly

- 3 = The group's views or actions are referred
 - 4 = The group is mentioned by others (in a quote)
 - 5 = Other appearance
17. Centrality: Does the article make only a passing reference to the party youth wing?
- 0 = No
 - 1 = Yes (the youth wing is not part of the story of the argument; the name of the youth wing is only mentioned for context or biographical information)
18. Political valence from the perspective of the party youth wing
- 1 = appears to contribute positively to the party youth wing image
 - 2 = appears to contribute negatively to the party youth wing image
 - 3 = appears to contribute neutrally to the party youth wing image
 - 4 = mix of positive or negative contribution, or unclear
19. Collaboration: is there mention of a joint action of party youth wings?
- 0 = No
 - 1 = Yes
20. Political theme (the one most applicable to the action(s) or statement(s) of the youth wing)
- 1 = Environment & climate
 - 2 = Education
 - 3 = Mobility
 - 4 = Health care
 - 5 = Immigration
 - 6 = Public administration
 - 7 = Economics
 - 8 = Housing
 - 9 = International affairs
 - 10 = Labour
 - 11 = Social security
 - 12 = Security and safety
 - 13 = Politics/party affairs
 - 14 = Culture & media
 - 15 = Defence
 - 16 = Other
 - 17 = No political theme, unclear or more than one theme mentioned equally
21. Mother party: does the article refer to the mother party, and if so, does it concern resistance/criticism, neutrality or support from the party youth wing? (from the perspective of the youth wing)
- 0 = no mention of the mother party (also if the party name is mentioned because of the name of the youth wing)
 - 1 = Resistance/criticism
 - 2 = Support
 - 3 = No reflection / neutrality
 - 4 = Mix of support / criticism

Appendix 5.1a Party youth wing membership figures 1960 – 2020

	SGPJ*	JS*	JOVD	ARIOS*	CHIO*	KVPIG*	CDJA**	JD	PSIG*	PPRJo	DWARS** *	RPIO*	GPJC	PpF**	ROOD	PINK!
1960			2000	4667	2000	2477										
1961				4641		2055										
1962				4089		2394										
1963			1700	3487	2100	3142										
1964				3378		3531										
1965				2925		3038										
1966			2000	3284	1500											
1967																
1968				1294												
1969				1234												
1970		500		1438												
1971		700		1480												
1972		900	500	1360												
1973		1200		1162		650										
1974			1000	1202									1500			
1975		1200		1351												
1976		800		1377	350	450										
1977		1400		1300												
1978			2000	1300	313	690										
1979		1800		1300	161											
1980					166											
1981		2000					2000									
1982	1044						2077						1100			
1983	1088		5000				1964									
1984	1157	2300	4300				1700	148		876			1026			
1985	1207	3000	3846				1500	1256		869		105	1136			
1986	1324	3000	3342				1606	1600		818		150				
1987	1343	4420	3150				1984	1600	1150	844		235	1950			
1988	2734	4323					1960	1400		1200		275	1899			
1989	3312	4140					2119	1500				285	2500			
1990	7318		3200				2500					440	2217			
1991	10713						3000	1864				1210	2300			
1992		1000	3500				3000	1700				1250				
1993			3000				3000					1250				
1994			3100				3000				350	1574				
1995		1500	1537				2550	956			420		2286			
1996		1000					2000	859								

Appendix 5.1a (continued) Party youth wing membership figures 1960 – 2020

	SGPJ*	JS*	JOVD	ARIOS*	CHIO*	KVPIG*	CDJA**	JD	PSIG*	PPRjo	DWARS**	RPIO*	GPIC	PpL**	ROOD	PINK!
1997		900	1600				2323	652								
1998		2125	1246				2000	700			24					
1999	14229	2311	1372				2000				48					
2000	14562										70					
2001	13268	689	819				649	321			254					
2002	14591	593	652				608	325			317			2402		
2003	13729	588	995				1256	755			388			2034		
2004	12891	1106	1221				1427	1054			969			1584	1123	
2005	12309	1305	1391				1537	1650			1047			1933	1673	
2006	11807	1066	1467				1767	1377			1077			1867	1539	
2007	9761	959	1256				1952	1225			1193			2038	2257	433
2008	9684	1277	1294				1820	1322			967			2149	2143	680
2009	10392	976	1294				1826	2074			1011			1994	1569	587
2010	11175	976	1493				1904	3724			1142			1943	1315	577
2011	9078	1215	1491				1530	4940			1490			1845	1470	695
2012	7590	1540	2280				1495	4328			1570			1661	1603	621
2013	6783	1490	2808				1797	5042			1530			1544	1314	620
2014	6479	1555	2756				1679	5160			761			1399	1472	524
2015	6094	2200	2647				1648	5678			760			1234	1544	651
2016	6233	2020	2589				1539	5720			854			1235	1484	778
2017	7346	1965	2476				1588	6000			1120			1188	1355	701
2018	7216	1533	2696				1643	6000			2946			1494	1349	1261
2019	6036	1753	2638				1871	5270			3349			1579	1219	1062
2020	4279	1681	2513				1997	4598			4480			1423	886	2134

Note. JFVD and OPPOSITIE have been omitted because they were not founded until 2017. Reference date is 1 January or as close as possible to that date. Sources are listed in Appendix 5.1b. *Has undergone a name change in the past (see Figure 4.1). **Has undergone a merger in the past (see Figure 4.1).

- Party youth wing active, self-reported numbers
- Party youth wing active, subsidized numbers
- Merger year
- = Merged party youth wings

Appendix 5.1b Sources of party youth wing membership figures

Table A5.1. Sources of Appendix 5.1a

PYW	Source
ARJOS	1960 to 1975 Welp (1999, p. 207) and Koole and Van de Velde (1992, p. 639) 1976 to 1979 Welp (1999, p. 207)
CDJA	1981 <i>CDJA jaarverslag 1981</i> , in Jaarverslag CDA 1981, p. 35, via https://dnpp.nl/pp/cda 1982 <i>Ledenopgave CDJA</i> (Christen Democratisch Appèl (CDA), 2.19.112, inv. 672), Nationaal Archief, Den Haag 1983 Welp (1999, p. 209) 1984 Jongerenorganisaties boeren weer goed (1984, 5 juni). <i>Het Parool</i> , p. 30. Consulted via Delpher, 18-06-2021, https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ABCD:010832779:mpeg21:p010 1985 <i>CDJA jaarverslag 1985</i> , in Jaarverslag CDA 1985, p. 35, via https://dnpp.nl/pp/cda 1986 <i>CDJA jaarverslag 1986</i> , in Jaarverslag CDA 1986, p. 29, via https://dnpp.nl/pp/cda 1987 <i>CDJA jaarverslag 1987</i> , in Jaarverslag CDA 1987, p. 53, via https://dnpp.nl/pp/cda 1988 <i>CDJA jaarverslag 1988</i> , in Jaarverslag CDA 1988, p. 53, via https://dnpp.nl/pp/cda 1989 <i>CDJA jaarverslag 1988</i> , in Jaarverslag CDA 1988, p. 53, via https://dnpp.nl/pp/cda 1990 <i>CDJA jaarverslag 1989</i> , in CDA jaarverslag 1989, p. 68, via https://dnpp.nl/pp/cda 1991 <i>CDJA jaarverslag 1992</i> , in CDA jaarverslag 1992, p. 56, via https://dnpp.nl/pp/cda 1992 <i>CDJA jaarverslag 1992</i> , in CDA jaarverslag 1992, p. 56, via https://dnpp.nl/pp/cda 1993 <i>CDJA jaarverslag 1993</i> , in CDA jaarverslag 1993, p. 67, via https://dnpp.nl/pp/cda 1994 <i>CDJA jaarverslag 1994</i> , in CDA jaarverslag 1994, p. 73, via https://dnpp.nl/pp/cda 1995 Bos et al. (1995, p. 11) 1996 <i>CDJA jaarverslag 1996</i> , in CDA jaarverslag 1996, p. 67, via https://dnpp.nl/pp/cda 1997 to 1999 Welp (1999, p. 209) 2001 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2003, juni 26). <i>Overzicht subsidiëring politieke partijen 2001</i> . Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/nds-bzk0300393-b1 2002 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2004, augustus 30). <i>Overzicht subsidiëring politieke partijen 2002</i> . Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/nds-bzk0400479-b1 2003 to 2011 Personal communication, 2014, August 4 2012 <i>CDJA jaarverslag 2011</i> , in CDA Jaarverslag 2011, p. 106, via https://www.cda.nl/partij/doe-mee/doneren/anbi/jaarrekeningen-en-verslagen/ 2013 to 2014 <i>CDJA jaarverslag 2013</i> , in CDA Jaarverslag 2013, p. 121, via https://www.cda.nl/partij/doe-mee/doneren/anbi/jaarrekeningen-en-verslagen/ 2015 <i>CDJA jaarverslag 2015</i> , in CDA jaarverslag 2015, p. 137, via https://www.cda.nl/partij/doe-mee/doneren/anbi/jaarrekeningen-en-verslagen/ 2016 <i>CDJA jaarverslag 2016</i> , in CDA jaarverslag 2016, p. 144, via https://www.cda.nl/partij/doe-mee/doneren/anbi/jaarrekeningen-en-verslagen/ 2017 <i>CDJA jaarverslag 2016</i> , in CDA jaarverslag 2016, p. 144, via https://www.cda.nl/partij/doe-mee/doneren/anbi/jaarrekeningen-en-verslagen/ 2018 <i>CDJA jaarverslag 2017</i> , in CDA jaarverslag 2017, p. 125, via https://www.cda.nl/partij/doe-mee/doneren/anbi/jaarrekeningen-en-verslagen/ 2019 <i>CDJA jaarverslag 2018</i> , in CDA jaarverslag 2018, p. 97, via https://www.cda.nl/partij/doe-mee/doneren/anbi/jaarrekeningen-en-verslagen/ 2020 Personal communication, 2020, January 15
CHJO	1960 Koole (1992, p. 75) 1963, 1966, 1976, 1978 to 1980 Welp (1999, p. 204)
DWARS	1994 Sadée, T. (1994, 28 April). Dwars, één been in de kraakbeweging, één been in de politiek: Beatrix mag solliciteren. <i>NRC Handelsblad</i> , p. 30. Consulted via Delpher, 14-05-2021, http://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=KBNRC01:000031403:mpeg21:p030 1995 Bos et al. (1995, p. 11) 1997 to 2004 Personal communication, 2013, August 13 2005 DNPP (2005, 13 april). <i>Persbericht 3: Jongerenorganisaties van politieke partijen boekten in 2004 winst</i> [press release]. Via https://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/12086/ 2006 to 2013 Personal communication, 2013, August 13 2014 to 2015 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Leden politieke jongerenorganisaties 2012-2016 (personal communication, 2017, March 15) 2016 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Overzicht ledenaantallen jongerenorganisaties politieke partijen 2016 (personal communication, 2018, February 9) 2017 to 2018 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Overzicht ledenaantallen jongerenorganisaties

politieke partijen 2017-2018 (personal communication, 2020, January 13)

2019 to 2020 Personal communication, 2020, April 18

GPJC

1974 *Gereformeerd Politiek Jongeren Contact (GPJC)* (n.d.) Via

https://www.parlement.com/id/vjczcnkm75u2/gereformeerd_politiek_jongeren_contact

1982 *Jaarprogramma 1984 stichting gpjc*, p. 4

1984 *Jaarprogramma 1985 stichting gpjc*, p. 4

1985 *Jaarprogramma 1986 stichting gpjc*, p. 4

1987 *Jaarprogramma 1988 stichting GPJC tbv WVC*, p. 3

1988 *Notulen van de vergadering van het bestuur van het Landelijk Verband van G.P.J.C.'s en de Stichting G.P.J.C. op 27 april 1988 te Amersfoort, De Eenhoorn*, p. 2

1989 Bestuur Landelijk Verband van GPJC's (1989, 2 March). Ingezonden: GPJC. *Nederlands Dagblad*, p. 7. Consulted via Delpher, 14-05-2021, <http://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010558992:mpeg21:p007>

1990 *Leden GPJC* (doos 561)

1991 *Notulen van de bestuursvergadering van het LV en de St. GPJC op donderdag 13 juni 1991 te Zwolle*, p. 3

1995 Bos et al. (1995, p. 11)

JD

1984 Koole and Van de Velde (1992, p. 641) but see Welp (1999, p. 219) for an alternative membership figure (300)

1985 *Programma van werkzaamheden 1986*, p. 4

1986 *Programma van werkzaamheden 1987*, p. 4

1987 *Programma van werkzaamheden 1988*, p. 3

1988 *Programma van werkzaamheden 1989*, p. 4

1989, 1991 Welp (1999, p. 219)

1992 Kweekvijvers politieke partijen borrelen hevig (1992, 20 March). *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden*, p. 5. Consulted via Delpher, 18-06-2021, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:011019895:mpeg21:p005>

1995 Bos et al. (1995, p. 11), but see Welp (1999, p. 219) for an alternative membership figure (696).

1996 to 1998 Welp (1999, p. 219)

2001 to 2005 Personal communication with D66, 2014, October 28

2005 to 2013 Personal communication, 2014, October 17

2014 to 2016 *Jonge Democraten September ALV 75 Congresboek versie 3*, 2016, p. 85-88

2017 *Jaarrekening 2016 Vereniging Jonge Democraten*, p. 3

2018 to 2019 *Jaarrekening 2018 Vereniging Jonge Democraten*, p. 3

2020 Personal communication, 2020, January 9 but see *Jaarrekening 2019 Vereniging Jonge Democraten*, p. 3 (4,620)

JOVD

1960 Koole et al. (1988, p. 202)

1963 Habben Jansen (1994, p. 36)

1966 Koole et al. (1988, p. 202)

1972 Koole et al. (1988, p. 202)

1974 Jongeren en politiek (1974, 28 February). *Nederlands dagblad*, p. 1. Consulted via Delpher, 18-06-2021, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010633533:mpeg21:p001>

1983 Koole et al. (1988, p. 202)

1984 Jongerenorganisaties boeren weer goed (1984, 5 June). *Het Parool*, p. 30. Consulted via Delpher, 18-06-2021, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ABCD:010832779:mpeg21:p010>

1985 Welp (1999, p. 212), but see Koole et al. (1988, p. 202) for an alternative membership figure (5,000)

1986 *HB info 1986-08*, p. 4-5

1987 *JOVD jaarverslag 1987*, p. 15

1990 Klei (2015, p. 124)

1992 Kweekvijvers politieke partijen borrelen hevig (1992, 20 March). *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden*, p. 5. Consulted via Delpher, 18-06-2021, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:011019895:mpeg21:p005>

1993 Noordelijke opmars in JOVD (1993, 12 November). *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden*, p. 9. Consulted via Delpher, 18-06-2021, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:011020413:mpeg21:p009>

1994 Welp (1999, p. 212)

1995 Bos et al. (1995, p. 11)

1997 to 1999 Welp (1999, p. 212)

2001 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2003, 26 Jun e). Overzicht subsidiëring politieke partijen 2001. Via <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/nds-bzk0300393-b1>

2002 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2004, 30 August). Overzicht subsidiëring politieke partijen 2002. Via <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/nds-bzk0400479-b1>

2003 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2005, 26 September). Overzicht subsidiëring politieke partijen 2003. Via <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-27422-9-b1>

2004 to 2005 DNPP (2005, 13 April). *Persbericht 3: Jongerenorganisaties van politieke partijen boekten in 2004 winst* [press release]. Via <https://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/12086/>

2006 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2008, 7 February). Overzicht van de subsidies verstrekt op grond van de Wet subsidiëring politieke partijen over het jaar 2006. Via <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/nds-bzk0800052-b2>

2007 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2009, 4 May). Overzicht van de subsidies verstrekt op grond van de Wet

	<p>subsiëring politieke partijen over het jaar 2007. Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-31700-VII-77.html</p> <p>2008 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2010, 7 October). Overzicht van de subsidies verstrekt op grond van de Wet subsiëring politieke partijen over het jaar 2008. Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-32500-VII-3.html</p> <p>2009 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2011, 18 January). Overzicht subsiëring politieke partijen 2009. Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-32500-VII-79.html</p> <p>2010 <i>JOVD Secretarieel Jaarverslag 2010</i>, p. 21, via https://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/view/party/VVD,_JOVD/jaarverslag.html</p> <p>2011 <i>JOVD Financieel Jaarverslag 2011</i>, p. 6 via https://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/view/party/VVD,_JOVD/jaarverslag.html</p> <p>2012 <i>JOVD Financieel Jaarverslag 2012</i>, p. 6 via https://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/view/party/VVD,_JOVD/jaarverslag.html</p> <p>2013 <i>JOVD Financieel Jaarverslag 2013</i>, p. 4 via https://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/view/party/VVD,_JOVD/jaarverslag.html</p> <p>2014 <i>JOVD Financieel Jaarverslag 2014</i>, p. 5 via https://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/view/party/VVD,_JOVD/jaarverslag.html</p> <p>2015 <i>JOVD Financieel Jaarverslag 2015</i>, p. 5 via https://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/view/party/VVD,_JOVD/jaarverslag.html</p> <p>2016 <i>JOVD Financieel Jaarverslag 2016</i>, p. 5 via https://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/view/party/VVD,_JOVD/jaarverslag.html</p> <p>2017 <i>JOVD Financieel Jaarverslag 2017</i>, p. 5 via https://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/view/party/VVD,_JOVD/jaarverslag.html</p> <p>2018 <i>JOVD Financieel Jaarverslag 2018</i>, p. 5 via https://jovd.nl/anbi/</p> <p>2019 <i>JOVD Financieel Jaarverslag 2019</i>, p. 5 via https://jovd.nl/anbi/</p> <p>2020 <i>JOVD Financieel Jaarverslag 2020</i>, p. 5 via https://jovd.nl/anbi/</p>
JS	<p>1970 to 1973, 1975 Welp (1999, p. 214)</p> <p>1976, 1977, 1979, 1981 Welp (1999, p. 215), Koole and Van de Velde (1992, p. 637)</p> <p>1984 Jongerenorganisaties boeren weer goed (1984, 5 juni). <i>Het Parool</i>, p. 30. Consulted via Delpher, 18-06-2021, https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ABCDDD:010832779:mpeg21:p010</p> <p>1985 Welp (1999, p. 215)</p> <p>1986 Op Den Brouw, W. (1986, 5 March). Voorzitter Jonge Socialisten hekelte 'angsthazendiscussies' in partijbestuur: 'Partijbestuur PvdA lijkt rouwkamer'. <i>NRC Handelsblad</i>, p. 30. Consulted via Delpher, 28-07-2021, https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=KBNRC01:000028700:mpeg21:p006</p> <p>1987 Welp (1999, p. 215)</p> <p>1988 Koole and Van de Velde (1992, p. 637)</p> <p>1989 Koole and Van de Velde (1992, p. 637), but see Welp (1999, p. 215) for an alternative membership figure (1,500 – probably excludes support members)</p> <p>1992 Welp (1999, p. 215)</p> <p>1995 Bos et al. (1995, p. 11)</p> <p>1996 to 1999 Welp (1999, p. 215)</p> <p>2001 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2003, 26 June). Overzicht subsiëring politieke partijen 2001. Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/nds-bzk0300393-b1</p> <p>2002 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2004, 30 August). Overzicht subsiëring politieke partijen 2002. Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/nds-bzk0400479-b1</p> <p>2003 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2005, 26 September). Overzicht subsiëring politieke partijen 2003. Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-27422-9-b1</p> <p>2004 to 2005 DNPP (2005, 13 april). <i>Persbericht 3: Jongerenorganisaties van politieke partijen boekten in 2004 winst</i> [press release]. Via https://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/12086/</p> <p>2006 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2008, 7 February). Overzicht van de subsidies verstrekt op grond van de Wet subsiëring politieke partijen over het jaar 2006. Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/nds-bzk0800052-b2</p> <p>2007 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2009, 4 May). Overzicht van de subsidies verstrekt op grond van de Wet subsiëring politieke partijen over het jaar 2007. Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-31700-VII-77.html</p> <p>2008 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2010, 7 October). Overzicht van de subsidies verstrekt op grond van de Wet subsiëring politieke partijen over het jaar 2008. Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-32500-VII-3.html</p> <p>2009 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2011, 18 January). Overzicht subsiëring politieke partijen 2009. Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-32500-VII-79.html</p> <p>2010 to 2011 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Ledentallen politieke jongerenorganisaties 2007-2012 (personal communication, 2014, August 20)</p> <p>2012 to 2014 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Leden politieke jongerenorganisaties 2012-2016 (personal communication 2017, March 15)</p> <p>2015 <i>Activiteitenverslag 2014 - Jonge Socialisten in de PvdA</i>, n. p.</p> <p>2016 to 2017 <i>Activiteitenverslag 2016 – Jonge Socialisten in de PvdA</i>, p. 6</p> <p>2018 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Overzicht ledenaantallen jongerenorganisaties politieke partijen 2017-2018 (personal communication 2020, January 13)</p> <p>2019 Personal communication, 2019, July 1</p> <p>2020 Personal communication, 2020, January 16</p>
KVPJG	<p>1960 to 1965, 1973, 1976, 1987 Welp (1999, p. 202)</p>
PINK!	<p>2007 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2009, 4 May). Overzicht van de subsidies verstrekt op grond van de Wet subsiëring politieke partijen over het jaar 2007. Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-31700-VII-77.html</p> <p>2008 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2010, 7 October). Overzicht van de subsidies verstrekt op grond van de Wet</p>

	<p>subsidieering politieke partijen over het jaar 2008. Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-32500-VII-3.html</p> <p>2009 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2011, 18 January). Overzicht subsidieering politieke partijen 2009. Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-32500-VII-79.html</p> <p>2010 to 2011 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Ledentallen politieke jongerenorganisaties 2007-2012 (personal communication, 2014, August 20)</p> <p>2012 to 2015 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Leden politieke jongerenorganisaties 2012-2016 (personal communication, 2017, March 15)</p> <p>2016 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Overzicht ledenaantallen jongerenorganisaties politieke partijen 2016 (personal communication, 2018, February 9)</p> <p>2017 to 2018 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Overzicht ledenaantallen jongerenorganisaties politieke partijen 2017-2018 (personal communication, 2020, January 13)</p> <p>2019 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Overzicht aantal subsidiabele leden jongerenorganisaties politieke partijen 2019 (personal communication, 2021, January 11)</p> <p>2020 Personal communication, 2020, January 31</p>
PpF	<p>2002 to 2006 Personal communication, 2013, August 21</p> <p>2007 to 2016 <i>Jaarverslag Perspectief, Christenunie-jongeren 2015-2016</i>, p. 16</p> <p>2017 <i>Jaarverslag 16'17 Perspectief</i>, p. 15</p> <p>2018 & 2019 <i>Jaarverslag Perspectief 2018-2019</i>, p. 13</p> <p>2020 Personal communication, 2020, June 15</p>
PPRjo	<p>1984 <i>Congres PPR-Jongeren, zaterdag 28 november 1987, bestuursverantwoording</i>, p. 9</p> <p>1985 to 1986 <i>PPR-Jongerencongres, zaterdag 30 mei 1987, bestuursverantwoording</i>, p. 16</p> <p>1987 <i>Congres PPR-Jongeren, zaterdag 28 november 1987, bestuursverantwoording</i>, p. 9</p> <p>1988 <i>Leuk, die politiek?</i>, n.p. (separately enclosed brochure with the <i>Jonge Radikalenkrant</i>, 1988, no. 4)</p>
PSJG	<p>1987 Trom, B. (1987, 19 September). Politieke jongeren. <i>Het Parool</i>, p. 2. Consulted via Delpher, 01-08-2021, https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ABCDDD:010831166:mpeg21:p020</p>
RPJO	<p>1985 to 1986 <i>Notulen van de ledenvergadering van de Reformatorisch Politieke Jongerenorganisatie gehouden op 15 maart 1986 in de "Evangelische Hogeschool" te Amersfoort</i>, p. 2</p> <p>1987 <i>Jaarverslag Vereniging RPJO over Anno Domini 1987</i>, p. 1</p> <p>1988 <i>Jaarverslag Vereniging RPJO over Anno Domini 1988</i>, p. 1</p> <p>1989 <i>Jaarverslag Vereniging RPJO over Anno Domini 1989</i>, p. 1</p> <p>1990 <i>Jaarverslag Vereniging RPJO over Anno Domini 1990</i>, p. 1-2</p> <p>1991 to 1994 Van Baardewijk (1994, pp. 45, 47, 63)</p>
ROOD	<p>2004 to 2005 DNPP (2005, 13 april). <i>Persbericht 3: Jongerenorganisaties van politieke partijen boekten in 2004 winst</i> [press release]. Via https://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/12086/</p> <p>2006 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2008, 7 February). Overzicht van de subsidies verstrekt op grond van de Wet subsidieering politieke partijen over het jaar 2006. Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/nds-bzk0800052-b2</p> <p>2007 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2009, 4 May). Overzicht van de subsidies verstrekt op grond van de Wet subsidieering politieke partijen over het jaar 2007. Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-31700-VII-77.html</p> <p>2008 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2010, 7 October). Overzicht van de subsidies verstrekt op grond van de Wet subsidieering politieke partijen over het jaar 2008. Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-32500-VII-3.html</p> <p>2009 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2011, 18 January). Overzicht subsidieering politieke partijen 2009. Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-32500-VII-79.html</p> <p>2010 to 2011 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Ledentallen politieke jongerenorganisaties 2007-2012 (personal communication, 2014, August 20)</p> <p>2012 to 2014 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Leden politieke jongerenorganisaties 2012-2016 (personal communication, 2017, March 15)</p> <p>2015 <i>Activiteitenverslag Behorende bij het Financieel verslag en overzichten 2015, Wet Financiering Politieke Partijen, Socialistische Partij</i>, p. 17</p> <p>2016 to 2017 <i>Activiteitenverslag Behorende bij het Financieel verslag en overzichten 2016, Wet Financiering Politieke Partijen, Socialistische Partij</i>, p. 18</p> <p>2018 to 2019 <i>Activiteitenverslag Behorende bij het Financieel verslag en overzichten 2018, Wet Financiering Politieke Partijen, Socialistische Partij</i>, p. 25</p> <p>2020 <i>Financieel verslag en overzichten 2020 Wet financiering politieke partijen Socialistische Partij</i>, p. 5, via https://www.sp.nl/sites/default/files/sp_wfpp_financieel_verslag_2020_was_getekend.pdf.</p>
SGPJ	<p>1982 to 1986 <i>Jaarverslag 1985 van de secretaris van het Landelijk Verband van Staatkundig Gereformeerde Studieverenigingen, ter goedkeuring aangeboden aan de huishoudelijke vergadering, bijeen te Gouda op vrijdag 21 maart 1986 ter gelegenheid van de 44e jaarvergadering</i>, p. 1</p> <p>1987 to 1991 <i>Jaarverslag van het LVSGS 1990</i>, p. 4</p> <p>1999 to 2007 <i>SGP-jongeren jaarverslag 2008</i>, p. 12-13</p> <p>2008 to 2011 <i>SGP-jongeren jaarverslag 2013</i>, p. 28</p> <p>2012 to 2017 <i>SGP-jongeren jaarverslag 2015</i>, p. 61</p>

Table A5.2 Sources of subsidized party youth wing membership figures 2001-2020

<i>Year</i>	<i>Source</i>
2001	Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2003, 26 Jun e). Overzicht subsidiëring politieke partijen 2001. Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/nds-bzk0300393-b1
2002	Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2004, 30 August). Overzicht subsidiëring politieke partijen 2002. Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/nds-bzk0400479-b1
2003	Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2005, 26 September). Overzicht subsidiëring politieke partijen 2003. Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-27422-9-b1
2004	Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2006, 3 February). Overzicht van de subsidies verstrekt op grond van de Wet subsidiëring politieke partijen over het jaar 2004. Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/nds-bzk0600040-b1
2005	Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2008, 7 February). Overzicht van de subsidies verstrekt op grond van de Wet subsidiëring politieke partijen over het jaar 2005. Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/nds-bzk0800052-b1
2006	Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2008, 7 February). Overzicht van de subsidies verstrekt op grond van de Wet subsidiëring politieke partijen over het jaar 2006. Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/nds-bzk0800052-b2
2007	Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2009, 4 May). Overzicht van de subsidies verstrekt op grond van de Wet subsidiëring politieke partijen over het jaar 2007. Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-31700-VII-77.html
2008	Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2010, 7 October). Overzicht van de subsidies verstrekt op grond van de Wet subsidiëring politieke partijen over het jaar 2008. Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-32500-VII-3.html
2009	Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2011, 18 January). Overzicht subsidiëring politieke partijen 2009. Via https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-32500-VII-79.html
2010-2011	Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Ledentallen politieke jongerenorganisaties 2007-2012 (personal communication, 2014, August 20)
2012-2015	Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Leden politieke jongerenorganisaties 2012-2016 (personal communication 2017, March 15)
2016	Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Overzicht ledenaantallen jongerenorganisaties politieke partijen 2016 (personal communication, 2018, February 9)
2017-2018	Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Overzicht ledenaantallen jongerenorganisaties politieke partijen 2017-2018 (personal communication, 2020, January 13)
2019	Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Overzicht aantal subsidiabele leden jongerenorganisaties politieke partijen 2019 (personal communication, 2021, January 11)
2020	Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Overzicht aantal subsidiabele leden jongerenorganisaties politieke partijen 2020 (personal communication, 2021, December 10)

Appendix 5.2 Party youth wing membership criteria and conditions in the 1980s and 2010s

Youth wing	1985-1990					2014-2020				
	Age	Annual fee	Dual membership	Type*	Other**	Age	Annual fee	Dual membership	Type*	Other**
CDJA	≤29	f10: ages ≤18, then based on income	Optional, with free PM up to age 25	I	P	≤30	€5	Optional, with discount on PM	I	P
	PPRjo	≤28	f10	After 1 st year: PM as condition for PYWM	I, S	-				
	PSJG	≤26	f15	-	I, S					
DWARS						14 to 28	€10	Optional, with free PYWM	I	P
JD	12 to 30	f10	-	I	-	12 to 30	€17,50: ages ≤27 €27: ages 28-30	Optional, with discount on PM	I	-
JFVD						14 to 30	€5	-	I	P, R
JOVD	16 to 30	+/- f31 (varied per branch)	-	I	-	14 to 30	1 st year €5, then €28	Optional, with discount on PYWM	I	P
JS	14 to 27	f15	Party members aged ≤28 = automatic PYWM	I, S	P	12 to 28	1 st year €5, then €10	Optional, with free PYWM	I	P
LVSGS/SGPJ	12 to 25	n/a	n/a	C, I	-	11 to 28	€0: ages ≤14***, €5: age 15, €9,50 age ≥16	Optional, with discount on PM	I	-
OPP						14 to 30	€5, €10 or €20	n/a	n/a	n/a
PINK!						14 to 30	€9	Optional, with free PYWM	I	P, R
	GPJC	-	+/- f25	n/a	C	-				
	RPJO	14 to 29	f15	PM as condition for PYWM (until 1989)	I	P				
PpF						12 to 30	1 st year €5, then €12,50	Optional, with discount on PM	I	P
ROOD						14 to 28	€5: ages 14-16	Party members aged 16 to 28 = automatic PYWM	I	E, P, R

Sources: Various political party and youth wing websites, statutes and/or internal regulations, and member magazines.

Note. PYWM = party youth wing membership. PM = party membership. Annual fees are often a minimum. *Membership type: I = Individual, S = Registered Sympathizer, C = Collective. **Other membership criteria: E = Exclusivity, P = Endorse Principles, R = Residence. ***Those aged 11-14 are called 'aspirant'-members.

Appendix 5.3 Political participation of respondents broken down by youth wing in 2020

	<i>Total*</i>	<i>CDJA</i>	<i>DWARS</i>	<i>JD</i>	<i>JS</i>	<i>PINK!</i>	<i>PpF</i>	<i>SGPJ</i>
Involved radio, TV or newspaper	39	47	43	39	45	(44)	(21)	29
Involved political party or organization	52	62	60	54	58	(61)	(57)	25
Joined public hearing, government discussion meeting	41	53	44	40	37	(44)	(61)	25
Contacted politician or civil servant	48	65	51	52	54	(46)	(46)	28
Joined action group	33	11	54	16	50	(70)	(14)	14
Joined protest or demonstration	54	13	84	36	64	(91)	(26)	36
Signed a petition	78	56	89	73	85	(96)	(61)	72
Joined political discussion/action via internet, e-mail, text message	65	60	76	73	73	(83)	(46)	38
Other	45	48	59	39	48	(61)	(50)	18
<i>Total N**</i>	<i>888</i>	<i>182</i>	<i>63</i>	<i>208</i>	<i>95</i>	<i>23</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>261</i>

Note. Values are reported in brackets when $N < 50$. *Weighted by party youth wing size. Unweighted $N = 860$.

**The exact N may slightly differ per item due to item-nonresponse.

Appendix 6.1 Descriptives for ideological positions of respondents

Table A6.1 Left-right scale

		<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>	<i>95% Confidence Interval</i>	
					<i>Lower Bound</i>	<i>Upper Bound</i>
<i>Own position</i>	CDJA	188	6.4	1.4	6.2	6.6
	DWARS	65	2.5	0.9	2.2	2.7
	JD	211	5.3	1.6	5.1	5.5
	JS	100	3.2	1.4	2.9	3.5
	PINK!	23	3.6	2.3	2.6	4.5
	PpF	28	4.6	1.9	3.9	5.3
	SGPJ	280	7.5	1.4	7.3	7.6
<i>Position party youth wing</i>	CDJA	187	6.7	1.3	6.5	6.9
	DWARS	65	2.9	1.4	2.6	3.2
	JD	209	5.7	1.4	5.5	5.9
	JS	100	3.8	1.7	3.4	4.1
	PINK!	23	4.1	2.3	3.1	5.1
	PpF	28	5.1	1.3	4.6	5.6
	SGPJ	277	8.5	1.2	8.4	8.6
<i>Position mother party</i>	CDJA	188	6.6	1.0	6.4	6.7
	DWARS	65	3.1	0.7	2.9	3.3
	JD	210	5.5	1.1	5.4	5.7
	JS	100	3.8	1.1	3.6	4.1
	PINK!	23	3.8	1.9	3.0	4.6
	PpF	28	4.8	1.4	4.2	5.3
	SGPJ	279	8.0	1.2	7.8	8.1

Table A6.2 Euthanasia scale

					<i>95% Confidence Interval</i>	
		<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>	<i>Lower Bound</i>	<i>Upper Bound</i>
<i>Own position</i>	CDJA	184	4.4	1.9	4.1	4.7
	DWARS	65	6.4	0.9	6.2	6.6
	JD	222	6.5	0.8	6.4	6.6
	JS	99	6.2	1.1	6.0	6.4
	PINK!	24	6.3	1.3	5.7	6.8
	PpF	29	2.6	1.2	2.1	3.1
	SGPJ	281	1.3	0.9	1.2	1.4
<i>Position party youth wing</i>	CDJA	181	4.1	1.3	4.0	4.3
	DWARS	65	6.4	0.8	6.2	6.6
	JD	220	6.6	0.8	6.5	6.7
	JS	98	6.0	1.0	5.8	6.2
	PINK!	23	6.0	1.1	5.5	6.4
	PpF	29	2.4	0.9	2.0	2.7
	SGPJ	281	1.2	0.6	1.1	1.3
<i>Position mother party</i>	CDJA	181	3.5	1.2	3.3	3.7
	DWARS	64	6.0	0.9	5.8	6.2
	JD	221	6.4	0.9	6.3	6.5
	JS	98	5.7	1.0	5.5	5.9
	PINK!	23	5.2	1.2	4.6	5.7
	PpF	29	1.8	0.6	1.6	2.0
	SGPJ	281	1.1	0.6	1.1	1.2

Table A6.3 Income disparities scale

					<i>95% Confidence Interval</i>	
		<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>	<i>Lower Bound</i>	<i>Upper Bound</i>
<i>Own position</i>	CDJA	182	4.5	1.3	4.3	4.7
	DWARS	64	6.5	0.7	6.3	6.7
	JD	217	4.9	1.3	4.7	5.1
	JS	99	6.2	1.0	6.0	6.4
	PINK!	24	6.3	0.9	6.0	6.7
	PpF	29	5.2	1.2	4.7	5.6
	SGPJ	272	4.6	1.4	4.5	4.8
<i>Position party youth wing</i>	CDJA	180	4.6	1.0	4.4	4.7
	DWARS	64	6.6	0.5	6.5	6.8
	JD	215	5.3	1.0	5.1	5.4
	JS	97	6.4	0.7	6.2	6.5
	PINK!	23	6.3	1.0	5.9	6.8
	PpF	29	5.4	0.8	5.1	5.7
	SGPJ	268	4.7	1.2	4.5	4.8
<i>Position mother party</i>	CDJA	180	4.2	0.9	4.0	4.3
	DWARS	64	6.1	0.7	5.9	6.3
	JD	215	4.6	0.9	4.5	4.8
	JS	98	6.0	0.8	5.9	6.2
	PINK!	24	6.0	1.2	5.5	6.6
	PpF	29	5.2	0.8	4.9	5.5
	SGPJ	268	4.6	1.3	4.5	4.8

Table A6.4 Integration of minorities scale

					<i>95% Confidence Interval</i>	
		<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>	<i>Lower Bound</i>	<i>Upper Bound</i>
<i>Own position</i>	CDJA	179	4.6	1.6	4.4	4.8
	DWARS	64	3.1	1.1	2.9	3.4
	JD	213	3.9	1.3	3.7	4.1
	JS	98	3.7	1.3	3.5	4.0
	PINK!	24	3.8	1.3	3.2	4.3
	PpF	29	4.5	1.2	4.0	5.0
	SGPJ	269	4.5	1.8	4.3	4.7
<i>Position party youth wing</i>	CDJA	178	4.3	1.2	4.1	4.4
	DWARS	63	2.8	1.4	2.5	3.2
	JD	210	3.2	1.1	3.0	3.3
	JS	96	3.3	1.4	3.0	3.6
	PINK!	24	3.3	1.1	2.8	3.8
	PpF	29	4.5	0.8	4.1	4.8
	SGPJ	266	4.4	1.7	4.2	4.6
<i>Position mother party</i>	CDJA	178	4.5	1.4	4.3	4.7
	DWARS	63	3.1	1.1	2.8	3.4
	JD	210	3.5	1.1	3.3	3.6
	JS	96	3.7	1.2	3.4	3.9
	PINK!	24	3.5	0.9	3.2	3.9
	PpF	29	4.6	0.7	4.3	4.8
	SGPJ	266	4.5	1.8	4.3	4.8

Table A6.5 European unification scale

		<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>	<i>95% Confidence Interval</i>	
					<i>Lower Bound</i>	<i>Upper Bound</i>
<i>Own position</i>	CDJA	177	4.0	1.7	3.7	4.3
	DWARS	63	2.1	1.1	1.8	2.3
	JD	210	2.3	1.4	2.1	2.5
	JS	95	2.6	1.4	2.3	2.9
	PINK!	24	3.4	1.7	2.7	4.1
	PpF	28	3.8	1.2	3.3	4.2
	SGPJ	268	5.5	1.4	5.3	5.7
<i>Position party youth wing</i>	CDJA	175	3.7	1.2	3.6	3.9
	DWARS	63	2.1	0.9	1.9	2.4
	JD	209	2.1	1.4	1.9	2.3
	JS	94	2.7	1.0	2.5	2.9
	PINK!	24	4.1	1.2	3.6	4.6
	PpF	28	4.1	1.1	3.7	4.5
	SGPJ	262	5.3	1.3	5.1	5.4
<i>Position mother party</i>	CDJA	175	3.9	1.1	3.7	4.1
	DWARS	62	2.6	1.0	2.3	2.8
	JD	210	2.2	1.4	2.0	2.4
	JS	94	2.9	1.1	2.7	3.1
	PINK!	24	5.3	1.4	4.7	5.9
	PpF	28	4.6	1.0	4.3	5.0
	SGPJ	263	5.4	1.3	5.2	5.5

Table A6.6 Total average absolute difference between respondent, youth wing and party position

		<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>	<i>95% Confidence Interval</i>	
					<i>Lower Bound</i>	<i>Upper Bound</i>
<i>Euthanasia scale</i>	Resp. - youth wing	925	.6	1.0	.6	.7
	Resp. - party	923	.8	1.0	.7	.8
<i>Income disparities scale</i>	Resp. - youth wing	908	.8	.8	.7	.8
	Resp. - party	913	.8	.8	.8	.9
<i>Integration of minorities scale</i>	Resp. - youth wing	900	1.0	1.0	.9	1.0
	Resp. - party	900	.9	.9	.9	1.0
<i>European unification scale</i>	Resp. - youth wing	893	.9	1.0	.9	1.0
	Resp. - party	891	1.1	1.2	1.0	1.2

Note. Weighted by party youth wing size.

Appendix 6.2 Youth wing background of all Dutch MPs sworn in before 30 y/o until 2020

#	Name	Sex	Age at start MP*	Inauguration date	Political Party**	Active in PYW?	Abbr. PYW**	Political position****	
								before	after
1	Hans van den Doel	male	30	23-2-1967	PvdA	no		no	no
2	Hans Wiegel	male	26	18-4-1967	VVD	yes	JOVD	no	yes
3	Relus ter Beek	male	27	11-5-1971	PvdA	yes	FJG	yes	yes
4	Maarten Engwirda	male	28	11-5-1971	D66	no		yes	yes
5	Hans Kombrink	male	26	7-12-1972	PvdA	yes	FJG	yes	yes
6	Nora Salomons	female	27	7-12-1972	PvdA	no		yes	no
7	Dick Dees	male	28	7-12-1972	VVD	yes	JOVD	yes	yes
8	Dilia van der Heem-Wagemakers	female	26	28-5-1973	PPR	no		no	yes
9	Arie de Graaf	male	29	12-10-1976	PvdA	yes	FJG	yes	no
10	Loek Hermans	male	26	8-6-1977	VVD	yes	JOVD	yes	yes
11	Ed Nijpels	male	27	8-6-1977	VVD	yes	JOVD	yes	yes
12	Frits Castricum	male	30	8-6-1977	PvdA	no		no	yes
13	Suzanne Bischoff van Heemskerck	female	29	24-1-1979	D66	no		no	yes
14	Andrée van Es	female	28	10-6-1981	PSP	yes	PSJG	yes	yes
15	Aat de Jonge	male	29	15-9-1981	CDA	yes	CHJO	no	yes
16	Eveline Herfkens	female	30	15-9-1981	PvdA	no		no	yes
17	Robin Linschoten	male	26	16-9-1982	VVD	yes	JOVD	yes	yes
18	Frank de Grave	male	27	16-9-1982	VVD	yes	JOVD	yes	yes
19	Hans Alders	male	30	11-11-1982	PvdA	no		yes	yes
20	Margo Vliegenthart	female	29	17-11-1987	PvdA	yes	JS	yes	yes
21	Hans Huibers	male	28	14-9-1989	CDA	yes	CDJA	yes	no
22	Ank Bijleveld-Schouten	female	28	16-11-1989	CDA	yes	CDJA	yes	yes
23	Sharon Dijksma	female	23	17-5-1994	PvdA	yes	JS	no	yes
24	Marjet van Zuijlen	female	27	18-5-1994	PvdA	no		yes	no
25	Stefanie van Vliet	female	28	30-8-1994	D66	yes	JD	yes	yes
26	Camiel Eurlings	male	25	19-5-1998	CDA	yes	CDJA	yes	yes
27	Joop Wijn	male	29	19-5-1998	CDA	yes	CDJA	no	yes
28	Kees van der Staaij	male	30	19-5-1998	SGP	yes	SGPJ	no	yes
29	João Varela	male	28	23-5-2002	LPF	no		no	no
30	Krista van Velzen	female	28	23-5-2002	SP	no		yes	no
31	Boris van der Ham	male	29	23-5-2002	D66	yes	JD	yes	no
32	Mirjam Sterk	female	29	23-5-2002	CDA	yes	CDJA	no	no
33	Erik van Lith	male	30	23-5-2002	CDA	no		yes	no
34	Fieroes Zeroual	female	30	30-5-2002	LPF	no		no	no
35	Maarten Haverkamp	male	28	26-7-2002	CDA	no		yes	no
36	Martijn van Dam	male	25	30-1-2003	PvdA	yes	JS	yes	yes

37	Max Hermans	male	29	30-1-2003	LPF	no		no	no
38	Pieter Omtzigt	male	29	3-6-2003	CDA	no		no	-
39	Eske van Egerschot	female	27	6-4-2004	VVD	yes	JOVD	no	no
40	Ewout Irrgang	male	29	6-10-2005	SP	yes	ROOD***	yes	no
41	Tofik Dibi	male	26	30-11-2006	GL	yes	DWARS	no	no
42	Lea Bouwmeester	female	27	30-11-2006	PvdA	yes	JS	yes	-
43	Renske Leijten	female	28	30-11-2006	SP	yes	ROOD	yes	-
44	Attje Kuiken	female	29	30-11-2006	PvdA	yes	JS	no	-
45	Sander de Rouwe	male	26	1-3-2007	CDA	yes	CDJA	yes	yes
46	Ed Anker	male	29	1-3-2007	CU	yes	GPJC	yes	yes
47	Farshad Bashir	male	20	15-1-2008	SP	yes	ROOD	yes	-
48	Manja Smits	female	23	22-4-2008	SP	yes	ROOD	yes	no
49	Jesse Klaver	male	24	17-6-2010	GL	yes	DWARS	yes	-
50	Léon de Jong	male	28	17-6-2010	PVV	no		no	yes
51	Johan Driessen	male	29	17-6-2010	PVV	yes	JOVD	no	no
52	Klaas Dijkhoff	male	29	17-6-2010	VVD	yes	JOVD	yes	yes
53	Nine Kooiman	female	30	17-6-2010	SP	no		yes	-
54	Niels van den Berge	male	26	12-1-2011	GL	yes	DWARS	yes	yes
55	Mohammed Mohandis	male	27	20-9-2012	PvdA	yes	JS	yes	-
56	Henk Nijboer	male	30	20-9-2012	PvdA	no		yes	-
57	Duco Hoogland	male	28	8-11-2012	PvdA	no		yes	-
58	Rens Raemakers	male	26	22-3-2017	D66	yes	JD	yes	-
59	Rob Jetten	male	30	22-3-2017	D66	yes	JD	yes	-
60	Mahir Alkaya	male	30	17-1-2018	SP	no		no	-
61	Thierry Aartsen	male	29	12-9-2018	VVD	yes	JOVD	yes	-
62	Eva Akerboom	female	27	15-10-2018	PvdD	yes	PINK!	yes	-

Sources: biographical archives of the Parliamentary Documentation Centre (PDC) of Leiden University complemented with information from the Open Data Portaal (ODP) Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, parlement.com, tweedekamer.nl, and, in a small number of cases, newspaper articles.

Note. PYW = party youth wing. *Although rounded to whole numbers, all are under 30 years old. **See Figure 4.1 for abbreviations and predecessors. ***The person in question was a member of youth groups that can be counted as predecessors of ROOD, was involved in the founding of ROOD, and seems to have been a member of the youth wing REBEL of the *Socialistische Arbeiderspartij* (SAP, in English: Socialist Workers Party). ****This column indicates whether the MP fulfilled a political position before and/or after the parliamentary membership. Examples of such positions are: local/regional councillor, board member within the party, party employee. A hyphen means the person still occupied a seat in parliament in 2020 or has left parliament too recently.

Appendix 7.1 Survey results from Chapter 7 broken down by youth wing

Table A7.1 ‘Without PYW membership I would never have known so much about politics’ (2020, in %)

	<i>Total*</i>	<i>CDJA</i>	<i>DWARS</i>	<i>JD</i>	<i>JS</i>	<i>PINK!</i>	<i>PpF</i>	<i>SGPJ</i>
(Totally) not applicable	44	49	39	47	49	(42)	(45)	44
Neither/nor	14	17	9	14	14	(17)	(16)	18
(Totally) applicable	38	31	50	33	36	(42)	(29)	34
Don't know	4	3	3	6	2	(0)	(10)	3
<i>Total N</i>	<i>985</i>	<i>193</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>233</i>	<i>104</i>	<i>24</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>300</i>

Note. PYW = party youth wing. Values in brackets when total $N < 50$. *Weighted by party youth wing size. Unweighted $N = 955$.

Table A7.2 ‘PYW ensures that members know more about politics’ (2020, in %)

	<i>Total*</i>	<i>CDJA</i>	<i>DWARS</i>	<i>JD</i>	<i>JS</i>	<i>PINK!</i>	<i>PpF</i>	<i>SGPJ</i>
(Totally) not applicable	2	4	0	2	6	(0)	(7)	2
Neither/nor	6	12	3	5	8	(4)	(7)	5
(Totally) applicable	87	74	94	83	76	(96)	(75)	90
Don't know	6	9	3	9	9	(0)	(11)	4
<i>Total N</i>	<i>892</i>	<i>180</i>	<i>63</i>	<i>207</i>	<i>97</i>	<i>24</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>257</i>

Note. PYW = party youth wing. Values in brackets when total $N < 50$. *Weighted by party youth wing size. Unweighted $N = 856$.

Table A7.3 ‘By being a member of PYW I have become much more articulate’ (2020, in %)

	<i>Total*</i>	<i>CDJA</i>	<i>DWARS</i>	<i>JD</i>	<i>JS</i>	<i>PINK!</i>	<i>PpF</i>	<i>SGPJ</i>
(Totally) not applicable	42	44	36	43	52	(25)	(32)	57
Neither/nor	18	20	16	14	14	(25)	(32)	19
(Totally) applicable	35	32	46	37	31	(50)	(23)	19
Don't know	5	4	3	6	3	(0)	(13)	5
<i>Total N</i>	<i>986</i>	<i>193</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>233</i>	<i>105</i>	<i>24</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>300</i>

Note. PYW = party youth wing. Values in brackets when total $N < 50$. *Weighted by party youth wing size. Unweighted $N = 956$.

Table A7.4 ‘PYW insufficiently ensures that members develop their political skills’ (2020, in %)

	<i>Total*</i>	<i>CDJA</i>	<i>DWARS</i>	<i>JD</i>	<i>JS</i>	<i>PINK!</i>	<i>PpF</i>	<i>SGPJ</i>
(Totally) not applicable	57	46	67	56	39	(71)	(64)	48
Neither/nor	15	18	11	12	24	(17)	(7)	22
(Totally) applicable	11	23	14	11	22	(13)	(4)	18
Don't know	13	13	8	21	16	(0)	(25)	11
<i>Total N</i>	<i>892</i>	<i>179</i>	<i>63</i>	<i>207</i>	<i>97</i>	<i>24</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>258</i>

Note. PYW = party youth wing. Values in brackets when total $N < 50$. *Weighted by party youth wing size. Unweighted $N = 856$.

Table A7.5 Ways in which members make their voice heard within PYW (2020, in %)

	<i>Total*</i>	<i>CDJA</i>	<i>DWARS</i>	<i>JD</i>	<i>JS</i>	<i>PINK!</i>	<i>PpF</i>	<i>SGPJ</i>
By participating in discussions at the local level	35	42	41	39	47	(48)	(13)	18
By voting at the general assembly of members	40	41	54	37	48	(56)	(45)	19
By participating in conferences	43	42	62	40	50	(60)	(29)	22
Via informal conversations	54	54	61	50	55	(88)	(58)	38
Online / social media	26	20	28	21	32	(48)	(23)	25
<i>Total N</i>	<i>1046</i>	<i>203</i>	<i>72</i>	<i>248</i>	<i>114</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>33</i>	<i>330</i>

Note. PYW = party youth wing. Survey question: "How do you make your voice heard within [PYW]?" Multiple answers possible. Values in brackets when total $N < 50$. *Weighted by party youth wing size. Unweighted $N = 1025$.

Table A7.6 Importance of 'chance to make new friends / acquaintances' in the decision to become a youth wing member (2020, in %)

	<i>Total*</i>	<i>CDJA</i>	<i>DWARS</i>	<i>JD</i>	<i>JS</i>	<i>PINK!</i>	<i>PpF</i>	<i>SGPJ</i>
(Totally) not applicable	30	27	(19)	26	16	(35)	(46)	45
Neither/nor	22	25	(19)	19	31	(30)	(0)	31
(Totally) applicable	48	47	(62)	55	52	(35)	(54)	22
Don't know	0	1	(0)	0	2	(0)	(0)	1
<i>Total N</i>	<i>568</i>	<i>112</i>	<i>37</i>	<i>140</i>	<i>62</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>179</i>

Note. PYW = party youth wing. Values in brackets when total $N < 50$. *Weighted by party youth wing size. Unweighted $N = 563$.

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Dutch Summary

Het functioneren van Nederlandse politieke jongerenorganisaties: een vergelijking tussen de jaren 1980 en de jaren 2010

Dit proefschrift buigt zich over de vraag welke rol de jongerenorganisaties van politieke partijen vervullen in ons politieke bestel. Jongerenorganisaties van politieke partijen zijn een vanzelfsprekend onderdeel van veel democratische samenlevingen. Toch hebben ze nog relatief weinig wetenschappelijke aandacht gekregen. Dat is opvallend omdat er zorgen bestaan over de mate waarin jongeren nog betrokken zijn bij de politiek. Bovendien staat de verbinding van politieke partijen met de samenleving al geruime tijd onder druk. Partijen reageren daarop met strategische en organisatorische aanpassingen. De eerdere bevinding dat politieke jongerenorganisaties (PJO's) steeds vaker voorkomen in Westerse democratieën past in die context. Zij kunnen gezien worden als een poging om de kloof tussen partijen en jongeren te overbruggen. Het is daarom van belang om de vraag te stellen hoe het gesteld is met het functioneren van de jongerenorganisaties van politieke partijen en of zij hierin onder druk staan vanwege de recente partijgerelateerde ontwikkelingen.

In deze studie wordt het functioneren van politieke jongerenorganisaties over tijd geanalyseerd aan de hand van een functioneel raamwerk dat uit drie hoofdfuncties bestaat: de mobilisatiefunctie, de representatiefunctie en de socialisatiefunctie. Ten eerste hebben politieke jongerenorganisaties de potentie om, als 'mobiliserend instrument', de participatie van jongeren in het politieke systeem te bevorderen. Ten tweede kunnen politieke jongerenorganisaties zich inspannen om de belangen van jongeren te vertegenwoordigen door te fungeren als 'vertegenwoordigingskanaal' tussen de jonge generatie enerzijds en het politieke systeem anderzijds. Ten derde kunnen politieke jongerenorganisaties worden gezien als potentiële 'socialiserende actoren': een context waarin jongvolwassenen politieke kennis en vaardigheden ontwikkelen en deelnemen aan discussies en sociale netwerken die nodig zijn voor toekomstige politieke betrokkenheid. Elk van deze drie hoofdfuncties bestaat uit deelfuncties waarop de prestaties van politieke jongerenorganisaties met behulp van een combinatie van kwantitatieve en kwalitatieve onderzoeksmethodes zijn onderzocht.

In hoeverre is het vermogen van de Nederlandse politieke jongerenorganisaties om jongeren te mobiliseren, representeren en socialiseren in het politieke systeem tussen eind jaren 1980 en eind jaren 2010 veranderd?

Dit onderzoek richt zich op het functioneren van politieke jongerenorganisaties in één land, Nederland, in de tweede helft van de jaren 80 van de 20^e eeuw en de tweede helft van de jaren 10 van de 21^e eeuw. De beperking tot een enkel land volgt uit de wens om een wetenschappelijk onderbelicht onderwerp op verdiepende wijze te onderzoeken. Het waarborgt de benodigde variëteit aan databronnen en zorgt ervoor dat eigenschappen van het politieke stelsel constant worden gehouden. Nederland is bij uitstek een land dat een lange traditie van meerdere politieke jongerenorganisaties kent. De sinds 1976 beschikbare

overheidssubsidie voor de jongerenorganisaties van partijen zorgt voor enige stabiliteit en voldoende beschikbaarheid van data voor een vergelijking door de tijd heen. Bovendien is Nederland een relatief typisch geval van een land waarin gevestigde partijen hun ledenaantal en vaste kiezersaanhang hebben zien afnemen. Hieruit volgt de keuze voor een vergelijking van een recente tijdsperiode, 2014-2020, met de jaren 1985-1990. Sinds het begin van de jaren 90 wordt het Nederlandse politieke systeem steeds meer gekenmerkt door fragmentatie en instabiliteit. De selectie van 1985-1990, een periode aan de vooravond van grote politieke veranderingen, maakt het dus mogelijk om de invloed van politieke trends op het functioneren van jongerenorganisaties te onderzoeken. Bovendien is het landschap van politieke jongerenorganisaties in de jaren 1985-1990 stabiel, zijn er geen wijzigingen in de subsidieverstrekking en is er voor deze jaren voldoende data beschikbaar. Door middel van een analyse van grijze literatuur, surveyonderzoek en interviews is het functioneren van negen politieke jongerenorganisaties in deze twee tijdsperiodes onderzocht.

Politieke jongerenorganisaties in Nederland

Politieke jongerenorganisaties zijn een continue onderdeel van het Nederlandse politieke landschap sinds het ontstaan van politieke partijen. De eerste jongerenorganisatie van een politieke partij wordt opgericht in 1888. In de jaren 20 en 30 volgen er meer. Vanaf dan heeft een meerderheid van de politieke partijen in de Tweede Kamer een jongerenorganisatie. De in 1976 geïntroduceerde overheidssubsidie voor politieke jongerenorganisaties moedigt politieke partijen verder aan tot het hebben van een jongerenorganisatie. Tot de Tweede Wereldoorlog zijn de jongerenorganisaties hoofdzakelijk bezig met politieke socialisatie. Ze noemen zichzelf politieke studieclubs. Vanaf de jaren 50 zijn jongerenorganisaties in toenemende mate politiek betrokken bij het parlementaire proces en ontstaan er zelfs actiegerichte jongerenorganisaties die buitenparlementair te werk gaan. Deze drie typen, vormende, activistische en parlementair georiënteerde politieke jongerenorganisaties, blijven grofweg door de tijd heen bestaan.

Mobilisatie: Nog steeds effectieve instrumenten voor de mobilisatie van een kleine groep bevoorrechte en politiek actieve jongeren

Om inzicht te krijgen in de mate waarin politieke jongerenorganisaties in beide tijdsperiodes de politieke deelname van jongeren bevorderen, zijn hun prestaties op drie deelfuncties onderzocht: het aantrekken van een representatief ledenbestand, het faciliteren van interne participatie en het stimuleren van politieke participatie in andere vormen dan het PJO-lidmaatschap.

De verwachting was dat het ledenaantal van politieke jongerenorganisaties gedaald zou zijn. Immers, politieke partijen hebben veelal te maken met een vergrijzend en dalend ledenbestand en jongeren lijken steeds meer af te zien van deelname aan conventionele vormen van politiek. In tegenstelling tot de verwachting blijkt dat het totale aantal PJO-leden sinds het einde van de jaren 80 is toegenomen. Wel zijn er grote verschillen waar te nemen tussen politieke jongerenorganisaties. Vooral bij de jongerenorganisaties van de drie gevestigde partijen – PvdA, CDA en VVD – zijn de ledenaantallen afgenomen. Dit sluit aan bij

de constatering dat met name deze traditionele grote partijen sinds de jaren 80 een aanzienlijk deel van hun leden hebben verloren. De data laat zien dat het totale PJO-lidmaatschap niet lineair is gestegen sinds de jaren 80. Evenals het totale ledenaantal van politieke partijen is het PJO-lidmaatschap in de jaren 90 gedaald. Na de eeuwwisseling stijgen de PJO-ledenaantallen weer. Tot slot moet op basis van de gepresenteerde bevindingen worden geconcludeerd dat slechts een zeer klein deel van de Nederlandse jongeren besluit zich aan te sluiten bij een politieke jongerenorganisatie. Er is geen sprake van politieke massaorganisaties, maar van kleinschalige sub-organisaties van partijen. Kortom, hoewel het totale PJO-lidmaatschap stijgt, varieert dit in de tijd en tussen politieke jongerenorganisaties en betreft dit een laag percentage van de jonge bevolking.

De vraag is niet alleen in welke mate politieke jongerenorganisaties leden aantrekken, maar ook wie er lid worden. In beide onderzochte perioden blijken de leden van de Nederlandse politieke jongerenorganisaties geen afspiegeling te zijn van de jongerenpopulatie. Het gemiddelde PJO-lid is vaker man, ouder dan 21 jaar, woonachtig in stedelijke gebieden en actief in het hoger onderwijs. Daarnaast zijn jongeren met een migratieachtergrond in 2020 ondervertegenwoordigd. Dit sluit aan bij de eerdere bevinding dat bepaalde groepen vaker politiek actief zijn dan andere, zoals mannen en hoogopgeleiden. Door de tijd heen is er wel wat veranderd in het profiel van het gemiddelde PJO-lid. Hoewel er nog steeds meer mannelijke dan vrouwelijke leden zijn, lijkt de ongelijkheid in deze periode te zijn afgenomen. Voor de moederpartijen geldt dit doorgaans niet. Ook zijn er aanwijzingen dat PJO-leden in de tweede helft van de jaren 10 ouder zijn en vaker in steden wonen dan in de jaren 80 van de vorige eeuw. Als we de politieke jongerenorganisaties beschouwen als een soort voorbode voor de toekomstige samenstelling van politieke partijen of vertegenwoordigende organen, dan kan de gendergelijkheid op dat niveau toenemen, maar zal verdere diversiteit waarschijnlijk achterblijven.

De tweede deelfunctie van de mobilisatiefunctie betreft de mate waarin Nederlandse PJO-leden actief zijn binnen de organisatie. Hoewel conclusies vanwege de methodologische beperkingen van de survey met de nodige voorzichtigheid moeten worden behandeld, blijkt dat het niveau van de interne activiteit van leden redelijk stabiel is gebleven in vergelijking met het einde van de jaren 80. Dit komt overeen met bevindingen voor Nederlandse politieke partijen. Er is ook suggestief bewijs dat, in vergelijking met onderzoeken naar partijactivisme, het aandeel inactieve PJO-leden relatief laag is. Dit sluit aan bij eerdere observaties dat jonge partijleden over het algemeen actiever zijn dan oudere partijleden. Deze bevinding is van belang voor de moederpartijen, ook omdat eerder is gesuggereerd dat deze jonge leden in de toekomst meer dan gemiddeld actief zullen zijn binnen de partij.

Het onderzoek naar de derde deelfunctie, waarvoor alleen data beschikbaar was in 2020, laat zien dat een PJO-lid vaker stemt tijdens landelijke verkiezingen en vaker deelneemt aan politieke activiteiten dan de gemiddelde jongere. De politieke jongerenorganisaties bestaan dus voornamelijk uit politiek actieve jongeren. Dit bevestigt eerdere bevindingen dat leden van verenigingen veelal politiek actiever zijn. Het onderzoek biedt geen uitsluitsel of dit kan worden toegeschreven aan het PJO-lidmaatschap of dat dit het resultaat is van bepaalde

(zelf)selectiemechanismen. Wel geeft ongeveer de helft van de PJO-leden aan opzettelijke mobilisatie-inspanningen van hun organisatie te herkennen. Bovendien hebben jongeren minder politieke kennis, ervaring en connecties. Het is daarom waarschijnlijk dat er sprake is van een combinatie van zelfselectie en mobilisatie- en/of socialisatie-effecten.

Representatie: Sterkere vertegenwoordigingskanalen voor jongeren

Nederlandse politieke jongerenorganisaties fungeren in toegenomen mate als vertegenwoordigingskanaal voor jongeren. Deze centrale bevinding is gestoeld op een analyse van drie deelfuncties: het aggregeren van politieke belangen, het articuleren van politieke belangen en het verbeteren van de descriptieve representatie.

Meer politieke jongerenorganisaties bundelen de belangen van hun leden in een politiek programma in 2014-2020 dan in 1985-1990. Ook is er meer sprake van directe inspraakmogelijkheden voor leden bij de totstandkoming van het programma. In de jaren 80 verloopt deze betrokkenheid vaker via vertegenwoordigers binnen de organisatie. Dit sluit aan bij de algemene trend dat partijleden meer formele mogelijkheden tot directe invloed krijgen. Voor de late jaren 2010 kan worden vastgesteld wat de mate van congruentie is tussen de ideologische prioriteiten van de organisatie en de leden. Als het gaat om de saillantie van bepaalde onderwerpen, komt de aandacht voor bepaalde beleidsterreinen in de politieke programma's sterk overeen met de beleidsterreinen die door de PJO-leden belangrijk werden gevonden. Dit geldt alleen minder voor de thema's internationale zaken (teveel aandacht) en milieu en klimaat (te weinig aandacht). PJO-leden schatten ook hun eigen ideologische positionering op de links-rechts dimensie en specifieke beleidsthema's als redelijk dichtbij die van hun politieke jongerenorganisatie en de verwante moederpartij.

Voor de articulatie van de belangen van hun leden maken de Nederlandse politieke jongerenorganisaties tussen 2014 en 2020 meer gebruik van interne kanalen om politieke invloed uit te oefenen binnen de moederpartij dan in de tweede helft van de jaren 80. Meestal krijgen ze toegang tot de Kamerfractie of maken ze gebruik van hun bevoegdheden op het partijcongres. In de jaren 80 worden deze inspanningen slechts in twee gevallen ondersteund door reglementaire bepalingen over de formele toegang van jongerenorganisaties binnen de partij. Dergelijke bepalingen komen in de recente jaren 10 vaker voor in partijreglementen, hoewel er nog steeds politieke partijen zijn zonder enige vermelding van de representatieve toegang van de jongerenorganisatie in hun reglementen. Naast het nastreven van invloed binnen de partij proberen politieke jongerenorganisaties de politiek via externe kanalen te beïnvloeden. In de tweede helft van de jaren 2010 krijgen zij aandacht van de grootste landelijke kranten, maar in mindere mate dan in de tweede helft van de jaren 1980. Jongerenorganisaties nemen in de recente periode wel vaker het heft in eigen handen door opiniestukken in te dienen. Zij zien de traditionele media nog steeds als een belangrijk middel om publiciteit te krijgen en hun politieke opvattingen onder de aandacht te brengen.

Een andere manier waarop politieke jongerenorganisaties kunnen bijdragen aan de politieke vertegenwoordiging van jongeren is door de descriptieve representatie van jongeren in wetgevende instituties te versterken. Uit dit onderzoek blijkt dat sinds 1963 de meerderheid van de Tweede Kamerleden die jonger dan dertig jaar waren toen zij verkozen werden een

achtergrond heeft in de jongerenorganisatie van hun partij. Dit aandeel was in de jaren 80 van de vorige eeuw iets lager dan in de recente jaren 10. Het absolute aantal gekozen Kamerleden onder de 30 jaar oud, en daarmee het aantal jonge Kamerleden met een achtergrond in de jongerenorganisatie, is sinds de eeuwwisseling aanzienlijk gestegen. Politieke jongerenorganisaties proberen proactief invloed uit te oefenen op de selectie en verkiezing van jonge kandidaten door te lobbyen bij partijelites, specifieke trainingsprogramma's op te zetten en campagne te voeren. Dit benadrukt niet alleen de relevantie van deze organisaties als opstap voor ambitieuze jonge politici, maar bevestigt ook hun rol als rekruteringspool voor de moederpartij.

Socialisatie: Een verschuiving van ideologische en politieke kennis naar vaardigheden en socialiseren

De socialisatiefunctie houdt in dat politieke jongerenorganisaties functioneren als een politieke school voor jongeren. Dit is onderzocht door hun prestaties op twee deelfuncties te beoordelen: het bieden van politieke educatie en training, gericht op het vergroten van politieke kennis en vaardigheden, en het faciliteren van sociale interactie, gericht op het bevorderen van politieke discussies en netwerken.

De Nederlandse politieke jongerenorganisaties integreren in 1985-1990 bewust politieke vormingsactiviteiten in de dagelijkse praktijk van hun organisatie, en doen dat in 2014-2020 nog meer. Hierin zijn twee kwalitatieve trends te ontwaren. Ten eerste is de focus verschoven van politieke kennis naar politieke vaardigheden. De vormingsactiviteiten in de jaren 80 draaien om politieke ideologieën en principes. De aandacht voor vaardigheden richt zich dan voornamelijk op de ontwikkeling van het actieve kader ten behoeve van de organisatorische continuïteit. In de tweede helft van de jaren 2010 bieden de meeste politieke jongerenorganisaties hun leden uitgebreide vaardigheden- en carrièreprogramma's aan. De tweede trend is die van de verschuiving van een niet-professionele naar een professionele organisatie van politieke vorming. In de tweede helft van de jaren 80 zijn er minder politieke jongerenorganisaties die 1) de verantwoordelijkheid voor de politieke training en opleiding beleggen bij een persoon en/of orgaan op nationaal niveau, 2) hun eigen trainerspool beheren, 3) rapporteren over politieke vorming en training in jaarverslagen en 4) op dit gebied samenwerken met de moederpartij. Samenvattend kan worden geconcludeerd dat de jongerenorganisaties, als socialiserende actoren, zijn veranderd van instrumenten voor ideologische integratie in vehikels voor de loopbaanontwikkeling van jongeren.

Ook sociale interactie binnen de politieke jongerenorganisaties is van belang voor de politieke socialisatie van de leden. Eerder onderzoek suggereert dat zowel politieke discussies als netwerkvorming positief gerelateerd zijn aan iemands toekomstige politieke participatie. Beide zijn in zowel de jaren 80 als de jaren 10 inherent onderdeel van de Nederlandse politieke jongerenorganisaties. Het aantal politieke commissies, politieke programma's en de aandacht voor debatvaardigheden lijken over tijd te zijn toegenomen, net als de sociale motieven voor het PJO-lidmaatschap. Hoewel informele sociale bijeenkomsten belangrijk zijn in sommige politieke jongerenorganisaties in 1985-1990, zijn deze in 2014-2020 meer wijdverbreid en geïnstitutionaliseerd. We kunnen dus voorzichtig concluderen dat de mechanismen voor

politieke discussies en netwerkvorming binnen de politieke jongerenorganisaties sinds de jaren 80 geïntensiveerd zijn.

Verschillen tussen politieke jongerenorganisaties worden kleiner

Naast de verschillen in het functioneren van politieke jongerenorganisaties door de tijd heen, zijn er ook verschillen tussen de jongerenorganisaties te ontwaren. Deze verschillen sluiten aan bij de eerder geïdentificeerde drie typen: vormend, activistisch en parlementair georiënteerde PJO's. In de tweede helft van de jaren 80 functioneren de jongerenorganisaties van de drie grootste en gevestigde politieke partijen, het CDA, de PvdA en de VVD, anders dan de rest. Deze parlementair georiënteerde jongerenorganisaties zijn politiek actiever en meer georganiseerd op het vlak van politieke vorming. Zij zijn de enigen die sindsdien te maken krijgen met zowel een verlies aan leden als een daling in media-aandacht. De jongerenorganisaties van de religieuze partijen, de GPV, RPF en SGP, zijn in die tijd niet erg bezig met politieke zaken. Deze vormend gerichte jongerenorganisaties presenteren zichzelf als studieverenigingen met een sterke nadruk op de lokale afdelingen. Daarentegen is de activistische jongerenorganisatie van de PSP op buitenparlementaire wijze met politiek bezig en heeft geen bewuste aandacht voor de vorming van de leden. De jongerenorganisaties van de JD en de PPR lijken in hun functioneren nog het meest op het parlementair georiënteerde type, maar zijn minder bezig met het uitoefenen van invloed binnen de moederpartij. De PPRjo laat in die tijd bovendien ook activistische trekjes zien. Dit onderzoek laat zien dat de verschillen tussen politieke jongerenorganisaties door de tijd heen kleiner zijn geworden. We zien een trend van politisering en professionalisering; het parlementair georiënteerde type politieke jongerenorganisatie is in de tweede helft van de jaren 10 dominant geworden.

Verklaringen en implicaties

De verwachting aan het begin van dit onderzoek was dat het functioneren van politieke jongerenorganisaties door de tijd heen achteruit gegaan zou zijn vanwege zowel de toegenomen afstand tussen jongeren en de conventionele politiek als de professionaliserende organisaties van de moederpartijen. Deze verwachting is niet uitgekomen. Hiervoor zijn verschillende verklaringen denkbaar. De toename in het aantal leden kan bijvoorbeeld het gevolg zijn van de grotere aanwezigheid van jonge politici in de politiek, de opkomst van grote politieke thema's zoals het klimaat, en de komst van nieuwe jongerenorganisaties. De politisering van politieke jongerenorganisaties kan verklaard worden door de grotere electorale onzekerheid. De relatieve voorspelbaarheid van de verkiezingsuitslag in de jaren 80 zorgt ervoor dat de jongerenorganisaties van de grote, gevestigde partijen weten dat invloed uitoefenen op hun moederpartij vruchtbaar en wellicht noodzakelijk is om hen aan hun principes te houden. De jongerenorganisaties van de kleine partijen zijn dan vanwege de minder machtige en vaak kwetsbare positie van de partij minder bezig met het uitoefenen van politieke invloed. Vanwege de toegenomen electorale onvoorspelbaarheid en concurrentie tussen partijen zijn de politieke jongerenorganisaties in de jaren 10 van deze eeuw politiek actiever. Ze moeten immers voorbereid zijn op een moederpartij die verkiezingen wint of verliest; een partij die deel uitmaakt van de regering of de oppositie. Dit maakt dat ze meer dan ooit moeten navigeren tussen een rol als uitdager en pleitbezorger van de partij. De

bevinding dat politieke jongerenorganisaties professioneler en met meer nadruk op de politieke carrière bezig zijn met het politiek vormen van hun leden, raakt aan deze ontwikkeling. De noodzaak om voor elke scenario voldoende goede kandidaten te hebben, de grotere nadruk van partijen op hun procedurele functies en de professionalisering van hun organisatie, en de toename in het aantal jonge Kamerleden kunnen hier allen aan bijgedragen hebben.

De implicaties van de bevindingen kunnen in de volgende vijf punten worden samengevat. (1) De toekomst van de meeste partijen ziet er, afgaande op hoe het gaat met de jongerenorganisaties, niet zo somber uit als verwacht. (2) Er is nog altijd een groep jongeren die er wel voor kiest om actief te zijn in een politieke partij. (3) De politisering van jongerenorganisaties leidt ertoe dat politieke partijen in toegenomen mate te maken hebben met pogingen tot inspraak van hun jongerenorganisatie. (4) De lage representativiteit en organisatiegraad van jongerenorganisaties roepen vraagtekens op over de kwaliteit van de belangenvertegenwoordiging en de gevolgen voor de diversiteit van toekomstige partijleden en politici. (5) De toegenomen aandacht voor politieke vaardigheden in de vorming van PJO-leden draagt bij aan de professionalisering van partijen en vergroot de kans op een toename van het aantal beroepspolitici.

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Curriculum Vitae

Charlotte Johanna de Roon (Heemstede, 25 March 1988) graduated from the Fioretti College in Lisse in 2006. She obtained a bachelor's degree in Psychology in 2009 as well as a *propaedeuse* in Public Administration in 2010 at Leiden University. She received a master's degree in Social & Organisational Psychology in 2011 and a master's degree in Public Administration (specialization: Politics & Bureaucracy) in 2012. During her studies, she worked at the homeless shelter in Leiden. From 2012 to 2018, she worked as a research associate at the Dual PhD Centre of Leiden University. She served as chair of the PhD Network Netherlands in 2015-2016, was elected as member of the University Council in 2016 and was appointed chair of the University Council from 2018 to 2022. Between 2014 and 2022 she was affiliated as an external PhD candidate with the Political Science department of the Faculty of Social Sciences of Leiden University.

